Is existence definable?

Metaphysics and Epistemology
1

Recently I had a philosophical debate with a friend on questions of metaphysics. I was cornered by her request to define existence.

It all started with her request to define reality. She asked me to explain what I mean by this term. I answered that reality is the widest abstraction which contains everything that exists. Then she asked me what existence is, what it means “to exist”. My offhand answer (which I now don’t like) was that to exist means to be perceived or to have a potential to be perceived. She immediately countered that there are people who perceive imps, green gremlins and other stuff like that so doesn’t it mean that all these things exist?

I have two answers on this question but they both them seem to me unsatisfactory. First is that here we are speaking about pathology, about some perceptual dysfunction and that in a definition above it is implied that organs of perception function properly. But to distinguish between norm and pathology we first need to know what exists and what doesn’t because normal perception is a function which perceives what exists. So there is a kind of circularity involved.

My second answer is that nobody can really perceive imps and green gremlins in a full sense of this term. Imps and green gremlins can not kill you or feed you or protect you, i. e. they can not physically affect your life. And all these are forms of perception too. But to this it may be simply answered: “so what”? Yes, we can perceive them by some means but we can not perceive them by others. But we can not see sounds or hear colors, nevertheless sounds and colors do exist. How can we arbitrary elevate some forms of perception above others?

I think that the deeper problem here is a problem with my initial definition – it seems to me that it implies a primacy of consciousness. As a consequence – trying to defend it, I was constantly pushed to some subjectivist metaphysics, the kind which equates reality to social convention. But how else can we define existence? And is it definable? To define something we should refer to some existent in definition, so we will necessarily come to some circularity. On the other side it is clear that we have some way to distinguish between existence and non-existence.

I will be grateful if anyone would help me to resolve these issues.

Edit: grammar

2

It is a mistake to try to define existence. Existence is irreducible, and an attempt to define existence denies that fact. The technique of automatically demanding a definition of the self-evident is an easy way to bamboozle an opponent. Next time this comes up, you should turn the tables by saying “Define ‘define’”. Then no matter what your opponent says, pick a word from the definition and say “Define ‘___’”.

If existence does not exist, then definitions, arguments, arguers and evidence (inter alia) also do not exist, so it would be impossible for an arguer to provide an argument, based on evidence, and you (who do not exist) could not provide a definition to your opponent (who does not exist). If you were to say “I just did”, your opponent could provide no evidence that you didn’t, since evidence does not exist. She could not even offer a protest, because protests do not exist.

She immediately countered that there are people who perceive imps, green gremlins and other stuff like that so doesn’t it mean that all these things exist?

It sounds to me as though you are thinking of “existing” as being something about just entities, which would mean that ideas do not exist. The problem here is what to call the mental state of imagining or hallucinating. It is certainly not sense-perception. Imagination is not a pathological condition. So you have to distinguish sense-perception from imagination-perception, and not deny that a hallucination of an imp or the imagination of a unicorn or kitten does not exist qua hallucination or imagination. It is only sense-perception that tells you about the external world; but don’t be claiming that your imagination doesn’t exist.

3

Actually, it is possible to define the concept, “existence.” It is defined ostensibly. It is however not possible to prove existence. (The concept of “proof” or “prove” presupposes existence. To ask for proof is to have already accepted that “Existence exists.”)

The seeming problem of defining “existence” is the same as that of defining conceptualized sensations. To define the concept “blue,” one has to point. Same with the concept of “existence,” an axiomatic concept

Definitions: “The purpose of a definition is to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units differentiated from all other existents.” [Ayn Rand; Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 52.]

*All quotes are from the online Ayn Rand Lexicon.

4

If you try to define existence you will have to use the word “is” (or an expression that says the same). Therefore, by trying to define existence you have to use the word existence.

As DavidOdden said: It can’t be reduced any further. You can’t describe it with words that don’t already rely on existence.

5

If you try to define existence you will have to use the word “is” (or an expression that says the same). Therefore, by trying to define existence you have to use the word existence.

As DavidOdden said: It can’t be reduced any further. You can’t describe it with words that don’t already rely on existence.

Oh yes, I remember the trouble that the word “is” caused Bill Clinton – it all depends upon what the meaning of the word “is” is.

If we can’t define it, the (axiomatic) concept “existence,” then what does the concept refer to?

A definition identifies the units of a concept. Ostensive definitions differ from typical definitions, but they are definitions.

Were it not possible to define “existence” then we couldn’t grasp what it refers to. Were someone to ask us what we mean by “existence” we would have to shrug, “Who knows? We can’t identify the units of that concept.”

But we don’t shrug. “Existence” is defined ostensibly, just as is the concept “blue.”

