Objective morals

I know this topic has been discussed already, and I perused those threads. I didn’t want to tack this on to one of the old ones, since they seem to be long dead and it is a newer question.

In talking with someone who has taken a relativistic view on morals, I am having a problem – I can’t quite put into clear, concise words why morals are objective.

My reasoning (which is a product of reading Rand) goes like this, and it is in some instances quoting Rand:

Man is a being of volitional consciousness, and as such, has no automatic course of behavior. This is to say, he can turn his reasoning faculty – his primary tool of survival – on or off at his discretion (He can choose to think or not to think).

As a being of volitional consciousness, he is presented with a fundamental alternative: life or death. If he chooses life, whether explicitly or implicitly (in other words, very few of us will say: I have chosen to live, we usually just accept it) he needs a code of values to guide his actions – that code is not optional, it is a metaphysical necessity.

So, by virtue of the fact that we are alive (and are not actively in the process of trying to destroy ourselves), we all live by certain values to ensure that survival.

The problem I am having is that those values are not rational for everyone, not everyone accepts their life as their standard of value, etc.

The best I can come up with is that regardless of what each individual believes, the fact that they are alive indicates that they are taking steps to insure their survival. Basic existential facts do not differ from culture to culture – fire burns everyone, we all need water to survive, we need to cook raw meat, etc.

I’m just not sure where this means that values are objective: Does it mean that everyone who is living has accepted their life as the standard of value, whether they realize it or not?

The problem I am having is that those values are not rational for everyone, not everyone accepts their life as their standard of value, etc.

The best I can come up with is that regardless of what each individual believes, the fact that they are alive indicates that they are taking steps to insure their survival. Basic existential facts do not differ from culture to culture – fire burns everyone, we all need water to survive, we need to cook raw meat, etc.

I’m just not sure where this means that values are objective: Does it mean that everyone who is living has accepted their life as the standard of value, whether they realize it or not?

Tara Smith uses “flourishing” instead of survival. The term survival sort of indicates that if someone’s heart is still beating, they qualify among the moral. It’s common mistake in arguing with someone who’ll accept the “survival” premise.

A code of morality is a set of conceptual principles. It is very possible that someone can follow part of such a set inconsistently, and the fact that they are still alive does not prove that the code they follow is the right one.

Objective means its requirements derive from the facts of reality. Also not all choices are necessarily moral choices so there are many choices in life that don’t have a moral component. For instance, productivity would indicate that you ought to provide for yourself; however, what you decide to do to do that may only have part of a component that is moral in nature.

Okay, thanks Kendall. I have come to the same conclusions myself, and I’m sorry that the original post wasn’t very coherent – I just wanted to start this topic ASAP.

One problem that I’ve had with this “life as flourishing and not avoiding death” argument is that, while I agree that’s what life should be, I can’t deny that there are other people who do not agree, who think that life should be a restrictive state of being in anticipation of an afterlife or some such thing. I am having trouble proving that’s what the objective definition of life is, I guess is what I am saying.

But that’s just one thing. Anyways, hopefully this is a little more coherent way of looking at it, and tell me if you agree:

The person who has taken a relativistic point of view said:

I don’t deny that people value life. But the question is “do you think that there is a moral truth that all people live by at all times in all places” and I say no. Because we may say that everyone values life but I believe that there are cultures who define their MORAL TRUTH as something different.

To which my response would be:

Regardless of what people *think* their moral values or ethical beliefs are, the fact that they are people, that is, creatures of volitional consciousness whose primary tool of survival is the capacity to reason, and assuming they are not actively in the process of self-destruction, their existence necessitates the acceptance (whether actively or passively) of a code of values by which to ensure and continue their life.

