1 hour ago, Invictus2017 said:
I’d go further: Any choice is necessarily moral.
After your first post in this thread, I was hoping that you would also choose to respond to one of my own. I hope that, even in disagreement, we can maintain the spirit of discussion that I suspect we can. (Sometimes I feel like I’m searching for something so rare as to be practically nonexistent; yet I continue to search.)
1 hour ago, Invictus2017 said:
Somewhere in a chooser is better/worse that motivates his choices. Without the ability to decide that one alternative is better than another, there is no “choice”, only action. The morality may be very primitive, as in “pleasure/good”, “pain/bad”, and it may be wholly unconsidered, but it must be there.
Wholly agreed.
1 hour ago, Invictus2017 said:
I agree that this would be a moral choice. However, I disagree that individual survival would not support it. As human beings, feelings are our motivation and reward for action and, as such, gratifying them can be pro-survival. (Not always, of course.)
In the example at hand, gaining enjoyment through eating ice cream, the analysis is simple: Pampering myself, so long as it doesn’t have clearly determined negative consequences, makes my experience of living more positive and thereby improves my ability to handle my life. It is therefore pro-survival and I should do it when it doesn’t conflict with other more pro-survival actions.
StrictlyLogical’s first response was along these same lines, and I don’t disagree that there are survival advantages in “pampering oneself,” in improving the ability to handle life, or providing spiritual/emotional “fuel.” But I disagree that these survival advantages are the solitary consideration, or even the primary one. My subsequent reply to StrictlyLogical was to stipulate (for the purpose of my hypothetical) that when the survival advantages of pampering are accounted for, a lifetime of eating ice cream in moderation still results in a slightly shorter lifespan – by a day – accounting to the other negative health effects of eating ice cream.
What would be the moral choice, given that?
His response was that, in such a situation, the moral choice would be to forego ice cream; I presume that this is because he would judge the one extra day of living to be worth more than all of the enjoyment of ice cream that one may experience in a lifetime, eating it in moderation. I think that decision is consonant with what he’s expressed about his understanding of “life as the standard of value,” which I describe as “longevity,” but it conflicts starkly with my own; I would choose a lifetime of eating ice cream… and one fewer days of life, because that would be worth more to me than a lifetime without ice cream, and one more day (of an existence without ice cream).
Though my example is, obviously, highly contrived (we cannot know, and probably never will, with such specificity what the consequences of such actions will be) I don’t think it’s useless for that. It reflects real world behaviors and decision-making that I’ve observed over many years – both within and outside of the Objectivist community – and I’m certain that you’re familiar with them, too. I’ve known people who not only do not eat ice cream, but never eat dessert, as a matter of policy, or do not eat red meat, or do not eat meat at all, so focused are they on (what I have described as) longevity. They take seriously, as I suppose we must, what scientists and nutritionists have had to say about the long term consequences of such behaviors, including eating ice cream or red meat or what have you, and they have determined that those behaviors are not worth the expected consequences or risks.
Well, I’m aware of the long term consequences of those behaviors, and I understand that my lifespan may be limited as a result; I probably could secure a longer life – though a more joyless one – by replacing the bulk of my diet with celery and brown rice and so forth, and I do not believe that I can support the notion that the psychological joys of eating steak and ice cream will actually let me live longer than some harsh, abstemious diet. I accept that a more health-focused diet would promote a longer life, just as the experts proclaim that it would. But that is not how I wish to live my life.
57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
I agree with the last sentence, but I think you’re conflating different definitions of good. Happiness is experienced as good because that is part of its identity; happiness is good in exactly the same way that water is wet.
But happiness is also good, in the moral sense, because it promotes survival.
I understand, but in the service of explaining (or attempting to explain) my meaning, I am focused on the nature of happiness as good – as you say, in the same way that water is wet – and not because it adheres to an Objectivist’s understanding that happiness is good because it promotes survival.
