On the question of free-will vs. determinism

Skeptic, I’m a determinist, in a sense, and yet, at the same time, I’m certain that either I have free will or I’ve chosen to believe that I do (haha.)

Stop assuming that there must be a dichotomy, and try to find where the dichotomy really comes from. (Really, I think that this is one of the only points where Rand kinda missed the mark, the other being her distaste for rock music.)

There can be no dichotomy between metaphysical and epistemological truths. Volition is axiomatic because it is a root-level function of epistemology, of saying “I am conscious.” In grasping that “existence exists,” one also must admit two correllary axioms: “There is a something that exists, and I am choosing to grasp the fact.” Ie, identity and consciousness.

The break between pre-determination or so-called determinism and volition is an example of the mind-body dichotomy. If we exist (and I believe that I do,) then we exist in reality, as a part of Nature, obeying Her laws in every way.

Concepts like “possible,” “choose,” “predict,” and “probable” all stem heirarchically from the fact that human knowledge is limited to “less than the sum total of the facts of reality.” (As far as Nature is concerned, there is no “possible.” For Nature, there is only what is and what isn’t - and Nature doesn’t care about what isn’t.) Even some actions that you might someday take, though they are determined solely by your nature (read: by you,) are not always known to you. A “choice” is the act of determining your future action.

Unpack that a bit. The act of determining your future action.

That means that agent A is faced with two (or more) possible things to do - call them X and Y. (The “possible” is that which is not contradicted by any knowledge one posesses, and is supported by at least some knowledge that one posesses.)That is, as far as A knows at this point in time, he might do X or he might do Y. As we know from the law of causality, the actions of entities are determined by their nature. Therefore, the action of A will be determined by A’s nature. If you properly adopt an Aristotelian metaphysics “all the way down,” then you’ll realize that an entity is the sum of its attributes. In other words, A = A’s nature. Therefore, “determined by the nature of A” and “determined by A” are two ways to say exactly the same thing. (They’re really not even a little tiny bit different, except in style and focus. Semantally, they’re 100% identical statements.)

So, A doesn’t know what he is going to do, because he doesn’t know what the nature of all the relevant entities involved in X and Y will be. He doesn’t know if he’ll learn some more information about X or Y, or find out that Y is no longer possible, or maybe he’ll simply introspect until he solves the problem - but he hasn’t solved it yet. When he “makes up his mind,” he determines, “I will do X” or “I will do Y.” There is no longer any ambiguity.

Did A make the choice? Or did his nature somehow make the choice for him?

Translate the philosophobabble out of that, and you get:

Did A make the choice? Or did A make the choice for him?

Determinists and indeterminists both posit a false dichotomy. The nature of the world today was set in stone (well, not stone, but set in something) at the moment of the big bang. That’s not to say we don’t have any choice in the matter. In fact, if not for the law of causality, our actions wouldn’t be determined by us, and there would be no way to choose anything at all!

Volition is “axiomatic” because there is no way to argue against it without stealing a concept. (Even the concept of “proof” or “disproof” relies on the concept of volition.) Likewise, there is no way to argue for it without begging the question. That makes it an axiom.

isaac, your position may be summed up as “deterministic free will,” and is in fact a denial of the Objectivist notion of volition. You posit a single input that determines all occurrences in the entire Universe at all time; this would mean that we have a predetermined destiny and can do nothing to change it. This diametrically contradicts the idea of free will, as the latter means that we can add our own inputs to the story of the Universe–that we do not have a predetermined destiny but take part in determining it as we live our lives.

I suppose the reason many people have a difficulty grasping this idea is that all things non-human behave deterministically, i.e. their actions are a function on the actions performed on them, i.e. they are powerless agents that only react but do not act on their own initiative. Humans are different from this, and humans are the only things in the known universe that are different from this. This fact–the fact that humans are something very special–is what I think many people find hard to accept.

