Questions About Entities and Actions

Metaphysics and Epistemology
1

Peikoff, in OPAR, p. 13

Quote

First, however, I must offer some clarification in regard to the concept of “entity.” Since it is axiomatic, the referents of this concept can be specified only ostensively, by pointing to the things given to men in sense perception. In this case, one points to solid things with a perceivable shape, such as a rock, a person, or a table. By extension from this primary sense, “entity” may be used in various contexts to denote a vast array of existents, such as the solar system, General Motors, or the smallest subatomic particle. But all “entities” like these are reducible ultimately to combinations, components, or distinguishable aspects of “entities” in the primary sense.

So which entities are fundamental? Are fundamental entities more like people, rocks, and chairs, or are they more like subatomic particles?

I think that they are more like subatomic particles.

On p.14 he says,

Quote

In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.

What constitues the circumstances which determine the action of a given entity?

Since the world consists only of entities and their actions, I think that the most reasonable answer is that the circumstances under which the action of an entity is completely determined consists only of the entities which act on the entity in question “just before” it performs its action.

But there are a few questions we need to consider.

  1. Can an entity act on itself?

  2. Can a fundamental entity act on itself?

  3. If one entity acts on another, is it true that the other also acts on the first?

  4. If entity A acts on entity B and entity B acts on C, does A act on C?

EDIT:

Oh and one final question, do actions exist in the same sense that entities do?

2

1 hour ago, SpookyKitty said:

So which entities are fundamental? Are fundamental entities more like people, rocks, and chairs, or are they more like subatomic particles?

I think that they are more like subatomic particles.

The answer is found in the meaning of the concept fundamental. That means irreducible, not made as a result of integration of other entities into a new whole. Both fundamental entities and rocks are instances of “1” regardless of whether they resulted from _ integration.  _Your previous error was precisely treating fundamentals as “0” (“nothing”).

1 hour ago, SpookyKitty said:

  1. Can an entity act on itself?

  2. Can a fundamental entity act on itself?

  3. If one entity acts on another, is it true that the other also acts on the first?

  4. If entity A acts on entity B and entity B acts on C, does A act on C?

EDIT:

Oh and one final question, do actions exist in the same sense that entities do?

1). If it the kind of entity that does have self generated action (LIVING ORGANISM), certainly. Do other entities act on themselves? Depends on how broadly you define “self generated action”

2). See above

3). That is called an “interaction”

4). This is the reason Aristotle developed different causation types. To attempt to deal with these types of contextual questions.

5). That is difficult to answer due to the ambiguity possible because of the axiomatic nature of the concept “existence”. They both “exist” but actions are entity dependent, causally.

3
  1. I don’t see why not. There is a such thing as recursive functions and they work. That is, to make it concrete, the action of an entity can change the environment, which then could lead to the entity responding to that action it performed.  

2)  Depending on what you mean by fundamental entity, I don’t see why this in principle can’t be. I can’t even think of a counter example (unless we are to assume a fundamental entity is void of any properties whatsoever, which would have already contradicted entity-base causation that Objectivism uses).

  1. Sure. If you say something like “the red ball caused the blue ball to roll away”, that would just be you focusing on the red ball as a subject. On a primary entity level, there isn’t anything else to speak about. Once you advance in such a way that you are looking for a narrower look at how this occurs, you would be able to recognize that there are certain things the blue ball also does to the red ball. From there, you would just look at which actions originates in which entity.

  2. Do you mean act on directly? Then no. If the red ball pushes the blue ball, which then pushes the green ball, clearly the red ball was not acting directly on to the green ball.  If you mean indirectly, then yes. Clearly the red ball had to act upon the blue ball in order to cause the green ball to roll. In that way, the red ball caused the green ball to roll.

  3. Not in an identical sense. I mean, an action can only exist insofar as there is a tangible thing to embody the action. Something like a function. ‘x’ exists. f(x) can only happen (i.e. be actual and real) as long as there is an ‘x’.

Plasmatic, isn’t this sense of fundamental you are speaking of in an epistemic angle? You said “not made as a result of integration of other entities” which would sound like abstraction, when things like atoms are not abstractions. I am not sure if SK is speaking of here about being metaphysically irreducible, or epistemologically irreducible, but I think metaphysically irreducible is the point.

Specifically in the given Peikoff quote, only primary entities are spoken of. Primary in that sense was immediately available to your perception. This would not indicate that primary entities are metaphysically fundamental, only that they are fundamental to your recognizing those other existents. If they were metaphysically fundamental, that sounds like observer based metaphysics to me.

For quick reference that also defines what “primary” means in this context: http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/entity.html

4

37 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Plasmatic, isn’t this sense of fundamental you are speaking of in an epistemic angle? You said “not made as a result of integration of other entities” which would sound like abstraction, when things like atoms are not abstractions. I am not sure if SK is speaking of here about being metaphysically irreducible, or epistemologically irreducible, but I think metaphysically irreducible is the point.

No Louie, integration is here a metaphysical term. Ms. Rand used the terms “welded together physically” to refer to the singular status of being a “whole” as against a collection of “parts”.