When philosophy “began,” and ethics became a discipline, because people were interested in “the good life” and discovering how they may attain it, they identified happiness as good, and perhaps the chief good. They were thousands of years from Objectivism, and mistaken in perhaps all sorts of ways with respect to philosophy and science, but I think they were yet right in that identification. For good reasons.
I still look at ethics as the pursuit of the good life. (Or the better life; or the best.) And if I have a choice between a slightly longer life without ice cream, or a slightly shorter one with it, I know which one looks better to me.
57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
Mother nature did this on “purpose”, so that early humans, with their poorly trained rational faculties, would have a ready guide to pro-survival action. So the fact that happiness is both kinds of good is no accident. With a bit more knowledge under our belts, we can make note of he relationship and thereby make it a virtue to seek happiness, and take advantage of what evolution has gifted us with.
I agree with you about the role of “mother nature,” or evolution, with respect to both pleasure/pain and our capacity for emotional analogues; but I have grown uneasy over the years with drawing too much on evolution or “nature,” in that sense, for the purpose of ethical argument (such as that homosexuality is wrong because it is contra human nature, or “design,” or so forth).
57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
I believe that it is possible to have a conception of good and bad that is not rooted in pleasure/pain. Some intelligent species on another planet may arrive at their morality in a different way.
This is as may be, but I don’t know what that could be. And if we could imagine plausible sounding alternatives, I suspect that they would remain fundamentally and inescapably alien to me. I suspect it would be hard for me to empathize with a morality not based in our natural, human systems. (Just as it is hard for me to empathize with “moralities” based upon obedience to God, etc.)
57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
But for humans, because pleasure and pain are tied to our survival, our morality must take them into account. That is not the same thing as saying that the moral good is that which is felt as good, or even that for a thing to be morally good it must be felt as good.
My participation in these sorts of discussions goes back a while in the forum. If you have a lot of time and are feeling sufficiently masochistic, you might find this thread interesting (which, itself, refers back to earlier threads – it is a bottomless rabbit hole).
Suffice it to say, briefly, that we are fully agreed that “the moral good is that which is felt as good” and “for a thing to be morally good it must be felt as good” are incorrect; that is not at all my intended meaning or belief.
5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
It’s worth noting that longevity is not the Objectivist standard of value.
I agree. But sometimes I believe that Objectivists discuss “life” (as the standard of value) or “survival,” when really what they’re talking about is longevity.
Or, even if I am wrong about what the Objectivist standard of value is, or how it has been employed (by Rand or others), I know that longevity is not sufficient for me as a standard of value (and neither is survival).
5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
Life is a process, one in which an organism’s actions (ideally) all contributed to its continuing existence. This process, being goal directed, serves as both as end and means to its continued existence. A volitional being has the choice to make its actions contribute --or not – to its continuing existence.
Agreed.
5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
The point of ethics is to make those actions contribute.
This is possibly where I diverge. It is not alone to my “continuing existence” that I mean to direct my actions, but also the nature of my experience of my existence.
5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:
However, nothing in the Objectivist ethics speaks to the duration of the process. To the contrary, Rand focused on the nature of the process, not its duration. One action is not more moral than another because it makes you live longer, it is because it supports the life appropriate to the sort of being you are.
“Appropriateness,” like “human nature,” leaves me feeling uneasy. If we say that, of my nature, I may only achieve happiness in some certain way (or within a delimited range of ways) – if this is what we mean by “appropriate” – then I agree. And it remains for me to discover the ways in which a being like myself can attain happiness (and longevity, which, in most contexts, is a good).
But if I were to seek happiness in ways which we decide are not “appropriate” for me, because in terms of evolutionary history, or etc., we decide that such is not “natural,” then I cannot agree that “appropriateness” is an appropriate consideration.
The problem with inappropriate or unnatural means of pursuing happiness – when appropriate and natural are employed in what I consider to be the correct sense – is that: they will not work. They will not allow a man to achieve happiness. But ethics are still the pursuit of happiness, or the good life, and whatever works to achieve that is appropriate to man.