How would an Objectivist respond to the following Humian doubts?
-Solipsism (the notion that sensory data and a persisting external world can never be indepedently proven)
-The problem of induction (that empirical evidence can never form justified conclusions about the future)
-The is-ought problem (that ought morality statements can never be justified by referring to the state of things, effectively rendering morals subjective)
-Solipsism (the notion that sensory data and a persisting external world can never be indepedently proven)
“Proven”, as a concept, depends on sensory data and a persisting external world. Without those, the word “proven” means nothing. This fallacy is known as “stolen concept”.
-The problem of induction (that empirical evidence can never form justified conclusions about the future)
Doubt in the presence of evidence is as irrational as belief in the absence of evidence.
I know that water boils when heated. I know why water boils when heated. I know how several factors affect the boiling of water. I have a glass of water. I am absolutely 100% sure that if I heat it, it will boil. Because there is no evidence to the contrary.
-The is-ought problem (that ought morality statements can never be justified by referring to the state of things, effectively rendering morals subjective)
There is a choice that is outside the realm of ethics: the choice to live. Since things (including man) have specific natures, there are things that help you and things that destroy you. If you want to live, there are things you should do, and things you shouldn’t. If you don’t want to live, you don’t need to do anything at all, Ethics is irrelevant to corpses.
How would an Objectivist respond to the following Humian doubts?
-Solipsism (the notion that sensory data and a persisting external world can never be indepedently proven)
In snarkier moments, by saying “Well duhhh!”. More calmly by saying “The assertion is meaningless and the presuppositions are false”.
-The problem of induction (that empirical evidence can never form justified conclusions about the future)
That the conclusion is false.
-The is-ought problem (that ought morality statements can never be justified by referring to the state of things, effectively rendering morals subjective)
By pointing to the Objectivist ethics as a counterexample to the claim.
I think, though, that your questions are way to broad for a single thread, especially if you’re not happy with my answers. Objectivists tend to be more focused in their thinking.
“Proven”, as a concept, depends on sensory data and a persisting external world.
But surely those things cannot prove themselves, correct? So are we to believe that things within the sensory realm can be proven, while the mere fact of the sensory realm itself cannot?
This fallacy is known as “stolen concept”.
Sorry, I’m new to this, it would be helpful if you could refer to concepts outside of objectivist literature.
I know that water boils when heated. I know why water boils when heated.
This seems like circular reasoning to me. You consider yourself sure that heat will change the state of liquid water to vapor because, to your knowledge, it has always done so in the past. But isn’t that precisely what you are seeking to prove, that the future will consistently reflect the past? I don’t see how you can use inductive examples to justify induction as a whole.
Since things (including man) have specific natures, there are things that help you and things that destroy you.
Is this a truism? Why should we not be indifferent to life, or to attach some value to the lives of others so long as it does not interfere substantially with our own? Why should I choose at the outset to live 100% (or take the dummy option of 0%) rather than 50% or 70%?
I think, though, that your questions are way to broad for a single thread, especially if you’re not happy with my answers. Objectivists tend to be more focused in their thinking.
Well, as a new user, I mostly intended for this to be a summary of my questions for objectivism. If I were to pursue any at great length I would replace each to a separate topic.
So are we to believe that things within the sensory realm can be proven, while the mere fact of the sensory realm itself cannot?
The external world is self-evident, so a proof is not required.
Sorry, I’m new to this, it would be helpful if you could refer to concepts outside of objectivist literature.
Better to point you to a correct explanation of the concept. Read Peikoff’s book Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand. On p. 136 he explains “stolen concept”,
many ill-defined ideas wrapped up in one package, it is generally counterproductive to try to explain an idea in tems of widely-published errors.
and this one-sentence summary from there may help you: “The fallacy consists in using a higher-level concept while denying or ignoring its hierarchical roots, i.e., one or more of the earlier concepts on which it logically depends”. Since Kantian philosophical terminology involvesWell, as a new user, I mostly intended for this to be a summary of my questions for objectivism. If I were to pursue any at great length I would replace each to a separate topic.
