Objectivism emphasizes integrity with respect to one’s ideas, but it also has a utilitarian-esque element, recognizing that in some cases it is necessary to, for example, lie. These two elements create certain tensions in situations where it is necessary to violate principles in order to attain certain highly desirable goods.
For example, the Objectivist is committed to the principle of honesty. Given the way the human mind is constituted, however, it is beneficial to tell white lies as well as full-on, nakedly obvious lies to other people. Not just slightly beneficial, tremendously beneficial. It is obvious from the sort of life experiences that we all have that people who get into the habit of telling everyone, including the unworthy, that they are good, rational, diligent, kind, etc are much more likely to receive benefits from other people. Likewise, the person who acts as if an individual is a worthy person to his face, then dismantles him when he is not around, receives the double benefit of the favor of the person and the favor of the people with which the person is dismantled.
The same applies to those who pretend to agree with a person’s ideas when they actually do not. This last sort of lie is recommended by no less than the tremendously successful Andrew Carnegie, who recommended *never* telling a person he is wrong. Admittedly this could mean that one should simply not explicitly disagree with anyone, but that still contradicts passages in Rand. The human mind is so constructed that it responds positively to most compliments, even compliments that are disingenous and fairly nakedly so, which creates a conflict in this case between the Objectivist’s honesty (including the position, explicit in the scene in which Dagny tests Galt in Atlas Shrugged, that white lies are evil) and the benefits he could receive from other people by lying. This conflict would arise most clearly in cases of friendship, where your maintenence of the benefits you receive from the friendship depends upon your ability to remain a value to the friend, and in conversation, where lying about the other person in positive ways or saying dishonest things about yourself often produces benefits as well.
The typical Objectivist argument against dishonesty is that it produces this alternative realm in the other person’s mind that will eventually clash with reality, which generally produces bad results. But in cases like white lies told for the sake of a friendship or a person met in casual conversation, that doesn’t happen. The person could find out that you are don’t actually think highly of them or that they do not actually possess the virtue you ascribe to them, and still enjoy the compliment, and by extension, your company. You might say that this is the result of a widespread, perverted psychology or a widespread, “evil” moral code. Let’s assume that’s true. So what? The only relevant fact for the purposes of this thread is that there are benefits to white lies and certain nakedly obvious lies, not the perverse reasons that (may or may not) make those benefits possible.