I see in this no contradiction of what I have said except the first sentence. The idea that virtues are means of obtaining values is in no way inconsonant with the idea that they are properties and not actions. In her article concerning emergency ethics, Ayn Rand specifically rejected the Judeo-Christian formation of ethics that defines morality in terms of actions and rules without context. Instead she affirmed Aristotelian virtue theory, which I take to implicitly acknowledge Aristotle’s conception of virtues, though I have never seen her treat this explicitly one way or the other. If you have any excerpt I should be aware of, let me know.
But if we are to assume the Aristotelian framework, then it is explicit in The Nicomachean Ethics that virtues are properties, some of which may include rationality, productiveness, and strength, as strength is not a good in itself but a means unto other goods. The health that is often derived from strength may be considered a value, but simultaneously a virtue as it is a property that allows one to lead a happy life.
“Society and tradition are parts of reality; however they are man-made, not metaphysical givens, they must not be accepted without judgement, and in some cases they cannot be accepted at all.”
For the most part, agreed. This is all part of the discourse that goes into understanding the precise role that society and tradition play. While society is man-made, it is also in a sense metaphysically given–that is, it is an ontological fact. That does not mean that one must agree with it, or even treat it as just, but simply that one must identify and recognize it, and form one’s philosophy in light of it.
I find that many Objectivists are intensely hostile to the very mention of society, but I have a different conception of society than is traditionally intended by the word. I see the modern world, in the wake of the relativism and emotivism that is a result of the widespread and often unconsciously accepted Judeo-Christian formulation of ethics, has a very splintered and confused society. By “society”, I speak of the different forms of friendship that one obtains, either by mutual interest in a particular activity, mutual goals, and similar philosophies. Anything outside of this, such as a national society, I don’t actually recognize as society. And when I speak of society, I am not speaking of government, which often tends to be the case with communists. That I believe society is important in developing one’s hierarchy of virtues does not mean that I believe it should be enforced for the common good by a statist and dictatorial government.
I find this proper sense of society to play a central part in the way that one defines his own role in the world (for instance, if one sees a need in his society for a new technology, it becomes his telos to be a good technician, which requires the virtue of scientific intelligence). It is also central for a person’s ego, since man is a social animal. He needs companions and sexual relationships, which is–hopefully–good society.
“Social relationships are no different today than they were a thousand years ago.”
This, I must say, is entirely incorrect. The similarities begin and end with the fact that people had language, family, and nationality. But societies 1,000 years ago were by today’s standards radically localized and far more interwoven. The advent of Lutheranism was an initial break from this tradition, the likes of which had not been seen since perhaps the Sophists. Before this, it was believed that each person had a personal stake in the lives of all the others in the town’s community, and it was taken for granted that each may impose his will in particular ways (these ways would vary from nation to nation, town to town) on the others. In ancient Greek societies, each town was its own nation, with each citizen sharing a common goal. In Athens, the goal was wealth, culture, and intelligence. In Sparta it was strength, courage, and war; and what’s more is that people then did not want any such liberal society for themselves or for others. They wanted to be bound together in pursuit of a common telos. That kind of society is entirely alien to modern Americans in particular.