Is objectivism consequentialist?

On 10/20/2017 at 7:37 AM, StrictlyLogical said:

A mystic who never discovers independence or morality nor life itself as a human, can live as a physical and spiritual slave thinking he is happy.

To the degree that someone is a mystic, they are not happy.

I’ve met plenty of alleged mystics who hardly suffered from their ideology’s symptoms, at all - and none of them gave the causeless or miraculous a moment’s thought beyond the confines of their Church. I’ve known others who routinely expected their problems to be solved by magic and wailed just as often that the universe hated them. I’ve seen others being rushed to the psych ward after scrutinizing their own beliefs too closely.

Mystics are not happy.

 

On 10/20/2017 at 7:37 AM, StrictlyLogical said:

If any should break the chains that make this forum necessary, and we hear nothing from them again, I will assume they have reached a better place, a world beyond this one… 

 

/t/25884

:thumbsup:

On 10/17/2017 at 4:55 PM, DonAthos said:

My observation, meant to challenge this (if lightly), is that I do not believe that in reality people who decide to commit suicide would attach zero “value significance” to their method of suicide; I think that most suicides, even in their last moments, would consider drinking hemlock to be far more ethical than blowing up the proverbial (or literal) nuns and orphans.

But is this irrational? If an Objectivist were to decide to commit suicide, making whatever “amoral” or “pre-moral” decision no longer to value life that we imagine such people do (which I am not convinced is actually a thing that exists, but whatever) – then should that Objectivist consider all potential manners of exit (including the slaughter of others) ethically equivalent?

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Was this put to rest? 

My understanding was that initiation of aggression was immoral. I can see the logic, that a moral code is like a playbook in order to play football to win. When you are never going to play football again, the plays have no relevance. So morality only applies only when you want to play the game of life. But what about the issue of leaving a legacy, as in living the future in the now? “Anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today.” (Romantic Manifesto)
 Is forfeiting one’s life for a better society in the future, enjoying it now? If so, the decision to be remembered and honored for taking the hemlock instead of committing the slaughter of innocents is a moral act, to live the “pride” now. It has some reasoned moral significance.

3 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

Was this put to rest?

In what way? If this is what you mean, no debate around here (or as far as I can tell, in the world) is ever settled such that all parties are agreed.

3 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

My understanding was that initiation of aggression was immoral.

It’s easy enough to say that, from the point of view of the innocents harmed, blowing up a bus is immoral. But ethics, per Objectivism, are based upon self-interest. The moral prohibition against the initiation of the use of force is meant to be as self-interested as anything else – not fashioned to protect “others,” or the wider world, but for the sake of the person who abides by it.

But does the suicidal man stand to gain anything (in reason) by refraining from hurting others upon his exit? (I say that he does.)

3 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

I can see the logic, that a moral code is like a playbook in order to play football to win. When you are never going to play football again, the plays have no relevance. So morality only applies only when you want to play the game of life.

Right, that’s the way the logic goes. So when you’ve decided that you’re no longer playing to win (or that you cannot play football), then you can run any formation you’d like; you may even blow up the stadium. It’s anything goes from there on out.

In theory, this should also mean that a person with a terminal illness is no longer bound by morality (because they understand that they are never going to play football again, no matter what play they run). Some suggest that such a person will continue to drift along on their habits… and so we shouldn’t expect too much chaos. However, someone who has given these matters sufficient thought (and with the proper philosophical perspective) ought to be able to recognize their changed context…

3 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

But what about the issue of leaving a legacy, as in living the future in the now? “Anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today.” (Romantic Manifesto)
 Is forfeiting one’s life for a better society in the future, enjoying it now? If so, the decision to be remembered and honored for taking the hemlock instead of committing the slaughter of innocents is a moral act, to live the “pride” now. It has some reasoned moral significance.

Yes – this is my essential answer. “Legacy” runs the risk of implying that this is “for others,” but then you continue to identify the true root of it: that it is the experience of value in the present, the pride, the pleasure, the happiness that moral action brings, which continues to make our decisions morally significant, even in the face of (nigh) instantaneous death.

In another thread, discussing this same issue, I raised the Buddhist parable "The Monk, the Tiger and the Strawberry " as an example of moral action in the face of extremity. I believe that, so long as there is a self – so long as life remains, so long as choice remains, and so long as our choices matter to our experience of life – then there is the possibility of moral action, to wring out for ourselves the best possible experience of life, whatever our present context happens to be.