But the fact that we are conscious already sets apart from the rest of the world, and it is difficult to deny that we are conscious. Once we have accepted our exceptional nature, we might as well accept another obvious fact: namely, that we have a will.

Isaac’s interesting post ignores Rand’s position on free will entirely. Like all soft-determinists, he posits and then debunks a false alternative between determinism and indeterminism. But what about the alternative of agent-causation, which Objectivism endorses? It’s a bit disingenuous to say that this is one of the only points where Rand gets something wrong, and then to make an argument on the subject that doesn’t even address her own position. Presumably Isaac thinks that it is ultimately a form of indeterminism, but he needs to argue for that, because it’s not obvious (and indeed it’s not true).

GCS and Capitalism Forever,

I have 4 yes/no questions that I would like you to answer:

  1. Does Man have identity?

Ie, is it or is it not possible for Man to both have and lack the same property at the same time in the same respect?

  1. Are the actions of a man determined by His nature?

Ie, does Man obey the law of causlity which states that the actions of entities are solely determined by the nature of the entities engaged in the action?

  1. Are the actions of a man determined by the man acting?

Ie, does Man determine his own actions, or are they somehow determined “for” him by some outside source?

  1. Is an entity the sum of its attributes?

Note that 1, 3, and 4 are asserted by Objectivism. 2 is denied.

If Man has identity, they you cannot both posess and lack the same property in the same respect. If Man exists, and an entity is its attributes, then 2 and 3 are the same question. If that’s the case, and we are going to say that “Man determines his own actions,” then that means that the actions of every man are determined by some attribute(s) that they posess. Since Man cannot both have and lack any attribute at the same time in the same respect (Man/consciousness has identity,) then the actions that you will perform are “set” right now - they are determined by your nature, which is what it is and not what it isn’t. Any actions you may take to change your nature (such as lifting weights to increase your strength, studying to change your knowledge, etc.) are still determined by your nature. You chose to study, lift weights, eat, etc., and this changed your nature.

Cap Forever, you misconstrue my argument. I am certainly NOT saying that Man is some helpless pawn buffetted around by forces outside his control. No, in fact, that’s the opposite of what I’m saying. I’m saying that, with very rare exception, every action a man may take is determined by himself. Which is to say, it is determined by his nature (see #4 above.)

It’s not enough to say that “Humans are special.” We all know that already. We’re moral agents, we have a volitional conceptual consciousness, not to mention that we just all-around kick ass and rock the hardest. But a “special” existent is still an existent, bound by the axioms of existence as everything else. No one can say that the law of identity applies everywhere in the universe except inside a human skull, or that the action of any existent is determined by its nature, except inside a human brain. Unless you can show how Man’s specialness makes this argument invalid, then that’s just a ghost in the machine argument, and is invalid.

It is important to distinguish between “Man’s Nature” and a particular man’s nature. For example, as a result of being a normal adult human, you have a choice of whether to think or evade. However, the result of that choice is not determined by the fact that you are human - it is determined by your *particular* nature. I may not know what the “to think or not to think” attributes are. However, I know immediately and introspectively that I have a choice, and that my choice is determined by me. I also know that, as an entity in reality, I am the sum of my attributes, and I cannot both have and lack the same attribute at the same time in the same respect. Therefore, even if I dont’ know what my choice will be, I know that it is “determined” - because it is caused by Me, and I am what I am and nothing else.

To say that Man’s choice to think is necessitated and caused by his nature, yet the result of the choice is not determined by anything, is to say that the nature of the choice (the attributes of that action - ie, which way it will turn out) is not caused by *anything*. This is not right.

I do believe that this was an area that Rand never really developed fully, or I am sure that she would have come to the same conclusions I have, because those conclusions are true. And, in my opinion, there have been no great metaphysicians or epistemologists since Rand. (In fact, I find it hard to even think of more than 2 philosophers who wrote about the topic and didn’t do a horrid job of it: Rand and Aristotle.)