To define existence, we make a sweeping motion with our arm (left or right, it does’t matter) indicating everything. Too, we could make that sweeping motion using our leg instead, either one, or a stick, or a flashlight, etc. It doesn’t matter how we do so, but we indicate that we are “pointing” to everything. Everything that is is what “existence” refers to. That is a definition, an ostensive one, one of showing or pointing, as opposed to using other concepts. It is our only means of defining – identifying the units of – the concept “existence.”

6

It is a mistake to try to define existence. Existence is irreducible, and an attempt to define existence denies that fact.

Perhaps a mistake to attempt to define existence itself (whatever it even would mean to “define existence itself”); but do you think it is a mistake to attempt to define the CONCEPT ‘existence’?

7

It is a mistake to try to define existence. Existence is irreducible, and an attempt to define existence denies that fact.

David, I join to the question below: what about defining the concept of existence? As I see it, it is undefinable because we can establish for it neither genus nor diiferentia: there is no existents we can distinguish existence from, no more general category. But the concept of existence does have meaning, it does have referents. So how is it possible to reconcile this fact with the fact that we unable to define it? This is the question which bugs me.

It sounds to me as though you are thinking of “existing” as being something about just entities, which would mean that ideas do not exist. The problem here is what to call the mental state of imagining or hallucinating. It is certainly not sense-perception. Imagination is not a pathological condition. So you have to distinguish sense-perception from imagination-perception, and not deny that a hallucination of an imp or the imagination of a unicorn or kitten does not exist qua hallucination or imagination. It is only sense-perception that tells you about the external world; but don’t be claiming that your imagination doesn’t exist.

Ah, that’s interesting. Let me restate it to check if I got your point correctly.

So imps and gremlins do exist but the mere fact of their existence tells us nothing about their particular nature. They may be material bodies but they may be products of our imagination. To learn what they are we must go and discover it. It is a problem for special sciences, not for philosophy.

So the deeper mistake of my friend was that she assumed that philosophy by itself tells us (or aspires to tell) something about particular natures of existents. She assumed that by telling us that our halluciantions do exist philosophy tells us that they exist qua material objects of the external world. And from this wrong assumption she arrived to an apparent contradiction.

Is that correct?

As a side question. I don’t have ITOE at hand and may be wrong but doesn’t ideas belong to a category of entities in Objectivist vocabulary? And if not, than I’m curious to which category they belong because everything that exists is an entity or an attribute or an action.

Actually, it is possible to define the concept, “existence.” It is defined ostensibly.

But not every existent can be defined ostensibly (e. g. “ideas” “electrons”). So, I’m not sure that we can define existence ostensibly in a serious sense of this term.

8

But not every existent can be defined ostensibly (e. g. “ideas” “electrons”). So, I’m not sure that we can define existence ostensibly in a serious sense of this term.

Okay. Please tell me what you mean when you use the concept “existence”? You used the concept several times in your post, so it seems obvious that you know what it refers to. What are the referents of the concept “existence”?

(I’m not asking about particular existents, like “ideas” or “electrons.”)

9

It seems that Objectivism does hold that there is a definition of the concept of existence:

“Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter what his errors— the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.” - Ayn Rand

10

Okay. Please tell me what you mean when you use the concept “existence”?

I gave my variant of a definition in an open post: everything which is perceived or has a potential to be perceived. But I don’t like this definition because it, I think, does not follow a rule of fundamentality and implies a primacy of consciousness (or may be not; frankly, I’m at a loss at this point).

It seems that Objectivism does hold that there is a definition of the concept of existence:

“Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter what his errors— the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.” - Ayn RandOkay. Please tell me what you mean when you use the concept “existence”?

But this is not a formal definition rather a symbolic one.

11

It seems that Objectivism does hold that there is a definition of the concept of existence:

“Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter what his errors— the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.” - Ayn Rand

But this is not a formal definition rather a symbolic one.

Objectivism provides for a distinction between formal and symbolic definitions? Where can I read about that? (I am familiar with the discussion of definitions in ITOE - and I don’t dispute that the definition just cited might not conform to the method of definition given in ITOE - but I don’t recall mention of a distinction between formal and symbolic definitions.) What is the Objectivist distinction between formal and symbolic definitions such that the concept of existence defined by “A is A; a thing is itself; existence is identity” is a symbolic definition?

12

Dr. Peikoff’s podcast #67 has as the penultimate question: What is the difference between existence and reality as concepts? His answer was:

"Existence is the basic concept. It means that which is. That sum of that which is. Reality Ayn Rand defined as existence as correctly perceived by man. There are no degrees of existence: it either is or it isn’t. But there are degrees of reality. For instance: a mother gives birth to a baby. She knows that he exists. But she says ‘it’s not real to me, not fully real’. It is something she can’t integrate into the rest of her mind and ideas and information. Then when she finally does integrate it is real to her. So now she fully perceives this fact of existence. Fully perceive in the sense of it is a part of her cognition and not just an out-of-context piece of data. It is in that sense that reality is existence as fully or correctly perceived by man. So it’s a very valid distinction but the metaphysical term is existence and reality is not a metaphysical term.