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I have now changed my mind, I think that Objectivist Ethics, in fact, is a type of “Virtue Ethics”, not Consequentialism.

It pertains to “how to do life”, regardless of actual consequences. A key component of consequentialist ethics is to considered mistakes as being immoral. Yet that isn’t the case in Objectivistic Ethics.

“Morality pertains only to the sphere of man’s free will—only to those actions which are open to his choice”.

Playboy Interview: Ayn Rand
Playboy, March 1964

I remember in the Fountainhead, Roark befriends the construction worker, a person highly competent but not having achieved great wealth or fame. I also remember Rearden offering Fransisco a relatively low-rank job. It was all about “how you do it” or judging methodology rather than accumulated wealth or position.

I come back to the fundamental question of the topic which is: “Is objectivism consequentialist?” This time I’ve read most of the topic (not all because a lot of messages seem to deviate from the original subject) and I felt trouble in the force.

Sorry if I made mistakes in English, it’s not my primary language.

As 2046 rightly said, the point of Grames (page 5), which says consequentialism is an “empty doctrine” is invalid in itself, because consequentialism is not a moral doctrine as such, but simply a category of moral doctrine. The generally opposite category, deontology, is also “empty” and silent about on what the good is. Grames (and others) makes another mistake in believing that “every theory of good and of the virtues is trivially consequentialist” and that one can “bolt the standard objectivist of value - your own life - onto consequentialism” because Objectivist ethics is actually incompatible with the consequentism, I will explain why. It’s pretty simple.

I will use quotations from Rand and Peikoff that have already been given several times in this topic, but which, I think, have not always been clearly understood.

The reasoning of StrictlyLogical (who, if I understand well, thinks that Objectivist ethics is compatible with consequentialism) are sometimes brilliant, but he has just missed a crucial point.

Objectivist ethics can not be classified as consequentialist for exactly the same reasons that Ayn Rand rejected utilitarianism and hedonism.

What is consequentialism? Taking the consequence as the sole standard of good.

YES , the Objectivist ethic deals with causality, so it fully takes into account the consequences (which is why some people seems troubled), BUT it does not consider the consequences as the standard of the good. The pursuit of values does not imply consequentialism.

To know whether Objectivist ethics is consequentialist or not, the crucial question is not: Should the consequences be taken into account in a moral theory? (The answer is YES, of course, otherwise we fall back anyway into the intrincist theory of value). The crucial question is: WHERE  does morality lies? In the action? In the consequences of the action? Both ? In the relationship between the two? Or elsewhere?

Here is why, in short, Objectivist ethics is not consequentialist: Consequentialism confuses the consequences of morality with morality itself. In other words, it confuses the standard with the purpose of morality.

Consequentialism says: morality does not lies in action, but exclusively in the consequences of action. Objectivist ethics does not say that.

Think about the relation between morality and consequences like the relation between knowledge and emotions, because it’s exactly the same kind of relation. Values are knowledge, and emotions are consequences. Ayn Rand used to say: “Emotions are not tools of cognition.” because emotions are consequences of ideas or knowledge and not idea or knowledge by itself. We can also say somehow : “Consequences are not tools of morality”.

Back to the fundamental question: Why does man need a moral code? (Any moral code.) _In order to guide his action _. And action is always a mean. In other words, morality always deals with means.

Quote

The field of ethics itself, including all moral virtues and values, is necessitated by the law of causality. Morality is no more than a means to an end ; it defines’ the causes we must enact if we are to attain a certain effect.
— Leonard Peikoff (OPAR, p. 244)

Of course it is necessary to have a goal, values (to give meaning to the action-means), but the goal alone is not enough (contrary to the consequentialist view), there must be a standard for discriminating actions that are consistent with this goal and actions that are not. In other words, a standard is needed to identify the virtues.

Why do we need a standard? Why do our actions need to be guided by a moral criterion? Because man does not have automatic knowledge. He does not function by instinct, and he is not omniscient, a human being can not fully foresee the future when he acts, he do not know in advance all the consequences. (Which would be a pre-condition of consequentialism …) So he needs a guide, that is to say a moral code. As it has been said by many of you, we can not evaluate actions post-facto …

Quote

This is the fallacy inherent in hedonism—in any variant of ethical hedonism, personal or social, individual or collective. “Happiness” can properly be the purpose of ethics, but not the standard. The task of ethics is to define man’s proper code of values and thus to give him the means of achieving happiness.
— Ayn Rand (The Objectivit Ethics)

We must therefore identify a standard that accords with the purpose, where we can rationally show the necessary dependency relation between the standard and the purpose as a cause-and-effect relationship (life is the cause, the effect is happiness, as Ayn Rand says in the following quote).