Since for all practicable purposes as far as life on earth is concerned it can be said that reality exists independently of man’s consciousness (fire will burn your hand whether you believe it will or not), man does not have a blank check on what those values are – in other words, it is wrong to think that whatever man arbitrarily picks as good and evil will suffice. For example, a man is free to pick “physical suffering” as his highest moral value, as the highest good, and some do, but he is not free to get away with the consequences that continual self-inflicted pain will bring – namely, death. In fact, the degree to which that man stays alive is the degree to which he has accepted his life as his highest moral value, for however short a time (ie to stop torturing himself for a few minutes and eat food) regardless of whether or not he realizes this. On a larger scale, a culture might define its basic moral value or principle as anything it pleases, just witness the variety of things out there: Faith, family, hard work, etc. But the degree to which that culture survives (which means not to simply avoid destruction, but to thrive) is the degree to which its people have actually chosen their lives as their highest moral value, and have accepted other values that enhance that life given their context, which means: Action A in Location Y may be necessary to survive, but in location Z, it would kill a person (Wearing a heavy coat is necessary in the Arctic, but would kill someone in the Sahara), and to this degree, morals SEEM to be relative, although they really are not, since the specific values are based on the rules of reality, they are in fact objective. It’s just that different values may apply to different people relative to things such as location.

It’s a good response. :wink: What did he say?

I didn’t say it to them, cause I came up with this after our discussion.

But, I am writing my first major philosophy paper, with a professor who is generally regarded as among the hardest non-science professors on campus, in terms of “letting arguments go” … as in, he’ll find every gap in logic and faulty or questionable line of reasoning. So I’m worried about reducing this argument to its most basic level so that he won’t be able to find something and tell me my whole argument falls apart because of it… Any tips?

OH! I just caught this, and it’s a BIGGGG problem when arguing with a subjectivist:

A code of morality is a set of conceptual principles. It is very possible that someone can follow part of such a set inconsistently, and the fact that they are still alive does not prove that the code they follow is the right one.

Their question is consistently: Okay, but who are YOU to say what the RIGHT moral code is?

I’m always at a loss for words when they say this because it just seems so obvious to me: A code of morality is a code to guide man’s actions in order to ensure his survival. As such, the right code is one that is determined by what is proper for a rational being to survive, ie, drink water, don’t jump in fire, etc.

I guess the problem with the subjectivist point of view is the very thing that defines them as a subjectivist: They don’t think that people need to hold man’s life as the ultimate value in order to live. They think that whatever a person chooses as the good or evil will lead them to life.

I liked the spirit of your response, but it was non-responsive. Let’s go back to the quote you gave:

I don’t deny that people value life. But the question is “do you think that there is a moral truth that all people live by at all times in all places” and I say no. Because we may say that everyone values life but I believe that there are cultures who define their MORAL TRUTH as something different.

You are trying to justify a particular morality, not addressing his claim that even though everyone values life, some cultures may define “moral truth” as something different. You did not address the correct statement that there are, apparently, cultures with a concept “moral truth” or “moral fact” which is not based on the choice to exist. An alternative morality would be that man’s nature is to serve Allah, which is compatible with valuing life as Allah’s gift to man, but must give way to trading your life in for the glory and benefit of Allah. So it’s still true that you may not beat yourself with ropes all of the time, just during Ashura, and you must feed yourself, but it’s not ultimately so that you can live, it’s so that you can better serve Allah and praise Mohammed ptuh.

Smith makes the point, which I think is often missed, that you cannot rationally justify your moral primary. To do so, you must have a higher moral principle that serves as your justification – meaning that you are not justifying your moral primary, you are justifying a secondary principle by reference to a real moral primary. I don’t know what you’re really trying to argue in the paper, but I urge you to avoid the trap of justifying an axiom. Rand’s derivation of morality has the distinct advantage of being based on actual axioms, though that may not hold much sway with someone who is willing to entertain an arbitrary stipulation as an “axiom” (for example, the stipulation that Allah created man and wishes man to obey him). His question invites you to justify your moral primary (which is possible only if you concede that it isn’t primary). I would (explicitly) decline the invitation and reduce the matter to the fundamental metaphysical fact, existence and the fundamental human fact, choice, which means that the only axiomatic moral system has to be based on a choice about existence. (I presume you don’t have to also establish that morality is about man’s choices).

I don’t know of any way to argue for the Objectivist ethics against all imaginable alternatives, and you should not try. Is there a concrete alternative that you can address? For example, the argument for the Objectivist ethics over a god-based morality would be very different in detail from an argument considering the alternative moral nihilism.

