4 hours ago, Boydstun said:
But it is false that things within the universe never become nothing. Become two gamma rays, an electron and positron have ceased to exist. You and I were nothing while Thomas Paine was urging independence among the American colonies, and we shall, as us, cease to exist when we die (when our brains have ceased operations).
One could as well generalize to the whole of existence and its temporality that it will cease to exist. From the philosopher’s-chair viewpoint. Other lines of argument have been mustered for and against the eternity of the universe.*
Or we can cease all forms of research on the question, following Kant’s shrinkage of the competence of human reason and go with “How do I know? The Bible tells me so.” (Dorthea Frede once remarked at a seminar that that was part of the popularity of Kant in the succeeding pulpits of Germany.) Kant’s antinomies should be rebutted, I say, and from our contemporary context of scientific knowledge. I might get to that, but I’m elderly, and I first need to closely renew acquaintance with the parts of Kant pertinent to completing his part in my studies Metaphysics and Geometry and Space Not Relative to Its Discernment.
The statement “nothing ever becomes nothing” relates back to Rand saying that things change their form but they don’t cease to exist altogether. Their elements remain, either as disconnected from the whole or joined into another whole so that the original loses its identity. Her and Peikoff’s error was to slide from that true statement about things to making a larger statement about the universe as a whole. The reason they made that error? It’s the same error was made by the ancient Greek cosmologists, although they took it another step: they did not stop and consider making the transcendental distinction, which separates what is, from our perspective, from what might actually be. The “what is” of identity can’t be so deftly collapsed into a single axiom without considering first that the “what is” for us might not be identical to “what actually is.” Many, perhaps dozens, of illusions have been made showing that our experience of things doesn’t necessarily match what the thing is. I’m talking about raw experience, not the thought that goes into analyzing it. But the most realistic illusion is the moon illusion, which shows that the full moon we see on the horizon appears larger than the same full moon at zenith. It’s easy enough to reason out that the moon hasn’t changed in size, and that it is only our perspective that has changed. But this doesn’t change the fact that the illusion exists.
A far more difficult task lay in resolving the contradictory apparent motions of the cosmos surrounding the Earth. Even Aristotle made a geocentric model, and he didn’t seem to notice that two of those points of light in the sky behave differently. I guess it was easy to overlook just those two exceptions in a crowd of thousands.
One could as well generalize from making statements about the empirical realm to the universe as a whole, although “leap” is a more relevant word than “generalize.” But those empirical statements contain epistemic rules for making valid statements on the empirical level, and they lack limitations. There has to be a way to correctly say “that too is empirical” without simply asserting it. The book is empirical, the desk is empirical, the chair is empirical. These contain certain commonalities in their concepts. But can I rightly say, “The universe is empirical”? Or is that too much of a stretch? I agree we can consider it as empirical, only not in a serious sense.
We can apply correctly the category of totality to the universe, but does that lend it the thingness it would require to be discussed in an empirical sense?
No. We can apply categories to God, but that doesn’t change God into an empirical object. As someone once said, “You can’t just define God into existence.” The same holds true of the cosmos: “You can’t simply categorize the universe into thingness.” The reason is that experience of things, for Kant, requires both intuition and understanding, forms and concepts. The universe as a whole cannot be intuited, even indirectly. We have a manifold of sensations given to the imagination and understanding, but our manifold of the universe is incomplete, and absolutely so, because we can never intuit the whole thing. For cosmology, the manifold given over to the understanding via imagination consists only of an estimate of what we suppose the whole must look like, in general. We deny it spatiality, but we grant it temporality, as we must do with things produced by the mind. So we don’t say that the universe is in space, but that somehow it must obey the rules that form the temporal aspect of the empirical manifold in general.
The competence of human reason is denied complete knowledge of these things, but it is granted incomplete knowledge. It is also granted a horizon of sorts, which leads us on a quest to discover what lies just beyond that horizon, and refuses to allow us to settle comfortably into our dogmatic easy-chair. Reason is limited, yet always striving.
