Does the particular nature of a particular volition determine that vol

[Eiuol]

I can certainly conceive of the color “red”, without its being attached to any entity. Granted, this will have been the result of the cumulative perceiving of what “red” means, that is, as an accident attached to a subject. What is particularly interesting is how the mind will “group” these accidents together, so that a warm red, and a cool red, will still be seen as belonging to the family of “red”.

The point is really just that “red” can’t exist without there being an actual thing that is red. It’s odd word choice to say “accident”, though what you seem to be saying is that “redness” is not *in* the object, and a classification of red is a conceptual activity rather than merely automatic and perceptual, all of which I’d agree with. Tangent, anyway… But perhaps relevant.

[Tenderlysharp]

I can certainly conceive of the color “red”, without its being attached to any entity.

Epistemologically one can mentally isolate the attribute red in order to define it, but the ability to do so depends on first observing it while it is attached to objects.

[2046]

2046, thank you for posting. I am familiar with the claim that the metaphysical freedom of the will is self-evident through introspection. However, I remain unconvinced. I am, of course, aware of alternatives between which I choose. The problem I see is that these choices are not equivalent. When I am cooking at a stove, I am aware that I could, if I chose to, place my hand on the stove. But that option is experienced along with a sort of experiential evaluation which amounts to: I could, but I don’t want to, so I won’t. It is in this sense that I would hold my nature, coupled with my context, determines my particular choice. It is not in my nature to select burning my hand on a hot stove (unless there is some motivating reason that outweighs the negative experience of burning my hand). I do not think this makes my will unfree. I am free to do whatever I ‘want’ and therefore choose. Not being able to choose what I fundamentally want amounts to an inability to determine my own fundamental nature, but what sort of thing could determine its fundamental nature, and how would it do so?

I’m not sure what you’re describing is incompatible with the axiomatic view of a volitional consciousness. Again, I don’t really see how that “hand on the stove” example differs from my “not in my nature to murder someone” example. Perhaps you are, as oft are most objections to free will, taking as your understanding of volition as something conceived of before-hand, then comparing it to reality and seeing that it doesn’t live up to this expectation.

So we observe that we are not free to do literally “whatever we want,” which free will is defined as, therefore there must be no free will. Why must every alternative be equivalent? Why is that the standard? But this definition is arbitrary and context-less. We mustn’t start with a conception of volition or a standard of what volition should have to be, then observe what we can do. Rather, we just observe what we can do and see that we can make choices, that we can control and direct our focus, that we can select our attention to things, that we can move our body, that we can make evaluations, and choose between alternative courses, and so forth.

The point is that free will isn’t some thing that is magical or the limitless ability to “do whatever I want” or to “make any choice.” Nothing is limitless, everything is bound by the law of identity, and is thus something very specific with specific limitations and boundaries. Keeping this context, it is improper to conceive of free will as something which is our power to defy our nature or the nature of entities in reality. This includes keeping in mind that previous choices and acts of will that condition our character and values, and thus influence the kind of choices we will make in the future.

[Mandos]

Tenderlysharp, I am not attempting to invalidate the concept ‘self’. That way madness lies. I am merely pointing out that, if no patterns existed in the actions of entities, our concepts of entities and causation and action would not help us to predict or to deal with reality–and to this extent they would be useless and perhaps superfluous. I do not subscribe to this position and I don’t think Rand did either. What puzzles me is in what sense she meant the will is free to choose. If the choice is made and determined by the will’s nature, there is no problem, either for the claim that the action is chosen among alternatives or for the claim that the entity choosing was connected to the choice made–and thus the choice made tells us something about the entity choosing, validating judgment of a person based on that person’s past choices. Consider, for instance, the case of Jo and Mary you mention. Imagine Jo saved Mary. Would it be reasonable to expect that, after saving Mary, Jo would kill her? No, because Jo loves Mary, and Jo is not the sort of person who will destroy something he loves–he is the type of person who will risk everything for it. I am contending both that Jo chose to save Mary under the circumstance and that it was in Jo’s nature to save Mary, so his actions could have been predicted given sufficient knowledge about his nature. If we are maintaining that Jo is strictly unpredictable, his actions directed neither by the tendencies inherent in his character nor the nature of his particular self, then why expect anything at all from him? One moment he will do one thing. Another moment he will do another. Neither thing is determined by the nature of his volitional faculty or by the nature of his character. He is absolutely free in the sense that any of the available alternative could have happened in the metaphysical sense–which I take to mean they are strictly unpredictable in the sense I described earlier. Nothing we know about Jo can tell us how Jo will act from moment to moment. In a certain sense, the Jo who just saved Mary is not the same Jo Mary is with after having been saved–some memories and character traits happen to attach to him, but his will is absolutely free and not bound to behave according to a particular nature. Each choice thus is entirely free from all the others and no choice tells us anything about what he will do. I don’t know about you, but if I were Mary in this situation, I’d run from Jo as fast as I could.

