Is there an explicit Objectivist ontology?

Questions about Objectivism
1

In the first chapter of OPAR, Peikoff gives General Motors, subatomic particles and the solar system as examples of entities - existents, in the parlance of the rest of the philosophical community. Peikoff does qualify this by saying that these are combinations or arrangements of other entities. So what exactly do Rand and Peikoff include in their ontology, and where is it articulated (if it is at all)?

At least one implication of Peikoff’s statement is that mereological sums exist. A mereological sum is something which is nothing over and above the sum of its parts. So more explicitly, what Peikoff permits when he says that the solar system is a combination of other entities and what mereological sums are about is a relation of parthood. So in a possible world consisting of three simple entities, A, B and C, there are 7 possible mereological sums - A, B, C, A&B, B&C, A&C, A&B&C. Mereological summation is something like the inverse of a ascribing parthood to an entity - granting arguendo that A&B&C exists, we would say that A is a part of A&B&C. Allowing the existance of mereological sums is important, because it means allowing the existance of composite objects.

So we know that Rand permits the existance of composite objects. What I, at least, don’t know is what sorts of composite objects exist under Rand’s account. Presumably she has a very full ontology if she permits that entities like General Motors exist in a metaphysical sense. Is there anywhere in Rand’s corpus that we can find an explicit account of what sorts of things exist? Or even whether she thinks that there are mereological simples, entities that have only one part (themselves) and thus are not composite? Does Objectivism permit the possibility of gunk, infinitely divisible entities (ie, for any entity A there exists an X and there exists a Y such that X is a proper part of A and Y is a proper part of A and X does not equal Y)? Does she permit unrestricted fusion of entities, or does she have conditions on what constitutes a parthood relation?

2

What I, at least, don’t know is what sorts of composite objects exist under Rand’s account.

Now here, OTOH, you pose an easy question. The answer is, “those which do exist”.

3

So we know that Rand permits the existance of composite objects. What I, at least, don’t know is what sorts of composite objects exist under Rand’s account. Presumably she has a very full ontology if she permits that entities like General Motors exist in a metaphysical sense. Is there anywhere in Rand’s corpus that we can find an explicit account of what sorts of things exist?

In OPAR, Peikoff describes entities, in the primary sense, as “solid things with a perceivable shape.” But since there are all sorts of things that exist, I’m not sure what you are asking. There are elements, molecules, bacteria, animals, rocks, trees, spoiled hotel heiresses. Yes, unfortunately, even Paris Hilton is a sort of thing that exists.

4

The nature of the things which exist is largely a scientific pursuit . . . why should a philosopher have a list of everything that is allowed to exist? This hearkens back to the “categories of being” of ancient philosophers (I forget which one if there was only one, sorry). She discusses categories in ITOE (although that may be in the appendix so you’ll need a newer copy), so I’d look there first if I were you.

Keep in mind that “composite” entities are largely a result of a particular epistemological labeling system, i.e. your particular method of conceptualizing them. As for how you should choose to conceptualize, the answer is “whatever actually works”. Some things are so specific that you may or may not need a concept for them, for instance the word “Tingo” which on Easter Island means “borrowing someone’s possessions, one at a time, until they have nothing left”. Apparently this happened a lot there. If there were an absolute philosophical method for putting entities, actions, etc. into various mental filing cabinets then all languages would translate into each other with great ease. As it stands, translation is a tricky job because there is no one absolute method.

P.S. this should not be taken to mean that ALL methods of conceptualizing are valid, however, there is a method for determining whether or not a *particular* concept is valid, it’s just in the realm of the optional you may not find a need for a concept covering a particular ground if you don’t run across it often enough: a descriptive term can suffice.

5

David,

Now here, OTOH, you pose an easy question. The answer is, “those which do exist”

A non-tautological answer would be appreciated - or at least an explanation of an answer that you know I’m going to find inadequate and ask for explication of.

William,

But since there are all sorts of things that exist, I’m not sure what you are asking. There are elements, molecules, bacteria, animals, rocks, trees, spoiled hotel heiresses.