 

5

33 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Specifically in the given Peikoff quote, only primary entities are spoken of. Primary in that sense was immediately available to your perception. This would not indicate that primary entities are metaphysically fundamental, only that they are fundamental to your recognizing those other existents. If they were metaphysically fundamental, that sounds like observer based metaphysics to me.

Objectivism considers entities as the “only metaphysical primaries” and the cause of action. You are simply not taking the whole context of what Oism says about entities as primaries and that is the cause of your many year long confusion of metaphysics and epistemology in relation to entities.. EDIT: Entities are perceptual primaries because there is nothing else to observe! Even regarding the discovery of fundamental constituents Ms Rand agrees you have to bring it back to the perceptual.

Quote

When you talk about discovering the ultimate constituents of the universe, remember that in order to discover them, no matter by what calculations or by what machinery, you had to bring them to your perceptual level. You would have to say “this particle” is that which acts in such and such a way on subatomic particles, which act in such and such a way on atoms, which act in such and such a way on molecules, and all of that results in a material object such as this glass as distinguished from other material objects such as this ashtray. Unless you bring it back to the perceptual level, it’s not knowledge. That is what has to be kept in mind always in speculating about ultimate causes, which have to be discovered by some, at present, unknown means. You still always have to bring it back to your sensory-perceptual level, otherwise it’s not knowledge.

 

6

3 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

Objectivism considers entities as the “only metaphysical primaries” and the cause of action.

This would sound like observer-based metaphysics which I don’t think Objectivism is or aims to be. I mean, I explained the issue I see in what you said, you’re welcome to show I’m wrong or to clarify. The only confusion here is what you mean (that’s exactly why I am asking).

7

Just now, Eiuol said:

This would sound like observer-based metaphysics which I don’t think Objectivism is or aims to be. I mean, I explained the issue I see in what you said, you’re welcome to show I’m wrong or to clarify. The only confusion here is what you mean (that’s exactly why I am asking).

I don’t understand what the above is saying.

8

I’m referring to all of my post after I said “Plasmatic”, as in the very last paragraph I wrote in my first post. It’s problematic to me what you were saying. I saw the quote you posted. Yes, they are perceptual primaries, that’s all the quote shows. Says nothing about metaphysically irreducible. Just to clarify, especially with regard to SK’s questions, would you explain more what precisely metaphysically irreducible is?

EDIT: “observer-based” as in dependent upon what the observer sees on the perceptual level

9

20 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

I’m referring to all of my post after I said “Plasmatic”, as in the very last paragraph I wrote in my first post. It’s problematic to me what you were saying. I saw the quote you posted. Yes, they are perceptual primaries, that’s all the quote shows. Says nothing about metaphysically irreducible. Just to clarify, especially with regard to SK’s questions, would you explain more what precisely metaphysically irreducible is?

You keep playing this game. I already did"clarify" that I am not referring to “abstraction” by saying “No Louie, integration is here a metaphysical term.”. Your “sounds like abstraction” is a question about what I meant by “integration”. You require no more clarity than my express denial of what you thought it “sounded like”. I have quoted the relevant other excerpts many times over the years and you still respond as though you have no idea what Rand has to say on metaphysical primaries! Shall I point you to the many posts where I have pointed out the direct quotes about metaphysical primaries that you keep pretending doesn’t exist?

 

What does “observer based metaphysics” mean?

Edit:

What more can I say about metaphysically irreducible than “not made as a result of integration of other entities into a new whole.”?

10

@Plasmatic

@Eiuol

I’ll respond to your other posts as soon as I can, but wouldn’t it be a good idea to draw a distinction between metaphysical and conceptual primaries? Isn’t it possible that metaphysical primaries are not conceptually primary?

11

SK, the referents of all epistemic primaries are metaphysical primaries. Louie doesn’t understand this. 

All “perceptual” primaries are the result of metaphysically given facts.  The fact that there is nothing mind independent but entities. There is nothing optional about first level concepts. That part of epistemic hierarchy is metaphysically constrained.

12

3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:

So which entities are fundamental? Are fundamental entities more like people, rocks, and chairs, or are they more like subatomic particles?

I think that they are more like subatomic particles.

Another quote from OPAR you may find relevant to your inquiry is toward the end of page 44.

The task of identifying the nature of physical objects as they are apart from man’s form of perception does not belong to philosophy, but to physics. There is no philosophic method of discovering the fundamental attributes of matter; there is only the scientist’s method of specialized observation, experimentation, and inductive inference. Whatever such attributes turn out to be, however, they have no philosophic significance, neither in regard to metaphysics nor to epistemology.

Fundamentals in philosophy are used to induce philosophic principles. In physics, they are used to induce principles  regarding matter. Philosophic principles can help guide the physicist in his study of matter, but the discoveries in physics have no philosophic significance.

13

Philosophy does dictate to physics however, that it cannot violate metaphysical principles. What is meant by “fundamental entity” is not a physics question. What qualities those fundamental entities have, is a physics question. Notice that quote does pressuppose that what is “apart from mans form of perception”, is “objects”.

