Objectivist causation and free will

Questions about Objectivism
1

I’m curious to see how devoted Objectivists respond to this essay (or if they know of any systematic responses elsewhere).

http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/rand.html

The gist: Rand defines causation in terms of entities themselves acting on each other (not through some intermediary idea of action or force), and insists that cause and effect is an instantiation of the “nature” of entities acting on each other. But this would seem to commit Rand to some sort of determinism–since if bodies only act through their “natures,” then it follows that there is no effect without a wholly natural cause. This seems to rule out any effect that isn’t a necessary result of its cause. It is not clear how human volition turns out to be anything more. (Unless–as I recently pointed out to Kiekeben in private correspondence–we are willing to commit ourselves to different laws governing mental action than govern everyday causation. But this devotes us to some form of dualism, and is obviously non-Randian.)

2

I’m curious to see how devoted Objectivists respond to this essay (or if they know of any systematic responses elsewhere).

A site search for either “free will” or “determinism” will reveal several existing threads with the answer you seek.

3

A site search for either “free will” or “determinism” will reveal several existing threads with the answer you seek.

Thanks.

Seems like a recurring problem. B)

4

I’m curious to see how devoted Objectivists respond to this essay (or if they know of any systematic responses elsewhere).

http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/rand.html

The gist: Rand defines causation in terms of entities themselves acting on each other (not through some intermediary idea of action or force), and insists that cause and effect is an instantiation of the “nature” of entities acting on each other. But this would seem to commit Rand to some sort of determinism–since if bodies only act through their “natures,” then it follows that there is no effect without a wholly natural cause. This seems to rule out any effect that isn’t a necessary result of its cause. It is not clear how human volition turns out to be anything more. (Unless–as I recently pointed out to Kiekeben in private correspondence–we are willing to commit ourselves to different laws governing mental action than govern everyday causation. But this devotes us to some form of dualism, and is obviously non-Randian.)

A is A.

5

A is A.

No means no.

6

I’m curious to see how devoted Objectivists respond to this essay (or if they know of any systematic responses elsewhere).

http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/rand.html

The gist: Rand defines causation in terms of entities themselves acting on each other (not through some intermediary idea of action or force), and insists that cause and effect is an instantiation of the “nature” of entities acting on each other. But this would seem to commit Rand to some sort of determinism–since if bodies only act through their “natures,” then it follows that there is no effect without a wholly natural cause. This seems to rule out any effect that isn’t a necessary result of its cause. It is not clear how human volition turns out to be anything more. (Unless–as I recently pointed out to Kiekeben in private correspondence–we are willing to commit ourselves to different laws governing mental action than govern everyday causation. But this devotes us to some form of dualism, and is obviously non-Randian.)

Determinism can be refuted without reference to free will. The determinist principle that each action entails a single possible consequent action is an arbitrary assertion that cannot be proven. Considered as a simple restatement of the causality principle determinism fails because it unjustifiably restricts what is possible. Unjustifiable, because philosophy can not be normative by specifying apriori what physics must discover. Philosophy can only specify what kind of thing is impossible, a contradiction.

Determinism also invokes an infinite regress of causes unless there actually was a metaphysical first cause. But if determinism can have one first cause then it can have others and ‘single possible consequent action’ is a false premise.

Kiekeben understands and agrees that determinism does not follow from causality. His chief complaint lies in this concluding passage:

… That every entity always acts in accordance with its nature tells us nothing about how it will in fact act, including whether or not there is more than one possible way for it to act. It does not, for instance, rule out the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics: all one needs to say is that it is in an electron’s nature (for example) to behave unpredictably. Nor would it be contradicted by a helium-filled balloon that fell. If a balloon ever acted this way, then that would merely show that such behavior is part of its nature. Or, in other words, no matter how anything acts, it is by definition acting in accordance with its nature.

The point being that knowledge is impossible in a magical universe where any entity might do anything at any time, because any entity is always trivially “acting in accordance with its nature.” This is the problem behind validating the methods of induction, and is the root of skepticism. Ayn Rand did not solve this problem so there is no official Objectivist response, but Leonard Peikoff claims to have done so in his lecture course Induction in Physics and Philosophy.

My order has not yet arrived, so I don’t know the proper response.

7

Determinism can be refuted without reference to free will. The determinist principle that each action entails a single possible consequent action is an arbitrary assertion that cannot be proven. Considered as a simple restatement of the causality principle determinism fails because it unjustifiably restricts what is possible. Unjustifiable, because philosophy can not be normative by specifying apriori what physics must discover. Philosophy can only specify what kind of thing is impossible, a contradiction.

