If I wrote a sentence saying that, “The not-cat, not-pig, not-tree, not-horse, not-apple was on the porch,” you wouldn’t have much of a clue as to what *was* on the porch.
Here is what I’m trying to get at: Suppose I walk into a science lab and I see two objects sitting on a table. I may not know what those two objects “are”, but I know with unqualified certainty what they are not i.e. they are not the table, the chairs, the window, the ceiling, and one is not the other. I can assign a word to them such as “object A” and “object B” but “A” and “B” are not their identity. It’s not until I pick them up and begin to push buttons, hold them up to light or sound, shake them, etc. that I begin to get some understanding of their identity – and their identity is directly tied to their behavior and interaction with other things. In fact their identity might be said their behavior, and nothing “more”. I qualified this last sentence because I’m still working on these ideas.
I’m still trying to keep to this tied to your original post…
Identity consists of intrinsic and relational properties. As an example: mass is an intrinsic property, weight is a relational property. Intrinsic properties are inferred to explain relational properties, while the relational properties are what is observed directly.
An entity which existed but did not have any relational properties with respect to anything in the universe would be unknowable by its nature.
One could argue in epistemology it is actually causality which is primary, not identity. I don’t think there is much payoff to insisting that either being or acting must be “first” somehow, or most important.
Yes, it is true that one has to differentiate according to how something reacts or acts according to the circumstance, I’m not denying that. So yes, if you go into a laboratory and started to look around you would not be familiar with a few things and you could beginning by differentiating, and then investigate further to make the integration.No denying that at all. But one must do the investigation part to form the integration to identify what something is. So, you are on the right track, but that track is best identified as coming to realize that A is A, and not A is Not-B. The A is Not-B is the first step, in a way, but that is not the universal principle. The universal principle is that A is A, a thing is itself.
As to whether one starts with being or action, I think it must be kept in mind that concepts of action are abstracted from concepts of entities – that one cannot have a disembodied action – it must be something acting. So, in reality, the thing and the action are simultaneous, but epistemologically, the concept of the thing is prior to the concept of its action.
As to whether one starts with being or action, I think it must be kept in mind that concepts of action are abstracted from concepts of entities – that one cannot have a disembodied action – it must be something acting. So, in reality, the thing and the action are simultaneous, but epistemologically, the concept of the thing is prior to the concept of its action.
You can’t have a knowable thing that does not act. Epistemologically there are no static entities without the actions by means of which we know them.
Identity and Causality are of equal status and simultaneous in both metaphysics and epistemology.
A thing cannot both act and not act at the same time and in the same respect.
I think you are confusing an implicit concept with an explicit concept. True, if one observes several dogs playing in the back yard, one’s concept of dog (which is new to you) will include their actions of running and playing. However, one cannot form the concepts of "running"and “playing” until after one has formed the concept of “dog.” This is because the playing and the running must be abstracted from the observations of the dogs, it is something the dogs are doing, and even thouigh one sees the dogs and that they are playing and running, the abstraction from the abstraction must be done to resolve out the implict concepts of "running"and “playing.”
But I do agree with you that it is by interactions that we come to understand something and that if it is not interacting with us on some level we are not aware of it.
I come back to my previous question: What is “sodium”? Sodium is not protons, neutrons and electrons – because every element is composed of these. Sodium is not it’s “atomic weight” – which differs little from all the other elements. Rather, sodium is what we call the element that behaves the way that “sodium” behaves. It’s behavior IS it’s identity (and essence).
Where I believe I differ with Objectivism (as I understand it) is that I’m not convinced that it’s possible to state, in propostional form, what the “essence” of something is, since it’s “essence” is all the many possible behaviors available to it (and this ties to Thomas’s other post). I am however (through the validity of the senses) able to state with unqualified certainty that one thing is not another. A is not B. I belive this to be the basis of objective knowledge and that it ties in neatly to Objectivism’s position that knowledge is contextual. That something is what everything else is not.
Where I believe I differ with Objectivism (as I understand it) is that I’m not convinced that it’s possible to state, in propostional form, what the “essence” of something is, since it’s “essence” is all the many possible behaviors available to it (and this ties to Thomas’s other post).
Of the many possible manifestations of behavior by sodium atoms, none is more essentially sodium than the others. Essence is not metaphysical but epistemological. Because essence is epistemological it is also contextual. Essence is relative to me as a knowing subject, or more generally relative to the wider context of human purposes.
