Moral Obligation To Help

Questions about Objectivism
21

To formulate this argument properly it must be made explicit what subjects all of the value judgments are referring to. Bad for whom, cost to whom, etc.

Yes, and premise #1 is trying to overlook the idea that we cannot compare values like that: across two different people. It tries to set up a notion where I get (say) 1 unit of value from the $1 I’m going to spend on some gum, while someone in Africa will get 1000 units of value if I give him the money for a meal. It’s trying to compare that which cannot be compared.

22

To formulate this argument properly it must be made explicit what subjects all of the value judgments are referring to. Bad for whom, cost to whom, etc.

Exactly. The premises seem to sanction the notion of “intrinsic values”.

Singer is trying to persuade his audience that poverty is bad in abstact, and not as a relational value.

23

I think even #1 would probably be pretty easy to prove.

I don’t think so, I can’t quite put my finger on it, but something just strikes me as off about it. it seems reasonable at first, but it does not make sense to me. I am tired and going to bed soon, I will sleep on it.

my objection rests on the idea of “comparable significance.” It seems to be a meaningless concept - who defines what is comparable and significant to whom? it is there (intentionally or otherwise) to obfuscate the issue, to lead to a predetermined, altruistic outcome.

the altruistic intent is implicit in the statement, essentially it is saying: “If we can prevent something bad from happening _ TO OTHER PEOPLE _ without losing something of comparable significance, we should do it.” but it does not seek to prove this, just takes it as a premise.

Clearly, if I can prevent something bad happening to me without losing something of higher value, I should do it (obviously).

But I don’t see why, except from a utilitarian position, I should necessarily consider myself morally obligated to give up anything to prevent something bad happening to someone else. This calls for endless minor sacrifices, death by a thousand cuts. Someone on the street is hungry, their hunger is bad and is comparably more significant than my own desire for a cup of coffee - am I morally obligated to give up my coffee to buy the hungry beggar some food? Asked that question, most people would say no, yet they still accept the altruistic premise and would often seek to justify their refusal to sacrifice their coffee. Where would this kind of morality lead?

edit: just saw the previous posts, I guess I said (badly) in 300 words what those guys said well in about 50.

24

I would say that yes, at zero or insignificant cost, you are morally obligated to help a stranger, and I believe that this position is consistent with my understanding of Objectivism.

  1. There is no such thing as a zero cost action. Every action has a cost in energy and time spent. There is also the matter of opportunity cost which is highly contextual. Time spent in one action, deprives one of the time and opportunity to do another action, at that time. This could be (in a context) a significant cost.

  2. How do you reconcile you position with the Striker’s Oath in -Atlas Shrugged-?

Here is my position: If one has a specific contract to perform services of assistance (or rescue) and has taken a valuable consideration for making the contract, one is contractually obliged to help. For example; a life guard, a policeman, a fireman, a soldier. Being in this positions or occupations and being paid for it creates a moral and a legal obligation to render certain types of assistance, depending on the terms of the contract.

Bob Kolker

25
  1. How do you reconcile you position with the Striker’s Oath in -Atlas Shrugged-?

By realizing it doesn’t prohibit acting to save someone.

26

By realizing it doesn’t prohibit acting to save someone.

That is true, but it does not oblige a person to assist anyone either. If there is no obligation to assist then assisting is purely a matter of preference or choice. Like choosing which flavor of ice cream to have tonight. Except where a contractual obligation to assist is in place, assisting another person is purely optional. Neither choice is immoral or unethical. Where there is a contract in place to render assistance under specified conditions, failure to do so, is a breach of contract which is unethical.

Bob Kolker

27

That is true, but it does not oblige a person to assist anyone either. If there is no obligation to assist then assisting is purely a matter of preference or choice. Like choosing which flavor of ice cream to have tonight. Except where a contractual obligation to assist is in place, assisting another person is purely optional. Neither choice is immoral or unethical.

That’s not Ayn Rand’s view of morality, only yours. This is the “Questions about Objectivism” section of the forum.

28

That’s not Ayn Rand’s view of morality, only yours. This is the “Questions about Objectivism” section of the forum.

O.K. When is one obliged to help (in the sense of duty) outside of a contract? When is it immoral not to help? I simply do not see such an instance. If one has no contractual obligation to help, then one can simply choose not to help. On the other hand if there is a substantial interest or consequential benefit in helping out, then it makes good sense to pursue one’s interest or benefit. But even when it makes good sense to try to get a benefit, it is not immoral to not get the benefit, provided no harm comes of not pursuing the benefit.

