Do you happen to know where this is claimed in either reference, that the axiomatic concept entity had to be induced as relates to the instantiation of it in atoms?
The very idea is ridiculous. Imagine If one said we have to run an experiment to verify if atoms have identity…
I’m not sure I’m understanding your question. Chapter 1 of Harriman’s book does an overview of concept formation and the basics of metaphysics. He uses the term “existents” until getting to causality and switches to the familiar “entities act”.
The experiments done initially simply reduced substances to a homogeneous level. Valances, laws regarding gaseous volumes, Avogadro’s number and other discoveries ultimately led to the conclusion atoms qualified as a bona-fide entities, per my take thus far.
I don’t think that either Harriman or Dr. Peikoff claims that there was a question of whether there could have been a non-entity as a cause of what we know as atomic weight.
From homogeneous consistency, valences, gas laws etc., causality states that there is some entity acting giving rise to the observations. Identifying what that entity is requires sufficient integration of the evidence to grant “entity status” to the concept of “atom”.
I will go by your definition of fundamental entity, SK. However, for your questions, I don’t think the level of decomposition matters here. Whether decomposition is possible for a given object wouldn’t alter my answers.
When you say action here as “whose only defining features are the entity performing it and the entity it is being performed on”, that may be best described as “unary action”, or what I’d describe as which actions come from and are only due to the entity itself. “Being performed on” is unclear, it still leads us to your question 4.
Why boil down an entity to only its actions? I mean, how does it help to also get rid of characteristics like shape for example? Although that is fine to do if you want to analyze the concept of causality, which requires abstracting away the details like shape. Either way, the identity of every entity would certainly come down to what it does in all possible circumstances. I agree with this. (I’ve argued elsewhere before that this would work even for anything with volition.)
Self-generated action is only one kind of “acting on itself”. Self-generated here refers to the actions of animals or plants, i.e. biology. Discovering “self-caused” properties for fundamental entities I think would be a matter of special science, i.e. physics. In principle, they can.
Strictly speaking, if you suspect Objectivism requires a strange take on logic, this wouldn’t be it. A -> B. B -> C. A -> C. That is, we know if A is true, then C is true if the whole statement is to be true. So if A acts, C will necessarily act as well. But it can’t specify that every sense of the word “cause” is transitive. You didn’t define direct, I don’t even think transitivity would be called “direct”. If you use the word “cause” in an unqualified sense, then yes, A necessarily acts on C with B as the means. But this wouldn’t qualify for “unary action” I spelled out above because more than one entity is involved in getting C to act.
I agree with the absurdities you pointed out. But I don’t think it shows that fundamental entities should have no properties besides their action functions. It makes me wonder, can what you call an action function also include things like shape which have a bearing on how entities act in the first place? Clearly, that is discoverable through observation. In other words, you could conclude that all characteristics of an entity, if the characteristics are real, will have a bearing on their actions. Even if they only differ in size, that too will lead to at least one difference in action if you put them through all possible identical circumstances.
So which entities are fundamental? Are fundamental entities more like people, rocks, and chairs, or are they more like subatomic particles?
I think that they are more like subatomic particles.
Whoa whoa, stop right there. In looking for fundamental entities your mind is already leaping completely away from the topic at hand. The topic at hand was explaining how and why the concept “entity” is an axiomatic concept. “Entity” is an axiomatic concept for all men, and has been for all time regardless of their own level of knowledge of science or philosophy.
“Fundamentality” can be applied to the realm of epistemology, and it can be applied to the realm of metaphysics, and it can be applied to the realm of physics, and what is found to be fundamental can be (in fact, IS) completely different referents in all three contexts. Flipping back and forth between contexts carelessly can cause errors due to the equivocation fallacy.
The context of Peikoff’s introduction of the axiomatic concept “entity” is definitely epistemological. Peikoff writes “Entities constitute the content of the world men perceive; there is nothing else to observe.” (this is the next sentence after your quote) This is before and apart from any and all inferences and integrations about the structure of the world and how it works, before any careful measurements or use of instruments that make observable that which is not. In fact the primary importance of instruments is to bring into the realm of the humanly perceivable entities that which is otherwise imperceptible.
All knowledge starts with what is called “the epistemological given”, and for the Objectivism the given is the evidence of the senses. Other philosphers have postulated other givens, such as Kant’s a priori categories, or Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum”. Objectivism does not postulate what the ultimate constituents of matter must be, and only offers some methodological constraints on what is logically permissible to entertain as a theory. Physics is not philosophy, and philosophy can only specify that physics be consistent with itself and with the world as men are given to know it (however convoluted that might be). Otherwise, “hands off!” or “laissez-faire!”.
^ No, because then Objectivism has no metaphysics. If all Objectivism refers to in its metaphysics is epistemological relations between metaphysical concepts, then it is only talking about Being qua concept, but not Being qua Being.