I think you are confusing an implicit concept with an explicit concept. True, if one observes several dogs playing in the back yard, one’s concept of dog (which is new to you) will include their actions of running and playing. However, one cannot form the concepts of "running"and “playing” until after one has formed the concept of “dog.” This is because the playing and the running must be abstracted from the observations of the dogs, it is something the dogs are doing, and even thouigh one sees the dogs and that they are playing and running, the abstraction from the abstraction must be done to resolve out the implict concepts of "running"and “playing.”
But I do agree with you that it is by interactions that we come to understand something and that if it is not interacting with us on some level we are not aware of it.
It is just as true that the dogs must be abstracted from the running to and fro and the more general moment-to-moment changing sensory field, but this abstraction is part of forming the percept so is automatic and performed subconsciously. In perception the percept is the given and the starting point. In epistemology the dog comes before the running and playing, but in metaphysics one does not go before the other.
In epistemology the dog comes before the running and playing, but in metaphysics one does not go before the other.
Right, that’s the point I was trying to make. I will agree with you that all of the measurements in the observation are omitted when one forms the abstraction and the concept of “dog.” One has to differentiate the dogs from the background to form the concept of “dog” and it is true that one must abstract this out from the toys or whatever the dogs are playing with. And it is not as if our concepts are based on a mental snapshot of the actions, on this I agree. The original concept of “dog” includes everything we observe about the dogs, including what they are doing. It is only later that we can resolve out what they are doing and come up with the concepts "playing"and “running.”
Of the many possible manifestations of behavior by sodium atoms, none is more essentially sodium than the others. Essence is not metaphysical but epistemological. Because essence is epistemological it is also contextual. Essence is relative to me as a knowing subject, or more generally relative to the wider context of human purposes.
Does Objectivism hold that essence is contextual? Would this not lead to the statement that Identity is contextual? I’m not disagreeing with you, that essence is contextual, but I’m not sure that I’ve seen it stated explicity in the literature.
Does Objectivism hold that essence is contextual? Would this not lead to the statement that Identity is contextual? I’m not disagreeing with you, that essence is contextual, but I’m not sure that I’ve seen it stated explicity in the literature.
All knowledge is contextual, even the axioms (contextual on what is being observed and identified). The essence of something is epistemological in Objectivism because essence means the defining characteristic of an entity or something observed in existence. Following our examples, one might have that the essence of water is that it boils when placed over a fire (say if one has not observed anything else boiling). However, once one observes that other liquids boil,then boiling is no longer a defining characteristic of water, and one has to adjust the defining characteristic contextually. Similarly, upon seeing dogs play, one might conclude that playing is contextual or definitional or the essence of dogs – that is until one observes oneself and other living animals playing.
From ITOE: An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does distinguish a group of existents from all others;…
From this, I’ve taken it to mean that an existent’s essence is not contextual – but rather that it is finite, measurable and unconditionally knowable. Since all existents are composed of only a handful of elements, I believe that essence is observed in the behavior of an existent. “Characteristic” is behavior. Behavior is essence/identity. Behavior is understood conceptually, but can be known through direct observation, and in this sense is non-contextual.
From ITOE: An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does distinguish a group of existents from all others;…
From this, I’ve taken it to mean that an existent’s essence is not contextual – but rather that it is finite, measurable and unconditionally knowable. Since all existents are composed of only a handful of elements, I believe that essence is observed in the behavior of an existent. “Characteristic” is behavior. Behavior is essence/identity. Behavior is understood conceptually, but can be known through direct observation, and in this sense is non-contextual.
Are you putting the factual in opposition to the contextual? Because that is not quite the right way to understand it. Given a set of facts known about an entity a different fact can be selected as the essential fact in a different context. Contextual does not imply that facts are variable, but that judgments about facts and their relation to the judge are variable. Selecting an essence is a judgment.
Behavior is not identity, though behavior is helpful in understanding what something is. An entity is what it is, which is why it acts the way it does. Properly speaking, behavior is causation or causality, the point I was making in my two original posts. Water freezes solid below 32 F, is a liquid at room temperature, and boils at 212 F due to the fact that it is composed of oxygen and two hydrogen atoms, giving rise to the hydrogen bond keeping the molecules together. Hydrogen Sulfide, on the other hand, which is sulfur and two hydrogen atoms, is a gas at room temperature due to the fact that it does not have hydrogen bonds like water. Action, change, or behavior has to be the change of an entity – there are no disembodied actions, changes, or behaviors. And an action is not an entity in and of itself. So, there has to be something there to do the actions – that something is the entity, which is something, has an identity, and does what it does due to the fact that it is what it is.