The challenge to all:

First, answer the 4 questions at the top. Then, show what conclusion doesn’t follow, what assumption is not correct, and/or what context is dropped, etc. If someone here can show where this argument goes wrong, I will be impressed, flattered, and my view will be changed.

To those who care about this sort of thing:

I have no loyalty to Rand, Peikoff, Kelley, or any other Objectivist. Saying, “Rand said such and such” means very very very little to me. A, if she’s said it, I’ve probably read it, and B, if it’s not true, it doesn’t matter who said it. My loyalty is to Reality and the Truth. Any argument from Authority will be dismissed immediately. (I’m not trying to say that anyone here would try to make that kind of argument, of course, just being pre-emptive, since I have seen that a lot in the past in various Objectivist forums.)

GCS:

But what about the alternative of agent-causation, which Objectivism endorses?

Agent-causation = free will = predetermination.

That’s my argument, reduced to a single statement. (Not to confuse “predetermination” with “determinism.” Determinism generally states, “Man’s actions are caused by things other than Man,” and I’m not saying that.)

What do you mean when you refer to man’s “nature”? From my readings of Rand, I was under the impression that she believed the nature of man was “A rational being with volition”. You do not appear to agree with this, (as otherwise your point that “man’s choices are determined by his nature” reduces to “man’s choices are determined by him having free will” which is either trivially true or nonsensical, depending on how you view it), so what are you using the term to mean?

  1. Are the actions of a man determined by His nature?

Ie, does Man obey the law of causlity which states that the actions of entities are solely determined by the nature of the entities engaged in the action?

You incorrectly claim that Objectivism denies this. According to Objectivism, man does obey the law of causality. His nature, which he obeys, is that of a volitional being with a primary choice of whether to focus or not to focus.

For example, as a result of being a normal adult human, you have a choice of whether to think or evade. However, the result of that choice is not determined by the fact that you are human - it is determined by your *particular* nature.

This is where you go wrong and actually seem to deny free will. For, if the outcome of the primary choice is determined by one’s particular nature, one really has no choice. If the result of the choice is determined, how can you even call it a choice?

For, if the outcome of the primary choice is determined by one’s particular nature, one really has no choice.

Daniel,

Is an entity equal to the sum of its attributes?

(I believe that Rand’s answer is in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. It’s “Yes.”)

Think about the answer to that question, then ask whether “Determined by my nature” and “determined by me” are semantically different statements. If they’re not, then how could one be “free” and the other “not free.” That would be a case of A=!A.

Would it be correct to say this?

I have free will.

I determine my actions. 

My actions are determined by me.

What am I if not the sum of my attributes? In this context, “nature” means “the sum of the attributes of a given entity.”

What do you mean when you refer to man’s “nature”? From my readings of Rand, I was under the impression that she believed the nature of man was “A rational being with volition”.

It is important to distinguish between “Man’s Nature” and a particular man’s nature. For example, as a result of being a normal adult human, you have a choice of whether to think or evade. However, the result of that choice is not determined by the fact that you are human - it is determined by your *particular* nature.

“A rational being with volition” is certainly a succinct way to sum up the nature of the class of things called “Man.” That is the definition of the concept, the way in which you differentiate it from all other entities and integrate the class under a single word. However, if I say, “Bob is 6’ tall,” I’m clearly not saying anything about “Man,” though I’m certainly saying something about Bob. Many attributes of any given person are not “inherited” from the “Man” class.

You know, every day I notice a little more that computer-ese creeps into my speech…

I’m turning into an android, I swear :slight_smile:

“A rational being with volition” is certainly a succinct way to sum up the nature of the class of things called “Man.”  That is the definition of the concept, the way in which you differentiate it from all other entities and integrate the class under a single word.  However, if I say, “Bob is 6’ tall,” I’m clearly not saying anything about “Man,” though I’m certainly saying something about Bob.  Many attributes of any given person are not “inherited” from the “Man” class.