Unless, if you wanted to communicate the idea of Plato that there were two realities. You wouldn’t say there were two existences."

Reality is the product of perception, so it is epistemological. Because human all have very similar perceptual capabilities, an appeal to reality is an appeal to a common human perspective. There are philosophies that would deny that commonality and instead assert a radical uniqueness to every individual’s perspective and that ultimately communication is impossible because no two people’s words will signify the same things (true tale from the crypt sophomore philosophy course.)

13

Coincidentally, I was thinking about this recently myself. “Existence exists”, as it stands, is vacuous, as many non-Objectivists have pointed out; but Rand’s Aristotelian rider someone quoted above explains it better; as do some of the quotes from Rand, from one of the “potted summary” essays, where she puts it in “simple terms” - “nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed”. It’s really more of a mnemonic than a true axiom, and it’s a mnemonic that emphasises identity, essence.

What Rand meant was that whatever exists already has a specific identity. i.e., its identity comes from its own side (is objective), and not from ours. We do not “impose” an identity on things, or somehow create the identity of things, they already have one, which it is our job to discover.

This is meant, I believe, to counter primacy-of-consciousness thought - to counter Idealism, Phenomenalism, traditional Empiricism, etc.

So, really the axiom could be paraphrased as “Existence (with a certain specific nature) exists.”

I say above that it could be construed as “vacuous”, and has been, by many very intelligent people. This is because the concept is overdetermined. There is no way of deciding, without taking advantage of any other presuppositions, whether it means “Existence (in the form of physical reality, obeying regular laws, and non-material minds somehow perceiving that physical reality) exists.” or “Existence (in the form of a purely phenomenal reality, obeying regular laws, with nothing physical behind it) exists”, or some other concrete meaning that we haven’t even thought of yet.

Any way reality is, whether the law-abidingness of it comes from its own side or from our side, exists. The opposite of this is some kind of chaoticism, the position that what exists has no laws, no regularities, or that the regularities are illlusory - but that is actually rather a minority sort of philosophical position. In fact, I don’t know of any philosophers who would hold that position.

Now, in reality, “Existence exists” does actually mean something specific, it means this world, however it turns out to be - the trouble is, we don’t yet fully and clearly know what that is! This reality has whatever character it ultimately has, and that will be some specific character, some specific nature. But since we are not omniscient, we cannot know beforehand what it is. It might turn out to be a physical world, it might turn out to be a phenomenal world, or some mixture, or even something that hasn’t yet occurred to us to posit. So far, it’s looking like a largely physical world, with some (quickly disappearing) elbow-room for some non-material mental entity that perceives it. But it needn’t have been like that - by this, I don’t mean that “it needn’t have been like that” in the sense that it could have been some other way (that we cannot know), but that “it needn’t have been like that” in the sense that we have no logically necessary arguments to show that this is the world we should ultimately have come to discover.

Again, non-Objectivists who scorn Objectivism would point out that what Rand has plumped for as a definition of the nature of what exists (which, as I said, seems to be a largely physical world, with some kind of non-material perceiver thereof, basically a form of dualism) is a simplistic picture, “un-nuanced”, etc. However, so long as Objectivism sticks to the scientific image of the world, it’s on solid ground, since the scientific image is (almost by definition, by the definition of what science is) the best-tested.

However, it has to be said that science seems to be homing in on a description of the world as purely physical, with no room for a non-material “mind”. In terms of modern science, the “mind” is what the brain does, and is manifest in the brain activating internal dialogue, speech, activity, etc. - i.e. the particular, identifiable style of animation of one’s body (which includes both internal and external dialogue) is one’s mind, one’s self, one’s unique identity.

14

“Existence exists”, as it stands, is vacuous, as many non-Objectivists have pointed out;

The positive purpose and functions fulfilled by stating an axiom in the form “existence exists” is described in the Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

Any attempt to be “not vacuous” by being more specific would be an error equivalent to Thales saying everything is water, or Aristotle’s four elements, or that it is “turtles all the way down”. In other words, not philosophy and not even bad science but metaphysical in the theological sense of an arbitrary condition imposed on the world. In other words, stupid.

15

The positive purpose and functions fulfilled by stating an axiom in the form “existence exists” is described in the Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

Any attempt to be “not vacuous” by being more specific would be an error equivalent to Thales saying everything is water, or Aristotle’s four elements, or that it is “turtles all the way down”. In other words, not philosophy and not even bad science but metaphysical in the theological sense of an arbitrary condition imposed on the world. In other words, stupid.

Yes, I agree.