Ayn Rand's Steady-State Universe

4 hours ago, Boydstun said:

But it is false that things within the universe never become nothing. Become two gamma rays, an electron and positron have ceased to exist. You and I were nothing while Thomas Paine was urging independence among the American colonies, and we shall, as us, cease to exist when we die (when our brains have ceased operations). 

One could as well generalize to the whole of existence and its temporality that it will cease to exist. From the philosopher’s-chair viewpoint. Other lines of argument have been mustered for and against the eternity of the universe.*

Or we can cease all forms of research on the question, following Kant’s shrinkage of the competence of human reason and go with “How do I know? The Bible tells me so.” (Dorthea Frede once remarked at a seminar that that was part of the popularity of Kant in the succeeding pulpits of Germany.) Kant’s antinomies should be rebutted, I say, and from our contemporary context of scientific knowledge. I might get to that, but I’m elderly, and I first need to closely renew acquaintance with the parts of Kant pertinent to completing his part in my studies Metaphysics and Geometry and Space Not Relative to Its Discernment. 

The statement “nothing ever becomes nothing” relates back to Rand saying that things change their form but they don’t cease to exist altogether. Their elements remain, either as disconnected from the whole or joined into another whole so that the original loses its identity. Her and Peikoff’s error was to slide from that true statement about things to making a larger statement about the universe as a whole. The reason they made that error? It’s the same error was made by the ancient Greek cosmologists, although they took it another step: they did not stop and consider making the transcendental distinction, which separates what is, from our perspective, from what might actually be. The “what is” of identity can’t be so deftly collapsed into a single axiom without considering first that the “what is” for us might not be identical to “what actually is.” Many, perhaps dozens, of illusions have been made showing that our experience of things doesn’t necessarily match what the thing is. I’m talking about raw experience, not the thought that goes into analyzing it. But the most realistic illusion is the moon illusion, which shows that the full moon we see on the horizon appears larger than the same full moon at zenith. It’s easy enough to reason out that the moon hasn’t changed in size, and that it is only our perspective that has changed. But this doesn’t change the fact that the illusion exists.

A far more difficult task lay in resolving the contradictory apparent motions of the cosmos surrounding the Earth. Even Aristotle made a geocentric model, and he didn’t seem to notice that two of those points of light in the sky behave differently. I guess it was easy to overlook just those two exceptions in a crowd of thousands.

One could as well generalize from making statements about the empirical realm to the universe as a whole, although “leap” is a more relevant word than “generalize.” But those empirical statements contain epistemic rules for making valid statements on the empirical level, and they lack limitations. There has to be a way to correctly say “that too is empirical” without simply asserting it. The book is empirical, the desk is empirical, the chair is empirical. These contain certain commonalities in their concepts. But can I rightly say, “The universe is empirical”? Or is that too much of a stretch? I agree we can consider it as empirical, only not in a serious sense.

We can apply correctly the category of totality to the universe, but does that lend it the thingness it would require to be discussed in an empirical sense?

No. We can apply categories to God, but that doesn’t change God into an empirical object. As someone once said, “You can’t just define God into existence.” The same holds true of the cosmos: “You can’t simply categorize the universe into thingness.” The reason is that experience of things, for Kant, requires both intuition and understanding, forms and concepts. The universe as a whole cannot be intuited, even indirectly. We have a manifold of sensations given to the imagination and understanding, but our manifold of the universe is incomplete, and absolutely so, because we can never intuit the whole thing. For cosmology, the manifold given over to the understanding via imagination consists only of an estimate of what we suppose the whole must look like, in general. We deny it spatiality, but we grant it temporality, as we must do with things produced by the mind. So we don’t say that the universe is in space, but that somehow it must obey the rules that form the temporal aspect of the empirical manifold in general.

The competence of human reason is denied complete knowledge of these things, but it is granted incomplete knowledge. It is also granted a horizon of sorts, which leads us on a quest to discover what lies just beyond that horizon, and refuses to allow us to settle comfortably into our dogmatic easy-chair. Reason is limited, yet always striving.

4 hours ago, Boydstun said:

This post may be an appropriate place to mention to you, Cave Dweller, that Rand’s “existence” is a circumscribed type of “being”. Existence for Rand (or me) is qualified being, their being no such thing as unqualified being.

I would also like to mention that I’m glad you have joined us here.

Thank you for saying that. I’ve enjoyed my time here so far.