I hope it’s obvious that I don’t hold this sort of view of human beings. I think each individual determines their own destiny to a great extent, but I think each individual does so according to that individual’s particular nature. I am myself–I have a particular nature, and I act only as my nature dictates. This does not make my actions unchosen, it merely makes my actions predictable given sufficient information, which I hope I’ve demonstrated above is not necessarily an undesirable thing. (By the way, you mentioned in passing that a person can choose their own nature. What does the choosing and why does it make the particular choice it makes, if it does not yet have a nature?)

Avila, your post is interesting but I feel addressing it would sidetrack the discussion. If you feel it is important that it be addressed, please help me to understand how it fits in and I will try to formulate a response.

Eiuol, as I understand you, I think we are in agreement. The substitution of ‘individual’ is quite legitimate. I only use the more cumbersome ‘volitional faculty’ in an attempt to be clear about exactly what I mean by an individual that makes choices and should bear responsibility for them. I also wholeheartedly agree that generalizations over all human beings should not be made here. It certainly doesn’t follow from the fact that someone is a human being that they will behave rationally, nor does that follow from the particular context in which they find themselves. Rather, I would say that whether or not a person behaves rationally (or in any other fashion) in a particular context is ultimately determined by who the person, that is, the sort of person making the choice.

2046, I certainly do not think what I am describing is the actual state of affairs and I am most definitely not attempting to refute freedom of the will. I am simply trying to clarify what we mean by such freedom. Particularly, I am interested in why Rand seems to have rejected the idea that free will and determinism, properly understood, are compatible. This is essentially my own position, because when I think of ‘determinism’, I am including choice among the things determining what occurs. I think choices connect to the sort of person choosing, which seems to be a good way to justify hold the person responsible for the choice, rather than just ‘the person making that particular choice’ which is different than ‘the person immediately after making that particular choice’ responsible. I hope that was clear–it’s easy to get lost in the wording with this sort of thing.

[2046]

2046, I certainly do not think what I am describing is the actual state of affairs and I am most definitely not attempting to refute freedom of the will. I am simply trying to clarify what we mean by such freedom. Particularly, I am interested in why Rand seems to have rejected the idea that free will and determinism, properly understood, are compatible. This is essentially my own position, because when I think of ‘determinism’, I am including choice among the things determining what occurs. I think choices connect to the sort of person choosing, which seems to be a good way to justify hold the person responsible for the choice, rather than just ‘the person making that particular choice’ which is different than ‘the person immediately after making that particular choice’ responsible. I hope that was clear–it’s easy to get lost in the wording with this sort of thing.

Well, I think there might be a misunderstanding of the Randian position on will here. Far from rejecting determinism in the properly understood sense, Rand views this as the very basis of her search for knowledge, for without a determined universe (including man’s consciousness) we could never grasp any systematic facts of reality. The reason we say that things are determined is that every existing thing must have a specific existence. Having a specific existence, it must have certain definite, definable, delimitable attributes. Every entity, then, can act or behave only in accordance with its nature, and any two entities can interact only in accord with their respective natures. Therefore, the actions of every entity are caused by, determined by, its nature. Note this is quite the opposite from saying that any thing is uncaused, including man’s choices.

This is the Aristotelian view of causality Rand takes. Determinism, properly understood, means cause and effect. The law of identity and determinism or causality are interlinked. “The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature (AS.)” Rand hasn’t at all rejected determinism, only the behaviorist or materialist view of the mind (or if you want to be specific, psychological determinism.)

What Rand means by freedom of will is basically the Thomistic view of free will as the ability to think, to use your conceptual faculty. In other words, reason and free will are one in the same, and both necessary for the other to work.

Since all things are something specific, so too is the mind and consciousness and all of its workings, including the will. So while most things have no consciousness and therefore pursue no goals, it is an essential attribute of man’s nature that he has a kind of consciousness unique among other organisms, a consciousness that can perform certain acts of self-regulation, and therefore that his actions are self-determined by the choices his mind makes according to the kinds of self-regulation the mind can do. Psychologically speaking, these things can be discovered and enumerated by the science which studies consciousness. Philosophically speaking, we can know universally that we choose between alternative modes of action, and select our focus and attention by direct introspection, and that the logic of (psychological) determinism leads to contradiction.

That’s pretty much it in a nutshell (of course there are numerous points we can make, and conclusions we can draw, based on this outline.)

[Avila]

The point is really just that “red” can’t exist without there being an actual thing that is red. It’s odd word choice to say “accident”, though what you seem to be saying is that “redness” is not *in* the object, and a classification of red is a conceptual activity rather than merely automatic and perceptual, all of which I’d agree with. Tangent, anyway… But perhaps relevant.

It’s not an odd word choice at all, as I am using the term as it is generally understood in philosophy (an attribute that is not essential to the essence of a thing).

But you’re right, this probably is just getting off on a tangent…

[Dante]

It’s not an odd word choice at all, as I am using the term as it is generally understood in philosophy (an attribute that is not essential to the essence of a thing).

Although this is apparently a tangent, it should be noted here that in the Objectivist view, essences are epistemological, not metaphysical. We need to identify essences in order to properly form abstractions, but on a purely metaphysical level all of an objects characteristics are on par with all others. See here. And that’s all I’ll contribute to the tangent.