How is existence meaningful as an axiom. (I messed up the topic accidentally. My apologies)
Hello everyone.
I know it sounds ridiculous but hear me me out if you will.
How does Objectivism counter the proposition that existence is meaningless as an axiom.
We know that it must be implicit in sense perception.
We know existence cannot be derived from being the opposite of non-existence. Non-existence does not exist metaphysically, only epistemologically.
We know existence canât be derived from being the opposite of mental delusion. Even the mind and everything in it exists. That is the question of reality in contrast to mind.
We know existence canât be defined as it is a metaphysical primary.
So where is it in sense perception? What makes it meaningful? I want to understand but I canât seem to answer it.
If you do know then my followup questions are:
How is existence applied to things outside what you see?
How is identity implicit in sense perception? Why canât an existence exist without identity?
To be clear I am convinced of the axioms but havenât really grasped them fully and explicitly in my head.
The assertion that something exists does not have to serve as any sort of axiom to be meaningful and true. Russell was not taking that assertion as some sort of axiom when he disputed Bradleyâs claim that it was meaningless. Why, by the way, would Bradley be wanting to say that âsomething existsâ is meaningless? If he permitted himself to comprehend Russellâs assertion, he would be allowing himself to authentically question the truth of metaphysical idealism.
It is a curiosity for thinkers to try to find what are the widest, most comprehensive things. That is enough for pursuing that quest. As it happens, much can be said for taking the fact of existence to be the widest, most pervasive, indeed only thing. That there are diverse words in this text is evident, that this screen is not my keyboard is evident, that they both exist is evident. Perfectly sufficiently, however meager or erudite is my understanding of their operations, the operations of my fingers, or operations of my eyes. Also manifestly distinct from any of those would be the pain in my back and the perspiration under my arms. One thing all those things have in common is that they are in the same spatial neighborhood. Another is that they all remain constant or change during the interval of me making this post. Existence is a commonality of all those diverse particulars as well as of all occasions of such things, all loci in space, all intervals of time. Existence is a contraction, a reigning in, of the old widest-thing candidate thing: being. Existence is what had been known as qualified being.
Assertions like âExistence existsâ or âExistence is Identityâ have some traits of axioms we are familiar with in philosophy, mathematics, or axiomatized sciences such as mechanics or SR. But they do not have the fertility or productivity trait of axioms + posutlates + definitions in geometry. And other philosophers besides Rand, such as Spinoza or Wolff, have had distinctively philosophical (metaphysical) axioms, yet not given them the same mild function given them by Rand. I notice that axioms are selected in all these intellectual areas with conceptual dependency relations in mind, whatever the variety of uses one might try to make of such asymmetric relations.
In her 1957, Rand set out her fundamental wide categories of existents in the course of articulating her axiom âExistence is Identity.â Showing that any proposed existent not falling under one or more of those categories leads one to self-contradiction is a way of showing that Identity, and in just those sub-divisions, necessarily attaches to anything that exists. Of course most of us go along fine thinking productively and making a garden or a living presuming that any existents are of diverse natures and have distinctive identities, and leave it to folks with the philosophical-curiosity bent to ponder further âExistence is Identity.â One use of that axiom was to expose as empty the traditional via negativa approaches to characterization of God, should one dally in such stuff, which Rand did in her 1957.
There is nothing common between existence and nonexistence, as you know. The latter is only a lack of standing in the former, a mere lack noted by us, by us in and of existence (cf. Rand 1966â67, 58, 60â61; Branden [ca. 1968] 2009, 28).
The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in the form âFor every existent, there is a reason why it exists, rather than notâ can apply at most to constituents or proper parts of Existence, not to that comprehensive standing Existence, the all, the whole comprising all actuals and their potentials, all those concretes and all their formalities. PSR in the form âNothing happens without a reasonâ applies only within Existence, not to that all of alls Existence. PSR in the form âThere must be a sufficient reason for every truth of factâ applies to the bare truth Existence exists only in the sense that there must be a sufficient reason for our knowledge of the fact, not for the reality of the fact (cf. Schopenhauer [1813, 1847] 1971, 13). Talk of reason for the fact that Existence exists is foolishness (cf. Heidegger in Braver 2012, 151â52; see also Nozick 1981, 141â42). None of these bounds on the various versions of PSR diminish by one iota the complete intelligibility of Existence.
To assert Existence exists is to remind oneself or another of that ultimate framing already known or to bring into full light what one or the other had known without previous articulation. Rand rightly held that it is incorrect to try to prove the existence of the external, perceived world (1961b, 28). The worldâs existence is self-evident in perception. The existence of distinctive character and spatiality and action is self-evident in perception. To deny the existence of the world or to assert the possibility that it does not exist or that we have no way of knowing it exists is talking on empty (see too Heidegger in Braver 2012, 150â52; Jary 2010, 45â46, 86â88). Question or denial of the worldâs existence or the existence of other persons attempts to reverse the embedment of meaningful assertions in world and living body. Denial or doubt of the worldâs existence or of each otherâs existence voids our common ground for all communicative utterance. Then too, âThe world may not existâ includes the possibility that that text does not exist, that its originator does not exist (in the viewpoint of a reader, including the originator reading it). That notion of possibility is empty. It is not merely a zero probability of a specified possibility, such as the possibility that a random number from the real line will be a rational number. To hold forth existence of the world or of other minds as things not presupposed in rational, discursive proof would be vacuous.
The question âWhat is Existence?â is sensible if we are asking for the most fundamental character and compass of Existence in itself or in its relations to us, a part of it. The question is not sensible, however, if by it we are seeking: to cleave an existent in two by whether it is sensed or thought; or to disqualify some existents as truly existent or as fully existent (such as attributes, alterations, situations, potentials, or formal relations vis-Ă -vis concrete Randian entity or Aristotelian substance); or to penetrate deeper than existence, go behind or beyond existence (so portraying Being, the mind, the Good, the One, or God). Answers to the sensible versions of the question would be broad characterizations of Existence: the patent everything-everywhen around us and in us as we sense it or think it ordinarily and in science; or the most basic thing constituting and provisioning cognition; or the most basic thing whose most basic categories are those discerned by Aristotle, Whitehead, Rand, Lowe, or oneself; or the universe, spacetime and mass-energy.
