It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. "It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.
Why is life the only candidate for an end in itself? Presumably the answer is the claim exemplified by this line from Galt’s speech: “There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms.” Value is by Rand’s definition “that which one acts to gain and/or keep”. Rand further claims that non-existence doesn’t require action, whereas continued existence does (Anyone have a citation for this? I don’t have access to my books, I’m finding these quotes online). It follows (at least, I think Rand says it does) from these premises that we have to choose life to have value. I want to try and outline this rigorously, and see if we can get Rand’s conclusions to follow. I’ll bracket all my concerns about the truth of Rand’s premises and save that for the debate forum. Here’s a first stab at reconstructing the argument.
V(ab) = a values b
K(ab) = a acts to gain or keep b
B(a) = a is a volitional being
C(a) = a chooses to exist
N(a) = a chooses not to exist
f(a) = a’s life
(P1) (x)(y) V(xy) <-> K(xy) (value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep)
(P2) (X) C(X) -> K(a,f(a)) (If someone chooses to exist, they value their own life)
(P3) (x) B(X) -> C(X) v N(X) (If someone is a volitional being, they either choose to exist or choose not to exist)
(P4) (X) ~(C(X) & N(X)) (One can’t both choose to exist and choose not to exist)
(C1): (x) (Ey) ~ (V(xy) & ~(V(x,f(x) & B(x)) (It cannot be the case that someone is a volitional being, they value something, and they do not value their own life.)
Only problem is that I don’t think this follows from the premises as I’ve outlined them. I’ve been trying to do a proof with this premise set for a while, and I don’t think one is possible. So have I gone wrong in translating one of Rand’s premises? Do I need an additional premise? The main problem is that it doesn’t follow from “X values something” that “X values their life” - at least not with the premises Rand supplies. And we can’t just supply it as a premise, because that would amount to assuming our conclusion (namely, that life is an end in itself). Any thoughts?