I’m having a hard time understanding qualified versus unqualified Being. I believe you’re saying that there is no distinction in Objectivism between an appearance (qualified Being) and a thing in itself (unqualified Being). Of course, Rand will reject some dichotomies (while accepting others). The problem is that Kant wasn’t distinguishing between two types of Being, qualified vs. unqualified or anything like that. The preconditions for cognition aren’t even at that level of thought yet, they are a priori to it. The Aesthetic isn’t concerned with Being, but with the transcendental conditions that make the rest possible. The situation here involves Being’s proper categorization as a metaphysical concern vs. Kant’s concern with the conditions that make such discussions possible at all. So what you’re saying doesn’t directly engage with Kant’s project. You moved beyond it to simply declare that unqualified being doesn’t exist and that qualified being is all that exists.

49 minutes ago, Cave_Dweller said:

. . . The Aesthetic isn’t concerned with Being, but with the transcendental conditions that make the rest possible. The situation here involves Being’s proper categorization as a metaphysical concern vs. Kant’s concern with the conditions that make such discussions possible at all. So what you’re saying doesn’t directly engage with Kant’s project. You moved beyond it to simply declare that unqualified being doesn’t exist and that qualified being is all that exists.

I was not raising the qualified/unqualified being in regard to Kant, but the history before and after him. He mentioned that ding-an-sich has definite character, whatever, unknown to us, that might be (besides being the ground of sensory experience). Talk of conditions that make something possible, such as common knowledge or science, in fact relies on what is learned empirically (cf. Kuhn’s SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE IN GERMANY 1768–1800). To go all a priori about it is a form of the the traditional and valid philosophy reflection on what presupposes what. But one does not need to think of the concepts as not from experience to carry out that project. The arguments for the non-existence of unqualified being consists in checking each category-division of Rand’s (or my different category-division) and showing that denial of any of those categories as applied to some existent leads to self-contradiction. Then Rand has her cashing of Existence is Identity, which is the thesis that being is only qualified being, by the showing that any existent must be entity, attribute, action, or relationship or some combination thereof, which are qualifications. 

4 hours ago, Boydstun said:

@Cave_Dweller, Rand (and I and Spinoza too) reject the idea of things-in-themselves as things as they are. The idea of things-in-themselves was around before Kant. And insofar as it drifts into the idea of things apart from any relations to things not itself, it is nothing. Things as they are stand in relations to things not themselves. The totality of existents stands in relations to only its parts and its past and future, I’d say.

You certainly have the right to reject these ideas. But it’s best to do so on their own grounds. To take them up and critique them within their own context not only respects the original ideas, it more profoundly brings them to their knees, because it shows that you understand the context and did not need to ignore that context as one religion does to a competing religion. This is extremely true, however, when atheists criticize the New Testament out of context with the OT, and vice versa, when in fact the whole of Biblical history is joined together and intertwined.

In this respect, Kant didn’t intend anybody to take the thing-in-itself literally, as something unknowable standing off in a realm by itself. Kant was not doing ontology, he was doing critique, which attempts to uncover the a priori foundations of experience and knowledge. By taking Kant literally, you’re planting his critique on empirical grounds when it should remain on transcendental grounds, as a way to limit the tendencies of metaphysicians to claim knowledge beyond reason’s capacity. So by knocking down the idea of the thing-in-itself, you’re giving implicit permission for philosophers to wreak all kinds of metaphysical havoc. Rand’s axioms - which are really just assumptions - don’t affect Fichte’s and Hegel’s works. In a way, you’re doing their foundational work for them. By rejecting critique, you’re opening the way for 19th-century German Idealism in a symbolic sense.

 

 

 

 

2 hours ago, Cave_Dweller said:

The statement “nothing ever becomes nothing” relates back to Rand saying that things change their form but they don’t cease to exist altogether. Their elements remain, either as disconnected from the whole or joined into another whole so that the original loses its identity. Her and Peikoff’s error was to slide from that true statement about things to making a larger statement about the universe as a whole. The reason they made that error? It’s the same error was made by the ancient Greek cosmologists, although they took it another step: they did not stop and consider making the transcendental distinction, which separates what is, from our perspective, from what might actually be. The “what is” of identity can’t be so deftly collapsed into a single axiom without considering first that the “what is” for us might not be identical to “what actually is.” Many, perhaps dozens, of illusions have been made showing that our experience of things doesn’t necessarily match what the thing is. I’m talking about raw experience, not the thought that goes into analyzing it. But the most realistic illusion is the moon illusion, which shows that the full moon we see on the horizon appears larger than the same full moon at zenith. It’s easy enough to reason out that the moon hasn’t changed in size, and that it is only our perspective that has changed. But this doesn’t change the fact that the illusion exists.

