The most significant first salvo in Trump’s attack against foreigners is his interpretative directive regarding “citizen”, which says that
Among the categories of individuals born in the United States and not subject to the jurisdiction thereof, the privilege of United States citizenship does not automatically extend to persons born in the United States: (1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.
One has to fill in some gaps to make this argument complete. These points will no doubt be explicitly argued when the case reaches the appeals courts. Para 6 of the TRO against the order only gives a simple statement of why plaintiffs are likely to succeed. For our temporary entertainment (or, in anticipation of a forthcoming legal apocalypse), we can consider the probable logic that can be applied to this case.
The key constitutional clause is that “All person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”. Exceptions have long been recognized by reference to English law for a definition of “natural-born British subject”, whereby one is not a natural-born British subject. First, “Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien” and “Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the Crown by the Sovereign of a foreign State is (though born within the British dominions) an alien”. This defines the common law presumption that underlies the US Constitution.
In the Slaughterhouse Cases (16 Wall. 83 U. S. 72), the court makes a distinction between citizenship in a state, and citizenship in the US:
The distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union.
That ruling also states the standard interpretation of ‘subject to its jurisdiction’:
The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."
In US v. WAK, the court dials back this position a bit, noting that “neither Mr. Justice Miller nor any of the justices who took part in the decision of The Slaughterhouse Cases understood the court to be committed to the view that all children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of foreign States were excluded from the operation of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is manifest…”, referring to Minor v. Happersett (1874), 21 Wall. 162, 88 U. S. 166-168. Instead,
Allegiance and protection are, in this connection…reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other: allegiance for protection, and protection for allegiance. . . . At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further, and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents.
Here is the ticking time bomb:
As to this class, there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens.
The court in US v. WAK then claims that
The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, “All persons born in the United States” by the addition “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases – children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State – both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country.
It is uncontroversial that there exists a traditional definition of those who are not natural born citizens (a fatal lacuna in Roe v. Wade). The core of the “subject to jurisdiction” argument starts at p. 169.
It is utterly uncontroversial that every alien who is present in the US, other than a POW or diplomat, is subject to the laws of the US. Were that not the case, and were Trump’s assertion about offspring of aliens who are either illegal or temporary not being “subject to US jurisdiction” true, that would mean that offspring of such persons are, like POWs and diplomats, immune from criminal prosecution of civil action – a ludicrous assertion. That is the difference between those subject to jurisdiction, and those immune to jurisdiction.
Whenever the court utters an unprincipled statement like “For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts”, you can predict that such failure to identify a principle will come back to bite you, or more precisely, us. There is a strong argument from tradition that “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” has an extremely narrow application. I predict that the order will be obliterated, possibly even by SCOTUS explicitly reaffirming the meaning of “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”. Still, nothing is certain with this court.