The questions âWhy do existents have definite character, or definite nature, or why are there concrete existents having potentials and formalities?â are not sensible. That these broad propositions are true of and most fundamental to existence is, upon reflection, self-evident. Their denial, as in denial of the principle of noncontradiction, stands one in performative self-contradictions (see also Braver 2012, 130).
My meaning of the self-evident is the usual one: the manifestly true requiring no proof. Truths accepted as self-evident are sometimes defeasible as to truth, such as occurred with the old view that heavier bodies fall faster. (See also Summa Contra Gentiles 1.10â11, in Aquinas [ca. 1259â68] 2014, 13â15.) An axiomatic self-evident truth in metaphysics should be fundamental and necessarily true. Its denial leads to bumping into the widest frame. I notice that susceptibility to performative self-contradiction upon denial is not the source of a propositionâs truth (the source is fact). Leonard Peikoff characterized Randâs axioms as perpetually evident. Fair enough.
I donât have an answer for you, but I can help connect the notion to to some other ideas. I, too, find âexistence existsâ kind of banal, but I also take the argument that the only alternative to axioms is an infinite regress. A similar problem is that of appreciating âlife as the standardâ. Thatâs one Iâm working through now that is so fruitful all the way up to the point of actually understanding how life can be an end in itself. But the argument Objectivism makes is that, if ends exist, something must be an end in itself. This is undeniable. Similarly, existence must exist. I think it might be helpful to look at the ways in which certain ideas contradict this axiom. That task is not straightforward in itself as it involves grasping really wide metaphysical concepts, but I think thatâs a good reminder that failure to be moved by the axioms is not out of the ordinary at all. I would pick up a copy of OPAR if you havenât already and take a look at the first chapter. Piekoff gives a lot of good examples of rejecting the axioms.
In part, this issue speaks to the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. The axioms have a very analytical aura (thus the banality), so they donât seem like they could possibly say anything helpful for practical purposes. That might be a good framework for investigation: figure out how your life might be impacted by (implicitly) believing that existence doesnât necessarily exist, or that nothings or infinites or violations of causality (another good corollary of existence - and identity - to consider) could exist metaphysically. Today, I listened to C.S. Lewis describe humans as âabstract personsâ derived from God, the âconcrete personâ. This is a good example of the absurdity that comes with postulating something existing outside of existence. I was almost offended. I am existence.
Another possible connection is to the âmetaphysical as absoluteâ (review Randâs The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made or the corresponding section in OPAR). Itâs easy to forget that existence is oddly stubborn (odd in the context of most other philosophies). The past stays passed, and my ex and I are not seeing each other. Thatâs true, and I must accept it â and one day Iâll figure out how. I think that right there is the âmeaningfulnessâ of an axiom: remember how easy it is to forget.
An axiom is cognitive tool, not a quality (although being in existence is a quality). Think of it as a reminder that you canât cut corners in reality. âHonesty is the recognition of the fact that the unreal is unreal and can have no value" (Rand). Donât accept things that donât exist, and donât waste your time on things that canât.
As far as identity goes, think about it this way: identity, like non-contradiction, is the basis for saying anything that doesnât appear banal. Identity is specificity and applicability and limitation and interconnection. There is nowhere for nothings or infinites or miracles to be. Existence will not allow them. Attempting to create one would be like trying to eat your own mouth. Even imagining it would require you to build some construct in your mind out of things that actually exist, and good luck getting specific without accidentally making sense.
The notion of absurdity only makes sense in contrast to whatâs real. Only ideas can be absurd; everything else is 100% pure, uncut reality down to the lowliest quark. Everything about it is factual and can be described and has effects.
By the way, your title is the only reason I clicked on this post.
6 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:
. . . I would pick up a copy of OPAR if you havenât already and take a look at the first chapter. Piekoff gives a lot of good examples of rejecting the axioms.
In part, this issue speaks to the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. The axioms have a very analytical aura (thus the banality), so they donât seem like they could possibly say anything helpful for practical purposes. That might be a good framework for investigation: figure out how your life might be impacted by (implicitly) believing that existence doesnât necessarily exist, or that nothings or infinites or violations of causality (another good corollary of existence - and identity - to consider) could exist metaphysically. Today, I listened to C.S. Lewis describe humans as âabstract personsâ derived from God, the âconcrete personâ. This is a good example of the absurdity that comes with postulating something existing outside of existence. I was almost offended. I am existence.
Another possible connection is to the âmetaphysical as absoluteâ (review Randâs The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made or the corresponding section in OPAR). . . .
Hear, hear!
Beyond what Rand wrote about philosophic axioms in her 1957 is Chapter 6 âAxiomatic Conceptsâ of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Additional defenses of the Objectivist philosophical axioms are these:
Chapter 4 of H. Binswangerâs How We Know (2014)
Chapter 11 of Blackwellâs Companion to Ayn Rand (2016)
References I cited but failed to show in my earlier post:
Braver, Lee. 2012. _Groundless Grounds â A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger._ Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Jary, Mark. 2010. _Assertion._ New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Additionally relevant, from an earlier scholarly paper* of mine:
PHILOSOPHY FRAMES
The foundation of a house is one thing, its framework another. That is not so for a submarine. Its inner, pressure hull is the craftâs passive support against collapse under external hydrostatic pressure. The pressure hull is the foundation, but it is also an integral part of the frame of the structure. When speaking of epistemological foundations, we tend to slip into analogy with foundations of a building. Iâll use foundation and framework interchangeably in connection with epistemology, rather like their fusion in the structural organization of a submarine, though with a further character. When thinking of bases of knowledge, analogies from statics are natural. (See another statics analogy in Binswanger 2014, 151.) But knowledge entails processes of knowing, and it entails growth of knowledge. The continuing organization that is knowledge is more like a dynamically maintained structure, such as an animal cell wall.