I’m confused. If entities act according to their “nature,” then how is more than one consequent action possible? If Eddie the Entity has Nature 1, and Nature 1 leads to Action B, now the action is out in the world and the effect is definitely in the realm of physics. The interesting part is the relationship between Eddie, 1, and B. If Nature 1 could, in principle, lead to Actions C, D, E, etc. rather than B, then specifying Eddie’s “nature” as the cause of those actions is vacuous. (Obviously, Rand isn’t a huge Leibniz fan, but I don’t think she wants to reject the principle of sufficient reason.) If 1 only leads to a set number of outcomes, say “If Nature 1, then (B or C)” Eddie’s possibilities still seem determined (perhaps drastically so, depending on what B and C mean). Probably, objectivists are willing to bite this second bullet and admit to some version of compatibilism–a move I approve of. But espousing compatibilism invites the question of just what concepts we are saying are compatible. In this case, free choice is compatible with our natures; but saying “an Entity is free to choice any option that it is within his nature to choose” tells us nothing unless we have some idea of what these “natures” are and how it is they determine the possible choices (and even then, it probably still tells us nothing).

8

I’m confused. If entities act according to their “nature,” then how is more than one consequent action possible? If Eddie the Entity has Nature 1, and Nature 1 leads to Action B, now the action is out in the world and the effect is definitely in the realm of physics. The interesting part is the relationship between Eddie, 1, and B. If Nature 1 could, in principle, lead to Actions C, D, E, etc. rather than B, then specifying Eddie’s “nature” as the cause of those actions is vacuous. (Obviously, Rand isn’t a huge Leibniz fan, but I don’t think she wants to reject the principle of sufficient reason.) If 1 only leads to a set number of outcomes, say “If Nature 1, then (B or C)” Eddie’s possibilities still seem determined (perhaps drastically so, depending on what B and C mean). Probably, objectivists are willing to bite this second bullet and admit to some version of compatibilism–a move I approve of. But espousing compatibilism invites the question of just what concepts we are saying are compatible. In this case, free choice is compatible with our natures; but saying “an Entity is free to choice any option that it is within his nature to choose” tells us nothing unless we have some idea of what these “natures” are and how it is they determine the possible choices (and even then, it probably still tells us nothing).

In my opinion which I hold to be consistent with Objectivism (and I certainly hope that those are the correct prefacing words), it is not correct to say that a person’s identity at the moment he chooses does not wholly determine his action; rather, his identity is in a key respect not wholly pre-determined by antecedent factors. In other words, at the moment at which you choose, you supply the final ingredient in your own identity that determines the outcome. Whether you choose to call this ingredient an “emergent property” or something else is up to you, the point is that up until the moment you chose, you could have chosen differently. This observation, validated by introspection, is an instance of the principle that an entity acts according to its nature. Of course there is some additional legwork involved in observing and conceptualizing to determine what natures different kinds of entities have, but that hardly renders the principle itself vacuous. Rather it points the way to the work you have to do to obtain the knowledge you seek about how particular entities will act - it says “get off your buns and figure it out, don’t expect philosophy to hand you an automatic answer”, which is a pretty useful idea, I think.

9

I think part of the problem in understanding this is in the implicit equivocation between action and reaction. “An entity reacts in accordance with its nature” is not the same as “an entity acts in accordance with its nature,” in terms of cause and effect. A rational being evaluates a situation in the context of the totality of its knowledge, envisions a potential future, makes a rational judgment, and acts in order to bring that future about. The action has only the most tenuous connection to external physical causality. What occurs, given a rational being in a specific context, is not a reaction, but a proaction, whose “cause” is consciousness and rationality.

Volition involves how much rationality (v. reaction) is brought to bear on a particular situation.

To paraphrase Einstein, the man who enjoys reacting to external stimuli automatically received his great brain by mistake…

10

I think part of the problem in understanding this is in the implicit equivocation between action and reaction. “An entity reacts in accordance with its nature” is not the same as “an entity acts in accordance with its nature,” in terms of cause and effect. A rational being evaluates a situation in the context of the totality of its knowledge, envisions a potential future, makes a rational judgment, and acts in order to bring that future about. The action has only the most tenuous connection to external physical causality. What occurs, given a rational being in a specific context, is not a reaction, but a proaction, whose “cause” is consciousness and rationality.

Volition involves how much rationality (v. reaction) is brought to bear on a particular situation.

