Objectivist lawyers

I’m wondering if an objectivist could morally permit himself to be a lawyer in this world. More specifically, something like a corporate lawyer where you would have to be defending corporations who attempt to use every tax loophole possible to save money (including taking tax money directly from the treasury).

Would a moral lawyer pick and choose the cases he would take depending on if he agreed with the law or not?

Do people have a legitimate defense if the law says X even though X is immoral from an objectivist view point? If not, aren’t we justified in receiving our social security payments if we payed into the system our entire lives (thus showing that we can defend immoral laws in some circumstances)?

I’m wondering if an objectivist could morally permit himself to be a lawyer in this world.

Of course. Why do you think that would be in doubt? The question is roughly analogous to saying "Could a moral person become a policeman, given the existence of North Korea.

Do people have a legitimate defense if the law says X even though X is immoral from an objectivist view point?

Of course it is legitimate. Depending on the case, it’s an open question whether the defense will be successful. For example, a defense against tax evasion is not in fact going to succeed based on the fact that taxation is immoral.

Of course. Why do you think that would be in doubt? The question is roughly analogous to saying "Could a moral person become a policeman, given the existence of North Korea.Of course it is legitimate. Depending on the case, it’s an open question whether the defense will be successful. For example, a defense against tax evasion is not in fact going to succeed based on the fact that taxation is immoral.

So, a company hires me to defend their taking a tax subsidy. What they did was technically legal and I know it. Should I defend them or not?

There is nothing immoral about evading taxes, legally or otherwise.

Edit: See this thread on tax avoidance - don’t post about that here.

So, a company hires me to defend their taking a tax subsidy. What they did was technically legal and I know it. Should I defend them or not?

I think you’re confused about what lawyers do for a living. The word “defend” as applied to attorneys refers to “answering legal allegations in a court of law”. You’re talking about “justify to the public”, which is the job of a PR firm. Also, btw, a corporation can’t take money directly from the treasury.

Would a moral lawyer pick and choose the cases he would take depending on if he agreed with the law or not?

I certainly hope so. If a client were to come to me asking me to make a legal argument that I couldn’t honestly and morally agree with, I’d send him to another lawyer. As far as I know, state law will still allow me to do this. It might in fact require it. However, I doubt that the issue will come up much, at least in private practice. I can see a lot of potential moral conflicts arising in a public defender situation, or a prosecutor situation, or an administrative law situation. But private practice attorneys are still free to pick their areas of practice, as well as their clients.

-Q

If a client were to come to me asking me to make a legal argument that I couldn’t honestly and morally agree with, I’d send him to another lawyer. As far as I know, state law will still allow me to do this. It might in fact require it.

I’ve puzzled over this for some time, and conclude that it’s best to nip the problem in the bud by not taking the person on as a client, in the first place. When you are appointed by the court, then there you are, but let’s assume you’re talking about a guy coming in off the street. EC 2-29 says “Employment should not be accepted by a lawyer when he is unable to render competent service…a lawyer should decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client”, so if you hate Nazis and a Nazi wants you to represent him in court, your feelings on the matter could impair effective representation. For example, your intense hatred could lead you to not recognising that a self-defense argument was quite viable since the assailant has a knife and a gun. Somewhat contrariwise, EC 2-26 says that “Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse”. I think this means that if you hate Nazis and that would keep you from effectively representing them, then you can say no; but if you don’t care about the Nazis per se and only care about the fact that Nazis are hated, then you should not decline employment. And, following EC 2-25, “A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client; but in furtherance of the objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment. The fulfillment of this objective requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to him and the bar generally”. I think that this means you need to prepare an extensive justification, probably reducing to effective counsel, if you want to say no.

As an exercise in concretizing, I wonder what would be a criminal case where an objectivist attorney would / should refuse to defend a client because of the law itself. I can’t imagine any – I can imagine not wanting to defend a client who you are certain is guilt, or not wanting to use a particular defense in an instance (such as the insanity defense). As a prosecutor, of course, I can see huge problems in prosecuting drug laws, for instance.

The shalt not rule is DR 2-109:

(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to:

  1. Bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assert a position in litigation, or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
  2. Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

But once you’ve said yes, and assuming the more extreme conditions regarding mandatory withdrawal don’t hold, DR 2-110 ( C ) says you can’t get out unless certain things are true. That does not, as far as I can see, include the fact that you find taxation immoral, so if a client wishes to pursue an actually legal argument that they are owed money deriving by taxation, you should have understood that fact before taking the person on as a client.

Plus there are a lot of opportunities for lawyers that don’t boil down to “partner in a law firm”.

An organization of Objectivist lawyers.

Indeed. The ‘shall not’ rule mirrors FRCP 11. Every time you sign a document in Federal court (and any other court that has a similar rule), you basically swear to both of those points on pain of nasty nasty sanctions.

The example I came up with was if a murder defendant were to come to me asserting that his crime was justified because of a religious mandate. I’m unwilling to expand the insanity defense that far. But even that’s a toughie. Outside of being a public defender or representing the government, I really don’t see it coming up that often. You could always tell the prospective client that you will fully and zealously represent him, but you hate his guts. That might be enough to convince him to find a different lawyer.

-Q

The example I came up with was if a murder defendant were to come to me asserting that his crime was justified because of a religious mandate. I’m unwilling to expand the insanity defense that far.

Perhaps you know the answer or can raise this issue with s.o. with solid knowledge of the topic. Given the duty to the client to defend him to the best of your ability, while remaining within the bounds of DR 2-109(2): may not “Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”. Suppose you know that there was a clear application of a 1st amendment-based precedent – something like the Bronston “literal truth” defense. BTW, I think the defense sorta sucks in definable contexts. So the question is whether if the client directs you to use the Holy Roller defense, you are allowed to refuse (on the grounds that you think the precedent sucks).