Ayn Rand's Steady-State Universe

8 hours ago, Boydstun said:

Do you agree with that view? 

I’ll believe it until someone shows me how cosmologists have come up with anything of practical use. The theoretical accomplishments are only theories, not real accomplishments, and can’t take us back to the singularity at the beginning of time, if it existed at all.

My guy below indicates that everything Kant argued for in the transcendental expositions of space and time checks out. (I’ll provide the argument for Time later.)

Space and time are forms of appearance in general, not real, and not the result of abstraction.

§ 3 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space

If space were merely a concept abstracted from experience, then geometric knowledge would not have its universal and necessary character. Empirical observations can show contingencies but cannot account for the certainty and necessity of geometric theorems. Geometry does not operate by happenstance.

   Thus, Kant concludes that our ability to make synthetic à priori judgments in geometry depends on the intuitive representation of Space, which exists independently of experience.

Argument Structure:

·         Premise 1: Geometry contains synthetic à priori judgments.
Premise 2: Such judgments require a form of intuition that is independent of experience to account for their universality and necessity.

·         Premise 3: Space provides the intuitive framework that makes geometry possible.

o    Conclusion: Therefore, Space must be an à priori intuition, not a concept derived from experience.

General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic (II)

1: Everything represented by an external sense is always a phenomenon.

2: A representation of the internal sense either need not be acknowledged or, if acknowledged, the self (as the object of that sense) can only be represented as a phenomenon, not as it would judge itself if its intuition were purely self-activity (intellectual).

3: Self-consciousness (apperception) is the simple representation of the self and does not automatically include the manifold of the subject.

4: In humans, self-consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is passively given, rather than arising from spontaneous activity.

5: Sensibility must affect the mind to produce an intuition of itself, and the form of this intuition (Time) determines how the manifold is represented.

Conclusion:

Therefore, the mind intuits itself not as it directly represents itself (intellectually or as a thing in itself), but according to how it is affected internally, appearing to itself as a phenomenon shaped by the form of Time.

This argument follows logically from the premises through the interplay of sensibility, form of intuition, and self-consciousness (apperception), to wit:

Premise 1 and 2 establish that all representations, whether of external or internal senses, are phenomena (appearances) rather than things in themselves. This sets the foundation that self-consciousness (apperception) must also be an appearance.

Premise 3 clarifies that self-consciousness (apperception) alone provides a simple awareness of the self but does not include the manifold (the variety of inner states or content) necessary for intuition. This implies that self-consciousness is not enough to provide a direct, intellectual representation of the self.

Premise 4 asserts that for humans, the manifold must be passively received through inner perception, rather than spontaneously produced. This reinforces the point that the self cannot represent itself as a purely intellectual, self-active being but must rely on how it is passively affected.

Premise 5 identifies that Time as the form of inner intuition organizes the manifold. Because this organization is determined by the form of Time, it shows that internal appearances are shaped by how the mind is affected, not by direct intellectual insight into the self. [Ed.]

The seer of the seen.

Aham Brahmasmi :slight_smile:

18 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

however, you did mention a “manifold” of experience to which the categories are applied by the synthetic unity of apperception.

No, not the Kantian meaning, just the common one: “many and various.”

Suppose that “existence exists” merely meant: “at least two things exist”. No talk about a universe, cosmos, multiverse or whatever. Could you jump from this modest claim to “the totality of everything is unborn, causeless, non-destructible”?

I’d say “yes”, even if the total number of entities was literaly two. They key lies in how you’d form the concepts “nothing” and “cause”.

In my understanding, you can form the concept “nothing” by observing an entity changing. When an entity “sheds its old skin” (form) and takes on a new one, I think: “that form turned to nothing.” So, nothingness never refers to the non-being of an entity, but only serves to differentiate what is currently true of an entity (actually, of its “ingredients”, since they can branch out into other entities), versus what used to be true about said entity.

The concept of “cause”, too, rests on observing an entity changing. You can look for the cause of a change, but only if there is a change – in the entity. Entities precede causes, not the other way around.

In order to draw these conclusions, the number of entities you observe is irrelevant. It could be two entities, or a googol entities. That’s the only thing my “city, country, planet, cosmos” example was hinting at. The amount of knowledge you need to verify both “existence exists” and its purported logical implications, is very small.

Now, let’s see how this could be applied to the Big Bang. If you concede my “entities first” conclusion, and conscientiously try to remain within its bounds, then the relationship between our current universe and the initial singularity is genetic, not causal. Where did the initial singularity dissapear? Well, answer this for me: in the case of the plant, where did the seed go, and in the case of the butterfly, where did the catterpillar go? I believe my analysis of “nothingness” shows how to answer this.

By the way, would you say that Kant’s conception of what metaphysics should be aligns, more or less, with your own? And is what Rand tried to accomplish in metaphysics even possible?

By the way, even Kant, who labored intensely at establishing the boundaries of our knowledge claims, simply took something as a given, with no need for further explanation: the thing-in-itself. Just like “nothingness” in Objectivism, Kant’s “noumenon” is not a positive, but a purely negative construct: that to which the categories have no applicability, or, what is left over after considering which things do fit into phenomenal experience. But he treats it as if it were a real existent (even ascribing it a name), which is indefensible on Critical grounds.

