I’ve been studying Kant for an undergraduate research project. I’ve concluded that although Rand and Kant certainly have their differences, and important ones, I think they also have lots in common, and that Kant was hardly Rand’s opposite. (Probably some postmodernist like Foucault, Derrida, or Rorty fits that description). I’m wondering if anyone wants to discuss why Rand hated Kant so much.
I’d be interested. But before I commit myself I like to read what you think Rand and Kant had in common, and why (if?) you think those commonalities have any importance.
According to Kant, the world is unknowable to man, and therefore hostile to him. Knowledge and values are impossible to man or - if he wants to try for them anyway - utterly subjective.
According to Rand, the world is knowable to man, and therefore benevolent to him. Knowledge and values are possible to man and they are achievable - and they are fully objective.
According to Kant, the world is unknowable to man
This is just wrong. Kant no more held that man couldnt ‘know reality’ than AR did, when she said that “all knowledge is human knowledge”. The point both are making is fundamentally the same - man knows the world from his point of view, and it is senseless to say his knowledge is therefore invalid because it falls short of a theoretical ‘God’s eye’ omniscience.
If by the complaints – that we have no insight whatsoever into the inner nature of things – it be meant that we cannot conceive by pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, they are entirely illegitimate and unreasonable. For what is demanded is that we should be able to know things, and therefore to intuit them, without senses, and therefore that we should have a faculty of knowledge altogether different from the human and this not only in degree but as regards intuition likewise in kind – in other words, that we should be not men but beings of whom we are unable to say whether they are even possible, much less how they are constituted
CPR A278-9 B334-5
Is this not essentially ARs point?
if he wants to try for them anyway - utterly subjective.
How can you support the claim that values were subjective to Kant, when his entire moral project was to derive ethical laws from (what he believed to be) universal laws of reason, which governed all rational beings and applied to them all equally? Kant’s position was ‘objectivism’ (with a lower case o) taken to ludicrous extremes - there is nothing subjective about it.
I’ve been studying Kant for an undergraduate research project. I’ve concluded that although Rand and Kant certainly have their differences, and important ones, I think they also have lots in common, and that Kant was hardly Rand’s opposite. (Probably some postmodernist like Foucault, Derrida, or Rorty fits that description). I’m wondering if anyone wants to discuss why Rand hated Kant so much.
I dont think the complaint is that Kant himself was the polar opposite of AR, but that his work was the catalyst for a long line of irrational thought. People like Marx, Derrida and Rorty, along with most other Continental irrationalists, have their roots firmly in Hegel who himself was a reaction against the Kantian project. In other words (or so the argument goes), its not so much what Kant did, as what his work made possible.
Im quite sceptical about this line of reasoning though because its not clear where it ends. Kant was strongly influenced by Aristotle, Leibniz and Hume, who were in turn influenced by previous philosophers, and so on until we get back to Thales (or perhaps Pythagorus, who was a more direct influence on Plato afaik). It seems a bit arbitrary to pick out Kant as being ‘The One’ responsible for modern day irrationality - if you had to pick a single person, Hegel would seem a more natural choice. It’s more the Hegelian developments of Kantian doctrine, such as the relativisation of his ‘universal’ principles to specific cultures and historical periods, that have influenced philosophers like those you mentioned.
In particular, if you wanted to claim that Nazism and the Soviet Union were ‘caused’ by philosophy, Hegel seems a far better choice than Kant. Kant didnt really contribute much to German nationalism, and Marx was a Hegelian.
Sorry, I’m retarded with computers. Referring to the last post, the 2nd anf 4th paragraphs are mine. The 1st and 3rd are Hal’s. Don’t want Hal to think I’m plagiarizing. 
Is this not essentially ARs point?
[bold added for emphasis.]
No. I am sure that you can pick passages out of Kant’s CPR that “sound” like something acceptable to an Objectivist-- on a first reading and without questioning either the terms/ideas in it or the context.
The question at issue, however, is meaning, and meaning is determined by context.
In particular, what did Kant mean by “inner nature of things” as distinct from appearances? Likewise, what did Kant mean by “pure understanding”? Where did Ayn Rand use the same ideas?
Remember that the meaning of all ideas, except axioms, is determined by the context in which they are held. Part of Kant’s context was his desire to limit reason in order to make room for faith. Where did Ayn Rand express that desire – or the underlying premise that faith and “reason” are necessary?
For that matter, do you hold that “reason” for Kant meant the same as “reason” for Ayn Rand?
The point both are making is fundamentally the same - man knows the world from his point of view
That is a premise of both, but not a point they are making.
Miss Rand uses that premise to make the point that man is capable of discovering reality.
Kant misuses the above premise to make the point that man is only capable of discovering some appearances that are distinct from his “true” reality, and whose connection to or disconnectedness from “true” reality man can never know anything about.