Good plan. Of course if you have not actually read any Objectivist philosophical literature, the discussion will probably be short and brutal. I would suggest taking one specific statement from Ayn Rand’s writings that you think you don’t accept, chewing on it, and then explain what she said and why you think it’s in error. In my experience, failure to actually read the writings of Rand is the most frequent cause of error, so if you’re basing your objection on some third-hand rumor about what Objectivism says, you are urged to check your premises – in that case, the premise “Objectivism says …”. Pick something specific in e.g. epistemology or ethics.
Sorry, I’m new to this, it would be helpful if you could refer to concepts outside of objectivist literature.
That definition is actually available online. You might also find this helpful.
First of all, David is right in that your questions are fully answered, in detail, in Objectivist literature. You should absolutely read Dr. Peikoff’s book Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, whether you like the answers here or not.
That said, I’ll address your comments in general terms.
But surely those things cannot prove themselves, correct? So are we to believe that things within the sensory realm can be proven, while the mere fact of the sensory realm itself cannot?
Stop. You are doing it again. Before you ask these questions, define “proof”. To “prove” something means to demonstrate that it is true. The concept “truth” means “in accordance with reality”. Thus direct sensory evidence is proof in the most fundamental terms - it is direct perception of reality.
All knowledge is derived from perception, because perception is the way we relate to reality. I know your next question is “but what if my tea kettle actually is a purple elephant but looks like a tea kettle?” or some such. The answer is that the tea kettle is what is is, and how it affects your sensory organs is part of it’s nature.
You should study Objectivist Epistemology before trying to have a more in depth discussion about this.
Sorry, I’m new to this, it would be helpful if you could refer to concepts outside of objectivist literature.
A stolen concept is using a concept to deny its own validity. Thus you arguing that it is impossible to prove anything is a contradiction. You use the idea of “proof”, which means “demonstrate adherence to reality” to deny that there is any reality to adhere to. The existence of reality and the means to perceive it are pre-conditions for “knowledge”, and “proof”.
Again, you should read up on Objectivist Epistemology. Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff explain it clearly and directly (which may be odd if you are used to reading other philosophers).
You consider yourself sure that heat will change the state of liquid water to vapor because, to your knowledge, it has always done so in the past.
No, because I know things have specific natures, that I exist in a causal universe.
Why should we not be indifferent to life
You have to be alive to be indifferent. If you don’t lie down and die, you have chosen to live.
If I were to pursue any at great length I would replace each to a separate topic.
All of these questions have been discussed here before. I suggest you read the book and get familiar with the forum’s search function. People will gladly answer your questions, but serious discussion Objectivism requires you to at least be familiar with it.
You use the idea of “proof”, which means “demonstrate adherence to reality” to deny that there is any reality to adhere to.
Proof, in the sense I am using it, refers to rigorous logical proofs, the sort by which I might demonstrate that 29 is a prime number, or that existence is a necessary precondition for thought. So by “prove” I mean I am asking you to show incontrovertibly that reality as we perceive it is genuine. There is no logical contradiction inherent in the notion that our reality is in fact the creation of, say, a Cartesian demon or a technologically advanced alien race. Certainly the possibility begs some explanation. It may well be that all of our non-trivial knowledge is predicated on accepting reality at face value, but I don’t see how that gives us a justification for doing so.
No, because I know things have specific natures, that I exist in a causal universe.
How do you claim toknow these things, except through induction? What are you using to justify the stock you put in induction, here, besides induction?
You use the idea of “proof”, which means “demonstrate adherence to reality” to deny that there is any reality to adhere to.
Proof, in the sense I am using it, refers to rigorous logical proofs, the sort by which I might demonstrate that 29 is a prime number, or that existence is a necessary precondition for thought. So by “prove” I mean I am asking you to show incontrovertibly that reality as we perceive it is genuine. There is no logical contradiction inherent in the notion that our reality is in fact the creation of, say, a Cartesian demon or a technologically advanced alien race. Certainly the possibility begs some explanation. It may well be that all of our non-trivial knowledge is predicated on accepting reality at face value, but I don’t see how that gives us a justification for doing so.
