“A concept is a mental integration of two or more units…”
I say this is not so. A concept may be constructed from one. For example, for most of human history, there was one and only one moon. Was “moon” an invalid concept until the discovery of Jovian moons by Galileo? Certainly not. What have I misunderstood?
“The moon” is a first-level concept, formed by integrating “the moon last night” with “the moon tonight” and “the moon I saw last January,” et cetera.
“The moon tonight” on any given night is a perception, formed by distinguishing the sight of the bright moon as against the sight of the night sky and identifying those two sensations (light and dark) as having two different sources; one of which is called “the moon”.
Your example does show something interesting; “moon” probably didn’t mean quite the same thing to people before Galileo because they had no idea what it really was.
But I digress.
“Moon” is not formed by integrating all of the different instances of actual moons (which aren’t visible with the naked eye) but by integrating all of the different memories one has OF “the moon” as different from “the night sky”.
“The moon” is a first-level concept, formed by integrating “the moon last night” with “the moon tonight” and “the moon I saw last January,” et cetera.
“The moon tonight” on any given night is a perception, formed by distinguishing the sight of the bright moon as against the sight of the night sky and identifying those two sensations (light and dark) as having two different sources; one of which is called “the moon”.
Your example does show something interesting; “moon” probably didn’t mean quite the same thing to people before Galileo because they had no idea what it really was.
But I digress.
“Moon” is not formed by integrating all of the different instances of actual moons (which aren’t visible with the naked eye) but by integrating all of the different memories one has OF “the moon” as different from “the night sky”.
It is also formed by distinguishing moon from sun, stars, clouds, and any other celestial event.
“A concept is a mental integration of two or more units…”
I say this is not so. A concept may be constructed from one. For example, for most of human history, there was one and only one moon. Was “moon” an invalid concept until the discovery of Jovian moons by Galileo? Certainly not. What have I misunderstood?
Just curious but why do you make an assertion like that about such in important issue and then just give one example that does not demonstrate your denial of a principle? It would be better to ask a question to illustrate how an example is demonstrated by the principle.
One might even argue that the Moon and the Sun are proper names, rather than concepts since there is only one of each. That is why they are often capitalized.
Recognizing that the Sun was a star didn’t happen until relatively recently in history.
In OPAR, unit: an existent regarded as a separate entity in a group of two or more. Examples include two tables as opposed to other items of furniture, such as chairs.
I reiterate: moon. One of a kind until Galileo. The moon is a unit. Why can’t “moon” be a well-defined concept. I would say such concepts are singletons, but still valid concepts.
“I” is also a well-defined concept and there is only one of me. What is important in concept formation is the making of distinctions, not that the distinct object be in a class of two or more. Sun and Moon are distinct entities. They are also distinct concepts.
“A concept is a mental integration of two or more units…”
I say this is not so. A concept may be constructed from one. For example, for most of human history, there was one and only one moon. Was “moon” an invalid concept until the discovery of Jovian moons by Galileo? Certainly not. What have I misunderstood?
I don’t think there was ever a concept of “moon” prior to Galileo. Moon (and other words in other languages) was a proper noun, a name. Do you have an example of an ancient usage of moon?
The Online Etymology Dictionary says “Extended 1665 to satellites of other planets.”
In OPAR, unit: an existent regarded as a separate entity in a group of two or more. Examples include two tables as opposed to other items of furniture, such as chairs.
I reiterate: moon. One of a kind until Galileo. The moon is a unit. Why can’t “moon” be a well-defined concept. I would say such concepts are singletons, but still valid concepts.
“I” is also a well-defined concept and there is only one of me. What is important in concept formation is the making of distinctions, not that the distinct object be in a class of two or more. Sun and Moon are distinct entities. They are also distinct concepts.
Please demonstrate that our modern concept of “moon” is the same as the concept prior to Galileo and not just the same word.
Please demonstrate that our modern concept of “moon” is the same as the concept prior to Galileo and not just the same word.