Well, maybe there are all sorts of things that exist. What I’m looking for is an understanding of Rand’s view of what it is for something to be an entity. Does Microsoft “exist” in the same sense as I do, or that coke cans do, or that cats do, or that subatomic particles do? Are there any existents that are metaphysically “simple”, that aren’t composed of anything else? Those are the sorts of questions that comprise ontology, and that I’m trying to get Rand’s views on.

Jennifer,

The nature of the things which exist is largely a scientific pursuit . . . why should a philosopher have a list of everything that is allowed to exist?

Because the question of whether some object X exists or not isn’t as simple or scientific as it might seem. Does some object X (one that we might epistemically label a table) such that it is the mereological sum of four table legs and a table top exist? How about some object Y such that it is the mereological sum of the Queen of England and my keyboard? You’re right that what we identify as objects is largely dependent on a labeling system, but I don’t think that necessarily bears on the question of whether that object which I’ve stipulated and somehow label exists in a metaphysically primary sense.

6

You’re right that what we identify as objects is largely dependent on a labeling system, but I don’t think that necessarily bears on the question of whether that object which I’ve stipulated and somehow label exists in a metaphysically primary sense.

From what I understand, you’re basically asking this question: everything is composed of pieces of other things until you get down to some “metaphysically primary” state, like, say, the smallest particle of matter, so how can you say that a table “exists” instead of, say, a cloud of 15.8 X 10^26 of these particles exists? You’re also asking: is there some metaphysical rationale why we say a table exists and not a cloud of many particles?

The answer is that “table” is the label we use to describe a cloud of particles in a particular shape with specific attributes. The question of the number and type of constituent parts is philosophically unimportant; it may even qualify as a nonsense-issue. What matters is the perceptual/conceptual unity of these parts. Now, a table is, to a human, perceptually all one thing. General Motors (which is not actually a concept, it’s a proper noun) is a bunch of things that are conceptually unified.

Concepts and percepts, however, are not metaphysical traits; you cannot say that because we perceive a table as all one thing it is therefore metaphysically all one thing on the most basic level of reduction. You can’t say that because we conceive of General Motors as a unified entity that it therefore becomes a homogenous indivisible blob.

You’re smearing epistemology and metaphysics all together in one big lump, is the problem. You couldn’t stipulate or label the object (or its various constituents) if it didn’t exist, in a “metaphysically primary sense”, in the first place. The Queen of England + your keyboard may not be a valid concept, but this is a completely epistemological question and both The Queen of England and your keyboard exist, that is metaphysically exist, whether you unite them under one concept or not.

In OPAR Leonard Peikoff gives an example of a man that attempted to unite Jesus Christ, cigars, and sex all under the same concept (“encirclist”) and he explains why this is not a valid concept, you may want to look at that also.

Basically I’m not sure I see the point of all this merelogical stuff, but all this seems like common sense to me. What is it intended to accomplish, prove, or demonstrate?

7

What I’m looking for is an understanding of Rand’s view of what it is for something to be an entity. Does Microsoft “exist” in the same sense as I do, or that coke cans do, or that cats do, or that subatomic particles do? Are there any existents that are metaphysically “simple”, that aren’t composed of anything else? Those are the sorts of questions that comprise ontology, and that I’m trying to get Rand’s views on.

An entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself. Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships do not exist by themselves.

But, now, if you ask me what is the relationship of parts of an entity to the entity: metaphysically they exist, so that if you, for instance, cut off the legs of this table, the top will exist by itself and the legs will exist by themselves.

Now, epistemologically, you could regard the top and the legs as attributes of the table in the sense that, if you cut them off, what remains is no longer a table. But that would be only an epistemological method of regarding a part of an entity [as if the part were an attribute]. Metaphysically, the separated parts will continue to exist, only they will no longer be in the form of a table.

Ayn Rand discusses this in more depth in ITOE if you are interested.

Microsoft does not exist in the same sense that you do. Microsoft is a business. You are a person. Microsoft is composed of people, buildings, computers. You are composed of flesh, bones, mind. You are an individual entity. Microsoft is a collection of individual entities.

Are there any existents that aren’t composed of anything else? I don’t know. It would seem that some subatomic particles might qualify, but then I’m not a physicist. What is outer space composed of? If you figure that one out, maybe you’ll discover the fundamental existent.

