Does a high correlation ever warrant rule of law?

Political Philosophy
1

If you could scientifically establish a 1-to-1 corelation between activity A (which in and of itself does not violate anyone’s rights) and activity B (which DOES violate other people’s rights), would it ever be acceptable to use the force of law to prevent activity A from happening?

If so, what about a 9-to-10 corelation? or a 7-to-10 corelation? At what point does a corelation between activity A and illegal activity B warrant a law against A?

Take Meth for example. It’s unlike other drugs in the extent to which it leads to other illegal activities. At least it seems that way. If you could establish a scientific link that showed that 90 percent of people who took meth went on to break laws that objectively protect other people’s rights as a direct result of taking meth, would it be justifiable to ban taking meth? Would it be justifiable with a 100% ratio?

I know the true ratio is not that high, but I’m curious how other objectivists would respond to this philosophically.

2

Correlation is not causality. No amount of correlation is sufficient for banning as you described. Once causality is established, banning is appropriate (in effect, “activity A” has been determined to violate rights).

3

Here’s a nice set of real examples of “meth-related crimes”. Reading this small sample one gets the impression that “meth leads to crime” is not an essential. Rather, prohibitions that criminalize meth attract criminals to the business, and criminals often commit multiple types of crimes.

…and that illustrates that correlations are different from causation.

4

There is the issue of inchoate “attempt” crimes however, and others such as drunk driving, etc.

A person who attempts the murder of another has not exactly violated their rights yet, they simply attempted to violate their rights. The crime of attempt does not require a 100% proof of certainty that the attempt would have succeded. In fact, you can be convicted of an attempted murder which in all likelyhood would have failed.

The main purpose of inchoate offenses is simply to try to deter crimes by attacking them further back in the causal/historical chain of events. This is essentially the same rationale behind the criminalization of meth as described earlier in the thread.

5

This is essentially the same rationale behind the criminalization of meth as described earlier in the thread.

The fact that the perpetrator of attempted murder actually made the decision to murder (though he failed) distinguishes such a crime from the act of getting stoned.

No, they are not essentially the same.

6

While drugs alone do not cause someone to commit a crime, they do cause loss of self control, and loss of ability to think rationally. And for this reason, there should be laws to restrict the activities of people under the influence of drugs: Specifically activities that require one’s self-control and ability to think clearly to avoid damaging others, such as driving.

I would even go a step further: if the influence of the drug is very strong, I would also want a law forcing people to not carry weapons on them while under the influence.

And if the drug is also known (had been proven) to cause aggressive behavior, I would require them to use it at home only, and make sure they have no option of getting out.

7

There are many activities which are potentially dangerous, but it’s not the government’s job to decide what level of risk people will tolerate as far as voluntary transactions are involved. Drunk driving is dangerous, but so it driving and talking, cell phone or not. The party to decide what level of risk is acceptable should be the property owner, not the state.

I would probably ban drunk driving on my highway, but I might be wrong. I’d be just as likely to require automated navigation systems and ban human driving entirely.

As far as the influence of drugs relates to responsibility:

Until mind control is invented, there can be no means to force someone to take a certain action without their cooperation. The idea that alcohol or other drugs somehow supersede free will is bullshit in my personal experience – I act exactly the same way when I drink as when I’m sober (other than motor function) and so does anyone else who’s not looking for an excuse to act out their subconscious urges.

8

The fact that the perpetrator of attempted murder actually made the decision to murder (though he failed) distinguishes such a crime from the act of getting stoned.

No, they are not essentially the same.

The intent to murder is not itself a violation of rights, just as using meth is not itself a violation of rights. The similarity is that in both cases the law decides to punish the initial act in a comprehensive scheme to prevent the probably future harms (murder, etc.) This is why they are essentially the same. Whether the meth user has the same level of intent as a person attempting murder is an issue of degree, not of kind.

I would probably ban drunk driving on my highway, but I might be wrong. I’d be just as likely to require automated navigation systems and ban human driving entirely.

The problem is that private property owners don’t have the same capacity to deter drunk driving as the government. As the private owner of a highway you can’t prosecute a driver for drunk driving with the penalty of prison, revocation of license, etc. You would be able to remove the driver and vehicle from your highway, perhaps ban him from future use and then have him arrested for trespass if he returns. This is a pretty weak punishment compared to most government prosecutions for drunk driving.

9

The intent to murder is not itself a violation of rights, just as using meth is not itself a violation of rights.

Acting to do murder is a violation of rights, whether you succeed or not. That is why it is essentially different from using drugs.

Whether the meth user has the same level of intent as a person attempting murder is an issue of degree, not of kind.

That is not the issue. There is no matter of degree. In one case you acted to violate a right, in the other you didn’t.

10

The problem is that private property owners don’t have the same capacity to deter drunk driving as the government. As the private owner of a highway you can’t prosecute a driver for drunk driving with the penalty of prison, revocation of license, etc. You would be able to remove the driver and vehicle from your highway, perhaps ban him from future use and then have him arrested for trespass if he returns. This is a pretty weak punishment compared to most government prosecutions for drunk driving.