I don’t understand…what do you mean by “29”? Can you please explain it to me without taking reality at face value? And in the process of explaining it to me, don’t utilize any senses you haven’t yet justified using.
Proof, in the sense I am using it, refers to rigorous logical proofs, the sort by which I might demonstrate that 29 is a prime number, or that existence is a necessary precondition for thought.
That’s a common but mistaken notion of proof; such a “proof” serves no useful purpose to man’s epistemology. The premises of a formal deduction cannot be fully proven in that sense and the rules of inference cannot be proven. So a requirement for formal deductive proof doesn’t have any purpose, and thus the lack of such a “proof” cannot have any bearing on epistemology. There is no proof that independently justifies faith in formal deduction.
Solipsism is the chicken’s way out, for those who aren’t willing to go the whole distance and even deny the self. Epistemological nihilism is really the way to go. Even you don’t exist. Go ahead, prove you do. Nihilism is at least consistent.
How would an Objectivist respond to the following Human doubts?
-Solipsism (the notion that sensory data and a persisting external world can never be independently proven)
I don’t know much of the other two, but I have played with solipsism.
Let’s establish a logical basis for solipsism.
All data input is sensory. This is a given. Science shows us that the senses are the only way our minds can garner information. Speaking hypothetically, even if things such as ESP exists, they would probably be just sensory organs that we have yet to fully understand.
Now, secondly, the senses are fallible. Things like optical illusions, the subjective nature of memory, and outright hallucinations show this. There are many psychological experiments showing that perception can be fooled.
So then, if all data is perceptive data, and perceptive data is fallible, then it follows that all data is fallible.
The grand question being; so what?
The problem with applying possible fallibility to all of existence is that existence does not behave as if it is fallible. Yes, in theory, you could have some Descartian Uber-Demon producing a Matrix-like perception of existence. The problem is that cause and effect always works. Reality does not glitch like the Matrix. Water always boils when heated, no matter your exact perception of the event. Every time you exact a specific cause, a specific effect occurs. Even if you perceive hot as cold, and cold as hot, the fact of the matter is that when you do one thing, over and over, you will perceive the same response each time. So then, either the reality we perceive is close enough too exact to be correct, or the demon’s illusion is so absolute that we will never be able to the difference.
In the end, solipsism is a fun idea to toy around with, but it serves no real practical purpose.
Now, secondly, the senses are fallible. Things like optical illusions, the subjective nature of memory, and outright hallucinations show this. There are many psychological experiments showing that perception can be fooled.
Meep. Let’s be careful here. Optical illusions, for example, are inferential (at a rather low level); ordinary color-blindness is a reliable and metaphysically correct but statistically abnormal physical response of the organs to physical stimulus. The consciousness which gains information can fail in the conclusion that it draws from sensations; the sense organs do what they do – see OPAR p. 39
Sensory experience is a form of awareness produced by physical entities (the external stimuli) acting on physical instrumentalities (the sense organs), which respond automatically, as a link in a causally determined chain. Obeying inexorable natural laws, the organs transmit a message to the nervous system and the brain. Such organs have no power of choice, no power to invent, distort, or deceive. They do not respond to a zero, only to a something, something real, some existential object which acts on them.
And furthermore: “The senses do not interpret their own reactions; they do not identify the objects that impinge on them”. Any failure, to interpret correctly, cannot rest with the senses, thus (Galt’s Speech at 934) “The task of his senses is to give him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his reason, his senses tell him only that something is, but what it is must be learned by his mind”.
Meep. Let’s be careful here. Optical illusions, for example, are inferential (at a rather low level); ordinary color-blindness is a reliable and metaphysically correct but statistically abnormal physical response of the organs to physical stimulus. The consciousness which gains information can fail in the conclusion that it draws from sensations; the sense organs do what they do – see OPAR p. 39
Some optical illusions rely of psychological quirks to get things off. (An example of one: http://www.grand-illusions.com/images/arti…hardgregory.wmv ) This though, is, as you point out, rather minor.