8

… what exactly do Rand and Peikoff include in their ontology, and where is it articulated (if it is at all)?

Metaphysically, whatever is is. In terms of being, the axioms (of which that is #3) and the law of causality are almost the whole of Objectivist metaphysics. There is no ontology (as you seem to mean it) in Objectivism. An examination of what sort of things exist is entirely for all other sciences to deal with. Other than recognising that there is such a thing as consciousness (axiom #2), we do not dream of what things may exist in heaven and earth in our philosophy.

Moreover - I am not a professional philosopher so I could be wrong - isn’t ontology more to do with categories of being per se (eg the concept of characteristic, relative location, etc, which gives rise to adjectives and adverbs etc in grammar) rather than some sort of taxonomy of existents as you seem to be asking about? What you are asking about sounds more like cosmology than ontology. Miss Rand rejected cosmology outright as a philosophical subject - see Journals of Ayn Rand, pp698-9.

At least one implication of Peikoff’s statement is that mereological sums exist…

Objectivism recognises that things are the sum of their parts, but also that they exist in a definite pattern that integrates those parts to form a coherent structure. But Objectivism also recognises that while such structures are metaphysically real as the product of what is possible for combinations of fundamental particles acting according to their nature and that this arises from the operation of the laws of identity and causality, our identification of them is a point in epistemology as well as metaphysics. Entities are metaphysically real, but what we physically observe is only one level of comprehension of what exists. That level we call perceptual, where what exists above and below this level must be inferred conceptually. To use the terminology you use at the end of your post, the perceptual level is just that degree of fusion automatically performed by our senses and the basic parts of our consciousnesses (it is in part a learned skill, though learned in babyhood very quickly). The rest of fusion has to be done volitionally and conceptually.

Were there some other creature who was at a different scale of existence, eg some bizarre being hundreds of kilometres across and whose visual and tactile resolution was measured in tens of metres instead of our tenths of millimetres, what we would call perceptual would have to be conceptually inferred by that creature, and what we’d have to conceptually infer on a larger scale than the perceptual would be visually obvious to that creature. Irrespective of what any consciousness’s actual perceptual level is, everything from fundamental particles to the whole of the universe is fully real as existents. Metaphysically, it is all equally real. Picking things out of that gamut for further consideration - for ‘fusion’ - is an epistemological issue. I second Mister Swig’s recommendation to read ItOE.

So we know that Rand permits the existance of composite objects.

“Permits”!?!? This attitude of ‘permitting’ things to exist something she condemned! Again, what is is , whether one wants to ‘permit’ it or not.

Is there anywhere in Rand’s corpus that we can find an explicit account of what sorts of things exist?

There is no such account anywhere, and nor would she provide one were she expressly asked to do so for the reasons I have already said: examination of what exists in particular is for the other sciences. It’s inclusion in philosophy by others was a grave mistake that lead to the dichotomy of rationalism versus empiricism, she wrote.

Does Objectivism permit the possibility of gunk, infinitely divisible entities?

Again with this ‘permitting’ thing…

One may divide something conceptually as far as one likes, so long as there is a metaphysical basis for it. Such division need not be on the entity level, either. Theoretically, one could break up the characteristics of even the fundamental particles for separate consideration, but this is not to imply the existence of something akin to Leibniz’ monads. The only limit is what the nature of the fundamental particles allow - and specification of the detail is, again, not a properly philosophical subject and is instead left to physics.

As to infinity, Objectivism does reject that as a physical possibility, and refers instead to indefinitude. Even the existence of fundamental particles per se is not a philosophical subject. There is only recognition that the infinite cannot physically exist, which just happens to lead one quickly to the conclusion that some such bits-of-something are indeed fundamental. Beyond that, who knows? These bits of something may not even be matter, for all anyone can say.

Does she permit unrestricted fusion of entities, or does she have conditions on what constitutes a parthood relation?