2 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

My guy below indicates that everything Kant argued for in the transcendental expositions of space and time checks out. (I’ll provide the argument for Time later.)

Space and time are forms of appearance in general, not real, and not the result of abstraction.

§ 3 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space

If space were merely a concept abstracted from experience, then geometric knowledge would not have its universal and necessary character. Empirical observations can show contingencies but cannot account for the certainty and necessity of geometric theorems. Geometry does not operate by happenstance.

   Thus, Kant concludes that our ability to make synthetic à priori judgments in geometry depends on the intuitive representation of Space, which exists independently of experience.

Argument Structure:

·         Premise 1: Geometry contains synthetic à priori judgments.
Premise 2: Such judgments require a form of intuition that is independent of experience to account for their universality and necessity.

·         Premise 3: Space provides the intuitive framework that makes geometry possible.

o    Conclusion: Therefore, Space must be an à priori intuition, not a concept derived from experience.

General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic (II)

1: Everything represented by an external sense is always a phenomenon.

2: A representation of the internal sense either need not be acknowledged or, if acknowledged, the self (as the object of that sense) can only be represented as a phenomenon, not as it would judge itself if its intuition were purely self-activity (intellectual).

3: Self-consciousness (apperception) is the simple representation of the self and does not automatically include the manifold of the subject.

4: In humans, self-consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is passively given, rather than arising from spontaneous activity.

5: Sensibility must affect the mind to produce an intuition of itself, and the form of this intuition (Time) determines how the manifold is represented.

Conclusion:

Therefore, the mind intuits itself not as it directly represents itself (intellectually or as a thing in itself), but according to how it is affected internally, appearing to itself as a phenomenon shaped by the form of Time.

This argument follows logically from the premises through the interplay of sensibility, form of intuition, and self-consciousness (apperception), to wit:

Premise 1 and 2 establish that all representations, whether of external or internal senses, are phenomena (appearances) rather than things in themselves. This sets the foundation that self-consciousness (apperception) must also be an appearance.

Premise 3 clarifies that self-consciousness (apperception) alone provides a simple awareness of the self but does not include the manifold (the variety of inner states or content) necessary for intuition. This implies that self-consciousness is not enough to provide a direct, intellectual representation of the self.

Premise 4 asserts that for humans, the manifold must be passively received through inner perception, rather than spontaneously produced. This reinforces the point that the self cannot represent itself as a purely intellectual, self-active being but must rely on how it is passively affected.

Premise 5 identifies that Time as the form of inner intuition organizes the manifold. Because this organization is determined by the form of Time, it shows that internal appearances are shaped by how the mind is affected, not by direct intellectual insight into the self. [Ed.]

Drat, it’s too late to edit out my obvious mistake. LOL! I mean to write “not physical” instead of “not real.”

I promise I’ll do better!

4 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

No, not the Kantian meaning, just the common one: “many and various.”

Suppose that “existence exists” merely meant: “at least two things exist”. No talk about a universe, cosmos, multiverse or whatever. Could you jump from this modest claim to “the totality of everything is unborn, causeless, non-destructible”?

I’d say “yes”, even if the total number of entities was literaly two. They key lies in how you’d form the concepts “nothing” and “cause”.

In my understanding, you can form the concept “nothing” by observing an entity changing. When an entity “sheds its old skin” (form) and takes on a new one, I think: “that form turned to nothing.” So, nothingness never refers to the non-being of an entity, but only serves to differentiate what is currently true of an entity (actually, of its “ingredients”, since they can branch out into other entities), versus what used to be true about said entity.

The concept of “cause”, too, rests on observing an entity changing. You can look for the cause of a change, but only if there is a change – in the entity. Entities precede causes, not the other way around.

In order to draw these conclusions, the number of entities you observe is irrelevant. It could be two entities, or a googol entities. That’s the only thing my “city, country, planet, cosmos” example was hinting at. The amount of knowledge you need to verify both “existence exists” and its purported logical implications, is very small.

Now, let’s see how this could be applied to the Big Bang. If you concede my “entities first” conclusion, and conscientiously try to remain within its bounds, then the relationship between our current universe and the initial singularity is genetic, not causal. Where did the initial singularity dissapear? Well, answer this for me: in the case of the plant, where did the seed go, and in the case of the butterfly, where did the catterpillar go? I believe my analysis of “nothingness” shows how to answer this.

By the way, would you say that Kant’s conception of what metaphysics should be aligns, more or less, with your own? And is what Rand tried to accomplish in metaphysics even possible?

By the way, even Kant, who labored intensely at establishing the boundaries of our knowledge claims, simply took something as a given, with no need for further explanation: the thing-in-itself. Just like “nothingness” in Objectivism, Kant’s “noumenon” is not a positive, but a purely negative construct: that to which the categories have no applicability, or, what is left over after considering which things do fit into phenomenal experience. But he treats it as if it were a real existent (even ascribing it a name), which is indefensible on Critical grounds.

