Without having the decency to name names and quoting text, he’s referring to specific individuals, attempting to discredit Objectivism (w.r.t. the “Fact and Value” aspect) based on a supposed defect of those individuals. You’re right, though, in addition it isn’t true, a point I skipped.
I didn’t read it as necessarily attempting to discredit Objectivism, but only criticizing what he regarded as a specific fallacy.
Certainly that’s possible, but how could that apply here; or, what even hypothetically would be an example of such an “honest error”? Invoking “honest error” is a widely-played get out of moral evaluation free card in contemporary society. Be more specific about how one could reject Objectivism via “honest error”.
Actually, I wasn’t intentionally referring to a situation where a person is rejecting Objectivism as such after significant study of the philosophy. I would actually not comment on that matter, as it’s a more complex issue than I’ve thought about, other than to say I can definitely imagine many examples where that would be immoral. However, if we’re talking about a specific debate between two people over a less broad issue, then yes, I hold that a person can reject a true proposition by honest error. To say otherwise, would imply that the only alternatives, if one reaches a conclusion, are correctness or evasion.
To be clear, I don’t believe the drivers of the major vices in the world today, like the diminishing freedom we face in the US and worldwide, environmentalism, etc. can be the result of honest error.
How? When you know that there is evidence against your conclusion that you ignore, that is not an honest error.
A person ignoring evidence against one’s conclusion is actually the example I gave as something falling outside of honest error, which I described as irrational! (My specific example was evidence one does not know how to argue against, thus implying it was clearly brought to the person’s attention.)
Reaching certainty about a conclusion is itself a reasoning process, which is subject to error. A person could incorrectly regard a piece of evidence as not being relevant one way or the other to a conclusion, thus not considering it any further.
So how can one prematurely reach a conclusion that Objectivism is wrong? Conclusion-jumping is a specific instance of immoral conduct – it is not a virtue. It cannot be morally neutral (since reaching a conclusion is always a voluntary act and in factt cannot be coerced).
I believe that would depend on the nature of the “conclusion-jumping” in the specific case. If evasion is involved, then it is immoral. If the person is diligently working to reach the correct conclusion, but errs, that is not immoral. Further, if a person is working to expand their knowledge–of ethics, philosophy, or whatever field which will further their life–diligently considering all the facts available to them and never evading–it is morally good, even if they err.
This is entirely false. The most important error is that it misconstrues the nature of moral evaluation. You must evaluate every choice that you face using your life as your standard of evaluation. You must not evade knowledge, you must apply reason. If your choose to drive stoned because you seek the thrill, you have made an immoral choice, evading your knowledge of the consequences of driving stoned on your life, and making a choice that contradicts your ultimate goal. The Objectivist ethics are fully applicable and relevant to all choices that you make. So it is wrong to say that a specific action of an individual is immune to Objectivist ethics.
I agree with most of this, but not the first and last sentences as they apply to my argument: If one observes another making a choice not consistent with the Objectivist ethics, one should evaluate it in the context of one’s own knowledge. However, the other person making the choice has a different context of knowledge. For example, if a knowledgeable Objectivist observes another donating to a beggar, stating they feel it is their duty, it would be immoral for the Objectivist to perform that same action because it would be blanking out their knowledge of Objectivism and what they know to be true. However, the other person may not have reached this conclusion due to evasion, but rather because they have passively accepted the virtue of altruism from constantly hearing it in society, and not realizing that there are other ethical alternatives. Yet, the action of self-sacrifice, in the abstract, is immoral as it is not compatible with man’s life as the standard of value.
To say that an action cannot be morally evaluated in the context of a person’s knowledge is to suppose infallibility (with the possibility of evasion).
This part especially: “basically acting in accordance with reality”, “attempting to apply logic”, “do they ever willfully evade”; this suggests to me that you think of moral evaluation as primarily a method for condemning the actions of other individuals. It is not. The root of Objectivist ethics is the individual, the principles that guide you in making choices in your quest to achieve your ultimate goal. The root of Objectivist ethics is not about the epistemological problems of how to evaluate the evidence that another person is evading knowledge or being illogical in making choices.
I don’t believe evaluating whether a person is evading is the root of Objectivist ethics–I believe there are two contexts of classifying the morality of an action–the specific and the abstract. A person thoroughly knowledgeable about Objectivism can (and morally, must) apply the abstract evaluation, in the context of the Objectivist ethics, to their own actions. Any person must morally evaluate their own actions on the basis of their context of knowledge.