CPR A278-9 B334-5
Did you look two sentences before what you quoted?
The absolutely inward [nature]of matter, as it would
have to be conceived by pure understanding, is nothing but
a phantom; for matter is not among the objects of pure
understanding, and the transcendental object which may be
the ground of this appearance that we call matter is a mere
something of which we should not understand what it is, even
if someone were in a position to tell us.
How can you support the claim that values were subjective to Kant when his entire moral project was to derive ethical laws from (what he believed to be) universal laws of reason, which governed all rational beings and applied to them all equally?
Universality does not equal objectivity. If all men commit the same fallacy, their conclusions will be equally non-objective.
Objectivity consists of making observations using one’s senses and drawing inferences from them using logic. Kant denied the validity of man’s senses, and thus confined logic to turning the arbitrary garbage it is input into some useless garbage to output.
Kant’s position was ‘objectivism’ (with a lower case o) taken to ludicrous extremes
What do you consider a non-ludicrous, non-extreme amount of objectivity? Why do you think it is necessary to place limits on objectivity? What do you propose to use in the place of objectivity when the limit has been reached?
I’ve been studying Kant for an undergraduate research project. I’ve concluded that although Rand and Kant certainly have their differences, and important ones, I think they also have lots in common, and that Kant was hardly Rand’s opposite.
Your assertions raise many questions. First, what were the essentials of Kant’s philosophy, and how do they compare to Ayn Rand’s essentialization of Objectivism, while “standing on one foot”? (“Objectivism,” Ayn Rand Lexicon, pp. 343-344)
Second, when you speak of two philosophers as being opposites, what do you mean?
What I mean is that one philosopher’s philosophical essentials contradict the other philosopher’s philosophical essentials. For example, if one philosopher says there are two worlds, the intelligible and the sensible, and the other philosopher says there is one world – which is intelligible through the senses – then those philosophers are opposites in the branches of metaphysics and epistemology as well as in all branches that hierarchically stand on them no matter what they say.
I’ve always been struck by the similarity between Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative and Rand’s principle that man is an end in himself.
Are you aware that you left out an important word? According to Objectivism, each man is an end in himself! This is a far, far cry from Kant’s “all humanity” stuff.
In particular, what did Kant mean by “inner nature of things” as distinct from appearances? Likewise, what did Kant mean by “pure understanding”? Where did Ayn Rand use the same ideas?
…
For that matter, do you hold that “reason” for Kant meant the same as “reason” for Ayn Rand?
She didnt, but this just shows how hard it is to directly compare 2 philosophers who were attacking problems from completely opposite directions, using very different concepts and terminology. Personally I see a lot of similarities between the epistemology of Kant and AR - obviously they differ on several things, but I think they have a lot more in common than AR and Kant’s opponents (Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, etc).
Personally I see a lot of similarities between the epistemology of Kant and AR
For example?
Personally I see a lot of similarities between the epistemology of Kant and AR - obviously they differ on several things, but I think they have a lot more in common than AR and Kant’s opponents (Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, etc).
I am in the process of proposing a discussion/debate between you and me on this very subject. You might wait to see if that is acceptable before posting here about your statement.
I’ve taken a class in Kant by Robert Greenberg, one of today’s most respected Kantologists. I have to say that I found him opposite of Rand in all but the most insignificant of matters–namely, the belief that people ought to own property fee simple in a liberal society (democracy?). The reason I find this an inconsequential parallel is because Kant made no argument on the premise of man’s self-interest but rather considered it the only way for man to prove his dedication to Christian, self-sacrificial ethics. Furthermore, Robert Paul Wolff argued–I believe successfully–that given Kantian moral principles one must conclude that anarchism is the most ethical political system.
Nonetheless, I must admit like a lamb amongst the wolves, that I actually found some of Kant’s ideas interesting and compelling. The one that I am most awed by, and which has in test of practice shown itself to have been a very brilliant idea, is the idea that time, space, and necessary truth (or, in Kantonese, “the categories”) are ideal–and thus not real. I think the vast majority of people who read his works on this are simply unaware of what is going on because Kant writes in unbearably obscure language. Those who get it see it as a problem, and not a solution, which I believe is a mistake. The point that Kant is trying to make here is that not all is what it seems to be. Opposed to positivists, Kant argued that time is just a means of human perception and concept formation, a “sensible object”, which exists in our heads. The Einstein-Minkowski spatialization of time is an eerie reincarnation of this idea. What Kant is telling us is that we should not confuse our means of perception for what actually exists. For instance, it seems to us that the sun revolves around the Earth, but this is only due to the fact that we stand as small beings on a large sphere and are not directly privy to a top-down view of the solar system.