All cell walls must withstand internal hydrostatic pressure that arises ultimately from net negative electrical charge of their internal molecules of life. Analogy of my philosophic foundationalism with the cell wall of a plant would go no further than analogy with the hull of a submarine. Structural integrity of the plant cell wall against hydrostatic pressure is by strength of materials, and its account is by statics. Analogy with the delicate cell wall of an animal is fuller by its requirement of continuous dynamic maintenance of the wall, which is by ion pumps across it, preventing the buildup of internal pressure. The structural integrity of the animal cell wall is by dynamical process featuring continual commerce with its surround (Boydstun 1994, 121â23). Similarly, the structure that is knowledge has core principles by which it is dynamically maintained, and these principles include patterns of success in external commerce. Core principles of the maintenance of the animal cell wall are a finer analogy to what Iâll mean in speaking of foundations or frameworks in epistemology.
Nicholas Wolterstorff (2001, 187â91) demarcates foundationalism as invoking mediate and immediate justified (or warranted) judgments in which there are justification conditions of the immediate judgments and methods by which such merit of justification can be conveyed to mediate judgments. The foundationalism of Rand, and mine too, can be brought under Wolterstorffâs broad formula if the immediate judgments (or action-schemata prior to language acquisition) are ordinary judgments expressing facts disclosed in perceptual acquaintance, such as âthis pen still writesâ or âthe oven is onâ or âthis board is less bowed than that one.â1 Metaphysical axioms and their core elucidations, Randâs or mine, are widest scene-setters and are quality controls for conveyance of justification to mediate judgments. Among the quality controls for conveyance of justification would be logic, deductive and inductive, whose foundations lie with metaphysical axioms and their elucidations.
By taking First Philosophy as widest frame, I mean only frame encompassing and situating all other wide frames of human life and knowledge. Quest for widest frame entails foundationalism, descriptive, explicative, and regulative. Philosophers not skeptical and not foundationalist are in pursuit of wide frames subsidiary to widest. (Notably not foundationalists would be logical positivists; see Friedman 1999, 2â5, 10â11, 119â20, 124, 144â52). In her foundationalism, Rand evidently took the special sciences, including the modern hard sciences, to be in a one-way need of philosophy.2 I do not. First Philosophy discerning grounds and widest frames of the sciences, mathematics, and ethics stands in organic, indeed symbiotic, relationships with those arenas in their greater specificity.
We know what truth is by having some truth.3 Occasions of finest truth require our grasp of the world, together with critical, integrative reflection on that grasp. We had some truth in image- and action-schemata prior to having language, and our prelinguistic truths are stems from which linguistic form of truth, with its higher level of reflectivity, develops and receives continual support.4 There are no conceptual cognitions, no logical connections of anything, without guidance by existence, utilizing our prelinguistic image- and action-schemata (Prinz 2002, chap. 6; Barsalou 2008; Noë 2006; Churchland 2012). The normativity of logic is ultimately from normativity of life, thence life of mind and its conceptual capture of the world.
By fact I mean that which is, that which is the case in Existence. (Iâll capitalize existence when meaning not only existence per se, but existence as a whole.) Truth is grasp of fact.5 Fact precedes truth, necessity precedes certainty. That is so genetically and logically (cf. Rand 1973, 27; Peikoff 1967, 108â9). Mature and healthy certainty critically gauges exactitude of candidate truth and contingencies of its alleged fact, setting them within oneâs abiding truths and their facts, concrete and formal. Subjective probabilities are to be continually recalibrated by objective frequencies and by advancing understanding of natures. Faintness or ambiguity of truths, I should add, does not disqualify them out the gate as candidates for framing core. Deeper and deeper mathematics is faintly born, then grown articulate, setting in new light earlier mathematical treasures. It is like that in lesser degree with right First Philosophy, enveloping all existence and knowing, empirical or formal (cf. Physics 184a22â25, in Aristotle [ca. 348â322 B.C.E.] 1984, 315).
Outside we living seekers of fact, there is nothing bearing meaning or truth. Before truth and with truth are not only fact, but life and value. Without conscious life and value, there are no challenges or problems, no curiosity, no accuracy or correctness, no meaning or truth. Truths of logic and their necessity have ground in formal features of existence and in the facts and necessities-for-ends of living mind.
The zone of philosophic reflection reached by Descartes in Meditations by doubting is a famous, if misshapen, sample of what is distinctively philosophical reflection (cf. Gilson [1939] 1986, 97). Phenomenological reduction of Husserl is a portion of what is distinctively philosophical reflection (cf. Drummond 1991, 45â48, 64â67). Philosophical reflection on the world and on us in it includes discerning what conditions what, in broadest perspective, and with what varieties of necessitation (Stoljar 2017, 25â34, 40â53). It discerns, in widest perspective, what depends necessarily on what.6 Independence of the existence of thinking subject, as in Meditations, from correctness of particular thoughts is one such dependency structure. Dependencies of self-reflecting acts on memory and on object-grasping acts are such structures. Dependence of justifications or refutations of knowledge on knowledge are two more such structures. The philosophic quest for most general categories is a quest for best hierarchical conceptual dependencies. Ethics concerns dependencies of the good. Dependencies between enquiry and value are among the structures to be discerned in philosophy.
