Nitpick: Words are not concepts

Metaphysics and Epistemology
21

If I removed this comma, then this sentence would have the same meaning. However, you can’t remove a concept from an idea without changing (usually destroying) the meaning.

Just as an idea is not a mere set of concepts, a sentence is not a mere list of words, but a structure of words. Punctuation emphasizes structure. Grammar, by definition, is the structural part of language.

 

Not sure that I understand your point.

 

I think you’re saying that Objectivists assert that the concepts in a sentence function something a math problem. For example, something like: 1+1+1+1= 4.

 

On the other hand, you seem to be suggesting something like: 2+2 = 5. I am not using that example to disparage you, but rather to merely suggest that you are arguing that the structure of a sentence adds another layer of meaning that is not strictly contained within the concepts/words used in a sentence.

 

I have no problem with that. Language and its usage is flexible and hardly written in stone. A sentence can contain a variety of implicit meanings that are not the same as its explicit/intended meaning.

22

If I removed this comma, then this sentence would have the same meaning.

No, if you removed the comma, your sentence would have no meaning, until a reader guessed what you’re trying to say, and where you left out that comma from.

Exactly the same as if you wrote “If I misspell this wrod, then this sentence would have the same meaning.”

As part of the studio audience, the punctuation mark itself (.,!;:slight_smile: are symbols. The conceptual portion occurs with-in the mind by the means of utilizing them as intended; a method organizing thought(s) in writing.

Yes, punctuation marks are symbols. Same as words, except they look different (as an aside, in some languages, they might not even look different, and you’d have trouble figuring out which are the punctuation marks, and which the morphemes or words; not to mention that Japanese uses particles where English might use ’ or : ). The quote in the OP (stating that words ARE concepts) is an out of context sentence. Ayn Rand made it clear that she doesn’t literally consider the words concepts. They’re symbols stand for concepts.

And a symbol represents one of two things: a concrete or an abstract. Punctuation marks represent abstracts. Proper names (and other symbols one might use to represent proper names in writing, for instance the singer Prince uses a symbol instead of his name sometimes) are not concepts. Everything else is.

The only question is, what grouping of letters and spaces constitutes a word (a symbol that stands on its meaningful own). Some examples of words are “has been”, “hasbeen” (as a noun; I guess that’s a new one, my spelling software doesn’t like it), “town hall”, or “doghouse”. These examples are each single words (they each stand for one concept), each made up of two morphemes.

In other languages (agglutinative ones), words can be made up of lots of morphemes. For instance, this is a plant name in Japanese: 竜宮の乙姫の元結の切り外し. That’s one word. Looks like a sentence, and it started out as a sentence. But now, it refers to a single concept (a type of seaweed, according to Yahoo Answers, called “eel grass” - oh look, another example of an English word with a space in it).

(note: these last two paragraphs aren’t really related to your post, it’s just me trying to clarify my previous point, and add something new - since Grames did such a good job settling the issue raised by OP)

23

you are arguing that the structure of a sentence adds another layer of meaning that is not strictly contained within the concepts/words used in a sentence.

 

A adds another are arguing concepts contained in is layer meaning not of sentence strictly structure that the used within words you.

I am not arguing that structure merely adds more meaning. I consider ‘concepts/words’ an invalid package deal.

 

 

Exactly the same as if you wrote “If I misspell this wrod, then this sentence would have the same meaning.”

Well, yes. Letters are not concepts. People talking about yoghurt and yogurt are talking about the same thing.

24

If I removed this comma, then this sentence would have the same meaning. However, you can’t remove a concept from an idea without changing (usually destroying) the meaning.

Just as an idea is not a mere set of concepts, a sentence is not a mere list of words, but a structure of words. Punctuation emphasizes structure. Grammar, by definition, is the structural part of language.

Yeah, a sentence is a structure of words. Grammar is structural, yeah. So why can’t a structural word or punctuation be a concept? I really don’t see where you reach the conclusion that “and” isn’t a concept. At best, you’ve shown that there is more to a concept than *only* meaning. My earlier post was getting at what might seem to be a non-concept.

25

If:

  1. A sentence contains information other than a set of concepts. (Zebras are mammals =/= Mammals are zebras; concepts: { zebras, being, mammals })

  2. The information in a sentence is communicated through words (Vocal ‘punctuation’ is unreliable)

 

Then it wouldn’t be surprising if:

  1. Some words aid in meaning without directly conveying a concept. (A grue was eaten by you = You ate a grue; concepts: { ingestion, grues })

 

As part of the studio audience, the punctuation mark itself (.,!;:slight_smile: are symbols. The conceptual portion occurs with-in the mind by the means of utilizing them as intended; a method organizing thought(s) in writing.