You know, every day I notice a little more that computer-ese creeps into my speech…

I’m turning into an android, I swear :slight_smile:

In that case I have to admit I’m not sure what you mean. What ‘is’ an individual man’s nature? How can you determine it or decide to what extent its influencing his actions?

Poohat,

An entity is the sum of its attributes.

In other words,

An entity is its nature.

That is aristotelian metaphysics in a nutshell. An entity is its nature. A thing is the sum of its attributes. That’s the first implication of the law of identity.

An “invidual man’s nature” is the sum of attributes of the individual man. It is shorthand for saying “what he is, including all aspects, known and unknown.”

I would like for someone to explain how “my nature” and “me” are semantically different, and how they can reconcile that with the law of identity.

Your nature and you aren’t different, they’re the same, and your nature determines that in certain circumstances you *choose* – i.e., cause action in a certain uniquely human way that is not predetermined.

Your nature and you aren’t different, they’re the same, and what your nature determines that you do is to certain circumstances *choose* – i.e., to cause action in a certain uniquely human way that is not predetermined.

Leave aside for a moment “in a certain uniquely human way that is not predetermined,” since that’s what we’re trying to become clear on. First, I want to make sure that we know what we mean by “to cause action,” so as not to get in deeper before laying the proper groundwork.

What is choosing? Me, or my nature?

What is causing the action? Me, or my nature?

What determines the outcomes of my choices? Me, or my nature?

Remember, you said that they are the same thing. So all of these are trick questions. What you really said in that quote is this:

You and you aren’t different, they’re the same, and you determine that you, in certain circumstances, *choose* – i.e., cause an action.

or, equally…

Your nature and your nature aren’t different, they’re the same, and your nature determines that your nature, in certain circumstances, *choose* – i.e., cause an action.

Observe how silly the world is when you accept an Aristotelian metaphysics halfway, and still try to split an entity from its nature, talking about the two concepts as if they’re two separate things.

It my nature does not determine the outcome of some event, then how could I have had any choice regarding that event? If an action was caused by me, then wasn’t it caused by my nature? If not, then we’re hypothesizing that I can violate the law of identity, by affecting an event without any means of doing so (for a means would entail having some property, which would be a part of my nature.)

Do any of you take issue with this much?

I keep on regretting putting my two cents into these threads. I keep thinking that I can make a brief helpful comment, but inevitably I end up getting drawn into a debate. So this will be my last post here for a while.

All causality is an entity causing itself to do something, so it is not surprising that Isaac can reformulate causal statements to bring that point out.

However, some of his specific reformulations rest on confusions. The concept “nature” conceptualizes an entity from a certain perspective (viz. as a metaphysically-given cause of actions). It is not valid to simply substitute “my nature” for “me” in sentences, just as it is not valid to substitute “my existence” or “my identity” for “me” into sentences. You can’t say, for example, “My nature gave my existence’s girlfriend’s being the actuality of a card that said ‘Be my unity’s valentine’”. The problem with that isn’t just that this sentence is cumbersome. It is a misuse of all the metaphysical jargon I threw in there. It is true that existence is identity and identity is nature. But that does not make the concepts equivalent. Each concept gives a different perspective. And that perspective is necessary and valid only in certain contexts.

(Incidentally, in 99 out of 100 cases, if you’re tempted to write an equal sign between two concepts, there is something seriously wrong with your thinking.)

Now human beings cause actions in a special way that is not predetermined by past events. Not all aspects of all of our actions are metaphysically given. So it is wrong to say that, in a case where we have a choice, our nature determines the action. That would obliterate the concept “choice” altogether. If you want to use the language of “nature”, the proper formulation would be that our nature determines *that* we will choose but not *what* we will choose. What we choose is caused by *us* in a *different way*. It is precisely this different type of causation that gives rise to the need for the concept “choice”.

Now when I say what we choose is caused by *us* rather than our natures, what exactly does this mean? The nature of a thing is that thing *qua* necessitator of actions. But what we choose is caused by us *qua* *chooser* of actions.