Philosophical reflection also includes making general identifications such as the definition of man as an animal capable of and requiring rationality, and this work is informed by what depends necessarily on what. Definition of man as an animal capable of and requiring rationality contributes to philosophical foundational framing furthermore through its explication, its clarification, of a prevalent workaday concept. Such too would be Platoâs craft of justice, Tarskiâs craft of truth, or Randâs craft of reason.7
Philosophy is discernment of essentials and their situations in wider to widest existence. Such activity grows oneâs picture of what is human being and oneâs self. All of the truths of logic and pure mathematics are also discerned in divisions of what I am calling the zone of philosophical reflection (cf. Philebus 56dâ58d, in Plato [ca. 428â348 B.C.E.] 1997, 446â48; and Metaphysics 1061b18â27, in Aristotle [ca. 349â322 B.C.E.] 1984, 1677).8 Discernment of the dependencies of formalities on each other and on their occasions in concretes is part of philosophical reflection (cf. Grosholz 2007, chap. 2; Sher 2011). The necessity in truth of conclusions deduced from true premises is one type of necessary dependence discerned in the zone of philosophical reflection, though not the only type and not independently of other types peculiar to the zone. In this zone, we grasp that nothing comes from nothing, that any matter is spatial and susceptible to stress, and that the simplest straight-edged closed figure in the Euclidean plane is a triangle.9
It is in this zone Aristotle discerned the principle of noncontradiction. Here, discerned that âthe activity of mind is lifeâ (Metaphysics 1072b27, translated by Lear 1988, 296).10 Rand would discern in this zone that life is an end in itself (1936, 42; 1957, 121; 1964, 17, 27, 29).11 Insights in the philosophic zone are generally not immune to error, particularly by way of supposed completeness and supposed complete independence from empirical knowledge attained in prelinguistic development, in mature common experience, and in science (cf. Armstrong 2004, 26â29; Stoljar 2017, 31â32).12
My pursuit of foundationsâspecifically a set of axioms, corollaries, postulates, and definitionsâis because it looks to be feasible, indeed at work, and because it is desirable by the economy, unity, and comprehension it provides (cf. Posterior Analytics 72a15â18, Metaphysics 996b26â997a25, 1005a19â29, in Aristotle [ca. 349â322 B.C.E.] 1984, 116, 1575, 1587). Successful epistemological foundationalism is furthermore, secondarily, a barricade and corrective to the pitfalls of epistemic skepticism.13
In no wise are philosophic foundations, mine or Randâs, âresponsible for everythingâ (Sider 2011, 105; further, 112â16, 137â41). Neither existence per se nor existence as a whole is âresponsibleâ for themselves or any particular existents they encompass. In no wise are these foundations something âin virtue of whichâ less fundamental facts or truths hold. Fundamental facts do not âgive rise toâ less fundamental facts. A valid syllogistic form does not âgive rise toâ the validity of its instances. Mathematical category does not âgive rise toâ its instances, such as the category of groups or the category of vector spaces. Differential equations do not âgive rise toâ the equations that are the solutions to those differential equations; the solutions merely satisfy the differential equations. Conservation of angular momentum does not âgive rise toâ the increasing angular velocity of a particular spinning skater who pulls in her arms. Two intersecting lines, whether in carpentry or Euclid, do not âgive rise toâ the plane they determine. Physical spacetime structure does not âgive rise toâ the conservation laws it determines.
This is not a terminological quibble. Metaphysical axioms and their core elucidations can be more fundamentalâand are more fundamental in my sense and Randâsâjust by being wider form bound to narrower form or wider species subsuming narrower species or individuals. Metaphysical fundamentals need not give rise to or bring forth more particular bits of the world in order to bring light on the bits, including on us, in the world.
Some of the References
Friedman, Michael. 1999. Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilson, Ătienne. [1939] 1986. Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge. Translated by Mark A. Wauck. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
Grosholz, Emily R. 2007. Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematics and Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lear, Jonathan. 1988. Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sher, Gila. 2011. Truth and knowledge in logic and mathematics. In The Logica Yearbook 2011. Edited by Michal Pelis and VĂt PunÄochĂĄĆ. London: College Publications, Kingâs College.
Sider, Ted. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, David. 2017. Philosophical Progress â In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 2001. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15 hours ago, 8g9 said:
How does Objectivism counter the proposition that existence is meaningless as an axiom.
By pointing out that any attempt to deny existence does presuppose existence. Everything in your question already accept existence. Your questions are not about existence, they are about some more advanced question of scientific method that not only assumes existence, it assumes identity and consciousness. We do not attempt to âderiveâ existence, existence simply is. We do attempt to understand the identity of things that exist.
15 hours ago, 8g9 said:
We know that it must be implicit in sense perception.
The concept âexistenceâ is a high level concept, which at least some humans have, though we can have a tangential discussion of âimplicit conceptsâ (which I am skeptical about) if you think all humans have this concept. Dogs donât have concepts. Infants also have not developed the concept âexistenceâ, instead they are developing their first-level concepts like âfoodâ, âpersonâ, âdiaperâ and so on. Like all concepts, the concepts are not âinâ sense perception, they derive from sense perception, which is where we get primary concepts like âfoodâ, âpersonâ, âdiaperâ. Eventually we develop a hierarchical network of concepts with fruits, vegetables, meat, milk, yogurt, ice cream, ice cream cones, banana split and so forth. Most people are deluded into believing in a âmultiverseâ, whereas the universe is all that exists so whatever âuniverse 37â is, it is just an aspect of the universe. People usually donât understand âexistenceâ.
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17 hours ago, Boydstun said:
The assertion that something exists does not have to serve as any sort of axiom to be meaningful and true. Russell was not taking that assertion as some sort of axiom when he disputed Bradleyâs claim that it was meaningless. Why, by the way, would Bradley be wanting to say that âsomething existsâ is meaningless? If he permitted himself to comprehend Russellâs assertion, he would be allowing himself to authentically question the truth of metaphysical idealism.
It is a curiosity for thinkers to try to find what are the widest, most comprehensive things. That is enough for pursuing that quest. As it happens, much can be said for taking the fact of existence to be the widest, most pervasive, indeed only thing. That there are diverse words in this text is evident, that this screen is not my keyboard is evident, that they both exist is evident. Perfectly sufficiently, however meager or erudite is my understanding of their operations, the operations of my fingers, or operations of my eyes. Also manifestly distinct from any of those would be the pain in my back and the perspiration under my arms. One thing all those things have in common is that they are in the same spatial neighborhood. Another is that they all remain constant or change during the interval of me making this post. Existence is a commonality of all those diverse particulars as well as of all occasions of such things, all loci in space, all intervals of time. Existence is a contraction, a reigning in, of the old widest-thing candidate thing: being. Existence is what had been known as qualified being.