Sensory experience is a form of awareness produced by physical entities (the external stimuli) acting on physical instrumentalities (the sense organs), which respond automatically, as a link in a causally determined chain. Obeying inexorable natural laws, the organs transmit a message to the nervous system and the brain. Such organs have no power of choice, no power to invent, distort, or deceive. They do not respond to a zero, only to a something, something real, some existential object which acts on them.
And furthermore: “The senses do not interpret their own reactions; they do not identify the objects that impinge on them”. Any failure, to interpret correctly, cannot rest with the senses, thus (Galt’s Speech at 934) “The task of his senses is to give him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his reason, his senses tell him only that something is, but what it is must be learned by his mind”.
The senses, such as in the case of deafness, can be faulty. Perception can also be fooled by extrasensory influences, such as hallucinatory drugs or disease. The fact that there are such things a hallucinations means that perception, at least, can be fooled or tricked (although, as pointed out, this needs outside help to effect). This is the basis of the brain in the vat scenario, and the only (logical) basis I can think of to justify solipsism. The problem is, hallucinations don’t operate under cause and effect, and the very fact that they are viewed as abnormal levers the case against solipsism. The central thrust of my argument that, even if I see red where you see blue, the fact that I always see red when the cause is appropriate, and you always see blue, demonstrates that even if the senses can be tricked or are not perfect, they are giving us a operable model of the rest of reality. So either, our senses are essentially correct, or the illusion is so utterly perfect that it cannot be perceived.
I also have to agree with other arguments in that asking a man to disprove solipsism is like asking him to walk to the bathroom without moving.
edit: Just to clarify, what I mean by perception is the metaphysical model of the world you mind builds in your head based off of sensory data. For example, your mind measures packets of energy (light) with your eyes, and your mind then expresses this with a quality of matter (color). If you feed bad data (such as with drugs) into the model, you get a bad model.
I don’t understand…what do you mean by “29”? Can you please explain it to me without taking reality at face value? And in the process of explaining it to me, don’t utilize any senses you haven’t yet justified using.
I can conceive of 29 as an abstraction independently of any sensory data or experience. I don’t really see the necessity of imparting this to others who, according to solipsist doctrine, would merely be figments.
The premises of a formal deduction cannot be fully proven in that sense and the rules of inference cannot be proven.
But by definition, neither can the rules of inference be wrong. This is something of an epistematic paradox, but it does not hold true for empiricism and the senses, the negation of which elicits no contradiction.
So then, if all data is perceptive data, and perceptive data is fallible, then it follows that all data is fallible.
I don’t view solipsism as something that can be proven, per se, but rather as an alternative hypothesis about reality that requires explanation. Why should we prefer the reality of the external world to a disembodied mind being acted upon by unknown forces? I have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question that does not play upon semantics or rely on foundationalist “self-evidencies”.
So then, either the reality we perceive is close enough too exact to be correct, or the demon’s illusion is so absolute that we will never be able to the difference.
In essence, that’s the position I espouse, but I was wondering whether Objectivism could decisively establish the objective reality of the external world and not just demonstrate its practical utility (which is presumably beyond question).
So then, if all data is perceptive data, and perceptive data is fallible, then it follows that all data is fallible.
I don’t view solipsism as something that can be proven, per se, but rather as an alternative hypothesis about reality that requires explanation. Why should we prefer the reality of the external world to a disembodied mind being acted upon by unknown forces? I have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question that does not play upon semantics or rely on foundationalist “self-evidencies”.
Technically, the axioms of consciousness and existence prove that there is consciousness, there is a reality separate from it, and that there is a link between the two (Perception). So the idea of a disembodied in space is a faulty one. Now, you could have a brain in a vat being fed information to create a fake perception, but this is fundamentally different.
