If a client were to come to me asking me to make a legal argument that I couldn’t honestly and morally agree with, I’d send him to another lawyer. As far as I know, state law will still allow me to do this. It might in fact require it.
I’ve puzzled over this for some time, and conclude that it’s best to nip the problem in the bud by not taking the person on as a client, in the first place. When you are appointed by the court, then there you are, but let’s assume you’re talking about a guy coming in off the street. EC 2-29 says “Employment should not be accepted by a lawyer when he is unable to render competent service…a lawyer should decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client”, so if you hate Nazis and a Nazi wants you to represent him in court, your feelings on the matter could impair effective representation. For example, your intense hatred could lead you to not recognising that a self-defense argument was quite viable since the assailant has a knife and a gun. Somewhat contrariwise, EC 2-26 says that “Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse”. I think this means that if you hate Nazis and that would keep you from effectively representing them, then you can say no; but if you don’t care about the Nazis per se and only care about the fact that Nazis are hated, then you should not decline employment. And, following EC 2-25, “A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client; but in furtherance of the objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment. The fulfillment of this objective requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to him and the bar generally”. I think that this means you need to prepare an extensive justification, probably reducing to effective counsel, if you want to say no.
As an exercise in concretizing, I wonder what would be a criminal case where an objectivist attorney would / should refuse to defend a client because of the law itself. I can’t imagine any – I can imagine not wanting to defend a client who you are certain is guilt, or not wanting to use a particular defense in an instance (such as the insanity defense). As a prosecutor, of course, I can see huge problems in prosecuting drug laws, for instance.
The shalt not rule is DR 2-109:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to:
- Bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assert a position in litigation, or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
- Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
But once you’ve said yes, and assuming the more extreme conditions regarding mandatory withdrawal don’t hold, DR 2-110 ( C ) says you can’t get out unless certain things are true. That does not, as far as I can see, include the fact that you find taxation immoral, so if a client wishes to pursue an actually legal argument that they are owed money deriving by taxation, you should have understood that fact before taking the person on as a client.