Genetic? That would entail something like an Aristotelian efficient cause. Consider that in Physics II.1–2, Aristotle distinguished between nature (physis) and art/craft (techne). The efficient cause of the former is internal (an acorn), while the efficient cause of the latter is external (the sculptor of a bust of Caesar, and his tools). The acorn is genetically programmed to grow into an oak, given the correct external conditions (sunshine, water, minerals in the soil). Nature “programs” the acorn to grow into an oak, but did nature exist at the time of the singularity? What programmed the singularity to grow into the universe? And were any external factors involved with the singularity as there are with the acorn growing into an oak? Is the singularity a real thing? Or is it just a placeholder that makes the Big Bang theory work? Can we talk about genetics (in your use of the term) coherently with regard to the singularity? I have more questions than answers.

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Could you jump from this modest claim to “the totality of everything is unborn, causeless, non-destructible”?

That depends on the philosophy or physics or theory of the cosmos you choose to believe. If the universe is infinite and boundless, then you can’t speak coherently of a totality. “Infinity” isn’t a number, it’s a concept that resists being totaled. If, however, we only have two entities in the universe, we need more evidence to get from there to “unborn, causeless, and non-destructible.” Because “totality” isn’t a thing that you can attach attributes and actions, or even relations, to. Totality is a conceptual limit, not an ontological limit. The edge of the map (mental model) is not a place, it’s a limit. So we can’t get from “here” to “there” without committing a category error, a paralogism. And to resolve this, you will need to offer more evidence. And to get that evidence, you’d need what Kant calls intellectual intuition, that is, a god’s viewpoint to see the totality as a thing, to qualify the totality with the attribute of thingness. Apart from that, we are just “pretend” gods playing with words.

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By the way, would you say that Kant’s conception of what metaphysics should be aligns, more or less, with your own?

To leap from epistemic conditions to metaphysics is a short-cut to knowledge. That is, to alleged knowledge that confuses the map with the territory. Metaphysics is useless as a stand-alone science; it must be connected to something real, that is, connected to empirical grounds that substantiate it. Kant didn’t destroy metaphysics, although he was incorrectly called the Great Destroyer. He gave it boundaries by limiting it to the empirical (or phenomenal). That was the whole point of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction: not to destroy knowledge of reality and leave us only with illusions, but to show that the illusions are in a metaphysics not grounded in the empirical (phenomenal). He called this transcendental illusion.

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And is what Rand tried to accomplish in metaphysics even possible?

Practically speaking, a dogmatic metaphysics such as Rand’s is a magnet for skeptics. If all we had to do was declare axioms, then why didn’t philosophers for the last 2500 years think of that? Perhaps they did; perhaps some of them even attempted it. But the result would be “barbarians at the gates.”

The barbarians (skeptics) will respond, “Did Rand think to offer a secure foundation? It’s only certain to provide great confidence to its followers. But let’s see how confident they are after we knock the foundations out from underneath it.” But their confidence won’t be as easily undermined as the system itself, which stands on unfirm ground. Human nature demands that people continue to loudly and ever more steadfastly reaffirm their beliefs even as their mouths are being covered over by the quicksand they are (were) standing on, that appeared to be solid ground to the unwary.

I don’t believe that Rand intended to revive old-school metaphysics on solider ground. Not that you asked about this. She kept her metaphysics brief. The move from “A is A,” which is a logical construct, to its application as a metaphysical axiom was not given any intellectual warrant whatsoever. Rand simply asserted it. The ancient Greek law “A is A,” which originally said “A is A, and not-A is not-A” or the law of non-contradiction “A is not not-A” (Metaphysics, book Gamma), is about how we should think about things logically, and does not pretend to offer a theory about how things really are. Yes, really. Because, for Aristotle, this is not, at this point, about solving philosophical riddles, but providing the preconditions for doing philosophy at all. So for Aristotle, “A” can technically stand for anything you can imagine, although Aristotle intended “A is not not-A” to limit discussions of Being as such. For Rand, “A is A” is a metaphysical statement in which “A” is limited to the senses which she declared, without a positive proof, to be valid. Rand said that Aristotle brought the discussion back down to reality (“It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist”; “Definitions,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 52). But in fact, he limited it to thinking, at first. And this is why, for Aristotle, philosophy begins with logic, not metaphysics. She bypassed Aristotle’s call to apply “A is not not-A” to discussions about Being as such, and used it to assert her own truths.

 

 

 

 

5 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

By the way, even Kant, who labored intensely at establishing the boundaries of our knowledge claims, simply took something as a given, with no need for further explanation: the thing-in-itself. Just like “nothingness” in Objectivism, Kant’s “noumenon” is not a positive, but a purely negative construct: that to which the categories have no applicability, or, what is left over after considering which things do fit into phenomenal experience. But he treats it as if it were a real existent (even ascribing it a name), which is indefensible on Critical grounds.

Kant did give the “given” further explanation. The thing-in-itself stands as the cause of sensory perception, otherwise you are left with the idea that the senses are stimulated by nothing at all.

Critique of Pure Reason (Bxxvi, in the second edition Preface):

Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that
even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves,
we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves. For
otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an ap-
pearance without anything that appears.

The thing-in-itself is a real existent. It is the source of sensations. Kant is *thinking* of it as a thing-in-itself, but not *cognizing* it as a thing-in-itself because it (obviously) has no intuition. To be cognized means that the object must be given in intuition and then in concept. But the thing-in-itself is neither. So it is a thought-object which we ascribe reality to in general, not specifically as we do objects. So as general, it is not ascribed anything other than that something exists mind-independently as the source of sensations.

