Whether it would be OK to hire a mercenary army from OUTSIDE the state, would be a practical question - but based on history I would say it is highly undesirable.
Pardon my ignorance, but to what history are your referring?
Are you talking about hiring an entire army from outside, or supplemental resources?
I haven’t spent that much time considering whether a mercenary army is proper, but I think for the USA, modifying the military reserves to be more akin to an organized mercenary force may be a good idea.
After 9/11 I considered enlisting in the military, but did not for several reasons. One big reason is the relationship I would have with the government. I would have little freedom to choose my duties. I would be eager to go to war in Iran, for example, or North Korea, or go after Bin Laden. I would not be eager to spend a year as a target in Baghdad pulling guard duty on some street corner. Nor would I want to go on “humanitarian” missions to pestholes in Africa.
But suppose the Pentagon lacked sufficient troops to fulfill its missions. I see no problem with them contracting out some of the fighting to a small group of mercenaries. Under the strategic guidance of the regular military, a mercenary unit could be assigned a task via a contract, and when completed, perhaps get another one.
Such a situation would enable me to be selective in the fighting I would do.
If history is a guide, the efficacy of such a cadre could be quite astonishing.
In Carnage and Culture, Victor Davis Hanson writes of the 10,700 Greek hoplite soldiers hired in 401 B.C. by Cyrus the Younger to “help press his claim to the Persian throne.” After marching some 1500 miles to face their foe, how effective were they?
“The price for destroying an entire wing of the Persian army was a single Greek hoplite wounded by an arrow.” (page 2)
“Though surrounded by thousands of enemies, their original generals captured and beheaded, forced to traverse through the contested lands of more than twenty different peoples, caught in snowdrifts, high mountain passes, and waterless steppes, suffering frostbite, malnutrition, and frequent sickness, as well as fighting various savage tribesmen, the Greeks reached the safety of the Black Sea largely intact – less than a year and a half after leaving home. They had routed every hostile Asian force in their way. Five out of six made it out alive, the majority of the dead lost not in battle, but in the high snows of Armenia.” (page 2)
The author argues that the cultural gap between the Ten Thousand and the army under the whip of Persia gave the Greeks a significant advantage. I won’t repeat the entire argument (see the book), but I think it is instructive to see just how much freedom the Ten Thousand had. Here’s an indication:
“Once the Ten Thousand, as much a ‘marching democracy’ as a hired army, left the battlefield of Cunaxa, the soldiers routinely held assemblies in which they voted on the proposals of their elected leaders. In times of crises, they formed ad hoc boards to ensure there were sufficient archers, cavalry, and medical corpsmen.” (page 3)
“Upon reaching the coast of the Black Sea, the Ten Thousand conducted judicial inquiries and audits of its leadership’s performance during the past year, while disgruntled individuals freely voted to split apart and make their own way back home. A lowly Arcadian shepherd had the same vote as the aristocratic Xenophon, student of Socrates…” (page 3)
And keep in mind this was 2400 years ago!
So I’m not convinced that mercenary armies are a bad idea, provided the proper oversight of their ultimate goals and of the bounds on their methods. In fact, there are some good reasons to consider contracting out more than just support work for the military.