Their question is consistently: Okay, but who are YOU to say what the RIGHT moral code is?

Well you’ve got the problem right. The answer is REALITY says it. The requirements of the nature of things says it.

Some subjectivists want to paint any code of morals as necessarily “dictatorial” or “inflexible”. That is the intrinsicist side of things. Objectivism counters with the idea of principles (as opposed to commandments) and the evaluation of those principles within context. That does provide some flexibility to adjust for conditions, but it is not ANYONE’s idea of flexibility. It is only the different conditions of reality, not someone’s desire.

David, could you explain the Smith thing a little more clearly?

And I am trying to argue that morals are neither universal nor relative. I say they are objective because to be objective means to be based on the facts of reality. Universal morals are not NECESSARILY based on anything, they could be completely arbitrary. A good example of a universal commandment is “thou shalt not kill” – but this contradicts the facts of reality given certain circumstances (war, self-defense, etc).

At the same time, I am arguing that morals are not wholly relative for the reason I stated in the second post.

Also, David, in response to you saying that I was not responding, I don’t understand that.

I thought I responded to them saying that some cultures have a different moral truth. Sure, some cultures have a different moral truth, you cannot deny that some cultures are set up on a code of morality that is designed to serve a god, others on a code of morality that is designed to serve others, etc. But a code of morality is something one accepts as a guide to one’s actions in order to live, is it not? As such, regardless of what people believe is *THE* moral truth, there are certain values that every person or culture must accept into their moral code, since the whole point of that moral code is to guide a person’s actions in order to live. Morals will tell you that you cannot plunge yourself into a fire and expect to live, no matter what culture you belong to.

Or are you saying that the whole point of a moral code is not necessarily to live, it might be to secure a good place in the afterlife?

In which case, I suppose I agree, people have moral codes for different things. Still, I don’t think this changes the fact that people need to have certain values in order to continue living on this planet, in this reality. And everyone who is alive needs to have those certain values. What can we call this, then?

Also, David, in response to you saying that I was not responding, I don’t understand that.

Actually, “non-responsive” means that you didn’t address the point given to you (by the instructor, given the quote). What he said was that even if other people value life, some of them nevertheless have a moral code where that doesn’t matter. In what you say after that, you suggest that there is a difference between “what people *think* their moral values or ethical beliefs are” and… well, the sentence doesn’t follow up on the implication that their beliefs about their moral values contrast with, hmmm… what they actually are? What they should be? Your answer doesn’t squarely refute his statement.

In focusing on the belief aspect, that gives the impression that you want to argue that in fact, their values are something else. But then you give a different argument: more or less to the effect that they should be something else.

But a code of morality is something one accepts as a guide to one’s actions in order to live, is it not?

No, that is question begging. Even though we agree that the purpose of a moral code is to guide one’s decisions as good or bad w.r.t. to the final goal of living, the goal of living cannot be held to be the definition or a moral code (when trying to argue with a moral relativist or nihilist, or, for that matter, religious zealot). A code of morality is something one accepts as a guide to one’s actions, judged according to some ultimate purpose. The purpose could be death, the greatest common good, or the glory of Allah. The former is generally not taken seriously as a moral code although it is in fact the end product of the latter two moral standards.

The will of Allah thing is a pretty serious problem, since it leads to such absurdities as religious suicide bombers, which are the existence proof that not all moral codes hold “in order to live” to be the ultimate goal (the standard by which actions are judged as moral or immoral). It’s true that you can’t plunge yourself into fire ane expect to live, but that’s not a concern for the person who holds his purpose to be serving the will of Allah, if they believe that plunging themselves into fire is the will of Allah. Allah trumps life. The greatest common good trumps life.

Or are you saying that the whole point of a moral code is not necessarily to live, it might be to secure a good place in the afterlife?

Indeed. In general, the purpose of a moral code is to reach an ultimate goal. For me, that is existence; for others, that might be “the maximum benefit of others” or “the glory of Allah”. I think that if you start by defining morality in such a way that only the Objectivist ethics will, by definition be a moral code, then you will get smacked for engaging in petitio principii. The right way to make the argument, I think, is not in terms of defining a moral code this way or that, but rather to characterize what man needs for a particular purpose, namely existence. If one actually makes the fundamental choice be “I chose to not exist”, that is pretty much the end of the discussion.