The thing-in-itself as a concept is not, however, only negative, as a limiting concept for metaphysics. It has a positive use. For when we speak of free-will, we do not merely say that it is free unto itself, but that it is also subject to empirical causes. In bifurcating thought (not reality) into two aspects, Kant can now say that free-will is truly free in the noumenal sense as a causeless self-cause, but also in the phenomenal sense as being subject to empirical causation, and to have both without contradiction.

Now if we were to assume that
the distinction between things as objects of experience and the very
same things as things in themselves, which our critique has made nec-
essary, were not made at all, then the principle of causality, and hence
the mechanism of nature in determining causality, would be valid of all
things in general as efficient causes. I would not be able to say of one
and the same thing, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free and yet that
it is simultaneously subject to natural necessity
, i.e., that it is not free,
without falling into an obvious contradiction..; (Bxxvi - Bxxvii).

Using this dual formulation, Kant is able to “have his cake and eat it too,” and by doing this he preserves the freedom of free-will from material coercion (“natural necessity”). Free-will, in the pure sense, is noumenal. Yet in other contexts, we can speak of free-will as subject to “natural necessity.” Morality (the subject of practical reason) must take free-will in the freest sense, noumenally. Jurisprudence, however, debates over whether the free-will of a suspect was affected by psychological or biological compulsions, phenomenally. 

 

2 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

Nature “programs” the acorn to grow into an oak, but did nature exist at the time of the singularity? What programmed the singularity to grow into the universe?

The initial singularity is hypothesized to have been an undifferentiated unity. This is different from Nature, which is a system of interlocking existents. So, as you’d expect, the laws that apply to a multiplicity collapse in the context of a singularity. No Kantian categories or “contemporary” physical laws, I’m afraid.

Actions imply an actor. But the existence of the actor is not chronologically prior to its actions, but rather existentially prior. The act of the singularity was to “break” into a multiplicity. The singularity preceded this act, not chronologically, but existentially. This is why it’s so hard to conceptualize.

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Kant did give the “given” further explanation. The thing-in-itself stands as the cause of sensory perception, otherwise you are left with the idea that the senses are stimulated by nothing at all.

Kant denied that categories can be applied to the thing-in-itself, while also applying the category of cause-effect to the thing-in-itself. This kind of awkwardness is inevitable. To quote Jacobi, “I could not enter into the system without the assumption of the concept of the thing-in-itself and, on the other hand, I could not remain in it with this concept.” (Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, p. 304)

3 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

The initial singularity is hypothesized to have been an undifferentiated unity. This is different from Nature, which is a system of interlocking existents. So, as you’d expect, the laws that apply to a multiplicity collapse in the context of a singularity. No Kantian categories or “contemporary” physical laws, I’m afraid.

Actions imply an actor. But the existence of the actor is not chronologically prior to its actions, but rather existentially prior. The act of the singularity was to “break” into a multiplicity. The singularity preceded this act, not chronologically, but existentially. This is why it’s so hard to conceptualize.

Kant denied that categories can be applied to the thing-in-itself, while also applying the category of cause-effect to the thing-in-itself. This kind of awkwardness is inevitable. To quote Jacobi, “I could not enter into the system without the assumption of the concept of the thing-in-itself and, on the other hand, I could not remain in it with this concept.” (Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, p. 304)

I don’t have much to say about singularities preceding the Big Bang. You say it’s hypothesized, so I’ll leave it to those who do the hypothesizing.

We can apply categories to the thing-in-itself – in thought. But we can’t cognize the thing-in-itself. Such cognition, if it were possible to us, would involve taking it up into consciousness without senses. For example, this would involve seeing a red rose without the redness, which would involve seeing it without light, or perhaps without eyes. You’d have to have some kind of psychic powers.

As i said above, it’s a matter of thinking of it versus cognizing it. Cognition of appearances is automatic, or as Kant said, spontaneous (and receptive). We don’t have to think it up. 

“So it is a thought-object which we ascribe reality to in general, not specifically as we do objects. So as general, it is not ascribed anything other than that something exists mind-independently as the source of sensations.”

That’s how we think of the thing-in-itself, but we don’t cognize it because we can’t. The thing-in-itself is just the general idea of mind-independent things that cause sensation. That sentence is not a cognition, that is a thought. “Red rose” is the thought of a mind-independent thing that causes the sensation of redness and whatever other sensory data we use to identify a rose. “Red rose” is not a cognition of the rose, it is a thought only. The red rose itself, once cognized, is an experience. At this point, the rose has been sensed as color, shaped in space, categorized by concepts, and schematized in time. This is a cognized experience, not a thought.

As a caveat, you will find translations of the original German confusing the matter, which certainly doesn’t help. But the way I’ve described the distinction between cognition and thought is, I believe, the best way to interpret Kant’s text. And, to go against Rand’s preference for old things, the older translations/interpretations are the worst and are to be avoided.