In general, there is no substantial interest in helping strangers who have no connection to one’s life or situation. Saving the world is, by and large, a futile effort.

Bob Kolker

29

O.K. When is one obliged to help (in the sense of duty) outside of a contract? When is it immoral not to help? I simply do not see such an instance. If one has no contractual obligation to help, then one can simply choose not to help. On the other hand if there is a substantial interest or consequential benefit in helping out, then it makes good sense to pursue one’s interest or benefit. But even when it makes good sense to try to get a benefit, it is not immoral to not get the benefit, provided no harm comes of not pursuing the benefit.

I don’t wish to engage in a debate about any of this. I just want to point out the inherent lie in answering a question about Objectivism, with your own contradictory viewpoint. I know you are aware of it being contrary to Objectivism, because you said so less than an hour ago in the other thread (here).

30

Yes, and premise #1 is trying to overlook the idea that we cannot compare values like that: across two different people. It tries to set up a notion where I get (say) 1 unit of value from the $1 I’m going to spend on some gum, while someone in Africa will get 1000 units of value if I give him the money for a meal. It’s trying to compare that which cannot be compared.

Singer thinks he can. He is a utilitarian and so takes value outside the context of a particular valuer. He is attempting to assume the “view from nowhere” when he makes these kinds of arguments (which of course he cannot do). So to him all units of value are equivalent and can be mathematically parsed in such a way. This type of thinking is why utilitarianism continues to exist.

31
  1. There is no such thing as a zero cost action. Every action has a cost in energy and time spent. There is also the matter of opportunity cost which is highly contextual. Time spent in one action, deprives one of the time and opportunity to do another action, at that time. This could be (in a context) a significant cost.

Yes, of course, and oftentimes in a real-world situation with context, the costs outweigh the value gained. In this situation, the obligation deriving from integrity goes the other way; it is immoral to extend help and forgo something of greater value. However, in assuming zero cost I simply responded to an unrealistically-formed question, and I think the logic of the answer has significance for real world situations. In real world situations, if you take the full context into account and still feel that helping a stranger is the most objectively valuable action you can take at present, you are obligated to take that action by integrity to your values.

  1. How do you reconcile you position with the Striker’s Oath in -Atlas Shrugged-?

Because the obligation to help derives from an egoistic ethics. It is fidelity to your own egoistic hierarchy of values that drives the obligation I am talking about. The well being of strangers carries a non-zero value to me, and it therefore fits somewhere within my hierarchy. In some situations, I will judge that promoting that value (the well-being of a stranger) will be the best course I can take to further my overall value structure, and in those situations I am obligated to help.

Your actions are not taken “for the sake of” the person you are trying to help, in the sense that your moral code is not built around their well-being. You’re still ultimately acting for your own sake. However, other people factor into your own value structure to varying degrees; loved ones factor in very heavily, friends less so, and strangers still less so. Acting for your own sake requires mutually beneficial relationships with each of these groups of people.

In a sense, I am saying that you would never be obligated to help a stranger when helping him is not a mutually beneficial action. When you judge that extending help will be the most beneficial action possible for yourself at that moment, you are obligated to take it.

32

That is true, but it does not oblige a person to assist anyone either. If there is no obligation to assist then assisting is purely a matter of preference or choice. Like choosing which flavor of ice cream to have tonight. Except where a contractual obligation to assist is in place, assisting another person is purely optional. Neither choice is immoral or unethical. Where there is a contract in place to render assistance under specified conditions, failure to do so, is a breach of contract which is unethical.

Is it immoral for me to follow my father into a career in medicine, simply because it is expected of me, when what I would really love to do is become an economics professor? Objectivism would say that yes, taking this action is immoral. Why? Because I’m sacrificing something of great value to me and getting little in return. Assuming I have chosen to live, I have a moral obligation to pursue my own happiness; that is to say, sacrificing myself and my happiness is immoral.

When I say that I have a moral obligation to take that career as an economist, what I am trying to convey is that morality dictates that we pursue properly-formed selfish values. These dictates of morality are what I refer to as moral obligations. Morality dictates that we look for rational values in all that we do.

To look back at the situation of helping strangers, morality still dictates that we look for rational values in others. When we find them, we should pursue them to an extent that is consistent with our hierarchy of values overall. It would be irrational to ignore all value except that to be gained by helping strangers, but it would also be irrational to neglect helping strangers entirely when they hold a true rational value to us. Forgoing the value to be gained from helping strangers is immoral in the same way as forgoing the value to be gained by pursuing the career that I like. My moral obligation to do both of them, given a favorable context, derives from my commitment to selfish values.