The point is, once you make the fundamental choice (existence), things fall in place nicely, but you deny that there is another fundamental choice. I’ll try to get back to the point about the impossibility of justifying the necessity for the fundamental choice, with reference to ____ (fill in the infinite regression blank). Hounds are howling.

The right way to make the argument, I think, is not in terms of defining a moral code this way or that, but rather to characterize what man needs for a particular purpose, namely existence.

Okay, I don’t know if this is what you were getting at, but I agree because different people have a moral code for different things, like we’ve just been over. Some people act according to a code of morals so that they can get into heaven, etc. I see it in terms of: Not everybody has consciously accepted existence as their purpose, but existence is ultimately what permits any other purpose (ie, it is the concept of life that makes the concept of value possible).

Here is how I would construct my argument, and tell me if there are points where you think it is flawed (because it might be going against what you suggested):

Man’s basic tool of survival is reason, and that tool does not come to man automatically, he is free to use it at any time or to avoid that effort (I’ll go into more detail as to why this is in the paper but I figure we all agree about it here) So, we can say that man is a creature of volitional consciousness whose primary tool of survival is his reasoning mind. This is the nature of man.

If this is the nature of man, if his primary tool of survival is something that he can use volitionally, then at any given moment of his life he is faced with the decision: life or death, or in other words: to think or not to think.

Now that this is established, let’s define “moral code” (which you said not to do, David, but I can’t see a way around this – how would you get around it?). To quote Ayn Rand: “There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action.” For all other living entities, that existence is automatic: A plant draws nutrients from the soil or opens up towards the sun, a wolf hunts, etc. None of these creatures make the choice to do so, it is instinctual. Considering how we defined man, that existence is NOT automatic. In order for man to SUSTAIN that existence, he needs a code of values to guide his choices and actions. Nor does that code of values come to man instinctually – he arrives at it through a process of reason. Since reason is objective, that is, derived from the facts of reality (Which I would have explained when I stated that man used reason as his tool of survival), we can say that man’s code of values is necessarily objective.

I know what you’re thinking: Not everyone has a moral code to sustain their existence – my best friend’s moral code is in place so that he can live a worthy life in the eyes of God, and Leonidas’ moral code was in place so that he could die in glorious battle for Sparta. I would call these “superficial moral codes” – everyone has one – which is to say, everyone has a different highest value – a different reason why they get out of bed every day and they have different lesser values that correspond to that.

But underlying each of these is an objective code of morals: Since it is the concept of life that makes the concept of value possible, everybody needs to sustain their life in order to keep valuing whatever it is they ultimately value.

Thus, a basic code of morals, that is defined as the values one accepts to guide one’s choices and actions, is objective, since the rules of reality do not change from person to person. On top of that, a person might consciously decide to live for whatever reason he wants, for whatever ultimate value he pleases. But this will not change the fact that in order to even HAVE that value, there are certain actions he will need to take – ie, use his reasoning mind to determine that he must drink water (that water is a value), use his reasoning mind to determine that he must eat (that food is a value). These are the same for all people in all cultures.

Here is how I would construct my argument, and tell me if there are points where you think it is flawed (because it might be going against what you suggested):

Before we go there, can we briefly re-start? I assume that you intend to argue for a specific proposition in a paper. What exactly is the thesis? Can you quote it verbatim, in one sentence? I understand the general area, and I’m looking for the precise target.

Sorry David, forgot that was kind of a crucial point to this discussion…

My thesis, briefly stated, is: Relativists hold that morals are wholly relative or particular, and specific to a context/community/era and universalists hold that morals are entirely absolute and are something that can be applied in all places at all times. I argue that morals do not fit neatly into either category, but that they are objective – which is to say, in order to live one’s life, there are basic values that must be accepted that transcend one’s context, community, and/or era, but that given an individual’s specific location or timeframe, there are certain vales that might differ.