Assertions like âExistence existsâ or âExistence is Identityâ have some traits of axioms we are familiar with in philosophy, mathematics, or axiomatized sciences such as mechanics or SR. But they do not have the fertility or productivity trait of axioms + posutlates + definitions in geometry. And other philosophers besides Rand, such as Spinoza or Wolff, have had distinctively philosophical (metaphysical) axioms, yet not given them the same mild function given them by Rand. I notice that axioms are selected in all these intellectual areas with conceptual dependency relations in mind, whatever the variety of uses one might try to make of such asymmetric relations.
In her 1957, Rand set out her fundamental wide categories of existents in the course of articulating her axiom âExistence is Identity.â Showing that any proposed existent not falling under one or more of those categories leads one to self-contradiction is a way of showing that Identity, and in just those sub-divisions, necessarily attaches to anything that exists. Of course most of us go along fine thinking productively and making a garden or a living presuming that any existents are of diverse natures and have distinctive identities, and leave it to folks with the philosophical-curiosity bent to ponder further âExistence is Identity.â One use of that axiom was to expose as empty the traditional via negativa approaches to characterization of God, should one dally in such stuff, which Rand did in her 1957.
There is nothing common between existence and nonexistence, as you know. The latter is only a lack of standing in the former, a mere lack noted by us, by us in and of existence (cf. Rand 1966â67, 58, 60â61; Branden [ca. 1968] 2009, 28).
The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in the form âFor every existent, there is a reason why it exists, rather than notâ can apply at most to constituents or proper parts of Existence, not to that comprehensive standing Existence, the all, the whole comprising all actuals and their potentials, all those concretes and all their formalities. PSR in the form âNothing happens without a reasonâ applies only within Existence, not to that all of alls Existence. PSR in the form âThere must be a sufficient reason for every truth of factâ applies to the bare truth Existence exists only in the sense that there must be a sufficient reason for our knowledge of the fact, not for the reality of the fact (cf. Schopenhauer [1813, 1847] 1971, 13). Talk of reason for the fact that Existence exists is foolishness (cf. Heidegger in Braver 2012, 151â52; see also Nozick 1981, 141â42). None of these bounds on the various versions of PSR diminish by one iota the complete intelligibility of Existence.
To assert Existence exists is to remind oneself or another of that ultimate framing already known or to bring into full light what one or the other had known without previous articulation. Rand rightly held that it is incorrect to try to prove the existence of the external, perceived world (1961b, 28). The worldâs existence is self-evident in perception. The existence of distinctive character and spatiality and action is self-evident in perception. To deny the existence of the world or to assert the possibility that it does not exist or that we have no way of knowing it exists is talking on empty (see too Heidegger in Braver 2012, 150â52; Jary 2010, 45â46, 86â88). Question or denial of the worldâs existence or the existence of other persons attempts to reverse the embedment of meaningful assertions in world and living body. Denial or doubt of the worldâs existence or of each otherâs existence voids our common ground for all communicative utterance. Then too, âThe world may not existâ includes the possibility that that text does not exist, that its originator does not exist (in the viewpoint of a reader, including the originator reading it). That notion of possibility is empty. It is not merely a zero probability of a specified possibility, such as the possibility that a random number from the real line will be a rational number. To hold forth existence of the world or of other minds as things not presupposed in rational, discursive proof would be vacuous.
The question âWhat is Existence?â is sensible if we are asking for the most fundamental character and compass of Existence in itself or in its relations to us, a part of it. The question is not sensible, however, if by it we are seeking: to cleave an existent in two by whether it is sensed or thought; or to disqualify some existents as truly existent or as fully existent (such as attributes, alterations, situations, potentials, or formal relations vis-Ă -vis concrete Randian entity or Aristotelian substance); or to penetrate deeper than existence, go behind or beyond existence (so portraying Being, the mind, the Good, the One, or God). Answers to the sensible versions of the question would be broad characterizations of Existence: the patent everything-everywhen around us and in us as we sense it or think it ordinarily and in science; or the most basic thing constituting and provisioning cognition; or the most basic thing whose most basic categories are those discerned by Aristotle, Whitehead, Rand, Lowe, or oneself; or the universe, spacetime and mass-energy.
The questions âWhy do existents have definite character, or definite nature, or why are there concrete existents having potentials and formalities?â are not sensible. That these broad propositions are true of and most fundamental to existence is, upon reflection, self-evident. Their denial, as in denial of the principle of noncontradiction, stands one in performative self-contradictions (see also Braver 2012, 130).
My meaning of the self-evident is the usual one: the manifestly true requiring no proof. Truths accepted as self-evident are sometimes defeasible as to truth, such as occurred with the old view that heavier bodies fall faster. (See also Summa Contra Gentiles 1.10â11, in Aquinas [ca. 1259â68] 2014, 13â15.) An axiomatic self-evident truth in metaphysics should be fundamental and necessarily true. Its denial leads to bumping into the widest frame. I notice that susceptibility to performative self-contradiction upon denial is not the source of a propositionâs truth (the source is fact). Leonard Peikoff characterized Randâs axioms as perpetually evident. Fair enough.
Thank you for your intellectually diligent response. I do have to chew a little bit on it probably. If I understand you mean that existence is the widest, most comprehensive and only thing. I would say that I agree that existence is that but existence is also every particular. When I look out I see things but I donât seem to understand at this point how the things that I see lead to be existence. If I say it is everything that I see then that would in a way be correct but that would if accepted on its face lead to the idea that existence is intrinsically tied to perception which leads to Berkeleyâs view. Besides that consciousness is also an existent so it would be preposterous. So I am in the position of: I know existence exist in some but I canât understand it really. If I differentiate it to everything then I am making a mistake. If I seek it as a primary in sense perception I fail to find it in a meaningful way. Your text is however very clarifying in many aspects but despite it probably seeming idiotic I think I need to ponder about existence some more to grasp it fully.