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To quote Jacobi, “I could not enter into the system without the assumption of the concept of the thing-in-itself and, on the other hand, I could not remain in it with this concept.” (Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, p. 304)

I can also quote thinkers who don’t understand Kant. And I can quote some who do. Those are the ones I learned from, and not only from books. I engaged with them personally. Jacobi didn’t have the benefit of access to a nice English translation of the CPR circa 1983 as I did. He was burdened with the task of reading the ghastly German original before anybody had a clue as to what Kant was trying to say. So someone’s opinion about this work in 1785 doesn’t matter anymore except historically. As time goes by, you see comprehension dawning across people’s faces; slowly, but it’s there.

I meant 1996, not 1983.

Critique of Pure Reason: Annotated and Simplified by Cave_Dweller

For @KyaryPamyu

21 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

No, not the Kantian meaning, just the common one: “many and various.”

Suppose that “existence exists” merely meant: “at least two things exist”. No talk about a universe, cosmos, multiverse or whatever. Could you jump from this modest claim to “the totality of everything is unborn, causeless, non-destructible”?

I’d say “yes”, even if the total number of entities was literaly two. They key lies in how you’d form the concepts “nothing” and “cause”.

In my understanding, you can form the concept “nothing” by observing an entity changing. When an entity “sheds its old skin” (form) and takes on a new one, I think: “that form turned to nothing.” So, nothingness never refers to the non-being of an entity, but only serves to differentiate what is currently true of an entity (actually, of its “ingredients”, since they can branch out into other entities), versus what used to be true about said entity.

The concept of “cause”, too, rests on observing an entity changing. You can look for the cause of a change, but only if there is a change – in the entity. Entities precede causes, not the other way around.

In order to draw these conclusions, the number of entities you observe is irrelevant. It could be two entities, or a googol entities. That’s the only thing my “city, country, planet, cosmos” example was hinting at. The amount of knowledge you need to verify both “existence exists” and its purported logical implications, is very small.

Now, let’s see how this could be applied to the Big Bang. If you concede my “entities first” conclusion, and conscientiously try to remain within its bounds, then the relationship between our current universe and the initial singularity is genetic, not causal. Where did the initial singularity dissapear? Well, answer this for me: in the case of the plant, where did the seed go, and in the case of the butterfly, where did the catterpillar go? I believe my analysis of “nothingness” shows how to answer this.

By the way, would you say that Kant’s conception of what metaphysics should be aligns, more or less, with your own? And is what Rand tried to accomplish in metaphysics even possible?

By the way, even Kant, who labored intensely at establishing the boundaries of our knowledge claims, simply took something as a given, with no need for further explanation: the thing-in-itself. Just like “nothingness” in Objectivism, Kant’s “noumenon” is not a positive, but a purely negative construct: that to which the categories have no applicability, or, what is left over after considering which things do fit into phenomenal experience. But he treats it as if it were a real existent (even ascribing it a name), which is indefensible on Critical grounds.

Reconstructed Syllogism:

Premise 1 : “Existence exists” means at least two entities exist.

Premise 2 : The concept of “nothing” is derived from observing change in entities; what was is no longer, and this is interpreted as “nothingness.”

Premise 3 : The concept of “cause” is also derived from observing change in entities; entities precede causes.

Premise 4 : These concepts (“nothing” and “cause”) are purely intra-entity or intra-manifold concepts—they do not require knowledge of the whole or its origin.

Premise 5 : The number of entities is irrelevant; concepts like “cause” and “nothing” apply regardless of quantity.

Conclusion 1 (intermediate): Therefore, a totality (e.g., the universe or existence itself) is not caused but simply changes form. Its previous state is not caused by something else; it is a transformation.

Conclusion 2 : Therefore, the totality of everything is unborn, causeless, and indestructible.


❖ Analysis of the Error:

:warning: Category Mistake (Reification of the Totality)

The biggest leap occurs between Premises 1–5 and Conclusion 2. The argument shifts from intra-manifold reasoning about entities (where “cause” and “nothing” apply) to a claim about the totality as a whole —as if the entire manifold could itself be treated like one of the things within it.

This is a category error : the concept of causality is grounded in how we experience relations within the manifold (phenomena). Extending this framework to the totality itself commits the same mistake Kant criticizes in the cosmological antinomy: applying categories like cause to the whole as if it were an object among objects.


:warning: Fallacy of Composition

The move from the fact that entities undergo change without vanishing into “nothing” to the conclusion that the entire totality is unborn and indestructible relies on assuming what is true of parts must be true of the whole. But the whole (the totality of existence) is not simply another entity—it’s the condition of all entities.


:warning: Equivocation on “Nothing”

The term “nothing” is defined here in a purely epistemic or linguistic way (“form becomes nothing”), but then the argument uses this interpretation to exclude real ontological absence. This equivocation slips from a phenomenological or conceptual shift (“that property is no longer true”) to a metaphysical claim (“nothingness doesn’t exist”), which the argument doesn’t actually prove.


❖ Summary:

The key error lies in this leap:

Because all change is within entities, and nothing ever “becomes nothing,” therefore the totality itself must be unborn and indestructible.

That step illegitimately treats existence as a whole as if it were a thing like its parts—subject to the same rules. It also neglects that to speak of the totality as a concept is not the same as grasping it in reality.

Kant (and many others) would warn: You cannot infer metaphysical properties of the totality from epistemic reflections about how we use concepts within experience.