I don’t go into a definition of what “objective morals” means in the thesis because I do that right away in the first paragraph, contrasting objective from universal.

David, could you explain the Smith thing a little more clearly?

Yep, I can try. I quote from Viable Values p. 94:

When it comes to human beings and moral value, however, it is important to understand that life is the standard of value

if

a person seeks life. Having rejected the idea of intrinsic value in chapter three, we cannot treat life as intrinsically valuable. Rather, the existence of value is condition; value arises for those who seek to maintain their lives. It is only for people who wish to live that we can intelligibly distinguish things as good for them and bad for them relative to that purpose.

In ch. 2, she has a good discussion of rationalist morality, where she emphasizes (p. 41) “that purposes are crucial to rational action”, (42) “Facts become reasons relative to a person’s purposes… We cannot assess the rationality of any action until we know what it is intended to accomplish”. So eating good food promotes a certain end – life, existence – and would be a moral good. The choice to eat is rational, given the choice to exist; the choice to buy food is rational, given the particular end of being able to eat. If you wish to justify the choice to exist in terms of some higher end, then existence is not your primary, and I don’t know what is. If you choose not to eat but have existence as your end, then you are being irrational. If you have non-existence as your end and you’re still yapping about it, you are also being irrational (this is why there are no rational beings with non-existence as their end – they’ve already killed themselves).

My thesis, briefly stated, is: Relativists hold that morals are wholly relative or particular, and specific to a context/community/era and universalists hold that morals are entirely absolute and are something that can be applied in all places at all times. I argue that morals do not fit neatly into either category, but that they are objective – which is to say, in order to live one’s life, there are basic values that must be accepted that transcend one’s context, community, and/or era, but that given an individual’s specific location or timeframe, there are certain vales that might differ.

Ah! So you’re arguing something like “X is wrong because X failed to consider this theory of morality”? That is doable. I suggest Viable Values. Smith lays out the nature of various moral bases (intrinsicism, rationalism, contractarianism, intuitionism). Part of what will challenge you, I think, is being able to nail down moral relativism, since not too many people actually profess to advocating that view, so it’s difficult to say with clear authority what moral relativists actually believe. Presumably you’re using Harman as your proponent of relativism.

Okay, I agree with Smith there, and thanks for supplying that.

But discussions of whether or not someone is acting rationally given their goals aside, is what I said in my recent post not true? So long as a person has values, the person needs to be alive, as you just said. So long as they have some ultimate goal that does not involve their immediate destruction, they need a code of values to guide their choices and actions – this is what I would call a code of morality: A code of values to guide someone’s actions and choices to meet some end or attain some ultimate value. So long as we are all humans, there are certain requirements for our survival given our nature, no matter what we individually believe. In this regard, we must all accept certain values in order to continue valuing something (in order for us to pursue an ultimate value). Those basic values are objective – which means, they are drawn from the facts of reality.

To reiterate: Isn’t it true that everybody who is alive has some ultimate value? And in order to obtain that ultimate value, there are actions they must take and choices they must make. But also, in order to even have that value, they must be living, and that necessitates some very basic actions and choices, which are non-negotiable given man’s nature.

Ah! So you’re arguing something like “X is wrong because X failed to consider this theory of morality”?

I look at it as a little more than that – I’m arguing: X and Y have differing opinions on what is right. But neither X nor Y is wholly right simply because they failed to consider Z: Without Z, neither X nor Y are possible. So Z is the basis.

My thesis, briefly stated, is: Relativists hold that morals are wholly relative or particular, and specific to a context/community/era and universalists hold that morals are entirely absolute and are something that can be applied in all places at all times. I argue that morals do not fit neatly into either category, but that they are objective

The idea of relative or universal seems to come down to something along the lines of empiricism versus rationalism, or the particular versus the abstraction. So, what you would have to do with that thesis is to show that there exists both the particular and the abstraction, and that they are not in conflict with one another if one is objective. In other words, what you have is more of an epistemological problem rather than an ethics problem.