Are you putting the factual in opposition to the contextual? Because that is not quite the right way to understand it. Given a set of facts known about an entity a different fact can be selected as the essential fact in a different context. Contextual does not imply that facts are variable, but that judgments about facts and their relation to the judge are variable. Selecting an essence is a judgment.
From ITOE: In the process of determining conceptual classification, neither the essential similarities nor the essential differences among existents may be ignored, evaded or omitted once they have been observed. … For example, if one took the capacity to run as man’s essential characteristic and defined him as “a running animal,” the next step would be the attempt to eliminate “non-essential” distinctions…
It would appear that there is a hierarchical relationship between essential and non-essential characteristics that transcends a given context. Meaning that there is something about an existent that most distinguishes it from all other existents, and not just within the context of comparison with a set of dissimilar existents.
It would appear that there is a hierarchical relationship between essential and non-essential characteristics…
Yes. An essential characteristic is more important than other characteristics when noticed because it enables you to think better and act more effectively. The importance assigned is the ranking within an epistemological hierarchy. There is a hierarchy of importance in knowing but not in being.
… that transcends a given context.
No. This is equivalent to claiming it is valid to drop context once you find the essential. But it is never valid to drop the context because it is the context that resolves what is essential.
Behavior is not identity, though behavior is helpful in understanding what something is. An entity is what it is, which is why it acts the way it does. Properly speaking, behavior is causation or causality, the point I was making in my two original posts. Water freezes solid below 32 F, is a liquid at room temperature, and boils at 212 F due to the fact that it is composed of oxygen and two hydrogen atoms, giving rise to the hydrogen bond keeping the molecules together. Hydrogen Sulfide, on the other hand, which is sulfur and two hydrogen atoms, is a gas at room temperature due to the fact that it does not have hydrogen bonds like water. Action, change, or behavior has to be the change of an entity – there are no disembodied actions, changes, or behaviors. And an action is not an entity in and of itself. So, there has to be something there to do the actions – that something is the entity, which is something, has an identity, and does what it does due to the fact that it is what it is.
That water freezes, is liquid, or boils is directly perceived. As Harriman pointed out, Newton or Galileo when it came to the ball rolls when pushed can only appeal to look and see for yourself.
Water freezes when placed in a freezer. Look and see. Ice in a glass on the table melts into a liquid. Look and see. Water boils when heat is applied. Look and see.
The 32°F and 212°F points as well as the hydrogen bond are further refinements of knowledge, application of the relationship of temperature supplimenting the observation, or principles discovered via chemistry in the case of the hydrogen bond.
I realize that I am pointing out what Harriman pointed out as causal axioms, but it is the only portion given in the direct observation. The latter is inferred, or inter-relating to other perceptually based abstractions or abstractions from abstractions.
Right, I agree with that. I wasn’t trying to say that the hydrogen bond is observable, it is not. I was trying to make a point that water is something in reality and that is why it acts the way it does. This is given on the perceptual level as in the examples you gave, but some people insist on going to the latest greatest scientific discovery when talking about causation, so I decided to take up that challenge. We know about water and what it is with direct observation. Everything else we find out about it requires further investigations using scientific instruments and further abstractions.
In “The Logical Leap”, Harriman writes: “The experience is directly perceptual. Just as one perceives an intransitive “rolling” directly (as in “The ball is rolling”)-so, exactly so, in the case of a transitive “rolling”(“I rolled the ball”). And if such rolling is an object of direct experience, as it clearly is, then causing, too, is an object of direct experience.”
I get: that rolling is an object of direct experience.
I also get: causing, too, is an object of direct experience.
I think causing in this context is one of personal efficacy: I caused the ball to roll by pushing it.
I think one more distinction might be made from this as well.
Yes, the ball is rolling. It is the ball causing the rolling.
While the grasp of cause from having pushed the ball, makes sense here, it is the application of ones grasp of cause in this sense, directly to the ball causes the rolling, sets the context of the corollary of causality as Objectivism portrays it. Would this be accurate?