 

17 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

[Kant:] Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears.

There he goes again, talking about object s and thing s , as if a plurality (a category of the phenomenal realm) applied to the noumenon.

We are always aware of one thing only, and that is ourselves. If you don’t believe me, try covering your eyes with your palms and observe what’s around your room. If you can’t see anything, it’s because your awareness is directed at nothing other than the affectations of your human body. Echoing the “What is it like to be a bat?” thought experiment, you are permanently stuck in “what it’s like to be this body” mode.

The body is the primordial “Object-as-such”, before it gets schematized in time and space as a multiplicity. Just as I cannot think of my hand as something that could be abstracted from the arm to which it is joined, I cannot think of my body as something that could be abstracted from the total system of Nature.

Consciousness of myself consists in a sentient principle, as well as something that is sensed (the body). Togheter, they are the two terms of self-consciousness, the subject and the object.


Consider the difference between thinking of geocentrism as a theory belonging to someone else (let’s say to the people of antiquity and the Middle Ages) and directly thinking that “the earth is the center of the world”. 

If you were to truly think that the earth is central, but afterwards you discovered that this is false, you would no longer be able to think this error for real, but henceforth only as a thinking that belongs to your past self or to other people – in any event, not to your “I”.

In the same way, when the intellect (qua act) thinks about itself, it discovers that it erred in treating a formed thought as if it were identical with the process which formed it. By the same law as before, a separation takes place between the “I” and the error.

Kant asked what conditions must obtain in order for the unity of self-consciousness to be possible. His answer was that we must be able to differentiate between the I that does the thinking and the object that we think about. But he did not see that the “I” that does the thinking is also the “I” being thought about. This discovery was made by Fichte and elaborated by German Idealism.

Next Kant needs to explain how we are able to differentiate between the subjective and objective elements of experience. His answer is that a representation is objective when the subject is necessitated in representing the object in a certain way, that is, when it is not up to the free associative powers of my imagination to determine how I represent it. . .

In order for a representational content to be necessitated in this way, according to Kant, is for it to be subject to a “rule.” The relevant rules that Kant has in mind are the conditions something must satisfy in order for it to be represented as an object at all. And these conditions are precisely the concepts laid down in the schema of the categories, which are the concepts of an “object in general.” Hence, if I am to have experience at all, I must conceptualize objects in terms of the a priori categories. (IEP)

This is why I said that Kant cannot account for the noumenon. I understand he was weary of being called an illusionist or Berkleyan idealist or whatever, but really, it’s irrelevant whether the noumenon is the thinking intellect itself, or a mind-independent X, or something else entirely. The only thing that matters is how an Object as such and in general must be represented in a way that guarantees the apperceptive unity.

My opinion stands, namely that Kant took what is true of the phenomenal realm (a material body being causally affected by a plurality of objects) and illicitly “copied” it to the noumenon. This noumenon, which you call a “real existent”, is a mere arbitrary presupposition. It is not compatible with the critical method, and flies in the face of what it sets out to accomplish.

I applaud you for creating your own edition of one of humanity’s cornerstone intellectual achievements. I am curious to read through your annotations.

1 hour ago, Cave_Dweller said:

 


❖ Summary:

The key error lies in this leap:

Because all change is within entities, and nothing ever “becomes nothing,” therefore the totality itself must be unborn and indestructible.

 

But it is false that things within the universe never become nothing. Become two gamma rays, an electron and positron have ceased to exist. You and I were nothing while Thomas Paine was urging independence among the American colonies, and we shall, as us, cease to exist when we die (when our brains have ceased operations). 

One could as well generalize to the whole of existence and its temporality that it will cease to exist. From the philosopher’s-chair viewpoint. Other lines of argument have been mustered for and against the eternity of the universe.*

Or we can cease all forms of research on the question, following Kant’s shrinkage of the competence of human reason and go with “How do I know? The Bible tells me so.” (Dorthea Frede once remarked at a seminar that that was part of the popularity of Kant in the succeeding pulpits of Germany.) Kant’s antinomies should be rebutted, I say, and from our contemporary context of scientific knowledge. I might get to that, but I’m elderly, and I first need to closely renew acquaintance with the parts of Kant pertinent to completing his part in my studies Metaphysics and Geometry and Space Not Relative to Its Discernment. 

18 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

 

[Rand’s] move from “A is A,” which is a logical construct, to its application as a metaphysical axiom was not given any intellectual warrant whatsoever. Rand simply asserted it. The ancient Greek law “A is A,” which originally said “A is A, and not-A is not-A” or the law of non-contradiction “A is not not-A” (Metaphysics, book Gamma), is about how we should think about things logically, and does not pretend to offer a theory about how things really are. Yes, really. Because, for Aristotle, this is not, at this point, about solving philosophical riddles, but providing the preconditions for doing philosophy at all. So for Aristotle, “A” can technically stand for anything you can imagine, although Aristotle intended “A is not not-A” to limit discussions of Being as such. For Rand, “A is A” is a metaphysical statement in which “A” is limited to the senses which she declared, without a positive proof, to be valid. Rand said that Aristotle brought the discussion back down to reality (“It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist”; “Definitions,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 52). But in fact, he limited it to thinking, at first. And this is why, for Aristotle, philosophy begins with logic, not metaphysics. She bypassed Aristotle’s call to apply “A is not not-A” to discussions about Being as such, and used it to assert her own truths.

