425,
I still do not understand your answer or how it answers the question from the original post.
My answer to the original post is the same as that of the other posters. When making decisions about morality, one must gather all of the evidence available and ensure that his own logical methods are airtight. It is always going to be, as one of them put it, a “guess-and-check” method. I believe our current conversation is a result of diversions taken by both of us onto tangential but related topics.
To continue your example, Muslim terrorists are certain they are right. You state that they are not right and you seem very certain about your claim that they are not right. At this point, according to your post, both sides will have to either agree to disagree or make a moral judgment depending on the situation. I would assume in this situation the Muslim terrorists’ judgment would be that they are moral and you are immoral and your judgment would be that you are moral and that they are immoral.
I’m quite certain that Muslim terrorists are not right. When I talk about agreeing to disagree or prescribing moral judgements, I’m referring to my conduct according to the Objectivist morality, not their conduct according to Islamic morality. I imagine that their position in this situation would be that I am an infidel who has insulted Allah and the prophet Mohammad and therefore deserve death.
My position is that I should choose between a few actions: a) agree to disagree and choose another topic of conversation; b ) agree to disagree, but determine that my opponents are dishonest and therefore not worth any more of my time; or c) determine that my opponents intend to initiate the use of force and inform the proper authorities for my safety and that of other innocents. Each of these three scenarios requires first the conclusion of my moral judgement. In the first, I conclude that my opponent is mistaken but not dishonest, immoral or a force user. In the second, I conclude that my opponent is dishonest but not a force user, at least not in the immediate sense. In the third, I conclude that my opponent intends to initiate force. In the Muslim terrorist example, I’m probably choosing the third option. So I am passing moral judgement on them, saying that they are immoral, and I’m also calling the authorities because I believe it is likely that they will initiate force.
So we are right back where we started. Muslim terrorists say that they are right, you state that they are not right, so both sides make a moral judgment based on their beliefs (of which both sides are certain). How can we say that anything is moral or immoral?
This is correct. However, I must again reiterate that being certain and being correct are two very different things. To provide a stronger illustration: Imagine a schizophrenic person who believes that you have hidden cameras in his house. You know well that you have not done this. He’s absolutely certain that you have, because he’s, you know, neurotic. You’re absolutely certain that you haven’t. Even though both of you are certain, it is clear who is correct. His thought method is not a rational one. He’s listening to his paranoid neuroses and jumping to completely unreasonable conclusions. No matter how certain he is in his belief that you hid cameras in his house, he is still wrong, because you did not.
That was a dramatization, but it illustrates the difference between being certain and being right. In a slightly less crazy example, look at our Muslim terrorists. They’re certain they are right. But what is their thought process? They’re taking the word of clerics and an old book that there is a supreme being who wants them to follow a whole set of rules, including the murder of infidels. This is not at all a rational thought process, this is the use of blind faith to replace reason. Since reason is the only method by which man can learn about reality, this process for determining moral principles is flawed as well.
Then, as DonAthos so wisely pointed out, there’s the matter of Objectivists disagreeing because one made an honest mistake. In this case, the mode of thought for the party that is incorrect is still a good mode of thought, but with a slight error in the process or a gap in knowledge. But still, in this case, it is clear that it is possible to be certain but wrong, even if the way in which you are wrong is a minor logical error instead of a completely incorrect mode of thought.
Follow the pattern here. Of course the certain schizophrenic in my example is wrong, that’s as clear as day. So why can’t the certain Muslim terrorist also be wrong? Or the mistaken but certain Objectivist? Just because the way in which these people are wrong isn’t as obvious as it is for the schizophrenic, this does not mean that we can’t identify where they go wrong and thus label their ideas as wrong ones?