Moral Dilemma About "cooties"

coirecfox: “Eddie, that was precisely what Kant said man should do in that situation–nothing. Generally, Kant saying something is right leads me to believe that the opposite is true.”

So if Kant says we should treat people as ends in themselves, you think we should do the opposite? If you re-read my post, you will see I was arguing what should be the appropriate course for an Objectivist, not the appropriate course for a Kantian.

As it happens, the Kantian solution is the same, and interestingly, Miss Rand appears to agree with this solution.

Eddie

I would like to see someone’s explanation as to how ANY human action can be performed without regard to value. Not as a matter of choice, but as the axiomatic tie between action and value. Or can there be certain situations in which values that are divorced from morality?

That’s what I want to know Greedy.

Sorry about the joke Eddie. But seriously, look at Kant’s justification for why people should be considered ends in themselves. I’m sure you’ll eventually disagree with him.

And by my above post, I dont mean to say that the idea that people are ends in themselves is in any way wrong. I mean that the premises Kant uses to justify it are totally wrong.

coirecfox: “Sorry about the joke Eddie.”

That’s OK.

coirecfox: “But seriously, look at Kant’s justification for why people should be considered ends in themselves. I’m sure you’ll eventually disagree with him.”

As far as I understand it, Kant’s justification is that human beings are rational agents, which makes them ends in themselves. To treat someone as a means to one’s end is to violate that rational agency.

For example, if I tell someone lie, I am treating the other person as a means to whatever end I have in mind, because I am compromising their ability to act as a rational agent.

As to whether any human action can be performed without regard to value, if we are by nature moral agents, then all our actions take place within a moral dimension. But some particular actions – shall I eat steak or pork? – have minimal moral value for most people.

Moral considerations come into play when we are faced with certain sorts of hard choices: do I eat the last piece of pie, or offer it to my neighbour?; do I lie and avoid an uncomfortable confrontation, or tell the truth and face the music? And moral considerations come most into play in extreme situations, such as the lifeboat example.

Unfortunately, it’s at the point where we most need morality that Rand deserts the stage, saying morality cannot apply. The implication is that in some situations we can cast aside all moral considerations and strive for brute survival. Her argument is that extreme situations are a different kind of event to the normal run. But of course they’re not; the difference is one of degree, not one of kind.

An ethic that can’t address some life and death situations, especially an ethic with life as its cornerstone, needs a lot more work to make it fly.

Eddie

I would like to see someone’s explanation as to how ANY human action can be performed without regard to value.  Not as a matter of choice, but as the axiomatic tie between action and value.

There are several. For instance, to act towards an object or seek a goal under force, does not imply that the object or the goal are of value to you.

(Incidentally, I do not think that your use of “axiomatic” captures the proper relationship between action and value.)

Or can there be certain situations in which values that are divorced from morality?

Miss Rand described a particular situation in which morality does not pertain. That is what I have been discussing. Even if, for whatever reason, you do not agree, do you not realize that that is the issue? Why do you not address the arguments that have been made instead of trying to deduce an answer from some other principle?

Stephen:

Miss Rand described a particular situation in which morality does not pertain. That is what I have been discussing. Even if, for whatever reason, you do not agree, do you not realize that that is the issue? Why do you not address the arguments that have been made instead of trying to deduce an answer from some other principle?

First, let me clarify the issue to make sure I have it correct: In a situation where man has been metaphysically reduced to a choice between his life and the life of another, morality a) neither pertains to his choice nor a later evalutation of his choice or B ) does not pertain to his choice but does pertain to a later evaluation of his choice or c) pertains to his choice but not to a later evaluation of his choice.

If this is not the issue then we should probably clarify it before we continue.

I think the disagreement also may lie in the question of whether or not all of man’s choices are inherently moral ones, ie inherently based on values. I think they are. I also believe this quesiton should be addressed before we continue as it is a more fundamental concern in this situation, that being the metaphysicsl nature of man rather than the code of ethics he follows.

I think that Greedy and I are trying to say that, because man is cognitive and rational, there can never be such a situation in which morality does not apply. Stephen, you said that the position I was advocating makes morality subjective, but if morality does not apply, how can it be subjective at the same time? What does your position do for morality? If morality does not apply in this situation, what standard should I base my choice on? What I am asking is how can you seperate morality and choice if man possesses consciousness? If you were in this situation, would you conscioulsy say, “This situation is outside the realm of morality” and not choose or randomly choose because of this?

I understand that Rand said that morality does not pertain to this situation. What does “does not pertain” mean though? Does it mean should not be applied to choice, or does it mean that any action taken should not be evaluated morally

to the situation, but man must still make a choice, he cannot be morally judged for his choice.

…morality does not pertain in that lifeboat situation, because in such a situation one cannot adhere to Man’s life as a standard. It is only upon life that a moral code can be established.

But you can choose to live or not to live. So is there a standard for such a choice?

Greedy if I have misrepresented you in any way let me know so I can stop.

There are several. For instance, to act towards an object or seek a goal under force, does not imply that the object or the goal are of value to you.

In such a case, the value is not the object one is forced to act towards, but the value one is seeking to preserve by obeying an order – namely one’s safety. My argument is that to the extent that one chooses to act between known alternatives, one chooses between different values, and therefore faces the choice of acting morally or not.

(Incidentally, I do not think that your use of “axiomatic” captures the proper relationship between action and value.)

I unintentionally used the term “axiomatic” in the sense that Austrian economists use it – from whom my position is derived. From an Objectivist perspective, I would say that the fact that values are inseparable from actions follows directly from the context of life as the standard of value.

Miss Rand described a particular situation in which morality does not pertain. That is what I have been discussing. Even if, for whatever reason, you do not agree, do you not realize that that is the issue? Why do you not address the arguments that have been made instead of trying to deduce an answer from some other principle?

That’s because I don’t disagree with those arguments. I have instead argued my position from a much more basic principle, which applies to all actions, not just emergency situations.

(There is a question of “well, if actions in emergency situations require moral evaluations, what basis would there be for one?” that I have not answered, but that is a secondary consideration, that can only be resolved after agreement on the basics.)

Greedy if I have misrepresented you in any way let me know so I can stop.

No, I think you are generally on track.

That’s because I don’t disagree with those arguments.

I took your original posting as disagreement, which is why I started discussing this with you. If you say that you actually agree, then I will not bother with these secondary issues and I’ll go on vacation from this thread.