According to Objectivist ethics, life is not the consequence or the purpose of morality, it is the standard. The purpose is happiness.

Quote

The maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are not two separate issues. To hold one’s own life as one’s ultimate value, and one’s own happiness as one’s highest purpose are two aspects of the same achievement. Existentially, the activity of pursuing rational goals is the activity of maintaining one’s life; psychologically, its result, reward and concomitant is an emotional state of happiness. 
(…)
But the relationship of cause to effect cannot be reversed. It is only by accepting “man’s life” as one’s primary and by pursuing the rational values it requires that one can achieve happiness—not by taking “happiness” as some undefined, irreducible primary and then attempting to live by its guidance. If you achieve that which is the good by a rational standard of value, it will necessarily make you happy; but that which makes you happy, by some undefined emotional standard, is not necessarily the good. To take “whatever makes one happy” as a guide to action means: to be guided by nothing but one’s emotional whims. Emotions are not tools of cognition

— Ayn Rand (The Objectivit Ethics)

Life is the ultimate value because it is the condition of happiness. Without life, there is no happiness. But life is not an action. Life is the standard that makes it possible to judge the morality of an action, in other words, whether it is virtuous or not. Moral action is virtue, and it is practiced by choice.

A consequentialist morality such as utilitarianism for instance, says: What is the purpose of morality? Happiness. (We agree.) But then immediately it says: So, everything that makes you happy is good. Happiness is the good.

But it is not happiness that is moral as such. Happiness is a consequence of a proper morality. In other words, happiness is not the good, happiness is a consequence of the good. There is confusion in utilitarianism between standard and purpose.

To say: “the consequences are the moral standard” is a contradiction, it’s like saying: “morality is useless” or “morality does not serve to guide action” or “man does not need a guide to action.” To say, as consequentialism claims, that morality does not lie in action is to say that virtue does not exist. There is no moral code, no moral principles.

Quote

To declare, as the ethical hedonists do, that “the proper value is whatever gives you pleasure” is to declare that “the proper value is whatever you happen to value”—which is an act of intellectual and philosophical abdication, an act which merely proclaims the futility of ethics and invites all men to play it deuces wild.

— Ayn Rand (The Objectivit Ethics)

For example, imagine that I am faced with an alternative. To determine how I should act, I will think, “I must choose my action according to such consequence.” (happiness for instance) This is the consequentialist morality in its totality. This is not wrong in itself, but there is no morality yet: it is obviously insufficient to guide the action. Then I have to think and tell myself: “What actions would cause this consequence?” How to know? (In other words, what virtues should I practice?) In short: I need a moral code.

In itself, having a purpose (happiness for example) is necessary, but not enough to determine a rational action plan. How do you determine what makes you happy? The moral code (life for example) is used to identify how to achieve this purpose. The purpose of your life.

Quote

Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one’s values. If a man values productive work, his happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his life. But if a man values destruction, like a sadist—or self-torture, like a masochist—or life beyond the grave, like a mystic—or mindless “kicks,” like the driver of a hotrod car—his alleged happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his own destruction.

— Ayn Rand (The Objectivit Ethics)

 

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45 minutes ago, gio said:

For example, imagine that I am faced with an alternative. To determine how I should act, I will think, “I must choose my action according to such consequence.” (happiness for instance) This is the consequentialist morality in its totality. This is not wrong in itself, but there is no morality yet: it is obviously insufficient to guide the action. Then I have to think and tell myself: “What actions would cause this consequence?” How to know? (In other words, what virtues should I practice?) In short: I need a moral code.

Could you contrast…  how would an Objectivist act versus how would a “consequentialist” act, in some specific and concrete example? 

12 minutes ago, softwareNerd said:

Could you contrast…  how would an Objectivist act versus how would a “consequentialist” act, in some specific and concrete example? 

A consequentialist has nos guidance. We can not really know how he will act. He will act by any means he thinks (how? we don’t know) will leads to such consequence.
An Objectivist will act according to the values and principles that he rationally concludes to be good for his own life.

1 hour ago, gio said:

Here is why, in short, Objectivist ethics is not consequentialist: Consequentialism confuses the consequences of morality with morality itself. In other words, it confuses the standard with the purpose of morality.