 

It is important to distingish between what is conceptual or conceptualizable, and what is itself a concept. A colon may trigger thought, but for actually talking about the concept colon we use the word, not the symbol.

26

If:

  1. A sentence contains information other than a set of concepts. (Zebras are mammals =/= Mammals are zebras; concepts: { zebras, being, mammals })

  2. The information in a sentence is communicated through words (Vocal ‘punctuation’ is unreliable)

 

Then it wouldn’t be surprising if:

  1. Some words aid in meaning without directly conveying a concept. (A grue was eaten by you = You ate a grue; concepts: { ingestion, grues })

 

 

It is important to distingish between what is conceptual or conceptualizable, and what is itself a concept. A colon may trigger thought, but for actually talking about the concept colon we use the word, not the symbol.

As you continue to dice, slice, and discard what you consider to be irrelevant to what you are trying to discover, you may find yourself with nothing left to analyze, and conclude that it all sums up to nothing at all.

27

If:

  1. A sentence contains information […]

 

“information” amongst us humans is held in conceptual form. You cannot escape concepts. Insofar as you think it, you think it in terms concepts.

28

If:

  1. A sentence contains information other than a set of concepts. (Zebras are mammals =/= Mammals are zebras; concepts: { zebras, being, mammals })

  2. The information in a sentence is communicated through words (Vocal ‘punctuation’ is unreliable)

 

Then it wouldn’t be surprising if:

  1. Some words aid in meaning without directly conveying a concept. (A grue was eaten by you = You ate a grue; concepts: { ingestion, grues })

 

1 and 2 don’t lead to 3. You seem to be saying that the word *is* the concept - that’s not Rand’s position. Maybe that conclusion is not surprising, but how do you get there? Even if a sentence conveys more than merely adding concepts, it doesn’t follow that some words in the sentence aren’t concepts. “Sure you saw a satyr” can mean that you really did see a satyr, or it could be sarcastic and mean that I think you never saw a satyr. Each word is a concept, but the meaning of the sentence is not merely adding up concepts. If you introduce punctuation to indicate sarcasm, that would be a concept of indicating sarcasm.

29

Dower said:

A colon may trigger thought, but for actually talking about the concept colon we use the word, not the symbol.

It doesnt matter because both the word and the “symbol” are symbols in different context. In both cases the meaning is the actual existents being symbolized.

30

It doesnt matter because both the word and the “symbol” are symbols in different context. In both cases the meaning is the actual existents being symbolized.

 

Is your position really that colons and “colon” have the same meaning?

31

I don’t know how you arrived at this conclusion.

32

I consider ‘concepts/words’ an invalid package deal.

 

I think that I am starting to understand your position.

 

In short, I think that you are trying to distinguish between:

  • visible/audible symbols/words
  • mentally apprehended symbols/words
  • concepts
  • structural/grammatical meaning.

I think that we can all agree that visible/audible symbols/words (e.g. — the written word “THIS”) are existents that are perceivable to the senses. Conversely, mentally apprehended symbols/words (e.g. — the thought of the written word “THIS”) are existents that are *NOT* perceivable to the senses.

 

I think that some of the disagreement is coming from what I understand as your assertion that:

  • [CONCEPTS] and [sTRUCTURAL/GRAMMATICAL MEANING] are in some way the same/mutually inclusive

and the Objectivist assertion that: 

  • [CONCEPTS] and [MENTALLY APPREHENDED SYMBOLS/WORDS] are the same.

According to Rand’s account of Objectivist epistemology, each and every case of a mentally apprehended (i.e. — recognized and understood) [WORD] is also a case of a mentally apprehended [CONCEPT].

 

In short, [CONCEPTS] = [WORDS].

 

The reason for this is simply based on Rand’s definition of [CONCEPT], which is — “a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition [in conjunction with its definiendum].” Thus, every [WORD] that is mentally apprehended is also a [CONCEPT] according to Objectivist epistemology. It is also worth noting that this kind of perspective is not totally unrelated to philosophical accounts of [CONCEPTS].

