This is a good point and goes with what I was saying about a payment plan not necessarily being a cancellation of debt. Making payments at a lesser rate than the original contract required doesn’t mean a debtor is off the hook for the rest. Consider the case where somebody goes bankrupt and his debt is structured into payments by the judge, but who later gets back on his feet and becomes wealthy enough to repay all his previous debt. What argument can be made that he shouldn’t have to repay his old debts in full now that he has new means to do so? Under current bankruptcy law, he wouldn’t have to because he got a “fresh start”. I have to agree with Seeker that current law, putting aside legal details, is fairly easily seen as a moral wrong.
It’s an interesting case, but a bit of a catch 22. Set aside for a second the fact that it takes a high level of rationality to get wealthy in a capitalist society, and a high level of irrationality to go bankrupt so having these occur in one person seems highly unlikely. If the profit motive is what would motivate someone to actually work to become wealthy, what would make that person do so if he knew that all his effort would simply enrich his creditors? Answer, none. People are not motivated to work harder in slavery (and I use that term recognizing that we’re not talking about actual forced slavery) even if someone has sold themselves into it. If you forgive the debt, you may create future motivation for wealth creation, and end up begrudging the fact that you forgave the debt. If you don’t forgive the debt, the wealth will not have materialized for you to collect. The only way to actually collect such a debt is to promise the debtor that they do not owe any more, but then come around later and reneg (which is probably anathema to anyone who believes in the concept of contract).
Seeker, certainly a court can predict what future earnings a person will _ voluntarily work to earn _ under a lifetime debt load. The answer to that is only as much as he has to to maintain whatever meager subsitence you allow him to eek out above and beyond the debt you impose on him.
Look if you want to argue that the moral breach is criminal in nature (rather than civil) and you want to argue to bring back debtors prisons, be my guest. But if you want to keep this issue civil, and you want the debt load to remain in perpetuity, and you determine that the debtor can earn X amount so therefore he will carry a full debt load based upon that earnings potential, but should he add to that earnings potential, then he will be responsible to increase his payments to pay off his debt, it is very clear what you will end up with de facto. He will not add to the earnings potential. Why would he, if you give him the option (i.e. make it voluntary) of doing so?
Again, I have not argued that bankruptcy is some sort of moral right, just that it is hardly a corruption of the concept of contract as David Odden claims because the particular part of the code you all are taking issue with is a small part of the code, and because you all keep positing that something would happen that was significantly different without the code, than what actually happens under the code, which is simply not correct.
So you have this conundrum. Doing the properly moral thing will not get the creditor any more remedies, i.e. any more justice. It will be more punitive to the debtor, for sure. But then we are still talking about a civil matter. Note also that under this sort of punitive system the punishment for any particular infraction is inversely proportional, not to the actual magnitude of the crime (i.e. the amount under default) but to the ability (i.e. the earning potential) of the debtor, which I think would make for an interesting debate if someone argues that this would be the appropriate as a criminal matter. This would immediately strike me as non-objective punishment. It is equivalent to saying the dumber the criminal, the longer his sentence should be.