33

In general, there is no substantial interest in helping strangers who have no connection to one’s life or situation. Saving the world is, by and large, a futile effort.

True. It is true that helping strangers who have no conceivable connection to oneself is not beneficial. However, assuming that all strangers are in this relationship to one’s life is entirely unrealistic.

The most obvious value to be gained by helping strangers is their potential relationship to you as value-producers in the future. I can’t tell you how many current friends of mine became friends of mine beginning with a kind gesture extended to them when they were a stranger to me. Effort expended to help strangers can turn into friendships, relationships, beneficial business contacts and partnerships, etc.

In many situations, the likelihood of this is very small. For example, there is little likelihood of this sort of benefit accruing from me sending money to starving children in India or some such thing. This type of potential benefit obviously favors helping those in your own university, community, company, etc over more distant strangers.

However, there is another kind of benefit available from helping strangers, and that is the psychic benefit from encouraging the pursuit of objective values by others. You may gain some rational satisfaction from contributing to a cause which teaches the uneducated valuable skills and puts them in a position to support themselves. Even if you never anticipate that your life will be made better by someone who went through the program, you value self-sufficiency and value production, and you gain some happiness from seeing others accomplish that. This type of benefit is possible even with very distant strangers; however, it is only possible with certain types of activities. Simply giving money to the poor indiscriminately is not likely to do anything but encourage their dependence on charity; this type of giving does not benefit me because I am not encouraging any rational values. However, if charitable giving is structured in a way which promotes self-sufficiency and rational values, I may legitimately gain satisfaction by giving to it.

Obviously, this satisfaction doesn’t go very far. An acontextual orgy of giving to others, even if done in a way which actually promotes self-sufficiency, is likely to end with the giver being impoverished and unable to pursue other values that he/she has neglected. However, if effort to help strangers is expended in the right way, and if it does not endanger his or her other rational values, it can be beneficial to and proper for the giver. This is why I would characterize charity as a marginal issue in ethics; it is likely to hold a low place in one’s value structure, far below pursuing a career or helping out loved ones and friends.

34

It is in the nature of man to be a contractual animal.

Since one cannot be contractual in loneliness, a contractual animal needs the existence of other contractual animals to keep being a contractual animal.

(Meaning, a man needs other men to keep living qua man).

That’s why almost all people value human beings more than a vanilla ice cream. We feel that people are more important to our own flourishing, and that’s why we would prefer to invest five minutes saving a life than eating vanilla ice cream.

Having a partner is so important for my long term goals, that even skipping a whole meal to get or keep a partner is generally a good investment. It is not that human beings have an intrinsec value. No. It is just that rational people happen to like, in principle, other people, unless dissapointed, unless they are given a good reason to dislike them.

So, to me saving the life of a stranger is related to rationality: to acting according to my nature.

Correspondingly, not saving the life of a stranger when there is no objective danger to myself and my higher values, is irrational and hence immoral.

35

The most obvious value to be gained by helping strangers is their potential relationship to you as value-producers in the future. I can’t tell you how many current friends of mine became friends of mine beginning with a kind gesture extended to them when they were a stranger to me. Effort expended to help strangers can turn into friendships, relationships, beneficial business contacts and partnerships, etc.

<snip>

However, there is another kind of benefit available from helping strangers, and that is the psychic benefit from encouraging the pursuit of objective values by others. You may gain some rational satisfaction from contributing to a cause which teaches the uneducated valuable skills and puts them in a position to support themselves. Even if you never anticipate that your life will be made better by someone who went through the program, you value self-sufficiency and value production, and you gain some happiness from seeing others accomplish that. This type of benefit is possible even with very distant strangers; however, it is only possible with certain types of activities. Simply giving money to the poor indiscriminately is not likely to do anything but encourage their dependence on charity; this type of giving does not benefit me because I am not encouraging any rational values. However, if charitable giving is structured in a way which promotes self-sufficiency and rational values, I may legitimately gain satisfaction by giving to it.

Good stuff, I agree with this fully. Dante, your posts usually make me think “I should have said that”. :slight_smile:

36

I don’t wish to engage in a debate about any of this. I just want to point out the inherent lie in answering a question about Objectivism, with your own contradictory viewpoint. I know you are aware of it being contrary to Objectivism, because you said so less than an hour ago in the other thread (here).