A far more difficult task lay in resolving the contradictory apparent motions of the cosmos surrounding the Earth. Even Aristotle made a geocentric model, and he didn’t seem to notice that two of those points of light in the sky behave differently. I guess it was easy to overlook just those two exceptions in a crowd of thousands.

One could as well generalize from making statements about the empirical realm to the universe as a whole, although “leap” is a more relevant word than “generalize.” But those empirical statements contain epistemic rules for making valid statements on the empirical level, and they lack limitations. There has to be a way to correctly say “that too is empirical” without simply asserting it. The book is empirical, the desk is empirical, the chair is empirical. These contain certain commonalities in their concepts. But can I rightly say, “The universe is empirical”? Or is that too much of a stretch? I agree we can consider it as empirical, only not in a serious sense.

We can apply correctly the category of totality to the universe, but does that lend it the thingness it would require to be discussed in an empirical sense?

No. We can apply categories to God, but that doesn’t change God into an empirical object. As someone once said, “You can’t just define God into existence.” The same holds true of the cosmos: “You can’t simply categorize the universe into thingness.” The reason is that experience of things, for Kant, requires both intuition and understanding, forms and concepts. The universe as a whole cannot be intuited, even indirectly. We have a manifold of sensations given to the imagination and understanding, but our manifold of the universe is incomplete, and absolutely so, because we can never intuit the whole thing. For cosmology, the manifold given over to the understanding via imagination consists only of an estimate of what we suppose the whole must look like, in general. We deny it spatiality, but we grant it temporality, as we must do with things produced by the mind. So we don’t say that the universe is in space, but that somehow it must obey the rules that form the temporal aspect of the empirical manifold in general.

The competence of human reason is denied complete knowledge of these things, but it is granted incomplete knowledge. It is also granted a horizon of sorts, which leads us on a quest to discover what lies just beyond that horizon, and refuses to allow us to settle comfortably into our dogmatic easy-chair. Reason is limited, yet always striving.

For the most part, we should leave  it to modern scientific cosmology (GR) to determine what local traits apply to the whole. By those lights, conservation of baryon number does not apply. Conservation of mass-energy, electric charge, and angular momentum do apply (MTW 1974). They have the effective tools for such determinations (which Kant naturally did not know of). 

9 minutes ago, Boydstun said:

For the most part, we should leave  it to modern scientific cosmology (GR) to determine what local traits apply to the whole. By those lights, conservation of baryon number does not apply. Conservation of mass-energy, electric charge, and angular momentum do apply (MTW 1974). They have the effective tools for such determinations (which Kant naturally did not know of). 

Sure, but you’re no longer doing metaphysics which stops with its knowledge claims, then sits back and relaxes as if solving these problems was a piece of cake. You’re now doing science, in which the transcendental object is treated as a real thing for purposes of modeling that which is being studied. But we can never know if the model matches the reality because of the limitations of induction.

Realist confidence requires humility or else it is prone to arrogance.

28 minutes ago, Boydstun said:

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I was not raising the qualified/unqualified being in regard to Kant, but the history before and after him. He mentioned that ding-an-sich has definite character, whatever, unknown to us, that might be (besides being the ground of sensory experience).

As long as this is acknowledged to be transcendental, not empirical, grounds for sensory experience. Or else you’ll fall into the trap of saying things like “the senses are valid,” which is to borrow a biological conclusion for the purpose of some metaphysical or epistemological claim or grounds. And even then, the validity of the senses is taken for granted as scientific fact. Yes, they are valid for survival and even flourishing. Or, as I put it, they are good enough; from the standpoint of the evolution of species, the senses are adequate to the task nature gave them. But are they valid for the purpose Rand gave them? That is, are they a valid foundation for theoretical discussions? I have found that they are not valid for theoretical discussions, as the findings of modern physics contradict the senses. After all, even Rand should have known that acknowledging the world around her was putting a limit - a regulatory idea - on all discussion that takes place in her realm of thinking, but the world itself may not “agree” that this limit is valid, and that it may not ‘agree’ with the limits Rand placed on philosophical “map-making.”