Anything real can be integrated in mind and form a valid concept corresponding to what actually exists. In this instance, what does the permitting is the actual nature of what is being integrated. Fusion by consciousness to form concepts of entities is epistemological, not metaphysical, but must conform to what the metaphysically given lets be fused. Moreover, we may fuse in any which way we like - so long as there is an objective basis for doing so, which basis must also be drawn from the metaphysically given so as to meet our needs for comprehension :slight_smile:

JJM

9

Microsoft does not exist in the same sense that you do.

If “same sense” means “having the same identity; being the same existent”. I do not exist in the same sense as my brother does, since he is he and I am I. I do exist in the same sense as my brother, at a higher level of abstraction – we exist as men. I exist in the “same sense” as Microsoft, that sense being “an existent with certain legal rights” (MS being incorporated). Until one specifies exactly what that sense is, and justifies the claim that that sense has a bearing on existence, the question “does X exist in the same sense as Y” is a brazen attempt to smuggle in the primacy of consciousness – to say that a certain (unspecified!) conceptual perspective on an existent actually affects whether the thing exists.

Are there any existents that aren’t composed of anything else? I don’t know. It would seem that some subatomic particles might qualify, but then I’m not a physicist.

Which is why this is not a question that Objectivism can address – it is not a philosophical question.

10

If “same sense” means “having the same identity; being the same existent” …

By “same sense” I mean the same type of entity. I am an individual entity. Microsoft is a collection of individual entities. I am a solid thing with a perceivable shape. Microsoft is not. It is a collection of solid things with perceivable shapes.

Microsoft might have rights, but only because the people that make up Microsoft have rights.

I only brought this up because I thought the original questioner was confused about the difference between an individual and a collective entity. A baseball card exists individually, on its own. A baseball card collection does not. It needs individual baseball cards in a box or binder to exist. Break up the collection and you have all the individual parts, but you no longer have the collection. Break up Microsoft and you have all the individual people, buildings, and computers, but you don’t have Microsoft anymore.

That’s all I was saying.

11

I think the short answer to your question is “no”. I don’t think there is a discussion of the issues your asking about in the Objectivist literature, at least not at the level of technical detail you appear to be seeking. Your best bet is probably in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, perhaps in the appendix, but I don’t think you’ll find the kind of formal technical description you want.

In terms of the “kinds of things” that exist, I believe Objectivism is broadly Aristotelian: entities, attributes, actions, relations. If I understand you correctly, I think Objectivism would not say that any mereological sum is automatically an entity in its own right. Given three entities A, B and C, where A and C are slices of bread and B is a slice of ham, you may or may not have a composite entity A&B&C, a ham sandwich. Whether you do or not obviously depends on the precise nature of the relations between A, B and C. (If B is stuck between A and C, it’s a ham sandwich. If A is in San Francisco, C is in New York and B is in Miami, then you don’t have a ham sandwich.)

I suspect that part of the confusion here is that Objectivism considers entities to be objective. This term has a very specific meaning within Objectivism, unsurprisingly. In this context, it means that an entity is an aspect of reality as identified by a human consciousness. In a purely metaphysical sense, totally separate from consciousness, there is only one ‘thing’ – existence. Consciousness identifies aspects of existence and groups them together on some basis.

I think an entity is some aspect of existence that is identified by human consciousness as causally integrated. In what Peikoff refers to as the “primary sense” of the term, the causal integration is perceptually apparent in physical terms. This is where you get the ‘entities are material and bounded’ criterion from – this is the form of causal integration that our awareness is capable of identifying through direct perception. Entities on other scales, or that are more distributed, have their causal integration identified conceptually. It is on the basis of this kind of conceptual identification that General Motors is considered an entity. The various parts of GM (employees, factories, inventory, relationships with vendors, etc) are tied together into a whole by a complex web of causal interactions (including in this instance human intentions).

The metaphysical basis of entities is that certain aspects of reality are causally connected to each other in ways that can be identified by human consciousness. But entities become entities when those causal connections are identified, perceptually or conceptually, by consciousness. The question of what kinds of entities can exist is thus a function of what kinds of causal connections can exist between aspects of reality. That is a scientific question, not a philosophical one, so Objectivism does not take a position on it.

It should be obvious from the above that Objectivism would not countenance “unrestricted fusion of entities”, if by that you mean the arbitrary combination of entities in the absence of causal integration.