 

The definitive work within the Objectivist philosophy on direct realism in perception is David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses. Like Kant and Russell, he argues for the inerrancy of the senses (Kant: because the senses do not judge). Rand had mentioned that she had not composed a defense of the validity of the senses. Kelley provided it (1986). For the philosophy readers more generally, Kelley’s direct-realism book has been overshadowed by the direct-realism of A.D. Smith’s Problem of Perception (2002), which resorts to a modern einstoff instead of Kelley’s existence.

Ettienne Gilson wrote vigorously against the fashion raging in Catholic philosophy trying to cast Aquinas in a Kantian frame. Rand read some Gilson in the 1940’s, and it could very well be that through him she began to shed what esteem she earlier had for Kant (in the original We the Living)* and locate her own philosophy being developed (as in Atlas Shrugged) as antipode of Kant and as extended from Aristotle (an antipode to Kant).

I think you are casting Aristotle as too close and customized a prelude to Kant, including Kant’s views on Aristotle’s logic and more recent conceptions of logic.*

Aristotle mentioned the thought that a thing is itself, in the merely substitutional sense, as is usually meant today in saying ‘A is A’. He rated that proposition as perfectly useless. He thought sensible the idea that a thing is always something(s) specific, which is part of what Rand includes in saying ‘A is A,’ such as when she stressed 'Man is man."

Leibniz, Kant, and Rand realized that PNC rides on the fact of identity for any sensible thing. 'Existence is Identity" for Rand, meaning that an identity is required of any purported thing to be an existent. I say that Arsitotle’s stress on PNC in Metaphysics is inconsistent with how he had gone about validating the syllogistic inferences in Prior Analytics. The latter relies on identity directly, not indirectly via PNC. Rand’s definition of logic as “the art of non-contradictory identification” fails to set her own version of identity in its rightful fundamental place for deductive inference. Today we go also to identity directly in the inferences by mathematical induction. 

This post may be an appropriate place to mention to you, Cave Dweller, that Rand’s “existence” is a circumscribed type of “being”. Existence for Rand (or me) is qualified being, their being no such thing as unqualified being.

I would also like to mention that I’m glad you have joined us here.

1 hour ago, KyaryPamyu said:

There he goes again, talking about object s and thing s , as if a plurality (a category of the phenomenal realm) applied to the noumenon.

We are always aware of one thing only, and that is ourselves. If you don’t believe me, try covering your eyes with your palms and observe what’s around your room. If you can’t see anything, it’s because your awareness is directed at nothing other than the affectations of your human body. Echoing the “What is it like to be a bat?” thought experiment, you are permanently stuck in “what it’s like to be this body” mode.

The body is the primordial “Object-as-such”, before it gets schematized in time and space as a multiplicity. Just as I cannot think of my hand as something that could be abstracted from the arm to which it is joined, I cannot think of my body as something that could be abstracted from the total system of Nature.

Consciousness of myself consists in a sentient principle, as well as something that is sensed (the body). Togheter, they are the two terms of self-consciousness, the subject and the object.


Consider the difference between thinking of geocentrism as a theory belonging to someone else (let’s say to the people of antiquity and the Middle Ages) and directly thinking that “the earth is the center of the world”. 

If you were to truly think that the earth is central, but afterwards you discovered that this is false, you would no longer be able to think this error for real, but henceforth only as a thinking that belongs to your past self or to other people – in any event, not to your “I”.

In the same way, when the intellect (qua act) thinks about itself, it discovers that it erred in treating a formed thought as if it were identical with the process which formed it. By the same law as before, a separation takes place between the “I” and the error.

Kant asked what conditions must obtain in order for the unity of self-consciousness to be possible. His answer was that we must be able to differentiate between the I that does the thinking and the object that we think about. But he did not see that the “I” that does the thinking is also the “I” being thought about. This discovery was made by Fichte and elaborated by German Idealism.

Next Kant needs to explain how we are able to differentiate between the subjective and objective elements of experience. His answer is that a representation is objective when the subject is necessitated in representing the object in a certain way, that is, when it is not up to the free associative powers of my imagination to determine how I represent it. . .

In order for a representational content to be necessitated in this way, according to Kant, is for it to be subject to a “rule.” The relevant rules that Kant has in mind are the conditions something must satisfy in order for it to be represented as an object at all. And these conditions are precisely the concepts laid down in the schema of the categories, which are the concepts of an “object in general.” Hence, if I am to have experience at all, I must conceptualize objects in terms of the a priori categories. (IEP)

This is why I said that Kant cannot account for the noumenon. I understand he was weary of being called an illusionist or Berkleyan idealist or whatever, but really, it’s irrelevant whether the noumenon is the thinking intellect itself, or a mind-independent X, or something else entirely. The only thing that matters is how an Object as such and in general must be represented in a way that guarantees the apperceptive unity.

My opinion stands, namely that Kant took what is true of the phenomenal realm (a material body being causally affected by a plurality of objects) and illicitly “copied” it to the noumenon. This noumenon, which you call a “real existent”, is a mere arbitrary presupposition. It is not compatible with the critical method, and flies in the face of what it sets out to accomplish.