First, the property owner can do more than ban future use. He could have the driver sign an agreement or post a bond that would exact an arbitrary penalty for drunk driving, that could include confiscation of the car or worse. He could communicate the offense to all other road owners.

Second, since drunk driving is not a coercive activity, I don’t see a justification for government to be involved, no matter how risky it is. I can imagine some people paying extra for a special road on which driving & drinking is permitted, or even required, such as a street dedicated to bars which only allows customers to use it.

11

First, the property owner can do more than ban future use. He could have the driver sign an agreement or post a bond that would exact an arbitrary penalty for drunk driving, that could include confiscation of the car or worse. He could communicate the offense to all other road owners.

I think that drunken driving is a violation of rights, and no matter what contract people have with the road owner, no contract can ever justify violation of rights. The road owner does not have a open check to decide what level of threat people on his road should endure: Some threats ARE violation of right. To take the most obvious example: holding a loaded gun pointed at someone, even without shooting, is a violation of right: It limits the freedom of movement of the threatened person, who has to change his path to avoid the high risk of getting killed. Even if the person holding the gun has no intention of shooting (he just likes pointing the gun at people and see them scared), he is violating their rights. So unless the contract was between the one pointing the gun and the one who the gun is pointed at, I don’t see how a contract with a third party can justify it.

Now the question is, is drunken driving a violation of right or not? At what level does a threat or a risk to one’s life become a violation of right? Or what are the principles involved (if it is not a question of level)?

Seems like there is an agreement here that pointing a loaded gun at someone is a violation of their rights. Anyone disagrees and has counter arguments?

12

The intent to murder is not itself a violation of rights, just as using meth is not itself a violation of rights.

You’ve performed quite a bait-and-switch here: intending to murder someone is not illegal_–attempting_ to do so, is.

13

Acting to do murder is a violation of rights, whether you succeed or not. That is why it is essentially different from using drugs.

“Acting” as you put it, to do murder is NOT itself a violation of someone’s rights. I am of course talking about an attempt at murder in which the victim is unaware of the attempt. Otherwise the attempt itself might constitute the crime of assault. The reason why we punish attempt is not because it violates rights but because as a society we think that the intent to do wrong is blameworthy regardless of whether the intent leads to an actual rights violation or not.

First, the property owner can do more than ban future use. He could have the driver sign an agreement or post a bond that would exact an arbitrary penalty for drunk driving, that could include confiscation of the car or worse. He could communicate the offense to all other road owners.

Second, since drunk driving is not a coercive activity, I don’t see a justification for government to be involved, no matter how risky it is. I can imagine some people paying extra for a special road on which driving & drinking is permitted, or even required, such as a street dedicated to bars which only allows customers to use it.

No legal action instituted by a private property owner could ever approach the effectiveness of government prosecution. For instance, even a waiver which exacts a large monetary penalty is going to be less effective than a prison sentence. Also, there is no really practical way to have all streets be privitized. Private highways/tollways are entirely feasible but since access to a public right-of-way is enshrined in property law there are going to be “public” roads or routes in which no private property owner could even attempt legal action to prevent drunk driving.

You’ve performed quite a bait-and-switch here: intending to murder someone is not illegal_–attempting_ to do so, is.

I am not sure what you mean here. I was simply replying to the person who thought that intent made the difference whereas in my argument the presence of intent makes no difference at all.

14

To take the most obvious example: holding a loaded gun pointed at someone, even without shooting, is a violation of right: It limits the freedom of movement of the threatened person, who has to change his path to avoid the high risk of getting killed.

The essential difference between being careless with a gun in public and drunk driving on a private road is the matter of consent. You don’t have a right to risk strangers lives without their consent, but you choose to get on a road on which drunk driving is allowed. (Don’t forget that I am talking about private roads, which involve a consensual transaction every time you get on the road.)

Keep in mind that banning drunk driving carries an enforcement cost and an inconvenience to drivers who drink and drive (but not necessarily drive drunk). I might not want to pay an extra $.10 per mile to police drunk drivers, and I might not want to be paranoid every time I have a few drinks that I might get dragged off to jail. Anyway, who should make a decision about what level of risk I want to tolerate – the state or me? Should cell phone drivers be banned? What gives politicians the right to override my judgment of what I value more – lower fees and convenience, or safer roads? Who decides what level of enforcement I must pay for – should there be sobriety checkpoints every 10 miles? 5? Why can’t the market be allowed to make such choices?

Also, there is no really practical way to have all streets be privatized.

Even if human beings could not find a way to exchange some values voluntary, that does not give them the right to take them from others at the point of a gun.

Anyway, this isn’t an issue at all – for example, see: http://www.rationalmind.net/2005/01/05/private-roads/

15

Even if human beings could not find a way to exchange some values voluntary, that does not give them the right to take them from others at the point of a gun.

Anyway, this isn’t an issue at all – for example, see: http://www.rationalmind.net/2005/01/05/private-roads/

I don’t want to get on a sidetrack over whether roads should be private. My point was just that drunk driving really can’t be prevented by private actors without radical changes to our legal system, essentially changing it to its very core. It would not only require the ability of private entities to prosecute, convict and imprison citizens for civil violations but it would also require a complete restructuring of the common law right-of-way which has existed going back for hundreds and hundreds of years in both American and English law.