Now, the problem with asking us to demonstrate that reality is not a hallucination is that, since solipsism throws perception and sensory data out the window, and sensory data is the only means for man to learn and understand the universe around him, your essentially asking us to preform a feat without doing it. By accepting all but a hypothetical solipsistic stance, you destroy man’s ability to gather data. If he can’t gather or trust his data, man cannot make conclusions. Essentially, solipsism is self-justifying. If nothing is provable, then nothing is disprovable. Its analogous to stating that legs don’t exist, then demanding proof that they do, then stating that since legs don’t exist, we can’t trust the sight of men walking. While there might be some logical basis for solipsism in the fact that perception can be duped, demanding proof against it is almost circular in its logic. You invalidate our tools, demand us to preform without them, and then cite victory when, surprise, we can’t. How can we be logical if our premises can not be trusted?
So then, either the reality we perceive is close enough too exact to be correct, or the demon’s illusion is so absolute that we will never be able to the difference.
In essence, that’s the position I espouse, but I was wondering whether Objectivism could decisively establish the objective reality of the external world and not just demonstrate its practical utility (which is presumably beyond question).
You can’t really argue that nothing exists outside the mind because you consciousness implies external existence. Even if the demon is giving us an illusion, the demon and the means to create the illusion exists. As does the organ housing the consciousness and the body housing that. The idea of a brain floating in space is silly.
One of the fundamental ideas in Objectivism is that everyone has a choice to believe what they want. The problem is that you have to live with it. You can think there is another life, and you can think reality is some sort of subjective dream, but you’ll have to deal with the consequences of these ideas, particularly if you try to force them upon others. If you think you can make rocks into food through force of will, more power too you. I just hope the trick works when your stranded alone on the desert island.
So, yes, Objectivism does state that your conscious and reality are existent and independent and interdependent of and with each other, but as for the question of the possibility of the brain in the vat or the Descartes demon, well, you can invalidate reality and sensory data, but you have to find some way to exist like this (which means most likely reevaluating the data and perception), or simply cease to exist. So, really, its kind of pointless to dwell on the possibility of the Matrix, unless your speaking hypothetically, or you have some proof.
I don’t understand…what do you mean by “29”? Can you please explain it to me without taking reality at face value? And in the process of explaining it to me, don’t utilize any senses you haven’t yet justified using.
I can conceive of 29 as an abstraction independently of any sensory data or experience. I don’t really see the necessity of imparting this to others who, according to solipsist doctrine, would merely be figments.
Well I have to reject THAT assertion categorically.
To conceive of 29 as an abstraction without sensory input - how would you do that? Were you floating in the sensory deprivation tank your entire life, and suddenly at some point, you conceived from nothingness the idea of numbers?
No - you had to learn what 29 was by learning what 29 of *something* was. 29 apples. 29 oranges. 29 pieces of fruit. 29 is a measurement, and you can’t measure without something TO measure.
To refer to an essay by Rand on this - imagine Hellen Keller - blind and deaf from age 0.25, (3 months), without having yet developed the rudimentary concepts all of us functional humans take for granted such as the idea that words have meaning. It took months of her patient teacher tracing letters into Hellen’s palm while putting her other hand on something for Helen to get it: Words have Meaning. W-A-T-E-R means this wet feeling thing. (Only she didn’t even have a concept for wet at the time.)
Could Hellen Keller before finally learning from sensory input of touch alone ever have conceived of “twenty-nine”?
But by definition, neither can the rules of inference be wrong. This is something of an epistematic paradox, but it does not hold true for empiricism and the senses, the negation of which elicits no contradiction.
By definition, it does. By definition (a different definition), the inductive inferential rule cannot be wrong. And for that matter, by definition, any deduction with a universal quantifier which takes as a premise any proposition that is not previously proven by induction or any proposition which is not axiomatically given is wrong. So you see, deductive inference is pretty weak and butters no parsnips. Yikes, I thought you knew that.
In essence, that’s the position I espouse, but I was wondering whether Objectivism could decisively establish the objective reality of the external world and not just demonstrate its practical utility (which is presumably beyond question).
Yes; there are unnumerable axiomatic (and thus decisive) arguments available, every day. The only way to defeat the evidence of the senses is to beg the question by asserting that the senses are necessarily invalid and indecisive.
Technically, the axioms of consciousness and existence prove that there is consciousness, there is a reality separate from it, and that there is a link between the two (Perception).
