A moral code is a system of teleological measurement which grades the choices and actions open to man, according to the degree to which they achieve or frustrate the code’s standard of value.
-Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology
. . . the doctrine that concern with one’s own interests is evil means that man’s desire to live is evil—that man’s life, as such, is evil. No doctrine could be more evil than that.
Yet that is the meaning of altruism.
-The Virtue of Selfishness
[tangential: what is the ultimate value of altruism???]
A deontological (duty-centered) theory of ethics confines moral principles to a list of prescribed “duties” and leaves the rest of man’s life without any moral guidance, cutting morality off from any application to the actual problems and concerns of man’s existence. Such matters as work, career, ambition, love, friendship, pleasure, happiness, values (insofar as they are not pursued as duties) are regarded by these theories as amoral, i.e., outside the province of morality.
-Causality versus Duty
The clearest symptom by which one can recognize [the amoralist] is his total inability to judge himself, his actions, or his work by any sort of standard. The normal pattern of self-appraisal requires a reference to some abstract value or virtue—e.g., “I am good because I am rational,” “I am good because I am honest,” even the second-hander’s notion of “I am good because people like me.” . . .
The amoralist’s implicit pattern of self-appraisal (which he seldom identifies or admits) is: “I am good because it’s me.”
-Selfishness Without a Self
“Good” and “evil” assume some sort of teleological standard, and no standard could be evil by its own standards (that would be equivalent to the Liar’s paradox). And yet here, Rand clearly applied a teleological standard to one such standard; namely altruism.
In the other quotes she indicated that amorality is the absence of any sort of evaluative standard, whatsoever, and that evaluation cannot take place in such a vacuum. But whatever anyone does, regardless of the reasoning behind it or the ultimate consequences, they do because they ultimately consider it to be the “best” option (no matter how screwed up their standards are). Choice between alternatives, according to certain preferences, is implicit in every single conscious moment.
- By what standard can evaluative standards, themselves, be evaluated? When we call altruism “evil” what makes that assertion conceivable, let alone justified?
- If life requires choice, and choice requires values and evaluation requires a moral code, can anyone actually live amorally?
What is the precise relation between values and morals?