Very good.  I learned what is the point of consequentialism as a category.

edit:  To elaborate, there is the category of intrinsicism, which can be deontological or consequential.

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8 minutes ago, Grames said:

edit:  To elaborate, there is the category of intrinsicism, which can be deontological or consequential.

Intrincism is not the same kind of category as deontology or consequentialism.
But deontology seems to me necessarily based on intrincist theory of value.
Consequentialism or deontology must derived from a theory of value. I do not think we can do the opposite. (Derived a theory of value from deontology or consequentialim…this makes no sense to me.)

10 minutes ago, gio said:

Intrincism is not the same kind of category as deontology or consequentialism.
But deontology seems to me necessarily based on intrincist theory of value.
Consequentialism or deontology must derived from a theory of value. I do not think we can do the opposite. (Derived a theory of value from deontology or consequentialim…this makes no sense to me.)

My understanding is currently that intrinsicism is category of theories of the good.  Deontological ethics assert that the good is achieved or served by right actions regardless of consequences, only the actions have meaning and results don’t matter.  Consequentialist ethics assert that the good is achieved or served by the consequences, only the results matter and the actions have no significance.

In other words, we have “means justify the ends” and “the ends justify the means”.  Ends vs Means is another false dichotomy.  Which harkens back to another earlier post of yours.

3 hours ago, gio said:

A consequentialist has nos guidance. We can not really know how he will act. He will act by any means he thinks (how? we don’t know) will leads to such consequence.

Are consequentialists mythical beasts? Or are there some people who say they’re consequentialists and claim they cannot – in principle --know how to act?

7 hours ago, softwareNerd said:

Are consequentialists mythical beasts? Or are there some people who say they’re consequentialists and claim they cannot – in principle --know how to act?

I didn’t say consequentialist does not know how to act. They have a goal, but no principles. They act without any moral code or principles or virtues. (They think their goal by itself is moral) Consequentialism is very simple, it’s only the famous aphorism: The end justifies the means.

For example, I was arguing with someone some time ago. I said that an ethics of life did not tolerate human sacrifice. And he asked me if, in my opinion, at the time of the Chernobyl disaster, the USSR should not have sent the “liquidators”. The USSR sent thousands of men without any protection knowing well that many would die (but without them knowing it at the beginning) in order to avoid a greater misfortune that would have contaminated the capital of the Ukraine and much of Central Europe. In other words, they sacrificed humans to save many more.

I told him that the USSR should not have done this and, for him, I was “out of reality”, he wanted to show me that it was not a question of morality but of “efficiency” . He thought that I was a deontologist, that I had a theory of intrinsic value: he did not say it with these words of course, but that’s what he meant, obviously. He did not see any other alternative.

He also claimed to be an admirer of Machiavelli.

Here you have a typical example of consequentialist. Machiavelli is quite in this kind of category, as Ludwig von Mises also was at some degree. I’m sure that person I was arguing with was atheist, materialistic, empiricist and probably “pro-science”. This is an example of muscle mysticism, or Attila.

The “package-deal” Witch Doctors (Mystics of the spirit) is often:

  • God
  • Metaphysical idealism
  • Transcendence / pure mysticism
  • Rationalist
  • Realistic in the quarrel of universals
  • Intrinsic theory of value
  • Deontology
  • Free will
  • Conservative

While the “package-deal” Attila (Mystics of the muscle) is often:

  • Atheist
  • Metaphysical materialism
  • Positivism and separation between fact and values
  • Empiricism
  • Nominalist in the quarrel of universals
  • Subjective theory of value
  • Consequentialism
  • Determinism
  • Liberal

They both agree to divorce percepts and concepts, one choose the side of floating concepts, the other choose the side percepts without principles. The first are the heirs of Plato, the second are the heirs of the sophists.

4 hours ago, gio said:

I told him that the USSR should not have done this and, for him, I was “out of reality”, he wanted to show me that it was not a question of morality but of “efficiency” . He thought that I was a deontologist, that I had a theory of intrinsic value: he did not say it with these words of course, but that’s what he meant, obviously. He did not see any other alternative.

If the alternatives are less death versus more death, how is that even a moral question? It seems like an emergency situation in which “morality” becomes a math question and a matter of one’s will to make such a decision. We need a non-emergency example to understand consequentialism. Let’s say he wants to get to the supermarket (end). How would he do it (means)? Would he drive carefully and obey traffic laws? Or drive recklessly and maybe run over a few pedestrians who got in his way? If the means are inconsequential, why not be reckless?