But Kant did stress that we can never “know the thing-in-itself”, which I find a fundamental mistake which was the root of Kant’s skepticism that logically leads to insanity, and more to the point, a serious divergence from Objectivism. Ayn Rand would argue, I believe, that we can know properties of the thing-in-itself and trust that our senses inform us about it. Kant argued that a priori knowledge was unreal, and a posteriori knowledge was untrustworthy. Ayn Rand argued that both in conjunction with the other was the only means of knowledge.
I will say, however, that I find many Objectivists are unclear about Kantian morality. They often dismiss it as Kantian subjectivism, which is not altogether unjustified. But Kant did try to develop a theory of ethics in which it was objectively and universally good to serve other people. What is subjective is the means to provide that service, and what constitutes “good to other people”. To choose an extreme but very appropriate example, Nazism defended itself on the principle that it was good for its people–and the means, though ugly, was quite necessary and moral in their eyes. Secondly, were the Chicago courts in the turn of the century acting on behalf of people’s best interests when they arrested prostitutes, homosexuals, errant alcoholic spouses, and other social deviants?
I’ve taken a class in Kant by Robert Greenberg, one of today’s most respected Kantologists. I have to say that I found him opposite of Rand in all but the most insignificant of matters–namely, the belief that people ought to own property fee simple in a liberal society (democracy?). The reason I find this an inconsequential parallel is because Kant made no argument on the premise of man’s self-interest but rather considered it the only way for man to prove his dedication to Christian, self-sacrificial ethics. Furthermore, Robert Paul Wolff argued–I believe successfully–that given Kantian moral principles one must conclude that anarchism is the most ethical political system.
Kantian and Objectivist ethics/metaethics are in direct opposition pretty much every point - I’d be amazed if anyone argued otherwise.
The one that I am most awed by, and which has in test of practice shown itself to have been a very brilliant idea, is the idea that time, space, and necessary truth (or, in Kantonese, “the categories”) are ideal–and thus not real.
But Kant did stress that we can never “know the thing-in-itself”, which I find a fundamental mistake which was the root of Kant’s skepticism that logically leads to insanity, and more to the point, a serious divergence from Objectivism.
I find your statements contradictory. The Kantian ‘thing in itself’ is the objects we experience, considered apart from the contributions of human cognition. If you accept that space and time are merely forms of our sensibility, then it seems to follow that objects, considered as things in themselves (ie abstracted from our particular modes of cognition), cannot be said to be spatio-temporal. And Kant’s point about their ‘unknowability’ (although this term is misleading) follows.
Well I do say that I am awed and compelled by Kant’s ideas, but not that I completely agree with them. I believe that we ought to make the best interpretation of the world that exists outside of ourselves by means of the information provided by our senses. So while we should take our perceptions to be reflections of properties that exist in the things in themselves, we should not take the positivist view that our directly seeing them is the only means of percieving them. We should realize that the senses may provide indirect proofs, but all the same we are relying upon the senses.
The point that Kant is trying to make here is that not all is what it seems to be.
He said more than that. He said that nothing was what it seemed to be.
Opposed to positivists, Kant argued that time is just a means of human perception and concept formation, a “sensible object”, which exists in our heads.
I’m trying to make sense of that, but it’s too Kantianese. “Time is just a means of human perception” … what on Earth does that mean?
What Kant is telling us is that we should not confuse our means of perception for what actually exists. For instance, it seems to us that the sun revolves around the Earth, but this is only due to the fact that we stand as small beings on a large sphere and are not directly privy to a top-down view of the solar system.
You assume that Kant would accept a “top-down view” of the solar system as how it “really” is. He would not. He would still say that it is just a view, tainted by its “top-down-ness.”
Kant does not say that we should adjust our observations for the effects of our means of observation (this is what we Objectivists are saying!) he says that the mere presence of any means of observation renders the observation invalid. According to Kant, things cannot be observed; only “phenomena” can be observed.
But Kant did stress that we can never “know the thing-in-itself”, which I find a fundamental mistake
Yes, this is what I am talking about.
Kant argued that a priori knowledge was unreal, and a posteriori knowledge was untrustworthy. Ayn Rand argued that both in conjunction with the other was the only means of knowledge
Actually, Ayn Rand did not accept the distinction between “a priori” and “a posteriori.”
But Kant did try to develop a theory of ethics in which it was objectively and universally good to serve other people.
Universally, yes. Objectively, no. As I wrote a couple of posts ago, objectivity consists of making observations using one’s senses and drawing inferences from them using logic. That is not how Kant’s morality was derived.
“He said more than that. He said that nothing was what it seemed to be.”
That’s why I later go on to say that his theory led to insanity.
“I’m trying to make sense of that, but it’s too Kantianese. “Time is just a means of human perception” … what on Earth does that mean?”
It would help–though it’s not necessary–to have a common background of understanding. Are you familiar with the Einstein-Minkowski 4-dimensional spatialization of time? If not, I’ll skip it and try to explain the whole deal without that crutch, since it is probably harder to explain that than it is to just talk about Kant.
