Pollution

Rand once wrote:

“As far as the issue of actual pollution is concerned, it is primarily a scientific, not a political, problem. In regard to the political principle involved: if a man creates a physical danger or harm to others, which extends beyond the line of his own property, such as unsanitary conditions or even loud noise, and if this is proved, the law can and does hold him responsible. If the condition is collective, such as in an overcrowded city, appropriate and objective laws can be defined, protecting the rights of all those involved—as was done in the case of oil rights, air-space rights, etc. But such laws cannot demand the impossible, must not be aimed at a single scapegoat, i.e., the industrialists, and must take into consideration the whole context of the problem, i.e., the absolute necessity of the continued existence of industry—if the preservation of human life is the standard.”

Rand argues laws aimed at curbing pollution cannot demand the impossible and cannot cause industry to cease to exist (for moral reasons in the latter case). I have not found further clarification of this point.

In terms of the moral reasons for preserving industry, this for me goes without question. There seems to be a weighing up of the pro-life element of curbing pollution (or forcing polluters to pay compensation) with the anti-life element of industry being restricted in some way.

How would one appraise what restrictions would be justified, objectively?

Objectively define ‘pollutants’ as opposed to byproducts would be a good start. Objectiviely consider to what ‘restrictions’ refer. Compensation may not have to rely on force, I have a vague notion that certain industries need to have (for lack of a better term) ‘industrial insurance’ eg to obtain permits to generate nuclear power I believe a requirement already in place is that the builders and operators of those plants need to have adequate insurance to be able to pay for compensation if they cause an accident. Is this what you mean?

That is an interesting question to explore.  Implementation is a fascinating subject and under appreciated.  

 

I am by no means an expert on the science of pollution, so take this as friendly chewing on the subject. I would consider intervention necessary for the same reason you would restrict any property - Something that makes life impossible for the community with no chance of reasonable justice.  Extrapolating the difference between the right to firearms versus WMD here.

 

II can see it being reasonable for a community to require some kind of insurance for a power plant if it does not have the assets to pay back the community for damages.  It is one thing to sue a company for damaging my land but another if it contaminates the entire town and the plant will not have the assets to replay the loss.  Then again the community might forgo it to.  

 

I’ll add that this would be less of an issue without zoning laws which set up these situations in the first place.  But when moving from mixed economy to a free one this is an issue and I can see these steps being taken in the interim.  

1 Like

They must be based on the premise of protecting rights of the individual and not on anything to do with the fictional “rights” of animals or of the planet.

Tadmjones,

By pollution I would be implying health hazards. I was not thinking so much of accidents but of day to day pollution. There was the fairly recent Fukushima disaster for example. However the resulting pollution was due to an accident and not a routine consequence of nuclear power generation. No one thought the Fukushima outcome was likely to happen.

This is different from say an industrial process where emission of pollutants is currently a given. I was thinking there may be two sorts of approaches to curbing pollutants - being to restrict emissions or to compensate those whose rights are being breached (where there is objective proof). There may be other ways.

There seems to be a weighing up of the pro-life element of curbing pollution (or forcing polluters to pay compensation) with the anti-life element of industry being restricted in some way.

How would one appraise what restrictions would be justified, objectively?

Strictly Logical,

“They must be based on the premise of protecting rights of the individual and not on anything to do with the fictional “rights” of animals or of the planet.”

Playing devil’s advocate for the sake of exploring this, say I am an individual who suffers from asthma and a waste incinerator company starts burning waste near to where I live. The smell triggers my asthma and means I cannot work as well as I could, it diminishes the enjoyment of my private life. Say I have proof of causality. If I can strictly uphold my rights, so they are not breaching them whatsoever, I could in theory force them to shut down the incinerator whenever there is a chance I will inhale polluted air. However let’s suppose this would have an impact on all the local industries and businesses which use it, making it more expensive for waste to be properly managed and disposed of. Is this inconvenience and expense something the polluters will just have to bear so that my rights are fully protected. Is it legitimate for me to waive my rights if they compensate me (or maybe I would accept them paying to move me to an area with cleaner air)? How much compensation is acceptable weighing up the impact on the pro-life side of production (not just the anti-life pollution which is a byproduct).

Re animals and planet - I agree speaking of rights is not legitimate in that context. However there is ample evidence of the value of biodiversity to human life - more biodiversity is consistent with a more pro-life environment for man to live in. So the cost of pollution in terms of biodiversity loss should not be ignored as it impacts us individually - the impact is anti-life. Preserving the natural environment is not necessarily motivated by anti-life intentions.

Tadmjones,

By pollution I would be implying health hazards. I was not thinking so much of accidents but of day to day pollution. There was the fairly recent Fukushima disaster for example. However the resulting pollution was due to an accident and not a routine consequence of nuclear power generation. No one thought the Fukushima outcome was likely to happen.

This is different from say an industrial process where emission of pollutants is currently a given. I was thinking there may be two sorts of approaches to curbing pollutants - being to restrict emissions or to compensate those whose rights are being breached (where there is objective proof). There may be other ways.

There seems to be a weighing up of the pro-life element of curbing pollution (or forcing polluters to pay compensation) with the anti-life element of industry being restricted in some way.

How would one appraise what restrictions would be justified, objectively?