Now, if this all seems convoluted, it’s because, it’s because it is designed to make a very simple point accessible from within a warped rationalistic context. The direct way to come at the issue is just to notice that we can choose and that causing something by choice is different from causing it in some other way. For example, choosing to blink is different from blinking automatically (e.g., when dust enters your eye), though both are caused by you. That difference is self-evident and, in the end, that is all that the issue of freewill vs. determinism turns on.

Isaac claims that the law of causality (or the concept of nature, or whatever) rules out the possibility of (non-predetermined) choice. But what’s the basis for this claim? Where does he get his (overly narrow) conception of causality? Where does he get the concept “nature”? The argument is nothing but a string of words.

If we detach our concepts from the facts that give rise to the need for them and write them neatly on pieces of paper in strings with equal signs and arrows, we can create all sorts of very rigorous feeling proofs, but it’s all meaningless and it just leads to confusion. Parmenides, for example, “proved” in this way that motion and plurality were impossible, inaugurating two centuries of vexed absurdity. All of this was solved when Aristotle simply (but brilliantly) turned his attention to the facts that gave rise to the relevant concepts, at which point all the tangled webs of pseudo-logic dissolved making progress possible. Let’s follow his example in philosophy rather than tying our minds in knots by emptying his concepts of meaning and playing word-games with their carcasses.

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isaac, given your comments on “becoming an android,” the following might help:

An inanimate object’s actions at a given point in time–A(t)–are a function of the influences it has received from other objects up to that time–i(t):

A(t) = f ( i(t) )

Here, f embodies the object’s nature. As you can see, the object is simply reacting to outside influences.

In the case of a human, f has an additional input, which is the human’s volitional “attitude” at the given point in time, i.e. to focus or not to focus:

A(t) = f ( v(t), i(t) )

f is still the human’s nature, but in this case, f is such that f and i(t) are not enough to determine the human’s action. One more variable is needed, and f “obtains” the value of that variable by consulting the human’s volitional consciousness. We know that this is true because we can observe our nature “asking” us what to do all the time. So in the end it is f and v(t) that determine the human’s reaction to i(t), and indirectly the human’s future nature. If v(t) has the wrong value, f might become such that

A(t) = f ( i(t) )

which means that the human has died. And that is what we–i.e. those of us who have the right v(t)–want to avoid, so our A(t) is to seek some philosophical i(t) that will hopefully keep it from happening.

B)

But I agree with GCS that we should follow Aristotle’s example of paying attention to the relevant facts rather than play silly word-games. The above should serve as a way for an “android-minded” B) person to satisfy himself that what we are doing is indeed exact science, but for Earthlings, it makes more sense to simply just recognize the fact that we are constantly making choices–and pursue philosophy so we can make the best possible choices.

You all are making this way more complicated than it has to be. I suppose I’ve been helping with that, too :wink:

If *I* cause something, then it must depend on some (or all) of the attributes that I posess.

Now, that’s certainly not to say that you can take some arbitrary string of known events and say what I’ll do. But it does imply that my actions depend upon ME.

What we choose is caused by *us* in a *different way*.

A way that’s different from being caused by the some or all of the attributes that I posess?

Are you saying that something can be caused by me, yet not affected by any attribute that I posess? Or, I suppose you could be saying that I cause something, yet it is affected by attributes that I don’t posess… but then I wouldn’t really be the only cause, would I? Or maybe that it’s just not caused by anything in particular? (*see footnote)

It’s as if you’re saying that “the sum of Isaac’s attributes” is a bunch of mechanistic cogs, and there’s a magical ghost named “Isaac” riding along with it. The cogs force the ghost to choose, but it’s up to the ghost to make the choice. Excuse me, but that’s just silly.

We all know that we do make choices, and that we determine the outcome of our choices. Which means that all or most of the factor(s) that affect the outcomes of our choices must be attributes that we posess.