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Talk of conditions that make something possible, such as common knowledge or science, in fact relies on what is learned empirically (cf. Kuhn’s SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE IN GERMANY 1768–1800). To go all a priori about it is a form of the the traditional and valid philosophy reflection on what presupposes what. But one does not need to think of the concepts as not from experience to carry out that project. The arguments for the non-existence of unqualified being consists in checking each category-division of Rand’s (or my different category-division) and showing that denial of any of those categories as applied to some existent leads to self-contradiction. Then Rand has her cashing of Existence is Identity, which is the thesis that being is only qualified being, by the showing that any existent must be entity, attribute, action, or relationship or some combination thereof, which are qualifications. 

In other words, We don’t need “unqualified being” - not Kant’s unknowable noumenon, not the mystic’s pure being, not the rationalist’s featureless substance.

It’s interesting to note that even Kant needed the rationalist’s featureless substance, and perhaps even the mystic’s pure being. Because (as I hope to have clarified in my book) from these errors he created the regulative ideas. Moreover, Rand has her own regulative idea - the validity of the senses - which places a limit on how physics is to proceed. That limit I particularly dislike, as modern physics is in extreme disagreement. But not with the idea that the senses are valid for this or that physical purpose. As I said, they are good enough in general to assist with the adaptation of species. It is in extreme disagreement with limiting the sciences to the realm of Rand’s axioms.

 

Our scientific instruments are extensions of our senses. Our plain validity of the senses gets us to the lab, to setting up a rotating mirror and a laser and a photo detector, from which we carry on to measuring the velocity of light and the tolerances we give to our measurement. Rand’s philosophy does not place any interfering constraints on the practice of science. Although, from her philosophic viewpoint, she should smile on the regular enterprise in science to find how the micro yields the macro (from Bohr’s correspondence principle guiding the development of QM to here). 

You may want to check what Ostaric has to say in The Criique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant’s Critical System (2023).

Kant’s tie of his KrV to his MFNS is pretty embarrassing (as is his reasoning in the First and Third Analogies of Experience in KrV). MFNS ends up being a regression almost so bad as the reasoning of Descartes to his laws of mechanics. Too much philosophy, not enough science. Kant thought he needed to supercede Newton’s laws of mechanics in MFNS  for integration with his results in KrV. He was always trying to get a leg up on Newton from the philosopher’s armchair, from Kant’s early efforts to find an account for the 3-dimensionality of space to Critical constraints on mechanics in MFNS. (And in his early embarrassing repetition of a popular-science magazine false argument to the inverse-square falloff of gravity—which was clearly clueless concerning Newton’s argument for that.) Rand seemed to have some sense of when she should not enter from her philosophy some fray going on in science. Some of her students lacked that sagacity. And she seemed to have some sense of when some popular disparity between scientific frontiers and ordinary experience was being stewed up—unreal—such as in the old silliness that because atoms and molecules are mostly empty space, I should be falling right through this chair I’m sitting on.


I should add, Cave Dweller, that I do not agree with the thesis of the inerrancy of the senses. Because peceptions are leaders, not just reporters. The moon illusion (which is not detrimental so far as I know) and the Mach-Bands illusion (which enhances accuracy of action) are not the predominant sorts of our perceptions. And anyway, I don't see Rand's inerrancy of the senses doctrine as any more constraining of science than Russell's.

 

9 hours ago, Boydstun said:

I think you are casting Aristotle as too close and customized a prelude to Kant, including Kant’s views on Aristotle’s logic and more recent conceptions of logic.*

That was an excellent catch, and I almost forgot to mention it. Kant has in some places been credited with completing Aristotle’s project. I don’t believe that Kant’s use of the term “categories” was an accident, and he actually credits Aristotle for it in the CPR.

“Aristotle had a list of ten categories… it is remarkable that he was able to discover them by mere reflection… But he did not have a principle for them…”
(B106–107)

Meaning, Aristotle did not have an organizing principle. The haphazard nature of his collection of categories was mentioned in other places.

I don’t know, but it’s possible that Kant got the idea for a list of categories from Aristotle, and, upon completing his own list, ordered them nicely. Furthermore, Kant did not gather his list from linguistic regularities in ancient Greek thought, as with Aristotle, but from their necessity for objectifying experience.

Didn’t Kant get his categories of the understanding from the forms of judgment in logic of his day? And aren’t Kant’s categories most fundamentally widest concepts we need for cognition, whereas Aristotle’s categories most fundamentally different ways in the world that things are?