“You assume that Kant would accept a “top-down view” of the solar system as how it “really” is. He would not. He would still say that it is just a view, tainted by its “top-down-ness.””
Actually, Kant saw the Copernican Revolution as the scientific application of his metaphysics. You’re right, I use a “top-down” view as an aid to help people understand what I’m saying, but Kant did consider the realization that the sun does not revolve around the earth but that the earth revolves around the sun. I’m guessing that you are going to tell me terms like “revolving” and “around” make no sense in a Kantian world and, while they don’t mean what we would think, they do have some significance. When we tackle the above, this will become more clear.
“Actually, Ayn Rand did not accept the distinction between “a priori” and “a posteriori.””
That’s why I say that she used them in conjunction, or combined them, that is, did not distinguish between them.
“Universally, yes. Objectively, no.”
Actually, he intended it to be objective, too, because he thought that there could be no morality that was objective without being universal. That does not mean–and Kant was distinctly aware of this–that this does not then imply that if a moral system is universal then it is objective, but that if it is objective then it is universal. But he did think that his moral argument followed from first principles and could be demonstrated in terms of a purely formal system, which he took to constitute an objective proof.
It would help–though it’s not necessary–to have a common background of understanding. Are you familiar with the Einstein-Minkowski 4-dimensional spatialization of time?
I am familiar with it–and also very curious about what it could have to do with that Kantianese sentence. So let’s give it a go! 
I’m guessing that you are going to tell me terms like “revolving” and “around” make no sense in a Kantian world
I don’t think anything makes sense in a Kantian world, so I wasn’t going to single out “revolve” and “around.” 
Actually, all three of the following statements are true:
-
The Sun revolves around the Earth in the Earth’s frame of reference.
-
The Earth revolves around the Sun in the Sun’s frame of reference.
-
The Sun, the Earth, and the other planets revolve around the solar system’s center of mass in an intertial observer’s frame of reference.
I simply like to express this as, “The Sun and Earth revolve around each other.”
Notice how I always either give the context for “revolve around” by specifying a frame of reference, or express the fact as a relationship. I do not speak of a “revolving-in-itself.”
If Kant thought that science had discovered a “revolving-in-itself” of the Earth around the Sun, which he could gladly seize upon as an example of how our geocentric picture was only an appearance, then he was dumber than I had thought. According to his own theory, men can never discover any thing-in-itself, so the heliocentric model would be just another appearance !
That’s why I say that she used them in conjunction, or combined them, that is, did not distinguish between them.
You can only say that you combine two things if you recognize that they are TWO things–i.e. you distinguish them. If there is only one thing, there is no need to “combine.”
According to Kant, there are a priori ideas, which do not tell us about reality in one way, and a posteriori ideas, which do not tell us about reality in another way. According to Ayn Rand, there is objective knowledge. Kant has two rotten apples, while Miss Rand has one good orange.
Actually, he intended it to be objective, too, because he thought that there could be no morality that was objective without being universal.
Did he flunk logic too?
"If it is objective, then it is universal.
It is universal.
Therefore, it is objective."
“I am familiar with it–and also very curious about what it could have to do with that Kantianese sentence. So let’s give it a go!”
Okay, good. Then we know that our perception of the “flow” of a unified time is simply an illusion created by the fact that we perceive one flow of time, B-series time, as well as time in relatively similar frames of reference, such as that in which the planets move. Because time is built into the very way that we think, it is taken to be ideal–that is, not real. As Kant stressed, we should never mistake our instrument for the object under observation. It would be like believing the microscope were a part of the cell, or the ear a part of the music.
But they do have significance in this regard: Changes in time, space, and the various other properties observed in an object do have objective causes–we simply cannot know what they are (that is what I call his Insanity Clause). For instance, according to Kant, the relationship of distance between two points–call it relationship R–is actually a property of something as it exists in itself, but we should assume that the property is the relationship R as we perceive it.
It is similar to the following: What is the image of a circle? You might be tempted to smack your forehead, air-finger a circle and say “Duh!” You’d be wrong. There is no intrinsic image of a circle. The circle is a shape that exists independent of representation and an image is nothing more than a representation which, though it may contain similar properties as that which it represents, does not capture the essence of the object but merely refers to its essence. The word ‘circle’ refers just as much to a circle as an image does, but we do not confuse the word ‘circle’ for a circle. Likewise, we should not confuse any representation of an object for the object itself.
The problem, as I understand him, is that Kant declined to acknowledge that our representations are significant. Like the relationship R, he took it to be the case that knowing the relationship R was a representation of some property P in the thing(s)-in-themselves did not actually tell you about the property P. Again, the Insanity Clause.
I have to go do roofing work (yay), so I’ll let you chew on this for a while and answer the rest when I get back.