 

THUS, It is based on this epistemological description that Objectivists assert that [CONCEPT] is not the same as [sTRUCTURAL/GRAMMATICAL MEANING]. Their contention is that [sTRUCTURAL/GRAMMATICAL MEANING] is created by the correct combinations of [WORDS]/[CONCEPTS].

 

It might be more useful to argue that Rand’s epistemological account does not logically entail her to the conclusions that she asserts.

33

The reason for this is simply based on Rand’s definition of [CONCEPT], which is — “a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition [in conjunction with its definiendum].” Thus, every [WORD] that is mentally apprehended is also a [CONCEPT] according to Objectivist epistemology. It is also worth noting that this kind of perspective is not totally unrelated to philosophical accounts of [CONCEPTS].

 

THUS, It is based on this epistemological description that Objectivists assert that [CONCEPT] is not the same as [sTRUCTURAL/GRAMMATICAL MEANING]. Their contention is that [sTRUCTURAL/GRAMMATICAL MEANING] is created by the correct combinations of [WORDS]/[CONCEPTS].

 

It might be more useful to argue that Rand’s epistemological account does not logically entail her to the conclusions that she asserts.

As far as I know, Rand never went that deep into philosophy of language, but I don’t think anything she believed entailed that syntax is created by combinations of words, or that semantics are created by combinations of words. How to structure a sentence isn’t a concept, but grammatical parts of a sentence like “and” are concepts referring to a method, just as the concept logic is referring to a method. I’m just trying to figure out why Rowsdower thinks anything used to convey grammar application is not a concept.

 

Also, words *denote* a concept. Concepts are more than their definition; it’s not quite right to equate a representation with what it represents.

34

Language not only allows us to express concepts, it allows us to apply concepts to entities, facts, hypotheticals, what-have-you. When you say “a red balloon” you not only communicate the two concepts, you specify that they apply to the same entity simultaneously. The Objectivist meaning of concept is an integration of similar existents; an idea is not necessarily a concept or set of concepts. The idea of a red balloon is not a mere juxtaposition of your concepts of red and balloons.

 

Also, from lojban.org/tiki/wavelessonscontinued:

la, as well as lai and la’i are a bit eccentric, since they always marks the beginning of a name. Unlike the other gadri, anything that can be grammatically placed after la and its sisters are considered part of the name. For example, le mi gerku is “my dog”, but la mi gerku is someone called “My Dog”.

 

It is a part of the language definition that these words (la, lai, la’i) alter the meaning of the sentence without themselves representing concepts.

 

 

I don’t know how you arrived at this conclusion.

 

If you do recognize the distinction between the concept of a punctuation mark and the meaning represented by it, then you can not, for example, claim that a period is a concept because you have a concept of “grammatical tool used to express the end of an expression” (post #2 in this thread). If a punctuation symbol is a concept, then what is the difference in meaning between “Yesterday I died” and “Yesterday, I died.” ?

 

 

grammatical parts of a sentence like “and” are concepts referring to a method

When I say “I am tired and hungry”, am I talking about how occasionally I have more than one thing to say? Or am I just doing it without referring to it? This is just the same as the difference between “period” and a period.

35

One of the lectures by John Searle deals with some of these issues on the philosophy of language/intentionality/“background”. Ill try and find it. May have been one on speech acts.

36

If you do recognize the distinction between the concept of a punctuation mark and the meaning represented by it, then you can not, for example, claim that a period is a concept because you have a concept of “grammatical tool used to express the end of an expression” (post #2 in this thread). If a punctuation symbol is a concept, then what is the difference in meaning between “Yesterday I died” and “Yesterday, I died.” ?

Not much difference, that doesn’t change a period as “sentence ending”. If you don’t need to convey “sentence ending”, then don’t. If you want to, go ahead. The sentence would be the same, albeit perhaps a little more ambiguous if it looked like you hit post by accident before you finished. A concept isn’t “that which will destroy the meaning of a sentence if removed”, since sentence meaning is not a sum of concepts within a sentence.

37

Dowser said:

If a punctuation symbol is a concept, then what is the difference in meaning between “Yesterday I died” and “Yesterday, I died.” ?

One of the sentences has the symbol that informs you of the intentional state of the speaker that the other doesn’t, that is, to pause. The comma is a symbol that tells you the method employed by the writer and therefore how you should interpret the writers intentional state.

Edit: this lecture on intentionality discussing “intrinsic”, “derived”, and “metaphorical” intentional states:

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Ov3JJyXvjGU

Approx 20:00 in.