(By the way, I’d love to see a rebuttal that can resolve this discrepancy without using this non-argument: “Our nature doesn’t determine our choices because man has a particular nature of a certain sort that makes him non-predetermined.” EVERYTHING has a “particular nature of a certain sort.” That’s fancy philosobabble for “our choices aren’t determined by our nature because man is a thing that’s a thing that’s not predetermined.”)

  I keep on regretting putting my two cents into these threads. I keep thinking that I can make a brief helpful comment, but inevitably I end up getting drawn into a debate.

I believe I know how you feel. I keep trying to think of other ways to put this more simply. I really don’t see why everyone has such a big problem with this, when it seems so obvious to me. It’s almost like objectivists get offended at the idea of predetermination, start throwing around the qua’s like nobody’s business :wink: But I mean, your nature is whatever you choose to make it; it’s not like this has to be so darn controversial.

I too feel boredom coming on.

*footnote: This last one is more or less exactly what Peikoff describes in OPAR. He says that the existence of the choice is determined by a man’s nature, but the outcome is not determined - by anything in particular. But it is determined by the Man himself - but not any of his attributes… That’s like saying that a chicken lays an egg, but it’s neither brittle nor hard, dark nor light, etc. Just nothing in particular. In creating the choice, you MAKE the choice.

We all know that we do make choices, and that we determine the outcome of our choices.  Which means that all or most of the factor(s) that affect the outcomes of our choices must be attributes that we posess.

(emphasis mine)

Yes. But you say it’s all and we say it’s most. You say that our genes, our memories, our sense perceptions etc. fully determine the outcome of the “choice.” We (or at least I) say that these things–let’s call them outside influences–combine to determine the state of your consciousness, but then it is up to you to choose your reaction to them.

“Up to you,” “choose,” “will,” “initiative,” and “power” are all ways to express an idea that is a primary concept only to be found in humans and not elsewhere, so it isn’t possible to find even an analogy for it in the natural world. It is the premise that humans are just like everything else, only in different shapes, that makes you unable to “model” the process of volition in your mind.

The cogs force the ghost to choose, but it’s up to the ghost to make the choice. Excuse me, but that’s just silly.

There was a time when a man who said the Earth was spherical would get the response “Excuse me, but that’s just silly.” Why? Because people found it difficult or even impossible to imagine the Earth being anything other than flat, so they would assume that someone who came up with such a proposition must be deranged.

But it happened to turn out that the idea of the Earth being flat contradicts reality, while the idea of the Earth being similar to a sphere is consistent with reality. The proper measure for judging a proposition is its relation to reality, not its relation to the pre-existing models of reality in your mind.

Yes. But you say it’s all and we say it’s most. You say that our genes, our memories, our sense perceptions etc. fully determine the outcome of the “choice.” We (or at least I) say that these things–let’s call them outside influences–combine to determine the state of your consciousness, but then it is up to you to choose your reaction to them.

When you say that “most” of the factors that determine the outcome of your choice are attributes that you posess, but not all of them, then you’re saying that there are factors affecting the outcome of the choice that do not have anything to do with you. They would be attributes that you do not posess - i.e., outside factors.

For example, if a rational man is drunk, then he will still be rational, for the most part. At the very least, he will recognize his intoxication, and will avoid doing anything that requires a great deal of focus. If, however, in his state, he avoids thinking about a particular topic, or says something that he normally wouldn’t, it may be correct to say that the alcohol has something to do with that choice. It’s still mostly under his control, but not totally under his control, because he is intoxicated, and this outside factor affects his judgement. (Even still, all the choices of a drunk man are nonetheless determined by his nature at that moment - which includes the attribute of intoxication. But it’s not typical of him. I’m more inclined to take the strong stance, and say that all the choices of all humans are always determined only by their nature - i.e., are chosen - but this kind of statement generally opens the door for annoying rationalistic hair-splitting.)

Let me say this again, even though I feel like I’m getting repetitive:

I am NOT saying that your genes determine your choices.

I am NOT saying that “outside influences” determine your choices.