But you would agree that objectively defining what constitutes pollutants and health hazards is the first step, yes?

Yeah, otherwise you end up stating something stupid such as calling CO2 a pollutant.

1 Like

And since biodiversity is prohuman life and happiness creating new species of plants and animals would increase human happiness, though it would work to unset the natural environment … so?

“though it would work to unset the natural environment … so?”

Sorry what do you mean?

‘so?’ like’ hmm what to do what to do’

It was a humorous (at least to me) aside.

On a serious note , do you consider man or humankind as outside the scope of nature ?

No, I’m not sure what you would be saying if you claimed humankind were outside the scope of nature. That would seem like an odd claim. What does it have to do with the OP?

No, I’m not sure what you would be saying if you claimed humankind were outside the scope of nature. That would seem like an odd claim. What does it have to do with the OP?

Not the OP as much as what ‘preserving the natural environment’ would mean . That usually implies the environment minus all activities of humankind, the ‘pristine earth’ notion.

Oh ok, I guess that can be an ambiguous statement.

What I meant by preserving the natural environment is taking steps to identify what pro-life attributes the natural environment offers and seeking to act in ways which does not diminish them, whenever reasonable.

Oh ok, I guess that can be an ambiguous statement.

What I meant by preserving the natural environment is taking steps to identify what pro-life attributes the natural environment offers and seeking to act in ways which does not diminish them, whenever reasonable.

I agree with the filter of reasonableness.

Oh ok, I guess that can be an ambiguous statement.

What I meant by preserving the natural environment is taking steps to identify what pro-life attributes the natural environment offers and seeking to act in ways which does not diminish them, whenever reasonable.

Who determines when something is reasonable, and by what standard? 

 

The only possible answer is: the owner(s) of that “natural environment”. There is no rational framework for protecting the environment outside the framework of property rights. Once you begin treating natural resources as outside the framework of property rights, all you have is socialism: a system of pseudo property rights, where ownership is assumed by those in power, in the name of “the people”.

 

When land and other natural resources are privately owned, the free market system will assess the value of each resource, and contracts will protect them whenever they are truly valuable. 

 

The only exception to that is pollution. Pollution cannot be controlled and stopped at the edge of one’s property, so the government must play a role beyond just contract enforcement from time to time.

 

Rand argues laws aimed at curbing pollution cannot demand the impossible and cannot cause industry to cease to exist (for moral reasons in the latter case). I have not found further clarification of this point.

I remember Leonard Peikoff going into far more detail on what that entails. Unfortunately I’m not sure when and where. I most likely heard it on his podcast. I believe his site has his podcasts, and they are searchable.

 

One interesting point I remember is that people shouldn’t just be able to move next to an existing factory, or airport, or whatever, and sue for compensation or a ban over the pollution that’s been there since before they built their houses. Similarly, factories can’t just be allowed to start polluting more, and airports can’t just be allowed to expand more, without just compensation to surrounding residences. And that compensation should be determined by the market value of the residential properties, not some kind of arbitrary system: if a factory or airport wishes to expand, the damage the loss in value the new pollution causes to residential properties should be evaluated (it’s not hard to do: one needs only to look at the change in real estate prices in the area), and the polluters should pay it.

 

But that’s it. If someone chooses to stay in the area, they should have no further claim against the polluter. If they choose to move, then the cost of moving (this is somewhat more difficult to evaluate objectively, but some standards are still possible) should be added to the bill.

 

Of course, more often than not, that would be enough to discourage significant pollution in residential areas. After all, why would polluters choose to bear the costs of loss of property values, if they can instead just build some place far less populated. At other times, when the actual cost of the pollution is small, residents would have to just live with it. That’s what Ayn Rand meant by “cannot demand for industry to cease to exist”: some pollution, we must accept. We must let the free market set the value of “pollution free environments”, rather than assign an arbitrary value of infinite to them, and ban all pollution from ever upsetting our scheme.

You asked for it, you got it:

 

Peikoff on pollution

Interesting Nicky, thank you.

I remember reading an Objectivist argument that the government acts as custodian of land before it is homesteaded. Say, for the sake of argument, someone dumps radioactive waste in the uncultivated wilderness. At this point it hasn’t been homesteaded so private property rights haven’t been established yet. Would the government as custodian have a right to take action against the polluter?

Thanks for the link Craig, I’ll check it out.

Nicky, your post has made me reflective.

You wrote we must accept some pollution. What would be a method for deciding what we mean by some? And who are the “we”.

Say some ecologists make no use whatsoever of what industry produces. Why must they accept any pollution (which they regard as anti-life) for the sake of the many individuals who do benefit from it.

To explore this further, what if someone said Rand was abandoning her theory of rights in favour of utilitarianism, on the subject of pollution?

I remember reading an Objectivist argument that the government acts as custodian of land before it is homesteaded. Say, for the sake of argument, someone dumps radioactive waste in the uncultivated wilderness. At this point it hasn’t been homesteaded so private property rights haven’t been established yet. Would the government as custodian have a right to take action against the polluter?

 

“Willful” negligence and any harm that it may cause is an intiation of force. If governement is the agency and mechanism with which a civilized society deals with, retaliates against, the intiation of force then yes the ‘government has the right’, but only it is only in  that context that the idea of a governemnt having a ‘right(s)’ makes any sense.