What is so implausible about a disembodied brain? Perhaps a section of the solipsist’s mind has created the world and denies him conscious access to its true workings.
How can we be logical if our premises can not be trusted?
I don’t think you really can. We have to take the existence of the external world as an article of faith, or pragmatism, or suspended judgment, not as fact or rational belief.
One of the fundamental ideas in Objectivism is that everyone has a choice to believe what they want.
What choice is implied here? If an external reality, independent of the self, cannot be proven to any degree of certainty, isn’t suspended judgment the only tenable belief?
Were you floating in the sensory deprivation tank your entire life, and suddenly at some point, you conceived from nothingness the idea of numbers?
It’s difficult to even conceive of what existence as a disembodied brain would be like, much less to speculate on what it could and could not ascertain for itself. But if it had a sensation of being, and thought, already it has learned to count to two.
To refer to an essay by Rand on this - imagine Hellen Keller - blind and deaf from age 0.25, (3 months), without having yet developed the rudimentary concepts all of us functional humans take for granted such as the idea that words have meaning. It took months of her patient teacher tracing letters into Hellen’s palm while putting her other hand on something for Helen to get it: Words have Meaning. W-A-T-E-R means this wet feeling thing. (Only she didn’t even have a concept for wet at the time.)
But Keller must first have had a wordless conceptualization of the wet liquid thirst-quencher to even understand that it was a permanent and discreet phenomenon. Presumably that would be how the first proto-humans invented language, as well, by assigning categories to perceptions and sensations.
By definition (a different definition), the inductive inferential rule cannot be wrong.
But it can be. Tomorrow, the entropic arrow of time could reverse, the earth could cease spinning on its axis, and electrons could begin hopping out of their orbits like Mexican jumping beans. This does not contradict itself. But one measly square circle rends all fabric of meaning and existence.
And for that matter, by definition, any deduction with a universal quantifier which takes as a premise any proposition that is not previously proven by induction or any proposition which is not axiomatically given is wrong.
Or it becomes an existential quantification instead. Is the point that deductive logic ultimately requires axioms which are by nature self-justifying…?
The only way to defeat the evidence of the senses is to beg the question by asserting that the senses are necessarily invalid and indecisive.
Skepticism begs no question. Belief in the veridicality of the senses is affirmative, and establishes a burden of proof.
But it can be. Tomorrow, the entropic arrow of time could reverse, the earth could cease spinning on its axis, and electrons could begin hopping out of their orbits like Mexican jumping beans. This does not contradict itself. But one measly square circle rends all fabric of meaning and existence.
Such distinctions are not meaningful, as Dr. Peikoff showed in his essay The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy. I’m going to try to present a brief refutation of your claim, drawing from my recollection of that essay. I will be assuming that all knowledge comes from observation of reality. You probably dispute this. If so, I recommend that you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.
The dichotomy, Peikoff argues, is founded on an equivocation between a concept and its definition. A concept is not the same thing as its definition-in other words, the two are not interchangeable. As an example, consider the concept “bachelor”, and it’s definition “unmarried man”. According to proponents of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, a single married bachelor would “rend the fabric of meaning and existence”, as you put it, since the existence of such a bachelor would imply a man who is both married and unmarried, which is a contradiction. To derive this contradiction, however, you have to use “bachelor” and “unmarried man” interchangeably at some point, and that step is invalid.
Here are some examples of the problems you run into in this specific case:
Is a newborn male infant a bachelor?
Suppose a man is married for 50 years, and dies in the hospital five minutes after his wife. Is he a bachelor during those five minutes?
Is a man in a permanent coma a bachelor?
How about a priest?
How about a man from a culture without the institution of marriage, who has a long-term mate to whom he is faithful. Do we call him a bachelor?
Suppose a rational species of aliens was discovered, and that these aliens possess an equivalent institution to marriage. Do we call unmarried instances of this species bachelors? Here is a case of ambiguity in the other direction.