14

Plasmatic,

I interjected that because of SpookyKitty’s effort to superpose subatomic particles (a physics investigation of the fundamental attributes of matter) over top of or in contrast to, a string or list of first level concepts. 

Even to consider an atom as fundamentally an entity, physics had to integrate the data from many disparate areas to arrive at the atomic theory, as explored in both The Logical Leap, by David Harriman and the parallel audio presentation of Induction in Physics and Philosophy, by Leonard Peikoff.

 

15

1 hour ago, Plasmatic said:

You keep playing this game. I already did"clarify" that I am not referring to “abstraction”

I know you’re not, so I stopped talking about abstraction and focused on metaphysically primary. But then you gave me a quote about validating knowledge via a perceptual primary, which is what I meant by “epistemologically irreducible”. Or “conceptual primary” might make more sense because validating knowledge certainly goes to a perceptual primary. That might not work either, since “conceptual primary” would sound like it is abstract, which it’s not. So I’ll stick to “perceptual primary”. Doesn’t make sense to call it metaphysically irreducible. This part also answers you, SK.

The bit about “welded at the parts” makes sense, but rather than argue who meant what, I will phrase it as a question. To what extent is it dependent on your position as an observer? If you were, say, Ant Man, what is perceptually primary is different than what it would be for me. Or if atoms were your perceptual primary, that would mean metaphysically primary is agent-relative. This is what I mean by “observer-based”.

I mostly get what you mean by metaphysical primaries, Plasmatic, but I don’t really see your explanation being specifically what Rand stated. In any case, it’s worth pointing out that we didn’t even disagree about the answer for 1 to 5.

16

@Eiuol

@Plasmatic

I will respond to your answers to the 5 questions jointly, because you both seem to have given the same answers.

So first off, by “fundamental entity” I mean, not an entity which is most directly perceived, but the kind of entity which cannot be decomposed into any further entities. From now on, whenever I say “entity” I mean “fundamental entity” unless otherwise stated.

By “action” I mean, the kind of action which occurs between fundamental entities. That is, the kind of action which is not “direct” or “indirect”, but whose only defining features are the entity performing it and the entity it is being performed on.

What I mean may be clearer if I state my intent with regard to these definitions. What I ultimately want to do is “boil down” the concept of fundamental entity so that it has no characteristics apart from its actions. That is, the identity of every entity should come down to only what it does under all possible circumstances (“the circumstance of an entity” meaning that which is determined solely by the collection of entities that are acting upon the entity in question).

Some further questions.

  1. Since you both accept that a fundamental entity can act on itself, and Plasmatic furthermore thinks that all such “self-generated action” is a property of living things, then does that mean that fundamental entities which can act on themselves are living things?

  2. You both seem to deny that actions between entities are transative. What I was asking in the original question was whether or not it is the case that if A acts directly on B and if B acts directly on C, then does A necessarily act directly on C? (Note that there should be no fundamental distinctions among actions between fundamental entities other than whatever entities they act upon.

Now let me explain the motivation for my definition of the identity of an entity as what it does under every possible circumsance. Mathematically, if x is the set of entities currently acting on the given entity, then f(x) is the set of entities that the given entity will act upon “right after”, Call this, the entity’s “action function”.

I’m sure you will both agree that the identity of any entity is, at least in principle, completely knowable. The way we determine the identity of an entity in this scheme is to take the entity and then systematically put it under every possible circumstance and see what it does. In order to be consistent with the law of identity, the same entity should always perform the same action under the same circumstances.

Now if entities had inherent characteristics apart from their action functions, then it is possible that two distinct entities could perform the same actions under all possible circumstances and fail to be identical. The inherent characteristcs would then not be discoverable through any possible observation. I am sure you will both agree that this is absurd. So therefore, entities should have no properties besides their action functions.

Yay or nay?

 

17

In your last paragraph, do you mean the distinct entities would be performing identical actions in identical situations? I wasn’t sure I read it correctly.

18

25 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

In your last paragraph, do you mean the distinct entities would be performing identical actions in identical situations? I wasn’t sure I read it correctly.

Yes. I’m saying that it is possible that two distinct entities could have the same actions under the same circumstance for all possible circumstances.

19

DW said:

Quote

Even to consider an atom as fundamentally an entity, physics had to integrate the data from many disparate areas to arrive at the atomic theory, as explored in both The Logical Leap, by David Harriman and the parallel audio presentation of Induction in Physics and Philosophy, by Leonard Peikoff

Do you happen to know where this is claimed in either reference, that the axiomatic concept entity had to be induced as relates to the instantiation of it in atoms? 

The very idea is ridiculous. Imagine If one said we have to run an experiment to verify if atoms have identity…

 

20

Louie said:

Quote

I know you’re not, so I stopped talking about abstraction and focused on metaphysically primary.

No, you need to review your own sequence of comments.  You made one post and I asked for clarity. You clarified you were referring to your “last paragraph” after “Plasmatic”. You stated “I explained the issue with what you said” in your next post following the “Plasmatic” paragraph and then you asked for me to “clarify”.  In that sequence of posts I already did clarify what you asked about. 

I’ll address the rest tonight.