“So which entities are fundamental? Are fundamental entities more like people, rocks, and chairs, or are they more like subatomic particles? I think that they are more like subatomic particles.”
Philosophically the answer seems reductionist to me. If I was a scientist then i get the “subatomic particles” answer. However, from the context of the philosopher (which is the case here quoting Peikoff), the answer would be people, rocks and chairs. For humans, the relevant context, observation, etc. is that fundamental entities are people, rocks, chairs etc. We are relating the world to man, that’s the relevant context FOR US. Realize that the concept “fundamental” like any concept, has to be understood within the context that it is being used. Until science would get to the point of finding an axiomatic particle - non reducible, that you would call fundamental, don’t make the mistake of thinking fundamental is not contextual.
Philosophically, subatomic particles are the people, rocks and chairs - it’s not either or. Scientifically it is either or, that is the total entity or some part of the entity that you study. So choose your context, Philosophy or Science, pick the relevant one in regards to your goal.
Is your computer screen moving in front of you right now? Yes, it’s moving 67,000 miles per hour around the sun. No, not moving in relation to you. This morning the relevant context for you is it is not moving. However, if you were flying to the moon and coming back next week to post another comment to this thread then you better understand that your screen is moving at a tremendous speed and calculate how to get back to it, otherwise we won’t be seeing a post from you next week. And then I’m going to have nothing to do at 3:35am in the morning!!!
If all Objectivism refers to in its metaphysics is epistemological relations between metaphysical concepts, then it is only talking about Being qua concept, but not Being qua Being.
Epistemological relations between metaphysical concepts I think is what Grames is referring to as fundamental as applied to epistemology. That’s what the quotes you provided are about. But then the questions you ask after that in the OP looks to be about fundamental as applied to metaphysics. They are a different set of questions. So, it looks like you were/are mixing contexts that cannot be mixed. I clicked “like” not because I think Grames completely answered all your questions, but because his post helps distinguish fundamental being applied to different contexts.
Fundamentality" can be applied to the realm of epistemology, and it can be applied to the realm of metaphysics, and it can be applied to the realm of physics, and what is found to be fundamental can be (in fact, IS) completely different referents in all three contexts.
Could you give examples to clarify what you mean here? Because, as stated, I don’t recognize this notion as anything Oism holds. If the hierarchy of knowledge is a ladder then what is philosophically fundamental is below what is physically fundmental but what is fundamental in physics will always be a species of what is philosophically fundamental. It is an iterative process.
In ITOE Rand does make a metaphysical vs epistemic fundamentality distinction where the metaphysical is referring to the causal, or “by means of which” (to use Searle’s terminology) , the characteristics that give rise to or make the most others possible. Ms. Rand herself called this sense of entity the “primary” sense in the appendix while discussing metaphysical vs epistemic “priority”. There, “society” can epistemically be called and entity but is in fact metaphysically dependent on the individuals that comprise it.
Edit:
Are you simply meaning that epistemic fundamentality is about what is “most essential” to cognition and that may be any given characteristic, which doesn’t really have to do with hierarchy qua logical invariance across all concepts? How would physics fit into that?
If all Objectivism refers to in its metaphysics is epistemological relations between metaphysical concepts, then it is only talking about Being qua concept, but not Being qua Being.
Being is a concept. The referents of that concept is metaphysically all the entities that exist. (All other “existents” are epistemically isolated from entities)
edit: but your criticism of Louie is correct in that context. Metaphysics is about what exists apart from epistemic relations (cognitive neccessity). That is why epistemic “fundamentality” as regards “similarity”-essentiality, is not about causal priority.
Physics is not philosophy, and philosophy can only specify that physics be consistent with itself and with the world as men are given to know it (however convoluted that might be). Otherwise, “hands off!” or “laissez-faire!”.
Philosophy most importantly specifies that physics be consistent with Philosophy.
I will go by your definition of fundamental entity, SK. However, for your questions, I don’t think the level of decomposition matters here. Whether decomposition is possible for a given object wouldn’t alter my answers.
When you say action here as “whose only defining features are the entity performing it and the entity it is being performed on”, that may be best described as “unary action”, or what I’d describe as which actions come from and are only due to the entity itself. “Being performed on” is unclear, it still leads us to your question 4.
Why boil down an entity to only its actions? I mean, how does it help to also get rid of characteristics like shape for example? Although that is fine to do if you want to analyze the concept of causality, which requires abstracting away the details like shape. Either way, the identity of every entity would certainly come down to what it does in all possible circumstances. I agree with this. (I’ve argued elsewhere before that this would work even for anything with volition.)
