I sat in on an economics lecture earlier in the term, and the lecturer said that there was a ‘macroeconomic trillema’ amongst the different types of money, which is that you can only have two of, but never all three of, the following:
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Fixed exchange rates
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The power of the government to expand the currency in times of depression and to deflate when there seems to be too much of a boom
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Free capital mobility (I’ve written, “Increase foreign investment alongside NO increase in domestic saving”, in my notes, but I don’t know what this means).
Now, his next point was that of Interest rates (well, he talked first about why the silver standard fell out of favour, and about Hume’s ‘specie-flow mechanism’*, which, if I understand it correctly, was basically the last nail in the coffin for the Mercantilist idea that if gold flowed out of the country, the country was necessarily weakened economically [a lesson the US and the UK would do well to learn]), which were a tool of managing the trade balance.
Since gold and silver was not literally being shipped around on boats on a regular basis (possibly practical today, but imagine what would happen if a wooden boat sunk carrying just 10% of your country’s hold inside back in the 1700s!), the central bank used the interest rate to encourage or discourage saving, relative to the value of the Gold. This was not the same as the fiat method now, where it is changed almost willy nilly - the central banks would be responding to the actual value of Gold, i.e. the economic reality of the country.
Now, one of the major problems that crops up - besides the need to avoid war** and financial panics, which might lead to inflation or an emergency suspension of the gold standard - is that of the central bank. See, it has a pretty legitimate role, even by our standards, in that what it should be doing is altering the interest rates in regard to an objective view of the reality of the economy. The problem was, it was a government institution, and if it wanted to keep interest rates low when it should really have started raising them, it could do so.***
Another problem was the fact that if a country started raising interest rates to stem its flow of production relative to the actual gold-capital it had to produce with (i.e. if its liabilities were greater than its assets and its free capital was becoming diminished), this rise in interest rates could bankrupt debtors who owed the interest-raising-bank money.
Finally, all economies needed to be strong. A weak, panicy economy in one part of the world could have very bad consequences for the rest, especially if it was one of the leading economies before it became weak and panicy (i.e. the US at the moment).
*Interestingly, the lecturer sees it in reverse to Objectivist economists: he thinks the relatively peaceful period of the 19th century was a precondition for global capitalism, not an effect of it.
** Not that a private bank issuing currency couldn’t do this, just that I think it would face a more immediate repercussion from other banks, although I’m not sure about this. Little help, any Objectoconomists?
*** One thing he pointed out struck me: he claimed that the Great Depression was caused largely by the raising of tariffs by Hoover - a mercantilist approach to the economy - which stopped the market from correcting itself through the flow of imports and exports.