To paraphrase Einstein, the man who enjoys reacting to external stimuli automatically received his great brain by mistake…

The million dollar question is whether it is plausible to believe that all that evaluation and envisioning and rational selection is “self-created” in a way that makes it immune to determined causation, or if, in fact, the conscious mental processes that seem deliberative are the end consequence of some set subconscious or physical patterns.

If entities act (or react, I honestly don’t see what difference it makes) according to their natures, then even the human act of deliberation will itself be a product of that nature–and I don’t just mean the tendency of people to deliberate, I mean my ability and (even more importantly) my willingness to infer P from Q will also be determined by that nature.

But no. What Rand wants to say is that reason takes place at a level over and above our individual natures, that we are able to and morally responsible for arriving at objective decisions, whatever our individual natures. It seems to me any argument along those lines, which also accepts her causal theory, is bound to commit us to some form of dualism.

11

The million dollar question is whether it is plausible to believe …

You’re making this way too difficult. Keep in mind, Objectivism holds that free will is axiomatic, available to any act of introspection. Let’s also remember that this is not a matter of physics, but a matter of philosophy that we are discussing (and a self-evident one at that). All you have to do is notice that nothing (neither externalities nor inner antecedent factors) impinge upon your freedom to focus or unfocus your mind at any given moment. You need only note the spontaneous character of the decision to arrive at the needed insight. Having validated that your will is free, you have validated the axiomatic concept of free will as an attribute of your consciousness, which you are free to focus on matters of physics or whatever else, which cannot invade the context and disturb the validity of the axiom here elaborated.

12

The interesting part is the relationship between Eddie, 1, and B. If Nature 1 could, in principle, lead to Actions C, D, E, etc. rather than B, then specifying Eddie’s “nature” as the cause of those actions is vacuous.

What other kind of answer could possibly satisfy here? Only a narrative about Eddie’s internal components and how they interacted to produce action B instead of C, D, and E. But if we dismantle Eddie the entity into his component parts then we are no longer have Eddie, we only have pieces of Eddie and any conclusion we reach pertains only to pieces of Eddie we have examined and not to Eddie as a whole. To assert otherwise is the fallacy of composition.

Yes, metaphysics is vacuous and filled with trivially true statements of the obvious. This is the degree of precision appropriate to the subject, which is the entirety of existence both known and unknown. The libraries and bookstores of the world are filled with the works of philosophers who have forgotten, neglected or evaded the obvious. Since those works are not improved by the omission I would conclude that the obvious is not worthless.

13

What other kind of answer could possibly satisfy here? Only a narrative about Eddie’s internal components and how they interacted to produce action B instead of C, D, and E. But if we dismantle Eddie the entity into his component parts then we are no longer have Eddie, we only have pieces of Eddie and any conclusion we reach pertains only to pieces of Eddie we have examined and not to Eddie as a whole. To assert otherwise is the fallacy of composition.

Yes, metaphysics is vacuous and filled with trivially true statements of the obvious. This is the degree of precision appropriate to the subject, which is the entirety of existence both known and unknown. The libraries and bookstores of the world are filled with the works of philosophers who have forgotten, neglected or evaded the obvious. Since those works are not improved by the omission I would conclude that the obvious is not worthless.

So it’s ok that it is trivial to say “Action B was the result of Eddie’s nature,” but somehow it is profound–even revolutionary–to say that a golf club is able to move a ball because of the “natures” of the entities?

14

You’re making this way too difficult. Keep in mind, Objectivism holds that free will is axiomatic, available to any act of introspection. Let’s also remember that this is not a matter of physics, but a matter of philosophy that we are discussing (and a self-evident one at that). All you have to do is notice that nothing (neither externalities nor inner antecedent factors) impinge upon your freedom to focus or unfocus your mind at any given moment. You need only note the spontaneous character of the decision to arrive at the needed insight. Having validated that your will is free, you have validated the axiomatic concept of free will as an attribute of your consciousness, which you are free to focus on matters of physics or whatever else, which cannot invade the context and disturb the validity of the axiom here elaborated.

Just because it seems to me that no externalities or inner antecedent factors are impinging upon my mind’s focus, it doesn’t follow that there aren’t any.

15

So it’s ok that it is trivial to say “Action B was the result of Eddie’s nature,” but somehow it is profound–even revolutionary–to say that a golf club is able to move a ball because of the “natures” of the entities?

No, both statements are equally true and equally trivial. Metaphysics is necessarily limited to such types of statements or it becomes physics.