I applaud you for creating your own edition of one of humanity’s cornerstone intellectual achievements. I am curious to read through your annotations.

Thank you for the nice round of applause. I really appreciate it. Now if only I can find a publisher.

What you said at the top is why I usually say it as “thing-in-itself.” However, it is no more a risk to apply the category of Plurality to “things-in-themselves” than it is to apply the category of Unity, Totality, or Causality to “thing-in-itself.” It is to apply a category only in thought, and not as part of Kant’s analysis of the transcendental unity of apperception, which is applied to the manifold. The thing-in-itself has no manifold. So it seems to be some kind of illegal maneuver. But it isn’t, because thinking that mind-independent things have thingness doesn’t pose a risk of entering into metaphysical discussions over it. Just the opposite. I can think of them as things imaginatively, but only for the purpose of giving something for our sensations to “attach” to beyond us, and only in general, not to make any ontological claims. Those claims are the problem that Kant was contending with in the CPR. It is not, therefore, to create antinomies and paralogisms to simply state that something out there is the cause of sensations, no matter how many categories I attach to it. And anyway, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to speak of something without referring to it as some thing. So you’re technically casting Kant into a quandary of identifying something while avoiding identifying it, as when the Knights Who Say Ni turn out to have a strong aversion to hearing the word “it.”

Perhaps the best way to distinguish this is to say that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate source of sensations. While the product of consciousness itself, the experience, is determinate. Kant thinks about the thing-in-itself in general, without identifying any of the objects there. They remain the indeterminate source of external sensations, and nothing more can be said about them in the empirical sense.

It is far less of a risk than applying Causality (internally or externally) or Unity to the universe as a whole in an attempt to derive some version of cosmology. Both seem to stretch the use of categories beyond their limits. But Kant is not trying to invent any theory about the universe by saying that something must cause the first sense impressions. He is simply saying that X is the indeterminate cause, the indeterminate source, and the indeterminate origin of experiences. On the other hand, if Kant didn’t deal with this at all, he would be charged with Berkeleyian idealism. Saying “I can’t know what the cause is, but something must be the cause of sense-impressions,” is far different from saying ‘I know the universe has a cause or a genetic origin,’ or the opposite, that “I know the universe is causeless and eternal.” The former, about the thing-in-itself, is a mere positing, while the latter is a theory in its own right. And the minimalist positing in the former leads to no significant metaphysical conclusion. In other words, positing a source for sensation is not to make any metaphysical commitment. It does not exceed Kant’s own boundaries, while doing so led old-school metaphysicians to all kinds of wild claims. 

Or to put it even more simply, placing an X as a placeholder for the source of sensations is not in the same category as a theory of cosmology. Because the X is a transcendental object, while the universe as a whole was being treated as an empirical object. The X exists only in theory as a boundary concept. And as a transcendental object, there is no danger in applying forms and categories to it. Physicists apply space/time (not exactly the same as formal space and time) to the transcendental object all the time without concern with breaching any intellectual boundaries, as long as they remain on the level of theory and avoid drawing any solid metaphysical conclusions, but only speculative ones.

The thing-in-itself is a “real existent,” but that goes nowhere near to identifying what it is. It remains indeterminate while being considered only as the mind-independent source of sensations.

Unlike Kant, I don’t equate the thing-in-itself, an X, with the noumenon which involves metaphysical theories about the thing-in-itself. The latter leads to antinomies by the application of categories to Ideas: God, the universe, free-will, and simplicity, in an attempt to determine the Truth of some idea only in theory, while skipping over the necessary step of empirical identification and empirical evidence. For example, science (properly) does not study universes, only things within the universe. Because the universe as a whole is not empirically identifiable, which process begins externally to the object of study. In medicine, we see how a living being behaves externally before we proceed to dissect it, to study it from the inside. We cannot, however, get outside of the universe to see how it behaves. The universe, therefore, can’t be treated like any other determinable empirical object because it absolutely broaches the limits of man’s perception.

14 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

Critique of Pure Reason: Annotated and Simplified by Cave_Dweller

For @KyaryPamyu

To your Introduction should be added the translation by Pluhar (Hackett), which is fantastic in its notes and its Index.

You might like to include a comparison along the way with Bird’s The Revolutionary Kant. Also, papers in The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 

@Cave_Dweller, Rand (and I and Spinoza too) reject the idea of things-in-themselves as things as they are. The idea of things-in-themselves was around before Kant. And insofar as it drifts into the idea of things apart from any relations to things not itself, it is nothing. Things as they are stand in relations to things not themselves. The totality of existents stands in relations to only its parts and its past and future, I’d say.

1 hour ago, Boydstun said:

To your Introduction should be added the translation by Pluhar (Hackett), which is fantastic in its notes and its Index.

You might like to include a comparison along the way with Bird’s The Revolutionary Kant. Also, papers in The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 

That’s a great idea. I have the Pluhar translation within arm’s reach as I type this. I also considered writing a companion work, but not a comparison work, because my annotations while good aren’t sufficient. Too many tiny fonts to read, and the footnotes are disconnected from each other.

 ‘of’ , not ‘in’ ? (the universe)