I am NOT saying that the choices of any given man may be predicted perfectly by plugging some variables into any equation.

I am saying that I determine the outcome of my choices. I am also saying, however, that this means that the attributes posessed by me determine the outcome of my choices and that it’s the same thing, because an entity is the sum of its attributes.

If you don’t understand this, and/or you think that I’ve just contradicted myself, then check your premises, and re-read what I’ve posted to this thread. Everyone, please stop telling me that I’m saying things that I’m clearly not saying.

How can “my memories,” and “my sense perceptions” possibly be considered “outside” influences? Outside of what, exactly?

CapForever, in your response to my ghost/cog example, you seem to be saying that you do support that version of the mind/body dichotomy, and that it is irrational of me to doubt it. Am I understanding you correctly, or was the whole round earth thing just a non sequitur?

The only relevant parts of the “model of reality that exists in my mind” are that an entity is the sum of its attributes, that a thing cannot both posess and lack the same attribute at the same time at the same respect, and that the actions of an entity are caused by the nature of the entity that acts. Existence, identity, and causality. Are these facts mistaken? Are they not “consistent with reality”? (Funny, I thought they were axiomatic…)

This whole conversation reminds me a lot of James Taggart’s “just love me for me” whine. As if you could love someone for themselves, but not for anything about them, as if their “self” was not the sum of their attributes.

Just a little note Isaac,

Man’s nature does NOT determine the outcome (i.e., result) of his choice. It determines only THAT he choose. The outcome of his choice is determined by the nature of ALL the entities involved in his choice. If he chooses to drop a glass on the floor, that the glass will break is not determined by the fact that he is a man, but because the glass IS fragile, and the floor IS hard and solid, etc, and the earth is massive enough to accelerated the glass towards it, and so on…

Basically, your point is (and correct me if I’m wrong)

If entity A does action T, and entity A is the sum of all the attributes of entity A, then the sum of all the attributes of entity A does action T.

One thing that Ayn Rand warned in ITOE is to not take “sum” literally. You can’t “add” attributes together and get an entity (see p. 264-268 in ITOE).

The outcome of his choice is determined by the nature of ALL the entities involved in his choice

True dat, Tom. But in the choice of whether and how to think, the only entity involved is oneself, no? (Actually, in the case of the glass breaking, I’d say that one has no choice as to whether or not glass breaks upon sudden impact - that is metaphysically given. But you may have a choice about whether or not you drop it. One ultimately only has choices regarding one’s own actions - you only have choices about other things to the extent that your own actions affect those other things.)

I will check the passage that you referenced when I get home, and either show that it’s not relevant, that it supports my position, that it is incorrect, or I will change my position in light of new information. Thank you very much for adding some new content to this discussion, Tom. :wink:

CapForever, in your response to my ghost/cog example, you seem to be saying that you do support that version of the mind/body dichotomy, and that it is irrational of me to doubt it.  Am I understanding you correctly, or was the whole round earth thing just a non sequitur?

What I do support is not a mind-body dichotomy, but a dichotomy between what you have control over and what you don’t. A dichotomy between you and the rest of the world. Your genes, for example, belong to the “rest of the world” in this respect. So does the culture you were born into, your family, the weather, etc.

All of these things have an influence on the attributes you will possess, and therefore on your actions. But they are not all the influence on them. You can influence your attributes and actions too.

So what I am saying is that there is an entity called “you” that is distinct from the rest of the world. This entity is conscious and has the power to determine some of its attributes, and thus, indirectly, many of its actions. The fact that it is conscious and has a will means that it has spiritual aspects, i.e. it is not purely material. But it has material aspects too, and it performs its actions on other entities via these material aspects (i.e. your body).

Yes, it is the sum of its attributes at any given time, but it can influence the way these attributes develop over time. Again, the meaning of “can” in this sentence is something you will only understand if you grasp the concept of volition. Inanimate objects don’t “can” ; they just “do.”