To see the contrast between virtue ethicists and Objectivism on the nature of virtue as a character trait versus a principle of action, note how I say in the essay:
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For Aristotle, a virtue is an excellence of a person’s functioning in a certain area of life. It is a stable character trait that governs a person’s actions in some respect. It is not a superficial habit or routine, but permeates every aspect of a person’s character, including his emotions, desires and intuitions.
This points to Aristotle’s distinction between the virtuous man and the merely “continent” man. A virtuous man, according to Aristotle, not only acts rightly, he does so naturally. His whole psychology must be harmonized with right action. He has no temptation to do wrong, and no emotional responses that conflict with what he should do. If he did, he wouldn’t be virtuous, but merely “continent.”
Ayn Rand doesn’t hold this. She says that, so long as a man acts on the proper principle, he is to that extent virtuous. Whether he’s conflicted about his action is irrelevant to the virtue of the action.
As far as I’m aware, modern virtue ethicists follow Aristotle on this issue. They see virtue as fundamentally a character trait, not a principle of action that an emotionally conflicted agent can follow. They don’t identify each virtue with the recognition of certain facts about reality and fundamental human nature.
The other issue that divides Rand from the virtue ethicists is the fundamentality of virtue. Virtue ethicists hold virtues as irreducible, explaining eudaimonia in terms of virtues (as at least one of the components.) This makes their concept of eudaimonia moralized, (value-laden) and it means that they beg the question about what virtues are. Where the virtues come from is rationally inexplicable. Rand grounds her morality–including the moral virtues–in the concept of “life,” and life is not moralized or value-laden. A key passage from the essay:
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The characteristic and necessary mode of human survival, which is self-sustaining action (i.e. pursuit of objective values) on the basis of thought, is the foundation of an objective account of human happiness, in Objectivism. This happiness is not merely a subjective assessment of one’s own psychological state, but a state of consciousness that is the psychological aspect of living one’s life as a human being. It is the experience of living well as a human being which can be called “flourishing” or, using Aristotle’s terminology, eudaimonia.
So here we see that Objectivism identifies eudaimonia with successful and sustainable life. It provides a solid theoretical foundation for Aristotle’s ultimate good. It clearly explains what eudaimonia means and gives it content in a way that is not dependent on assorted virtues of character as its irreducible foundation. It thus avoids the logical circle of: “What are the virtues? The character traits that combine under auspicious conditions to produce eudaimonia. What is eudaimonia? The state that is the combination of the virtues under auspicious conditions.” For Objectivism, happiness is the mental experience of eudaimonia, which is surviving as a human, par excellence. It is the mental experience of engaging–to the fullest of one’s capacity–in the sorts of actions that enable humans to survive and be healthy in the long term.
Hence the conclusion that Objectivist Ethical Egoism is not a form of virtue ethics:
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Is OEE a type of virtue ethics? Recall from the start of the section on the Objectivist virtues that Objectivism doesn’t conceive the idea of virtue in the same way that virtue ethicists generally do. Objectivist virtues are not fundamentally character traits, but principles of action grasped by reason. Moreover, even as principles of action, virtues are not the most fundamental starting points of OEE. Principles of action are regarded as virtues because of their impact on individuals’ achievement of values. So OEE can’t be considered a virtue ethical theory.
Virtue ethics is not merely a concern with virtues or character traits. Other moral theories, like utilitarianism and deontological theories can also have concerns for virtues and character traits. What defines and differentiates virtue ethics from other ethical approaches is that it regards character traits (“virtues”) as the fundamental guidelines of moral behavior, not to be explained in any deeper terms, nor judged by any deeper standard.