I recently read Peikoff’s “Fact and Value” and found it to be a brilliant rebuttal of the travesty of Kelley’s positions. Still, I’m having trouble imagining how one would actually apply some of the Peikoff’s abstractions.
Right away, Peikoff posits that fact and value cannot be sundered:
Every proper value-judgment is the identification of a fact: a given object or action advances man’s life (it is good): or it threatens man’s life (it is bad or an evil). The good, therefore, is a species of the true; it is a form of recognizing reality.
When applied to realm of judging men, this is the principle of justice. A man who holds a true idea is praiseworthy, whereas a man holding a false idea deserves condemnation. In regard to truth and falsity, Peikoff makes mention of a third possibility, an idea embraced whimsically, devoid any process of reasoning:
For Objectivism, an idea thus embraced is not “true” (or “false”). In relation to such a mind, the idea is without cognitive status; it is the arbitrary, and is analogous to the sounds emitted by a parrot. The true qua true, by contrast, does imply a process of understanding and integration, and therefore some degree of effort, focus, work.
In the preceding quotation, I personally added the underlining because I’m curious how this arbitrary idea should be judged by an external examiner. If I am judging a man with no grounding for his Marxism, a tenet which I know to be false and evil, do I judge him to a lesser degree than I would an academic Marxist? Certainly anyone holding such an arbitrary idea, regardless of its specific content, is automatically morally culpable by virtue of the fact that they’re abdicating reality in favor of caprice and faith, but are they evil to the same degree as someone who reasoned his way to the evil position? Is there even any objective basis for degrees of evil?
Maybe there’s some relevant principle in Peikoff’s article that I’m just not grasping. Hopefully someone else can clarify the issue a little bit. ![]()