Self-generated action is only one kind of “acting on itself”. Self-generated here refers to the actions of animals or plants, i.e. biology. Discovering “self-caused” properties for fundamental entities I think would be a matter of special science, i.e. physics. In principle, they can.
Strictly speaking, if you suspect Objectivism requires a strange take on logic, this wouldn’t be it. A -> B. B -> C. A -> C. That is, we know if A is true, then C is true if the whole statement is to be true. So if A acts, C will necessarily act as well. But it can’t specify that every sense of the word “cause” is transitive. You didn’t define direct, I don’t even think transitivity would be called “direct”. If you use the word “cause” in an unqualified sense, then yes, A necessarily acts on C with B as the means. But this wouldn’t qualify for “unary action” I spelled out above because more than one entity is involved in getting C to act.
I agree with the absurdities you pointed out. But I don’t think it shows that fundamental entities should have no properties besides their action functions. It makes me wonder, can what you call an action function also include things like shape which have a bearing on how entities act in the first place? Clearly, that is discoverable through observation. In other words, you could conclude that all characteristics of an entity, if the characteristics are real, will have a bearing on their actions. Even if they only differ in size, that too will lead to at least one difference in action if you put them through all possible identical circumstances.
Suppose that fundamental entities have an inherent characteristic of shape. Suppose that this shape can only be one of two, cube or sphere.
It is possible to decompose such an entity into two entities with no shape.
This generalizes to any collection of characteristics with any possible number of values.
Suppose that fundamental entities have an inherent characteristic of shape. Suppose that this shape can only be one of two, cube or sphere.
It is possible to decompose such an entity into two entities with no shape.
This generalizes to any collection of characteristics with any possible number of values.
But you said fundamental entities cannot be decomposed further. The point I’m making is that for an action function to exist, its corresponding entity must have some physical extension. Otherwise, what is even acting?
But you said fundamental entities cannot be decomposed further.
Yes, fundamental entities without shape cannot be decomposed further, but “fundamental” entities with shape can which is why they aren’t fundamental.
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The point I’m making is that for an action function to exist, its corresponding entity must have some physical extension. Otherwise, what is even acting?
I don’t see why we should assume that physical extension is a pre-condition for action. Physical extension may, however, be a necessary consequence of entities and their actions, though.
Okay, so you’re saying if they had shape, they wouldn’t really be fundamental. I’m not seeing a reason to say all you have left at the bottom are actions. Disembodied actions at that, because there are literally no other characteristics. -What- acts? It’s sort of like Cartesian dualism. If the mind is non-physical all the way down, how does the mind act on the physical world?
I’d put it this way. I wouldn’t say physical extension is a pre-condition of acting. Rather, “to be is to do” AND “to do is to be”. If an entity is to exist, it must exhibit action, i.e. an identity. If an action is real, something must exhibit it with physical extension. It’s not as though some entities don’t act. Any further decomposition makes it so the entity ceases to exist. It would be annihilated. Or you’d need to propose that ghosts exist, which gets absurd fast.
Okay, so you’re saying if they had shape, they wouldn’t really be fundamental. I’m not seeing a reason to say all you have left at the bottom are actions. Disembodied actions at that, because there are literally no other characteristics. -What- acts? It’s sort of like Cartesian dualism. If the mind is non-physical all the way down, how does the mind act on the physical world?
At “the bottom” are fundamental entities, not actions. No action is disembodied. Every action has an entity that acts and an entity which is acted on. I don’t see any need for characteristics.
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I’d put it this way. I wouldn’t say physical extension is a pre-condition of acting. Rather, “to be is to do” AND “to do is to be”. If an entity is to exist, it must exhibit action, i.e. an identity.
I agree.
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If an action is real, something must exhibit it with physical extension.
That does not follow. If an action is real, something must exhibit that action, but it is not necessarily true that that thing must have physical extension.
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It’s not as though some entities don’t act. Any further decomposition makes it so the entity ceases to exist. It would be annihilated. Or you’d need to propose that ghosts exist, which gets absurd fast.
Looking more closely at your definition of action function, I see you didn’t specify how the resulting set of entities is constructed. How do you decide if ‘x’ has acted upon an entity? You’d need to say how or what qualifies ‘x’ for acting.
So far, you’ve said the action cannot be disembodied. We agree that an entity is required. Next, you go on to say entities should have no properties besides action functions. That much is okay, since at root an identity is what entities are and do. However, I want to add “physical extension” because you also need what enables doing. That is, there are characteristics of ‘x’ in your action function, something that does actions. ‘X’ at least has physical extension or it doesn’t. If it does, right there is one required characteristic. If it doesn’t, ‘x’ is not real, or a “ghost”, or an abstraction, or a feeling. Since you said no action is disembodied, you should agree that option two doesn’t work.
"Any further decomposition from what? "
I misread something, forget that part.