15 minutes ago, Boydstun said:

Quote

Our scientific instruments are extensions of our senses. Our plain validity of the senses gets us to the lab, to setting up a rotating mirror and a laser and a photo detector, from which we carry on to measuring the velocity of light and the tolerances we give to our measurement. Rand’s philosophy does not place any interfering constraints on the practice of science. Although, from her philosophic viewpoint, she should smile on the regular enterprise in science to find how the micro yields the macro (from Bohr’s correspondence principle guiding the development of QM to here). 

If you stop at the practical level, then you’re right on the mark. It’s at the theoretical level that Objectivism and the validity of the senses premise is being used in an attempt to take down modern physics.

David Harriman has Leonard Peikoff’s approval for this anti-modern physics project: Unreason in Modern Physics

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You may want to check what Ostaric has to say in The Criique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant’s Critical System (2023).

Kant’s tie of his KrV to his MFNS is pretty embarrassing (as is his reasoning in the First and Third Analogies of Experience in KrV). MFNS ends up being a regression almost so bad as the reasoning of Descartes to his laws of mechanics. Too much philosophy, not enough science. Kant thought he needed to supercede Newton’s laws of mechanics in MFNS  for integration with his results in KrV. He was always trying to get a leg up on Newton from the philosopher’s armchair, from Kant’s early efforts to find an account for the 3-dimensionality of space to Critical constraints on mechanics in MFNS. (And in his early embarrassing repetition of a popular-science magazine false argument to the inverse-square falloff of gravity—which was clearly clueless concerning Newton’s argument for that.) Rand seemed to have some sense of when she should not enter from her philosophy some fray going on in science. Some of her students lacked that sagacity. And she seemed to have some sense of when some popular disparity between scientific frontiers and ordinary experience was being stewed up—unreal—such as in the old silliness that because atoms and molecules are mostly empty space, I should be falling right through this chair I’m sitting on.

 

I was taught that there’s an infinitesimally small chance, according to some models of QM, that you will fall through your chair. But Peikoff/Rand/Harriman agree with Einstein that “God does not play dice with the universe,” although those other three wouldn’t put it precisely that way.

Rand wasn’t afraid to apply her axioms to cosmology. Neither is Peikoff. And if you correctly apply the “validity of the senses” premise to QM and relativity, along with other physics topics, you are left with no modern physics at all.

 

 

1 minute ago, Boydstun said:

Didn’t Kant get his categories of the understanding from the forms of judgment in logic of his day? And aren’t Kant’s categories most fundamentally widest concepts we need for cognition, whereas Aristotle’s categories most fundamentally different ways in the world that things are?

Aristotle began with the various ways that a subject can be predicated. This indicates that his source was language usage.

Kant took his categories from other philosophers and logicians, and then ordered them in accordance with their roles in objectifying experience. The categories themselves are hardly original. And he didn’t gather them by inspecting his own thinking processes or anything like that. The original aspect is in his listing them under four headings and in three “moments.” And, of course, the necessity he gave them not just for thinking and language but for experience itself in general.

1 Like

https://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?/topic/45102-ayn-rands-steady-state-universe/&page=5#comment-415159

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I was taught that there’s an infinitesimally small chance, according to some models of QM, that you will fall through your chair. But Peikoff/Rand/Harriman agree with Einstein that “God does not play dice with the universe,” although those other three wouldn’t put it precisely that way.

Rand wasn’t afraid to apply her axioms to cosmology. Neither is Peikoff. And if you correctly apply the “validity of the senses” premise to QM and relativity, along with other physics topics, you are left with no modern physics at all.

 

Just from classical statistical mechanics, nothing QM, there is a very small non-zero chance that all the molecules in the air here in my library will concentrate in a corner of the ceiling. But the physicists go on to calculate what that chance is, and it will take more time than the age of the universe (age since Initial Singularity) for such an event to occur. That’s plenty sure enough that any breathing failure I have will be due to some other cause.

I do not see how “validity of the senses”—whether in Rand or Russell—is in some sort of conflict with QM or Relativity. In fact, Einstein’s devotion to operational definitions for such things as time seems rather an amplification of the importance of getting to valid sensory understanding of concepts. And both QM and Relativity are physics and, so, aim for empirical testing.

Rand and Peikoff stated the Objectivist Law of Identity such that given conditions yield a unique result. I gave a reformulated statement of the law in 1991 such that there is no such entailment. 

