Bernard Bolzano – Theory of Science

I can now do better than the following paragraph which I had in #1 of this thread.

The following material of this post is background for the post to follow, and is taken from other parts of my book, . . .

 

. . .

In Rand’s fundamental Existence is identity, the identity of an existent includes its that/which and its what. Rand has the relation of identity to existence as Aristotle had the relation of unity to being, which the schoolmen called a transcendental relation. Existence and unity are convertible; unity follows existence everywhere. In Rand’s metaphysics and in mine, not only is unity convertible with existence, identity is also convertible with existence. Unity is absorbed into Rand’s ample identity. Intelligibility, another traditional “transcendental property” of being, is also absorbed into the transcendental that is identity where (i) existence is identity and (ii) consciousness is identification. The scholastic transcendental property (of being) truth is absorbed into identification, which is not a transcendental property of existence. Rand’s convertibility of identity and existence was most fully seen before her by Avicenna with his addition of the transcendentals “thing and something, meaning definiteness and otherness, respectively” (Kovach 2013, 240). Aquinas folded those into his system of the transcendental properties. 

 

© Stephen C. Boydstun 2015

 

 

 

Here is my replacement for that paragraph, with my new learning and further reflection on these concepts and their history:

In Rand’s fundamental Existence is identity, the identity of an existent includes its that/which and its what and perhaps more_._ She has existence as the fundamental comprehensive reality. That role had been given not to existence, but to being by Aristotelians such as Thomas Aquinas. In its Randian conception, existence is to be taken as all existence, actual and potential, physical or mental. Being in this modern view is reined in to nothing but existence and what is of existence.

 

Rand has the relation of identity to existence near Aristotle’s relation of unity to being, which relation to (old-width) being the schoolmen called transcendental. Unity follows existence everywhere, to every category whatever, to every particularity. Unity is not apart from existence; only in thought are they separable. In Rand’s metaphysics, unity is absorbed into an ample identity. Unity is not convertible with existence in the full-fledged way it is convertible with being, once we have begun to see unity as only a portion of identity and have confined being to existence and what is of existence. Being is one, and existence is one. One is being, but one is not existence. The oneness of an existent is only an “of existence” where oneness is taken in isolation of other aspects of an existent. Identity, Rand’s ample identity, follows existence everywhere and is moderately convertible with existence in the following disjunctive way: Existence is identity, and identity is existence or is of existence. A floor is nothing but which and what and where and when it is. That is all there is to a floor’s existence if we are thinking by those the total containing all its specifics and particularities. Were one to use a notion of identity so broad as to contain all of those, one could say of the existing floor Identity is existence. A designer’s plan for a floor is also a type of existent, though in relation to its object, it is of a potential floor. Part of the identity of the plan is its being of existence. Existence of the plan is identity, and identity of the plan is existence or of existence.

 

Intelligibility, another traditional “transcendental property” of being, should also be absorbed into identity. The scholastic transcendental property truth is absorbed into identification, which is not convertible with existence nor with “of existence,” for although identification is “of existence,” existence is not identification. Rand’s marriage of identity and existence was seen in fair part before her firstly by Avicenna with his addition of the being-attachments “thing and something, meaning definiteness and otherness, respectively” (Kovach 2013, 240). Aquinas folded those into his system of the transcendental properties. In chapter Seven, I shall add . . . and . . . to Rand’s identity as comprehensive standings with existence. They follow existence everywhere, concrete existence actual and potential. Together these standings with existence, these aspects of existence, are existence. Together they are each existent, whether the existent is in Rand’s categories entity or attribute or action or in any other category of concrete existence.

 

© Stephen C. Boydstun 2015

 

Notes

[1] AS 1016–17, 1035–37, 1040–41, 1054; ITOE 56, 82, App. 240.

[2] Top. 127a27–28; Metaph. 1003b23–34; cf. Aquinas, ST Q11 A1.

[3] Francisco Suárez would rather absorb some aspects of Rand’s ample identity into unity and some into being, absorb as merely synonymous with unity and being, leaving any convertibility of being with Rand’s identity already covered by convertibility of being with a capacious unity; see Aertsen 2012, 609–10.

[4] Cf. Rouse 2013, xviii–xix; Haugeland 2013, 147–51, 191–93.

[5] Cf. Aristotle in Aertsen 2013, 64–67. Cf. Aquinas, DV Q1 A1 Reply, A2 Reply.

[6] Further on Avicenna’s innovation, Aertsen 2012, 86–90, 96–100.

[7] Aquinas DV Q1 A1 Reply; Kovach 2013, 241. On scholastic assimilation of Avicenna’s comprehensive identity-attachments of being into their theories of transcendental properties of being, see Aertsen 2012: on Aquinas 219–20, 222–30, 682–83; on Henry of Ghent, 286–97; on Peter Auriol, 435–36, 439–43, 447–52, 454–56; on Francis of Meyeronnes, 463; on Francis of Marchia, 502–9; on Lorenzo Valla, 570–72; on Suárez, 608–11, 633–34.

 

 

 

The following has been invaluable:

Aertsen, J. A. 2012. Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. Leiden: Brill.

 

The transcendental under scrutiny in the scope of Aertsen’s book refers (i) to things spanning, or transcending, categories of being and (ii) to nobility of being. My concern has been only with thought about the first of these two senses. Kant would later appropriate the long-standing term transcendental in metaphysics as name for his form of idealism, and his usage in the setting of his “Copernican” inversion has some thin ties to his medieval and modern predecessors mining in transcendental traditions.

 

Aquinas had innovated a distinction between (a) absolute transcendentals of being such as unity and thing and (b ) relative transcendentals of being such as something-distinct-from-others and truth.* Take away all intellect, human and divine, and no convertible with being called truth remains. Kant’s system in effect tries to mold all transcendentals of being into ones relative to intellect. If there are absolute transcendentals, they would have to lie beyond our ways of rational theoretical comprehension. Where Aquinas had the divine intellect as the measure of nature (in the way that a human plan for an artifact is a measure of the artifact) and had nature as the measure of the human intellect, Kant cast off such rational theology and set human intellect as the measure of nature in its fundamental aspects (though not by way of deliberate designing).