16 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:
I donât have an answer for you, but I can help connect the notion to to some other ideas. I, too, find âexistence existsâ kind of banal, but I also take the argument that the only alternative to axioms is an infinite regress. A similar problem is that of appreciating âlife as the standardâ. Thatâs one Iâm working through now that is so fruitful all the way up to the point of actually understanding how life can be an end in itself. But the argument Objectivism makes is that, if ends exist, something must be an end in itself. This is undeniable. Similarly, existence must exist. I think it might be helpful to look at the ways in which certain ideas contradict this axiom. That task is not straightforward in itself as it involves grasping really wide metaphysical concepts, but I think thatâs a good reminder that failure to be moved by the axioms is not out of the ordinary at all. I would pick up a copy of OPAR if you havenât already and take a look at the first chapter. Piekoff gives a lot of good examples of rejecting the axioms.
In part, this issue speaks to the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. The axioms have a very analytical aura (thus the banality), so they donât seem like they could possibly say anything helpful for practical purposes. That might be a good framework for investigation: figure out how your life might be impacted by (implicitly) believing that existence doesnât necessarily exist, or that nothings or infinites or violations of causality (another good corollary of existence - and identity - to consider) could exist metaphysically. Today, I listened to C.S. Lewis describe humans as âabstract personsâ derived from God, the âconcrete personâ. This is a good example of the absurdity that comes with postulating something existing outside of existence. I was almost offended. I am existence.
Another possible connection is to the âmetaphysical as absoluteâ (review Randâs The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made or the corresponding section in OPAR). Itâs easy to forget that existence is oddly stubborn (odd in the context of most other philosophies). The past stays passed, and my ex and I are not seeing each other. Thatâs true, and I must accept it â and one day Iâll figure out how. I think that right there is the âmeaningfulnessâ of an axiom: remember how easy it is to forget.
An axiom is cognitive tool, not a quality (although being in existence is a quality). Think of it as a reminder that you canât cut corners in reality. âHonesty is the recognition of the fact that the unreal is unreal and can have no value" (Rand). Donât accept things that donât exist, and donât waste your time on things that canât.
As far as identity goes, think about it this way: identity, like non-contradiction, is the basis for saying anything that doesnât appear banal. Identity is specificity and applicability and limitation and interconnection. There is nowhere for nothings or infinites or miracles to be. Existence will not allow them. Attempting to create one would be like trying to eat your own mouth. Even imagining it would require you to build some construct in your mind out of things that actually exist, and good luck getting specific without accidentally making sense.
The notion of absurdity only makes sense in contrast to whatâs real. Only ideas can be absurd; everything else is 100% pure, uncut reality down to the lowliest quark. Everything about it is factual and can be described and has effects.
Thank you for the response and tips. I would agree that I ought to look more into what effects metaphysical ideas have on my views. What I however want to comment on is that you seem to portray existence like it is (outside) reality. The absurd exists. Not in reality but it exists qua mental conception. So this is one of the things that canât be taken as an axiom as both reality and the mental are in existence. Every conceivable thing exists either qua reality or qua mental concept. Does that mean then that for example god exists because he is conceivable. No not qua an existent god but it is existent qua mental delusion. So we know every conceivable thing exists but we cant say it exists in the way it claims it exists or it exists in a way that contradicts its claims. Non-existence exists qua mental delusion as another example but does not exist qua non-existence. So I guess with that addendum you have given me a good tip as the key is to look maybe not at the effects of the negative of the axiom but actually the positive of the axiom. I must seek how the positive claim of the axiom justifies and acts in my knowledge.
16 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:
By the way, your title is the only reason I clicked on this post.
I guess such a strange title does catch the attention.
6 hours ago, DavidOdden said:
By pointing out that any attempt to deny existence does presuppose existence. Everything in your question already accept existence. Your questions are not about existence, they are about some more advanced question of scientific method that not only assumes existence, it assumes identity and consciousness. We do not attempt to âderiveâ existence, existence simply is. We do attempt to understand the identity of things that exist.
The concept âexistenceâ is a high level concept, which at least some humans have, though we can have a tangential discussion of âimplicit conceptsâ (which I am skeptical about) if you think all humans have this concept. Dogs donât have concepts. Infants also have not developed the concept âexistenceâ, instead they are developing their first-level concepts like âfoodâ, âpersonâ, âdiaperâ and so on. Like all concepts, the concepts are not âinâ sense perception, they derive from sense perception, which is where we get primary concepts like âfoodâ, âpersonâ, âdiaperâ. Eventually we develop a hierarchical network of concepts with fruits, vegetables, meat, milk, yogurt, ice cream, ice cream cones, banana split and so forth. Most people are deluded into believing in a âmultiverseâ, whereas the universe is all that exists so whatever âuniverse 37â is, it is just an aspect of the universe. People usually donât understand âexistenceâ.
I accept that my question implicitly contain the axiom of existence but what I am looking for is the meaningfulness of existence. Existence is. I know but what does that actually mean. Iâm not asking for a definition but for a validation in sense perception. Existence must be implicitly accepted for any knowledge. As an explicit axiomatic concept it is indeed high level. But as a axiomatic implicit understanding it is accepted from the beginning of knowledge. I know we cannot see existence like Hume falsely said we must. I am saying what in sense perception validates existence. I see things but how can we have this concept of existence part of all particulars individually and the whole sum of them. And that before we even talk about the law of identity and consciousness and ânon-existenceâ and true vs false and (outside) reality as contrasted to mental conceptions. People always implicitly accept existence. They can have mental confusions which I admit I am suffering from at this moment but because of a genuine desire for grasping existence and truth. So while explicitly people donât understand existence in many ways (although every sane adult does have an explicit concept of existence) they do implicitly accept it at any stage. Thank you however for the answer.