I’ve little good to say about Harriman’s representations of contemporary physics and for that matter his representations of what is predominant in philosophy of physics (specialty in philosophy of science) today. His is handwaving representation followed by salvation by him from his own intellectually vaporous concoctions.

22 minutes ago, Boydstun said:

https://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?/topic/45102-ayn-rands-steady-state-universe/&page=5#comment-415159

Just from classical statistical mechanics, nothing QM, there is a very small non-zero chance that all the molecules in the air here in my library will concentrate in a corner of the ceiling. But the physicists go on to calculate what that chance is, and it will take more time than the age of the universe (age since Initial Singularity) for such an event to occur. That’s plenty sure enough that any breathing failure I have will be due to some other cause.

I do not see how “validity of the senses”—whether in Rand or Russell—is in some sort of conflict with QM or Relativity. In fact, Einstein’s devotion to operational definitions for such things as time seems rather an amplification of the importance of getting to valid sensory understanding of concepts. And both QM and Relativity both are physics and, so, aim for empirical testing.

Rand and Peikoff stated the Objectivist Law of Identity such that given conditions yield a unique result. I gave a reformulated statement of the law in 1991 such that there is no such entailment.

I don’t see the laws of nature allowing such a vacuum by chance. Not because “abhors” a vacuum, which is a false idea that came down to us from Aristotle. But because classical physicists misunderstand the nature of the universe.

And that’s exactly what Peikoff/Harriman are saying about QM and relativity scientists. Harriman’s lectures on this topic are on YouTube.

It’s going to take me some time to read your article at the 1991 link.

5 minutes ago, Cave_Dweller said:

I don’t see the laws of nature allowing such a vacuum by chance. Not because “abhors” a vacuum, which is a false idea that came down to us from Aristotle. But because classical physicists misunderstand the nature of the universe.

. . .

See, for example, the standard text Thermal Physics by Charles Kittel.

17 minutes ago, Boydstun said:

See, for example, the standard test Thermal Physics by Charles Kittel.

Kittel’s statement, “The probability of a state is proportional to e−E/kTe^{-E/kT}e−E/kT. That’s the most important formula in the book," has been criticized from the standpoint that students don’t see its application to reality. This is from a study published in Physical Review Special Topics - Physics Education Research.

“Student understanding of the Boltzmann factor”
by Benjamin D. Geller, Catherine H. Crouch, and Kenneth S. Redding
Published in Physical Review Special Topics - Physics Education Research , Volume 11, Issue 2 ,
Date: December 9, 2015
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevSTPER.11.020123

But its applicability is apparently to systems that are in thermal equilibrium, can exchange energy with a much larger heat reservoir (not particles), has a fixed temperature T, and it is described by classical or quantum statistics , depending on the nature of the particles.

LIes, damned lies, and statistics. (That’s the ARI’s conclusion about QM and statistics.)

Students won’t see the application of a capacitor or an op amp or their equations if they are not spelled out or they get no engineering experience. The one “problem” I would bother to note about that Kittel book is that the student would better have taken classical thermodynamics first, so as to realize the magnificence of deriving results of classical thermodynamics from the micro realms. Just read the books to find for yourself their real intellectual value. 

“I don’t see the laws of nature allowing such a vacuum by chance.” You need statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.* To think about physics one first needs physics. Same for geometry. . . . 

Objectivist David Harriman lays down the law for physicists.

1 hour ago, Boydstun said:

Students won’t see the application of a capacitor or an op amp or their equations if they are not spelled out or they get no engineering experience. The one “problem” I would bother to note about that Kittel book is that the student would better have taken classical thermodynamics first, so as to realize the magnificence of deriving results of classical thermodynamics from the micro realms. Just read the books to find for yourself their real intellectual value. 

 

1 hour ago, Boydstun said:

“I don’t see the laws of nature allowing such a vacuum by chance.” You need statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.* To think about physics one first needs physics. Same for geometry. . . . 

Peikoff and Harriman say that chance and statistics aren’t allowed in physics. That should go for any hard science. Causality only. I don’t know what they’d say about the chance of air molecules joining in the corner of a room. I guess it’s possible that there doesn’t have to be a vacuum, that the air molecules will be replaced by new ones from outside the room. From the strict conditions Kittel gives for this scenario, I don’t think outside influences are allowed. It would have to be an air-tight, sealed room with certain temperature requirements. But I won’t pretend any further that this is resolved by philosophy, especially when I don’t understand.