Is your teacher one of those people who claim that there is no real relation between real particular things and man’s consciousness? If he claims that there is no real relationship, that particulars exist “out there” while universals exist “in here,” then you are not arguing on a fundamental enough of a level to get your point across. And is he trying to use theories of ethics to try to prove that point? That is, there are all of these rules and regulations (abstractions) that we refer to as morals, but they have nothing to do with every day life (in the particular); or that these rules exist, but one must do other things in order to remain alive or to pursue one’s happiness or one’s purpose. Because from some of the examples you have given, it sounds like he would be someone who would say that the concept of an apple doesn’t really have anything to do with the actual particulars of a specific real apple; and since that is true, the same is true for morals. That, sure, we have all these abstractions we claim are our morals, but one can’t follow them in the particular, because they are abstractions that don’t apply to real life situations.

If that is your position, and you are trying to show that morals can be objective, then you might have to start with a discussion of what you mean by the term “objective” – I mean epistemologically, not starting with the level of morality. Because if he is saying there is no relation between concepts and particulars, or that the relationship is tenuous, then starting at the level of morals is not going to convince him that you have something important to say.

What examples does he give in order to demonstrate that the particular is in conflict with the abstract, or that the abstract necessarily leads to doing things in the particular that can’t be done due to the situation?

In other words, you may be arguing that morals are objective, rather than being either particular or abstract, which doesn’t make sense in an objective theory of epistemology – because morals are both particular and abstract; particular to man, but abstractions based upon that fact.

I don’t think I made myself as clear in my previous post as I would like to have, so let me restate what I think the problem is.

In Objectivism, abstractions come from an integration of particulars, and the abstraction or the universal subsumes all of the particulars. Particulars exist as real entities, and abstractions are something done by the human mind. In a rational mind, there is no conflict between the particular and the abstraction, since the abstraction is derived from the particulars. It is not as if the abstraction exists apart from man’s mind – or rather an individual’s mind – and somehow must then be interpreted as to how it fits to the reality of particulars. This is why Objectivism considers concepts to be objective, to the extent that a concept or an abstraction matches the evidence of the particulars.

So, the concept “apple” for example, includes all types of apples, how they came about (i.e. growing on trees), all the variety of colors, all the places they come from, that they get ripe, that they sometimes have worms in them, etc. All of those particulars are subsumed under the concept “apple.”

Likewise for concepts of morality. In an Objective system of ethics, all of the particular actions that one takes that are considered to be moral are included in the abstraction. If man’s life is the standard, then wearing a coat when it is cold in the Arctic and wearing lighter clothing while in the Sahara is moral, since it leads to the sustaining of human life. Opening up a soft drink so one can enjoy a cold beverage is a moral act. Writing a clear essay based on reason is a moral act. Making a left turn when you need to in order to get to work on time is a moral act. Using the backspace to correct a misspelling is a moral act. All of these particular actions that one takes in order to sustain one’s life are moral acts. The practical is the moral and the moral is the practical. It is not as if one has an abstraction – the Objectivist ethics – that is not connected to the daily necessities of living one’s life. The idea of an objective morality is derived from all of those particulars, the particular things one must do in order to live one’s life.

If the issue is the particular versus the abstraction, one would have to show that there is no such conflict, and that this can only be true for an objective code of morality. If the morality is detached from reality, naturally one’s morality will be in conflict with what one ought to do based on the facts, because it wasn’t derived from the facts in the first place.

So, I think you are right about the nature of why the Objectivist ethics is objective – that it is based on man’s life as the standard – but this does not put the particular in conflict with the abstraction nor the abstraction in conflict with the particular.

To reiterate: Isn’t it true that everybody who is alive has some ultimate value?

Perhaps I’m not understanding you, but consider the following;

That ultimate value is either;

  1. life (yours)

or

  1. Anything else (which would be ultimately be death).

What ‘ultimate’ value can you put in front of life that will not ultimately resort in your death (albeit at various rates of success)?

In other words, consider one such value (pick one, any one) and think about pursuing that with life being a secondary (or lesser) value.

So long as they have some ultimate goal that does not involve their immediate destruction

How much ‘destruction’ is permissible in order to pursue an ultimate goal other than life?

Also, by ‘life’ are you referring merely to being six feet above ground versus six feet under ground?