I am not contrary to Objectivism in the entirety. I differ on one point concerning whether purely optional choices are a matter of moral import. Sometimes they are, sometimes they are not. I fully sympathize with the economic and political thrust of big Oh Objectivism. I am pro-Capitalism down to my toenails. I stopped working for governments back in 1968; that is 42 years ago. How long have you been it? I also detest altruism in all its forms. I consider it a disease as much as a philosophical error. I have seen more of the New Deal and Fair Deal than most of you folks here who were not even born until after FDR died.

I have made a sincere and studied effort to become as hard headed and hard-hearted as I can possibly be. I stopped shedding tears for the suffering of stupid mankind decades ago. I have done a good job of purging myself of compassion and pity. I have worked on this for over forty years so I am harder than most of you here.

I do not live for the sake of others nor do I expect or require that they live for mine. I reached that conclusion without a bit of help from Ayn Rand. I came across Ayn Rand when I was nearly 25 years old, so I did not have a teen-age infatuation with Rand. I found Atlas Shrugged to be an interesting alternate time-line novel and rather plausible. I note with a kind of amusement that some of the worst of Rand’s predictions are now coming true. What was it that Francisco said? Brother you asked for it. Yup. They asked for it, now they are getting it.

So, while I am not a member of the Club, neither am I an enemy of the Club.

Bob Kolker

37

I differ on one point concerning whether purely optional choices are a matter of moral import. Sometimes they are, sometimes they are not.

What is the the controlling source of Ayn Rand information (speech, writing, etc) where she defines this in terms of a “purely optional choice”?

I understand the the concept in terms of say, ice cream, where a person can determine what they want/feel like at that moment if they focus… But what about things like which number to choose if you’re playing roulette? Would Rand say the choice of black or red is a moral choice?

(this is a “for fun” game where no money is at stake… for the sake of simplicity)

38

So, to me saving the life of a stranger is related to rationality: to acting according to my nature.

Correspondingly, not saving the life of a stranger when there is no objective danger to myself and my higher values, is irrational and hence immoral.

What if there is a more pressing need of your time and attention than saving the life of the stranger? What if you were on your way to catch a train to go to a job interview that could be very important to your well being. If you save the stranger, you miss the train, you miss the interview and probably miss the chance of getting that job. Which is more important? The life of the stranger or the job interview (in this hypothetical scenario)?

All choices and judgments have a cost. One must weigh the cost versus the benefit.

So in deciding whether to try to save the stranger, I would first ask: what do I get if I save the stranger and what do I lose if I don’t save the stranger. I run a cost/benefit analysis as quickly as I can. Or at least I should run a cost/benefit analysis.

Bob Kolker

39

So in deciding whether to try to save the stranger, I would first ask: what do I get if I save the stranger and what do I lose if I don’t save the stranger. I run a cost/benefit analysis as quickly as I can. Or at least I should run a cost/benefit analysis.

Have you ever tried doing it? What exactly did you measure?

40

Bob:

If by cost/benefit analysis you mean what risk such an act entails for your life or the life of the ones you love, I agree with you.

But once you have established that your life runs negligible or no risk, what other sort of cost/benefit analysis could you possibly make?

Such an analysis would require information not only related to what you know you will lose (e.g. your job interview) but about the stranger and the consequences of saving his life. Is he a millionaire who will pay you back with a big check, or an Islamic terrorist that will interpret your act as an act of Alah that kept him alive to fulfill His will to blow up some bus?

Without information of both risks and benefits, how can you run a risk analysis?

That’s why I would say: In those situations, trust your nature.

Evolution has done a great job in you.

It has given you a mind able to perform logical thinking, but it has also given you neurohormonal mechanisms to make you do the BEST possible thing, in terms of survival, when there is no time or information for a logical thinking.

You can decide in advance that, in situations where rationality will have no time or input to work, you will trust your nature.

And many times it will guide you to an adventageous position. As a tool of survival, mind trumps guts by far, but guts trump chance. Following your guts is better than flipping a coin. I would even go further: whereas mind trumps guts by far in medium and long term goals, guts trump mind in immediate term goals, when decisions on life and death have to be made in few seconds. Indeed, trying to apply logical thinking such situations would work against you.

I believe that it is in our nature to save strangers when doing that does not represent an ostensible risk. Maybe evolution made individuals who save strangers more able to be saved by others when they are the strangers. This behaviour is seen in other primates. Sympathy generally pays off.