That is entirely beside the point. The concept “moon” evolves, as all concepts do when more information is gathered. However, the moon has identity and works under causality. The existence of months was tied to the moon due to causality. Months were directly tied to the observable moon until Julius Caesar. There is good evidence that observable properties then correspond to the same properties now-i.e., same identity. Causal properties were also the same. What might be different is any mystical associations, unless you are a New Age freak.
Even the “same word” notion is irrelevant. They did not use the same word but we still know that Luna refers to the same observable object despite any mystical associations. An important Oist understanding is to only assign objective identities to first-order concepts.
Seriously, was the moon just an entity until Galileo? It had the linguistic value of every other concept.
What about insects for which there is only one specimen? Is one specimen sufficient to form a new category? How about fossil specimens? Sometimes only one bone is enough. All hail the rise of the singleton.
“Singleton”
The concept of a particular is already embraced and the epistemic category we give it is a proper name. This is clearly differentiated from a unit in ITOE. The moon did not become a unit until it was united in a category with some other existents, say as a member of the class “entities”, or “celestial objects”, or when other moons were discovered etc.
Oist epistemology does not deny particulars.
This question is settled by etymology. I gave a citation above.
Moving on …
An important Oist understanding is to only assign objective identities to first-order concepts.
It is not the case that Objectivism holds objectivity is impossible beyond the first level.
Seriously, was the moon just an entity until Galileo? It had the linguistic value of every other concept.
What does that mean, “has the linguistic value”?
What about insects for which there is only one specimen? Is one specimen sufficient to form a new category? How about fossil specimens? Sometimes only one bone is enough. All hail the rise of the singleton.
If the specimen can be confidently identified as belonging to the biological class Insecta, then much is known about it by virtue of that classification. One of the things known is that there must have been other specimens of the same species to make reproduction possible. This would be an instance of subdividing the already known concept of ‘insect’, and subdivisions of concepts cannot fail to also be concepts.
“Singleton”
The concept of a particular is already embraced and the epistemic category we give it is a proper name. This is clearly differentiated from a unit in ITOE. The moon did not become a unit until it was united in a category with some other existents, say as a member of the class “entities”, or “celestial objects”, or when other moons were discovered etc.
Oist epistemology does not deny particulars.
A name serves as a differentia between units within a concept. This is different from the function of “moon”, at least before Galileo.
The culminating, crowning act in forming a concept is the assignment of a label. “Moon” is such a label. The act of label assignment makes this more than an entity.
Definitions in Oist philosophy apply only to concepts. It is possible to define “moon”.
Since Oist philosophy fails to recognize conceptual categories of one, I hereby introduce the notion: Singleton.
A name serves as a differentia between units within a concept. This is different from the function of “moon”, at least before Galileo.
The name Moon differentiated it from other celestial objects, of which there were many.
The name Moon differentiated it from other celestial objects, of which there were many.
Yes, stars are celestial objects, but they already form a concept of their own. Planets similarly form their own concept. The term celestial means something different now than before Galileo. Only the sun and the moon stand apart, at least before Galileo, and the sun stood apart for much longer. These were still concepts (of the singleton variety) and properly formed concepts until other discoveries allowed them to be subsumed as units into nonsingular concepts.
“Celestial” is a second-order concept and “moon” is a first-order singleton.
“Celestial” is a second-order concept and “moon” is a first-order singleton.
Moon is a name, just as Sun is.
Moon is a name, just as Sun is.
As I said, a name is a label used to differentiate units of a concept. How do you define “name”? Name doesn’t quite fit for Sun since it is more than just a label distinguishing Sun from similar units of some broader concept, at least mot historically. Since singletons have existed for thousands of years, we must know how to deal with them. The Sun, for most of history, was a unique entity/concept–a singleton. So are unique tools. How do we deal with objects distinct from other concepts if there is only one known instance of it? The answer: It is a singleton.
Aleph said:
“The term celestial means something different now than before Galileo”
No the meaning of a concept is its referents. A meaning does not change with context the designated essential characteristics does.