17 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:
, but I also take the argument that the only alternative to axioms is an infinite regress. A similar problem is that of appreciating âlife as the standardâ. Thatâs one Iâm working through now that is so fruitful all the way up to
This quoted sentence confuses, is incomplete and strays into the Objectivist ethics, of objective good and evil:
âLifeâ is the metaphysical given, not a standard.
[âObectivist ethics holds manâs life as the standard of valueâŠâ]
Just having a pulse is no âstandardâ for man. 
How would one objectively gauge oneâs own, and othersâ, moral performance â or, e.g. - what form of governance/society is to manâs good, (or, topically, who holds the moral high ground in Israelâs conflicts) - but for that standard to judge by, (proper) manâs life?
2 hours ago, 8g9 said:
what I am looking for is the meaningfulness of existence. Existence is. I know but what does that actually mean. Iâm not asking for a definition but for a validation in sense perception. Existence must be implicitly accepted for any knowledge.
I am trying to figure out how to restate what you donât know (and therefore are asking about) in terms that I can understand. I presume that you are stuck on validating a claim, and the fact that all knowledge derives from application of reason to perception. I also presume that you understand and accept the hierarchical nature of knowledge, for example you cannot grasp âexistenceâ if you do not grasp âexistâ. Even âexistâ is far from a first-level concept. It is more productive to focus on lower-level concepts like âperceiveâ. For example, how do you validate the concept âdogâ, and how do you validate the concept âcatâ, likewise âtableâ, âchairâ, âanimalâ and âfurnitureâ?
On the assumption that you can do this, then you can set to validating some much more abstract concepts like âentityâ, âattributeâ, âactionâ. My initial six examples are all examples of âentityâ and not âactionâ or âattributeâ. Eventually, we will get to the point of conceptualizing other intangible abstractions like âdelusionâ, âdeceptionâ, âtruthâ. How do you validate these concepts? The final product of this process is that you can validate the concept âuniverseâ, which is another name for âexistenceâ.
I strongly disagree with the claim that every sane adult has an explicit concept of existence â this is kind of a âtrue Scotsmanâ fallacy. You are not insane if you donât have an actual concept âexistenceâ, youâre just (___ fill in the blank: lazy? lax in your thinking? focused on things other than philosophy?). Most people do not have an explicit concept of existence, they simply know the word (if they are fluent English speakers), but there are thousands of words that people commonly know without knowing the true meaning of the word. If instead you focus on âexistâ, most English speakers have some defined concept âexistâ, but their definition is usually wrong (typically, only real entities are thought to âexistâ). I also reject the notion of âimplicit acceptanceâ as a contradiction in terms â itâs like Peikoffâs parrot squawking sounds that resemble an English sentence, but which is not an instance of âtruthâ.
The implicit acceptance or the recognition of the external world or reality comes from the mere physicality. The feeling of tactile response to solidity, bump into the door jam on the way out of the room, oh yeah solid stuff. Knock your coffee over on the counter, oh yeah that gravity so useful when causing my car to work on roads , but maybe a little too much and too always right here on the counter, lol.
Even more implicit is your awareness of âitâ. Even more implicit is that awareness is the most finite thing , the locus from which all of âitâ impinges toward or radiates from. Formulating an explicit statement that articulates the distinction and relationship between the most finite self and âeverythingâ that awareness is shown can be discombobulating.
@8g9 â That name is not a mystery, what with google and all.
Do you have use for saying that a batch of brownies you just took out of the oven exist? Donât they have to exist for you and your guests to eat them? Isnât it plain to you that both the oven and the pan of brownies exist. The bare conjunction between existents, oven and pan, is not originated by us. Our acknowledgement of the conjunction that is there in the kitchen is from us. Likewise for the bare conjunction of the existents kitchen and sun. Is the idea that this exists and that exists and so forth meaningful to you? Then the existence of any and all existents is meaningful to you.
What is the stretch of Hume you have in mind in saying he says we do not perceive existence. Are you getting crossed his (and Nicholas of Autrecourtâs) ideas about perception of substance, or perhaps perception of necessary connections between distinct events, rather than existence? He was arguing against concepts in scholasticism in his predecessors and contemporaries. Moderns such as Rand have simply the substances such as oatmeal or entities as disclosed by chemistry, physics, geology, and so forth. And here âexistentsâ doesât refer to anything but those things, their interactions, and traits. And as opposed to the old Schoolmen, the basic necessary connection between distinct events we think today worth having is physical connection. And that necessary connection between distinct events sometimes can be manifest in direct sensory perception. (If you are trying to pull out a certain kind of vine growing among a mesh of vines that you want to keep, you can take off your gloves, pull taut the bad vine on its free end, see where the mesh is moving, with your other hand find the taut vine among the mesh (not mainly by vision, but by its tautness), getting hold of it between thumb and a finger in the mesh, hold it taut on into the mesh, and so forth hand over hand, until you arrive at the root of the bad vine and pull it out. All along the way one was feeling the physically necessary connection of vine tautness between distinct grasps of it with oneâs fingers. Perhaps Humeâs concerns simply are not applicable to how we tackle the world today in realist philosophy. Physical, physical, physical, . . . .)
In sensory perception of my fingers on the keyboard, I am perceiving those objects and motions as existing. The same can happen in hallucinations. Existence is part of the content of and character of oneâs sensory perception. That is the primary form of consciousness: an act of perceiving existing things as existing. Other sorts of consciousness, such as hallucinations or dreams, are derivative of that primary sort of consciousness, according to Rand. I agree.
Existence is not inherently tied to perception. There is much existence in the history of the universe before the appearance of any life, let alone any sensory perception.
7 hours ago, 8g9 said:
So I guess with that addendum you have given me a good tip as the key is to look maybe not at the effects of the negative of the axiom but actually the positive of the axiom. I must seek how the positive claim of the axiom justifies and acts in my knowledge.