10 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

If the alternatives are less death versus more death, how is that even a moral question? It seems like an emergency situation in which “morality” becomes a math question and a matter of one’s will to make such a decision. We need a non-emergency example to understand consequentialism. Let’s say he wants to get to the supermarket (end). How would he do it (means)? Would he drive carefully and obey traffic laws? Or drive recklessly and maybe run over a few pedestrians who got in his way? If the means are inconsequential, why not be reckless?

Emergency situation are unproper to build morality, but it doesn’t mean morality doesn’t apply. And in this case, human sacrifice is still immoral. That does not mean that we should not do something. It simply means that in “doing something”, sacrificing humans to save others is inappropriate. (In the proper meaning of the word sacrifice.)

20 minutes ago, gio said:

And in this case, as in all other cases, human sacrifice is immoral. That does not mean that we should not do something.

Let’s boil this down and get real. On one hand you have 1000 people dying. On the other you have a whole city or county dying, many more than a thousand. You have the power to choose which outcome happens. Doing nothing leads to the greater number dying. Doing something leads to the 1000 dying. Will you do nothing because doing something is a sacrifice? A sacrifice means giving up the greater value for the lesser one. How did you decide that the 1000 were of greater value than the whole city?

2 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Let’s boil this down and get real. On one hand you have 1000 people dying. On the other you have a whole city or county dying, many more than a thousand. You have the power to choose which outcome happens. Doing nothing leads to the greater number dying. Doing something leads to the 1000 dying. Will you do nothing because it is a sacrifice? A sacrifice means giving up the greater value for the lesser one. How did you decide that the 1000 were of greater value than the whole city?

In the context of the original question, it was a fake alternative. Can you be more specific and describe a real situation where the only thing you can do to prevent an whole city or country from dying is to murder 1000 people?

5 minutes ago, gio said:

Can you be more specific and describe a real situation where the only thing you can do to prevent an whole city or country from dying is to murder 1000 people?

Yeah, having to send in 1000 workers to stop a nuclear plant meltdown. The details are not the point here. You raised a fundamental moral objection, not a technical one. I’m trying to understand how you arrived at your moral objection. Is it a sacrifice because the 1000 were not told they would die? Because the boss ordered them to go in, while he stayed out of harm’s way? Because the city is full of lesser skilled people, and the 1000 are highly trained scientists? 

34 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Yeah, having to send in 1000 workers to stop a nuclear plant meltdown.

Assuming this is the only thing that anyone (nobody else can’t do anything) can do to prevent the other to die, sending 1000 workers to stop a nuclear plant meltdown, without any element of context, does not equate murdering 1000 people by itself. It depends of many elements of the context.

Sending 1000 soldiers (or more) in a war to save the country, for example, is not human sacrifice most of the time, for sure. (And a war is often an emergency.) You are not necessarily murdering 1000 people. For many reasons. It depends of the context.

34 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

The details are not the point here.

It’s not an issue of details, but of context. The context is important. You can not properly evaluate the morality of an action without the context.

34 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

I’m trying to understand how you arrived at your moral objection.

My moral objection is Objectivist ethics. You don’t have to sacrifice human life when you don’t have to do it.

34 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Is it a sacrifice because the 1000 were not told they would die?

In the context of the original question, the liquidators have not all been deadly damaged. But anyway, assuming it was the case, this is, of course, an important point, since you are falsifying their judgment, and thus, their actions. (And this is why force and fraud are wrong.)

34 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Because the boss ordered them to go in, while he stayed out of harm’s way? Because the city is full of lesser skilled people, and the 1000 are highly trained scientists? 

Oh please, give me a break…
 

5 minutes ago, gio said:

Oh please, give me a break…

Okay, I really don’t want to debate the ethics of emergencies again. Can we go back to my question about driving to the supermarket? Or do consequentialists only apply their morality to emergency situations?

12 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Okay, I really don’t want to debate the ethics of emergencies again. Can we go back to my question about driving to the supermarket? Or do consequentialists only apply their morality to emergency situations?

There is no answer for the supermarket question applying to consequentialist. First, it depends on what consequence he considers to be good. (Since consequentialism is not a moral doctrine itself, but a category of moral doctrine.) And secondly, his action can not be determined: he will choose any means which seems to him leading to the consequence he considers to be good, without any code or principle. And we do not know by what process he will choose that this means are more suitable than others. (It can be reason, instinct, faith, whim…anything.)