Aleph said:
“These were still concepts (of the singleton variety) and properly formed concepts until other discoveries allowed them to be subsumed as units into nonsingular concepts”
I dont see how the above is different from what I said here:
"The moon did not become a unit until it was united in a category with some other existents, say as a member of the class “entities”, or “celestial objects”, or when other moons were discovered etc. "
Aleph said:
"Posted Today, 04:15 AM
“Celestial” is a second-order concept and “moon” is a first-order singleton. "
Hence when one integrates moon into the narrower category of “celestial object” one had to FIRST have the concept of the particular “moon”.
Aleph said:
“As I said, a name is a label used to differentiate units of a concept. How do you define “name”? Name doesn’t quite fit for Sun since it is more than just a label distinguishing Sun from similar units of some broader concept, at least mot historically”
A name is a word that refers to objects DIRECTLY, without the unit categorization of a kind.
ITOE said:
"Now here the context has been established that the
word denotes a concept which in turn denotes the
objects it subsumes. There can be no such thing as a
concept without the objects to which it refers. And
conversely, a sound, if it is to be a word, cannot denote
objects directly, without representing a concept. (A word
which did that would be a proper name.)"
"Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is
a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for
an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.
(Proper names are used in order to identify and
include particular entities in a conceptual method of
cognition. "
As I said, a name is a label used to differentiate units of a concept. How do you define “name”? Name doesn’t quite fit for Sun since it is more than just a label distinguishing Sun from similar units of some broader concept, at least mot historically. Since singletons have existed for thousands of years, we must know how to deal with them. The Sun, for most of history, was a unique entity/concept–a singleton. So are unique tools. How do we deal with objects distinct from other concepts if there is only one known instance of it? The answer: It is a singleton.
What “aspect” of concepts does a singleton “inform”? If a concept is a form of abstraction, that is beyond mere identification of particular concretes, then what about the knowledge pertaining to “the moon” (when it was a single thing) qualifies that knowledge as CONCEPTUAL i.e. an “abstraction” rather than merely a descriptive identification?
Are you arguing for a temporary “unit” such as “things like the moon” prior to knowing there is or could be more than one? In the face of no facts indicating any others exist or could exist (recall at the time there was no understanding of gravity, matter, etc. which could have been indications other moons could or must exist) would this not be the creation of a truly “arbitrary” concept since it relies on the arbitrary with respect to the possibility of other moons?
Divorcing concepts from “the arbitrary” would indicate this concept even if only populated by a singleton, would be invalid. If on the other hand, all of the scientific knowledge existed which could explain, what was the nature of the moon, and how the moon was formed, then perhaps, since one knows moonS, other than “the moon”, very likely Do Exist, then perhaps a concept/unit/abstraction can be valid. Such an integration would be of scientific knowledge and a single instance. I’ll concede such would be a validly formed concept even though only one instance was observed. IN FACT, if scientific knowledge were advanced enough, even if we had NO MOON, the concept of “moons” being a probable type of existent in the universe would be valid. Again here, there is a reason for the “abstraction”.
…
Thinking about this some more I may have actually changed by mind…
Knowing ANYTHING about the nature of the moon, that it was made of rock, that it was spherical, that it orbited the earth, is some knowledge from which I could propose abstractions such as “things made of rock” or “things spherical”, or “things made or rock, that are spherical and that orbit the earth”. Does the mere fact that there is only one instance of a combination of these remove that instance from conceptualization?
What then of the “abstraction”, “moon” or “rocky spherical things orbiting the earth”.. prior to discovering other moons, was this “abstraction” a “concept” or a “floating abstraction” (pardon the pun)… or something else?
Plasmatic,
Celestial means something different now if it formerly referred to a system of crystal spheres. Surely you are not advocating that the ancients were Oists. Yes, I get the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. You took my comment out of context.
P and SL,
It is without dispute that once the Jovian moons were discovered that the “Moon” became a unit of a full-fledged concept. You imply that concepts require a certain bon hommie in order to exist. One moment the Moon is an existent with only a name. Give it a few friends and it becomes a unit of a concept.
Abstraction is not the purpose of concepts. Concepts exist in order to organize our mental contents to managable proportions. I claim that a singleton is the same as a concept but without the friends. It has identity and operates under causality. It even has a label.