38

The section in the above video most relevant is probably the section about “world to word” vs “word to word” fit 39:00

39

As far as I know, Rand never went that deep into philosophy of language, but I don’t think anything she believed entailed that syntax is created by combinations of words, or that semantics are created by combinations of words. 

Fair enough. I was overreaching.

 

 

 

Also, words *denote* a concept. Concepts are more than their definition; it’s not quite right to equate a representation with what it represents.

 

In a way, this seems a little confusing. It is my understanding that, according to Rand, a [CONCEPT] is:

 

“a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition [in conjunction with its definiendum].”

 

Accordingly, a [CONCEPT], strictly speaking, is the UNION of

  1. a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction
  2. a specific definition, and
  3. a word (i.e. — the definiendum of #2 and for #1)

Henceforth, I will refer to this as Rand’s original position.

 

Thus, when you say that, “Concepts are more than their definition,” I accept this in the sense that a [CONCEPT] is not the aforementioned *#2* (i.e. — a specific definition), it is the union of *#1*, *#2*, and *#3*.

 

With regard to your statements that “words *denote* a concept” and that “it’s not quite right to equate a representation with what it represents” — henceforth referred to as Rand’s second position, this sentiment itself is problematic and seems to turn on Rand’s somewhat ambiguous account of what a [CONCEPT] is.

 

On the one hand, she asserts that a [CONCEPT], as such, does not exist until there is a word for *#1* and *#2*. In other words, Rand’s original position asserts that merely apprehending *#1* and *#2* with regard to [ENTITY-Xs] is *not* sufficient for there to be a [CONCEPT] of/with regard to [ENTITY-Xs].

 

In order for there to be a [CONCEPT] of/with regard to [ENTITY-Xs], she asserts that there must be an apprehension of the union of *#1*, *#2*, and *#3* with regard to [ENTITY-Xs]. 

 

Conversely, in her second position, she does in fact say that, as you say, words *denote* concepts and/or that concepts can take the form of words.

 

This position however, doesn’t make sense if we hold Rand to her original position with regard to what a [CONCEPT] is (i.e. — the union of *#1*, *#2*, and *#3* with regard to [ENTITY-Xs]). 

 

Thus, if we do in fact hold her accountable, this second position indicates that a second word is needed to denote a [CONCEPT] that, by definition, already has a word associated with it.

 

Let’s look at the dissonance of her original position as it relates to her second position by applying it to an actual example — the concept [OTTER].

 

Rand’s original position with regard to the concept [OTTER] (i.e. — the union of *#1*, *#2*, and *#3* with regard to otters):

 

  1. there is a mental integration of two or more brown, fuzzy, fun-loving, aquatic, etc, animals as units that have been isolated by a process of abstraction as being of the same kind

 

  1. a semiaquatic fish-eating mammal of the weasel family, with an elongated body, dense fur, and webbed feet
  • this is the actual definition of [otter], but Rand also holds that any sort of rough, approximate, non-technical definition will work just as well, as long as what is understood is the same
  1. [OTTER] (i.e. — the definiendum of #2 and for #1/the word for #2 and for #1)

 

Thus, [OTTER] - the word, serves a simultaneous triple function in Rand’s original position. First, it is the symbol for the definiendum of #2 and for #1/the word for #2 and for #1. Second, it is the symbol that connotes the union of *#1*, *#2*, and *#3* with regard to otters — it is in this sense that [OTTER], the word, is the concept for otter and that the representation is, in a partial way, what it represents. Third, it is the symbol that functions as either a perceptual concrete or a mental concrete for the consciousness apprehending [OTTER].

 

Rand’s second position would then have us use a new word, like [bROTTER], for the word [OTTER] when all we need and mean is just [OTTER].

__________

 

Personally, at least from what I have read, she seems somewhat uncertain and imprecise about what exactly a [CONCEPT] is.

40

In a way, this seems a little confusing. It is my understanding that, according to Rand, a [CONCEPT] is:

 

“a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition [in conjunction with its definiendum].”

 

Accordingly, a [CONCEPT], strictly speaking, is the UNION of

  1. a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction
  2. a specific definition, and
  3. a word (i.e. — the definiendum of #2 and for #1)

1 and 2 are united by a word or symbol. A word by Rand’s view is not 1, 2, and 3 united by a word or symbol because no word exists until 1 and 2 are unified. The word is the unifier. Rand clearly stated that her view is that words represent concepts. If you have no word, you have no representation.