I guess Iâd agree with everything you said. And thatâs a good point. Like Boydstun said:
On 5/7/2024 at 10:37 PM, Boydstun said:
An axiomatic self-evident truth in metaphysics should be fundamental and necessarily true. Its denial leads to bumping into the widest frame. I notice that susceptibility to performative self-contradiction upon denial is not the source of a propositionâs truth (the source is fact). Leonard Peikoff characterized Randâs axioms as perpetually evident. Fair enough.
7 hours ago, whYNOT said:
âLifeâ is the metaphysical given, not a standard.
[âObectivist ethics holds manâs life as the standard of valueâŠâ]
Is that quote not saying that life is the standard? Or are you underscoring the âmanâ part? Iâve always taken that emphasis to be qualifying the means to life rather than life as an end. So, survival as the end, with reason as the uniquely human means. Honestly, I canât keep all the terms straight â life, survival, life qua man, happiness, standard, end, purpose.
13 hours ago, tadmjones said:
The implicit acceptance or the recognition of the external world or reality comes from the mere physicality.
âImplicit knowledgeâ is a form of mysticism, based on a premise of a magical automatic reason machine in the human mind. Only a very small amount of oneâs knowledge is automatic, namely if you sense something, you have that concrete perceptual knowledge of an event for instance that you cut yourself or that the phone rang. You do not automatically gain high level conceptual knowledge explaining the causal relationship between the sharp object slicing your skin and the sensation that follows, even though that knowledge is âimplicitâ in cutting yourself. Knowledge must be chosen, it is not handed to you by a brain homunculus.
One of the small set of things that are legitimate automatic knowledge â things that you sense and that you register the fact of sensing â is basic words in your language. All people who speak English know that there is a word pronounced âpersonâ because they have experienced it. Most people do not know that there is a word pronounced âzymurgyâ because they have never experienced it. Most people probably know that there exists a word pronounced âexistenceâ, and most people likely have an arbitrary incorrect definition of the word. Having a concept means having the unification of units subsumed under the label âpersonâ or âexistenceâ. One has the potential to explicitly validate the concept of existence through experience, but the potential and the actual are not the same. If you havenât validated the concept, the concept isnât validated.
There may be some confusion over the proper limits on âimplicitâ knowledge, which relates to a person supplying actual knowledge that is not explicitly stated. If I tell you that you can use my hammer, I probably donât explicitly say that you have to return it in a short time, than you cannot destroy it, that you cannot hit me with it â these are implicit facts about what I say or would have said. This is what âcontextâ is about. You donât have to explicitly state everything when you are communicating with someone, you donât have to announce your definition of âhammerâ, and so on. You may assume that your interlocutor shares with you a concept of âexistenceâ, or ârightsâ, but as we know, the number of people who correctly grasp the concepts of ârightsâ is way smaller than the set of people who wield the word.
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55 minutes ago, DavidOdden said:
âImplicit knowledgeâ is a form of mysticism, based on a premise of a magical automatic reason machine in the human mind. Only a very small amount of oneâs knowledge is automatic, namely if you sense something, you have that concrete perceptual knowledge of an event for instance that you cut yourself or that the phone rang. You do not automatically gain high level conceptual knowledge explaining the causal relationship between the sharp object slicing your skin and the sensation that follows, even though that knowledge is âimplicitâ in cutting yourself. Knowledge must be chosen, it is not handed to you by a brain homunculus.
One of the small set of things that are legitimate automatic knowledge â things that you sense and that you register the fact of sensing â is basic words in your language. All people who speak English know that there is a word pronounced âpersonâ because they have experienced it. Most people do not know that there is a word pronounced âzymurgyâ because they have never experienced it. Most people probably know that there exists a word pronounced âexistenceâ, and most people likely have an arbitrary incorrect definition of the word. Having a concept means having the unification of units subsumed under the label âpersonâ or âexistenceâ. One has the potential to explicitly validate the concept of existence through experience, but the potential and the actual are not the same. If you havenât validated the concept, the concept isnât validated.
There may be some confusion over the proper limits on âimplicitâ knowledge, which relates to a person supplying actual knowledge that is not explicitly stated. If I tell you that you can use my hammer, I probably donât explicitly say that you have to return it in a short time, than you cannot destroy it, that you cannot hit me with it â these are implicit facts about what I say or would have said. This is what âcontextâ is about. You donât have to explicitly state everything when you are communicating with someone, you donât have to announce your definition of âhammerâ, and so on. You may assume that your interlocutor shares with you a concept of âexistenceâ, or ârightsâ, but as we know, the number of people who correctly grasp the concepts of ârightsâ is way smaller than the set of people who wield the word.
So I should have said passive acceptance or recognition? ( I didnât use the word knowledge, so a little confused as to your point)
My point is that what you are talking about isnât knowledge, it is potential knowledge. You might say that some people have that knowledge and others should get their act together to actually have it, and pursuing philosophical discussions here is one way to gain such knowledge. The central question in this thread is about knowledge (not metaphysics), and specifically about validating knowledge. Iâm not objecting to your mode of expression, Iâm objecting to what seems to be your idea, that people have âimplicit knowledgeâ, knowledge that is not chosen. As I noted, knowledge of personal experience via senses is automatic (indeed, axiomatic), but conceptual knowledge is not automatic. Applied to abstract concept like âentityâ or âexistenceâ, you cannot automatically know these concepts. But you can discover them by applying reason to the axiomatic, such as the sensation of bumping into a door jam. Can discover, potentially, if you choose to. Until you do, you do not have a concept âexistenceâ, you just have sensory knowledge that you heard a word âexistenceâ. Before getting to the proper concept of âexistenceâ, you might mistakenly think that delusions, contradictions and God do not exist. They do, as mental states, not a real things. Mental things exist, a fact that eludes many people. Which is why discussion of bare existence without including discussion of identity is a shortcut to intellectual hell.