The QE2 flavor of QE is the monetizing of government debt. The government is reducing its “external debt” since one wing (the Fed) is buying that debt from non-governmental entities. The net result is that government bonds in the hands of outside parties is replaced by newly “printed” dollars (M1). Left to themselves, people in the U.S. (in aggregate) want to “de-lever”, saving a little more and being a little more careful about taking on debt. This means that businesses have to change, to match this new “time-preference”. The process of adjustment is not pretty because it means laying off people, shutting marginal stores, closing marginal offices and factories. It also means bankruptcies and (usually) falling stock prices and higher interest rates.
Fortunately, the process of liquidation (or “deflationary spiral”) also has a silver lining. For instance, it is quite common for “labor productivity” to rise during such times, since people are being laid off, but production is reducing less than the layoffs. While absolute profits may drop, profit margins can actually rise after the initial adjustments. These cuts allow companies to reduce prices of outputs (and some companies are also reducing such prices out of desperation). So, a machine might be available at a discount. High vacancy rates allow companies to have lower rent costs. There are also always a lot of people and companies who have very safe balance sheets. At some point of a downward spiral, these entities will take advantage of low prices and will invest. I think a metaphor of a spring, used by economist George Reisman, is very appropriate: the downward spiral is not a typical free-fall, it is pressing on a spring, and the further it falls, the more the spring builds up the ability to push it back up.
If the process of adjustment was short enough, governments would probably have learnt by now to leave well enough alone. Unfortunately, it isn’t. The standard government reaction is to work against the pain that is being felt in various parts of the economy. Problem is: the lesser the pain, the slower the adjustment. Governments try to keep wages up, give money to the unemployed, help delay foreclosures and bankruptcies. It is like giving a patient some type of pain killer that fools the patient’s body into thinking there is no problem. To some extent the government can actually be successful in keeping certain key measures of aggregate economic health from deteriorating as much as they would normally do. For instance, if the unemployment rate would have been 15%, it might be possible to keep it at 13% by dragging things out. However, if one looks at the individuals who are employed, one sees that what this means is this: the government allowed one person to be unemployed for a longer duration so that another person who was a somewhat marginal worker could keep his job. It is a form of redistribution of wealth.
Redistribution of wealth can “help” some people at the cost of others, and the victims may not see it as redistribution. For instance, suppose the government were to take a few thousands of dollars from home-owners who were more conservative about their purchases or who otherwise have savings that make them secure despite their negative home-equity. And, suppose the government were to give this money to home owners on the margin of foreclosure: who would use the money to avoid foreclosure and not be in dire straits again. Such a redistribution process would “clean up” the balance sheet of the person at the margin of foreclosure and also help clean up the balance sheet of the lender. Of course it is morally wrong to achieve this by cleaning -out the guy who saved. It also means that the conservative guy, who would have invested that money or spent it on something cannot do so. Someone else down the chain of economic transactions also shares the pain. Furthermore, it also sets up the wrong long-term incentives (“moral hazard”) which creates more problems in the future. While such a blatant redistribution would be not be politically viable, something like “raise taxes on those who make more than $500,000” may go down well with a population in the middle of a recession. And then there is grandma who is also paying for it because the rate on her CDs just plummeted.
The experience in Japan suggest that the government can drag things out for decades as long as people keep faith in the long-term viability of the economy. The key is whether the fiscal and monetary stimulus merely assuages the de-levering or if it actually sparks credit growth in some broad area of the economy. The essential fact is that expanding “high powered money” (as in M1) need not cause price-rises for day to day goods and services. The key is whether credit booms again. If it does, it could simply set us up for a bigger fall. For instance, if Greenspan had allowed the U.S. economy to take some more pain after the dot.net bubble burst, we would not be where we are today.
Since the 1980’s people moved to the notion that monetary policy is more important than fiscal policy. In the situation we’re in now, I think it is fiscal policy that is more important. It is not QE1 alone that kept the economy from falling as much as it would have. The key was the fiscal stimulus with QE1 to support it. In other words: it was not just the printing of money, but the spending of that money. If the new Congress does anything to seriously curb the deficit , then QE2 will probably work differently from QE1. While QE1 flowed to unemployment checks, and public payrolls, etc., that was because of the high fiscal deficits. If those are reigned in, QE2 flow elsewhere: possibly inflating some other type of asset bubble that will disappoint in the end.
Of course, through all this, scientists and businessmen are constantly figuring out how to be more productive. Innovation might slow, but it does not cease. The resulting improvements mean this: the government can work against the economy to some extent and the damage can be masked because other agents are improving things at the same time. Other than monetary and fiscal policy, the third important governmental factor is: structural policy – privatization, regulations, climate-change nonsense, etc. Improvements in such policies can also help mask the negatives resulting from the other two.