Pleasure and Hedonism

Ethics
1

Imagine that we recognized a distinct ethical philosophy that held “knowledge” as its standard of value, as in: there is no greater good than the acquisition of knowledge. As “Gnosticism” is already taken, we shall appeal to what is perhaps an exemplar of this philosophy and call it Prometheism.

Suppose a situation in which a man had an opportunity to go to school, to acquire knowledge, but in order to do so he would have to sacrifice his loved ones, his productivity, and etc. A Prometheist would say that it is “good” to do so, and “evil” not to, on account of his standard of value.

Of course, if life is the standard of value – and the Objectivist Ethics would have it so – then Prometheism is an errant philosophy. It puts the acquisition of knowledge above other values which might be higher per the standard of life, and even life itself (which will ultimately collapse Prometheism into utter disrepair, as all contradictions must, as one cannot acquire knowledge when one is dead).

Now then, suppose another situation: in a conversation between Objectivists, one asks the other, “I hear you’re going to Harvard in the fall – how come?” The second answers, “I’d like to get a good education.”

Is this second so-called Objectivist therefore a Prometheist?

I would contend that he is not. Though he values education, and the acquisition of knowledge, such is not sufficient to make one a Prometheist. Rather, education and knowledge themselves are values in a rational ethics, so long as their pursuit does not conflict with one’s higher values, or one’s life. An Objectivist might even be mistaken on this score – going to Harvard might damage his life and entail sacrifice in fact , but he may be unaware of this, lacking the knowledge or time necessary to arrive at such a realization. What would make him a Prometheist – and the only thing that would make him a Prometheist – is if he held the acquisition of knowledge as his standard of value. And whatever his philosophy, explicitly held or implicitly, he would only be acting as a Prometheist if he pursued knowledge in such a manner as to knowingly sacrifice his greater values – to act against his own life, as such, for the sake of that knowledge.

(Dr. Frankenstein – the “modern Prometheus” – may possibly be understood as a Prometheist villain, as can others of the “mad scientist” archetype.)

***

I contend that the above relates to pleasure and Hedonism. Hedonism holds pleasure as the standard of value, but pleasure is itself a value in a rational ethics. To pursue pleasure is not to be a Hedonist. It is only Hedonism to hold pleasure above higher values, to counsel pursuing pleasure at the cost of one’s destruction (i.e. self-sacrifice), and it is only to act as a Hedonist to act in that manner.

But to do something for the pleasure it provides, when that something is not destructive of higher ends or the highest, like sunning oneself on the beach on a gorgeous summer day, for that experience, for that pleasure, is not Hedonism , any more than going to Harvard for the education it provides is Prometheist.

2

In Objectivism, one’s hierarchy of values is not the primary moral principle. And yet, you are treating it as such, and declaring that the moral is defined by where it sits on one’s tree of values.

While it is true that sacrifices are immoral and choosing higher values is moral, that statement is not sufficient for fully explaining the issue.

A more fundamental issue is the source of one’s values: if that source is the selfish pursuit of life qua our nature, then that person’s system of values is proper. If that source of values is pleasure, or knowledge, or anything else, then that system of values is wrong.

If you use “because it’s pleasurable” as the ultimate justification for a choice, you are a Hedonist. Even if an Objectivist would’ve made the same exact choice, because it also happens to be the rational choice to make.

3

If you use “because it’s pleasurable” as the ultimate justification for a choice, you are a Hedonist. Even if an Objectivist would’ve made the same exact choice, because it also happens to be the rational choice to make.

Why do you introduce “ultimate justification” when I’m clearly speaking of proximate justifications? In fact, it might even be said that this is rather the point to my post, in demonstrating the difference between a Prometheist who holds knowledge as his standard of value (or “ultimate justification”) and an Objectivist who holds life as his standard of value, but values knowledge accordingly and may make decisions on that basis (his “proximate justification”). After all, an Objectivist as well as anyone else may wish to go to Harvard “to get a good education”; or to lie on the beach to enjoy that experience; or even have sex for the pleasure it provides. They do not magically transform into Prometheists or Hedonists or X other follower of ethical philosophies, dependent on their specific reasoning and immediate goals.

Elsewhere, you’ve said, “I dislike decisions motivated by pleasure instead of an objective standard of values,” ignoring the fact that a decision can be motivated by pleasure (in a proximate sense) according to, and within the context of, an objective standard of values.

Once we’ve established that pleasure or education or what-have-you are rational values, according to an ethics with life as the standard, then it makes every sense to take action in pursuit of those values, and again, doing so does not mean that you’ve abandoned your ultimate ethical standard, unless and until taking some action would put you into conflict with your higher values.

But yay! Since you’re here, we can pick up where we left off on these topics:

Why would you need to establish that it is destructive? Because you are claiming that it is destructive. […]

Now, apart from that, can I make the positive case? – can I demonstrate the “utility” of pleasure? Is that really necessary, do you believe? Apart from such a demonstration, you would think it fair game to just consign all interest in the experience of pleasure to “hedonism” and immorality? I invite you to reflect on this for a moment or two. Please note: it is not the case that “all things are bad until they are shown good.” While in response a person may say that it is also not the case that “all things are good until they are shown bad,” I’d contend that a benevolent universe might well give “good” the benefit of the doubt.

With all that said, let me take a stab at it anyways. How about that pleasure reminds us – in visceral fashion – that life is something to continue to work for, to fight for? It reminds us that life is good , on the most basic level possible. Perhaps it functions in a fashion similar to the experience of art. Regarding this, Rand wrote in “The Goal of My Writing”:

Perhaps physical pleasure similarly gives us “a moment of love for existence” […] Meh, I’m no professional philosopher, so I’m sure I’m not couching this correctly… but yeah, I’ll stand by the notion that “pleasure,” apart from being destructive of our higher values, is good.

I don’t believe this is correct. Rather, I believe that pleasure and pain are biological realities. That certain physical activities cause pleasure or pain is factual information, and it is upon such information that we make decisions. The standard of value for our decisions is life, but we still must have an understanding of what things are, and their actual effects, in order to apply that standard in reality.

That touching a hot stove causes intense pain is reason enough not to touch the hot stove. Pain in this case is not “the result of making irrational decisions” – it is the result of touching a hot stove. Touching a hot stove would be an irrational thing to do, because to touch it would result in pain, scarring, etc., and thus be self-destructive. It is through that pain that we recognize the self-destructive (i.e. anti-life) nature of the act.

And of course we could invent a scenario in which a person must touch a hot stove to do something ultimately life affirming – like rescuing our child from the stove, or such, but in the bare case of the hot stove is there, and we seek not to touch it, we are acting so because pain is something, all else being equal, we seek to avoid. Pleasure works similarly, but in opposite fashion: all else being equal, we seek to experience it. In a way, pleasure and pain are proxies for life and death, and I think someone committed to life will love pleasure and despise pain (though temporarily deny the former and tolerate the latter, should higher values reasonably require it), and someone committed to death will tend the other way.