16

If you could scientifically establish a 1-to-1 corelation [sic] between activity A (which in and of itself does not violate anyone’s rights) and activity B (which DOES violate other people’s rights)

The question strikes me as rationalistic. What would be an example of this? Where would you find a 1 to 1 correlation of something that does not violate rights with something that does?

Also, are you also implying an absence of causation? Without causation, what use is correlation?

17

The intent to murder is not itself a violation of rights,

It is: it is the initiation of force. You seem to basing your conclusion on the premise that only the actual death is a rights-violation. This seems to me to be a basic distinguishing property of libertarian and Objectivist ethics, that libertarian ethics only precludes the actual realization of force and not its initiation (which is the Objectivist ethics prohibits by law). At no stage is drug use a violation of rights, which makes the difference.

18

The essential difference between being careless with a gun in public and drunk driving on a private road is the matter of consent. You don’t have a right to risk strangers lives without their consent, but you choose to get on a road on which drunk driving is allowed. (Don’t forget that I am talking about private roads, which involve a consensual transaction every time you get on the road.)

You missed my point: I said that even if a road owner allows rights violations (to take it to the extreme) on his road, it is still not a valid contract between the drivers: if the road owner makes the rule of “on my road, folks, everyone is allowed to drive and shoot, (yee-ha)” and somebody kills/injures someone, they are guilty of murder or should pay compensations, regardless of the rules on that road.

So even if some rules can be regulated in private contracts, they should not be, IF they are violations of rights.

So the essential question is: Is drunken driving a violation of rights? If it is, it doesn’t matter who owns the road or what rules he decided on. If it is not, then the rules on that road determine what should be done.

I need to think more about why drunk driving (or driving under influence of drugs) is a violation of rights, but here are my arguments so far:

When heavily drunk, or under the influence of mind-altering drugs or drugs that cloud one’s judgement and ability to think/react, a person behind a wheel becomes the holder of a dangerous weapon, instead of a tool of transportation. The line that makes it a weapon instead of a tool of transportation is when the driver is unable to prevent accident in regular situations of driving a car (such as the ability to remain in one’s lane, to stop behind the car in front of you under some average (or “normal”) deceleration, ability to notice people who are crossing the road, etc’). When a person is unable to perform these tasks, they are operating a deadly weapon against other people: if someone will not be harmed by it, it would be a coincidence. It would be as if someone started shooting in a street in all direction (suppose he did it from a distance, with a silencer, to make it more like this case), and eventually hit no one. Did he initiate the use of force against people? Well duh. Even if he hit no one, or even intended to hit anyone, it doesn’t matter.

The relation, in the eyes of law, is between using a gun (in the way I have described) and the probable outcome, not between using a gun and actually hiting someone. And the heavily-drunk driver is just the same.

19

If you could scientifically establish a 1-to-1 corelation between activity A (which in and of itself does not violate anyone’s rights) and activity B (which DOES violate other people’s rights), would it ever be acceptable to use the force of law to prevent activity A from happening?

Before you go down that slippery slope, I suggest worrying about what it would mean to “scientifically establish a 1-to-1 correlation”. That would mean that there is a perfect and exceptionless relationship: every time X happens, Y also happens. You have to determine that this is the case by observation, and since we’re talking about an open-ended concept and not a specific list of historical events, that means we have to ask “How many times have we observed this X-Y pair?” and “are our observations of Xs draw in such a way that all X’s have the same chance of being considered?”. If you have only considered three instances of X and Y going together, this doesn’t constitute scientific evidence of a correlation. And if your method of selecting cases by its nature precludes even considering X’s which are not Y, then of course no number of cases will prove such a correlation between X and Y.

To make this concrete in the case of meth, there is no evidence for a 100% correlation between meth use and rights-violation. There is not even evidence for a 50% correlation. There is no database of randomly selected meth users, or cocaine users, or PCP users – there is a database of people who commit crimes, some of which involve rights violations; and then amongst the rights-violators, you can find a certain number of people who use meth. Also you can find milk-drinkers, but let’s not worry about that scourge.

There is a fundamental reason why such a scientific perfect correlation cannot be made in statements about man’s chosen actions, and that is because of free will. If meth use made a made incapable of freely chosing, then such a correlation might theoretically be established. Similarly, being Muslim does not suspend free will and force you to commit acts of terror.

20

It is: it is the initiation of force. You seem to basing your conclusion on the premise that only the actual death is a rights-violation. This seems to me to be a basic distinguishing property of libertarian and Objectivist ethics, that libertarian ethics only precludes the actual realization of force and not its initiation (which is the Objectivist ethics prohibits by law). At no stage is drug use a violation of rights, which makes the difference.

This really doesn’t tell me anything, it is the equivilant of saying, “attempted murder is a rights violation because Objectivism says it as a rights violation.” You are going to have to explain why you think it is a rights violation, because I can tell you that the rationale in the law for attempt is not based on the idea that inchoate crimes themselves violate rights. It is based on the idea of punishing intent.