Here is an even clearer instance of these problems:
Consider the definition of man (as in human): a rational animal. Does this mean that a man who cannot think due to brain damage is a contradiction? You probably object to that definition. Consider, then, the definition of man qua animal (the biological definition of man). Would you say that a sterile man is a contradiction? After all, sexual reproduction is an essential characteristic of all mammals, man included. Give me any reasonable definition of man, and I will be able to find an example of a man who lacks the defining characteristic you named.
What is the concept “bachelor” if not its definition? It is the set of all bachelors you have observed in reality. You observe (or hear about) a large number of men who seem similar to you in some way. Eventually, you decide that the fundamental characteristic which distinguishes this group of men from other men is the fact of not being married. What if we don’t want to call infants bachelors? Since age is not the defining characteristic of a bachelor, we don’t want to add it to the definition. Why is this not a problem? Because infants are too different from other instances of “bachelor”. The fact that bachelors and male infants happen to share a characteristic which defines the former does not necessitate that we include the latter in the concept “bachelor” (because a concept refers to a set of things in reality).
Since concepts come from reality, the negation of an “analytic” truth is empirically false. I have disputed the fact that “a bachelor is the same thing as an unmarried man” is even true at all. One true statement which is thought to be “analytic” is your example, essentially “There are no square circles”. There are no things in reality which I would call both square and circular. In other words, the set of real circles and the set of real squares are disjoint. How about “there are no circles which are also polygons”? I claim that there are lots of things in reality which are subsumed by both concepts. Remember that all the circles you see on your computer are also polygons. Yet (assuming a polygon with a finite number of sides) the definitions of these two concepts contradict one another.
It is also true that the negation of a “synthetic” truth is a contradiction. Let’s consider your assertion that “the entropic arrow of time could reverse”. This would mean, among other things, that objects could “fall up”, or be repelled by massive bodies. Our concept of gravity, however, includes the fact that gravity is an attractive force. Hence, your statement logically contradicts the observed nature of gravity. In effect, you are claiming that an attractive force can repel, which is a contradiction. Your claim that the Earth could stop spinning is also a contradiction, since the Earth is a massive body, and all massive bodies obey the law of inertia. Thus, in asserting that the Earth could spontaneously stop spinning, you are contradicting something which is included in the concept of the Earth, mass, because you are contradicting something which is included in the concept of mass, inertia. You are claiming that a body which cannot spontaneously stop moving can spontaneously stop moving. One could bring up a scenario with another object coliding with the Earth and having precisely the right momentum to halt its rotation. I don’t think this is what you were getting at though.
How can we be logical if our premises can not be trusted?
I don’t think you really can. We have to take the existence of the external world as an article of faith, or pragmatism, or suspended judgment, not as fact or rational belief.
So you are accepting the epistemological nihilist’s credo.
By definition (a different definition), the inductive inferential rule cannot be wrong.
But it can be.
No, as I said, by definition the inductive inferential rule cannot be wrong. (Note your prior use of the “by definition” argument).
And for that matter, by definition, any deduction with a universal quantifier which takes as a premise any proposition that is not previously proven by induction or any proposition which is not axiomatically given is wrong.
Or it becomes an existential quantification instead. Is the point that deductive logic ultimately requires axioms which are by nature self-justifying…?
First, that no unproven proposition can be arbitrarily introduced in an inference scheme, second that all propositions with universal quantifiers are derived and require prior proof by induction.
The only way to defeat the evidence of the senses is to beg the question by asserting that the senses are necessarily invalid and indecisive.
Skepticism begs no question. Belief in the veridicality of the senses is affirmative, and establishes a burden of proof.
Skepticism presumes the axiomatic validity of formal deduction, while not accepting the validity of the axiomatic foundation of deduction. It then attempts to derives Humean doubt from the “unprovability” of premises. Petio principii ni action.
Now then, I believe that this is a sufficient overview of the Objectivist response to skepticism. For more details understanding of Objectivist epistemology, you should read Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand and Introduction fo Objectivist Epistemology. When you understand the foundation, it would be appropriate for you to return with additional questions. Continued discussion at this level would not be appropriate, given the purpose of the forum.