By the way, to avoid confusion, by “language” I do not mean symbols or sounds even, but simply a set of rules… I’m not sure what else I would term it.
I think you need to maintain a distinction between facts, which are mind-independent, and rules, which are mental integrations (conceptualizations) of patterns or relationships between facts. Take the example you used, of two spheres bouncing off each other. In reality, you have the fact of two spheres interacting in a certain way. You observe that. You observe other entities interacting, and you see similarities between those other interactions and that of the two spheres. You conceptualize the similarity as “collision”.
I think a lot of the problem is that I’m starting from a different context than objectivism and I did not see that at first. As one poster said, I am starting from a point termed “rationalism”. With my lack of experience I confused the two philosophies.
“Rationalism” in the sense I used it isn’t so much a philosophy as a way of thinking. There are numerous philosophers who have used rationalistic methods but who vary widely in their substantive content. Plato used rationalistic argument. So did Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza and Descartes. But their philosophies are very different in content.
You can think of rationalism as a philosophical method which focuses on concepts while turning away from reality. Rationalists love to build abstract castles in the sky, but have trouble connecting them to the actual world we experience through sense perception. Rationalism is contrasted with two other approaches, ‘empiricism’ and ‘objectivism’. Empiricism is basically the flip side of rationalism – a focus on facts and sense perception, grasped discretely without benefit of conceptualization. Objectivism is a blending – a focus on reality as grasped through concepts. (Or, conversely, concepts as grounded in reality.)
You should also be aware that the Objectivist use of ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ is somewhat ideosyncratic in the history of philosophy. If you see the terms used in a standard philosophy text they will have a somewhat different meaning. I point this out so you won’t be confused if and when that happens.
I believe objectivists essentially start from Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” point? Their consciousness and perception precedes everything. Their constant experience and perception IS existence, they need no definition, it simply IS. Existence simply IS because they perceive/identify/are conscious; existence is what they perceive. Do I have this correct?
Not exactly, although given the earlier posts in the thread I can see why you would think so. One difference between the Cartesian approach and the Objectivist one is that Descartes accepted what we today call the prior certainty of consciousness. This is the idea that we know consciousness before we know existence. Objectivism rejects this. All consciousness is consciousness of something. We must be aware of something external to consciousness before we can be aware of ourselves as conscious. The famous passage from Rand laying out her approach to the axioms is:
Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists.
If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness.
Whatever the degree of your knowledge, these two—existence and consciousness—are axioms you cannot escape, these two are the irreducible primaries implied in any action you undertake, in any part of your knowledge and in its sum, from the first ray of light you perceive at the start of your life to the widest erudition you might acquire at its end. Whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the axioms remain the same: that it exists and that you know it.
To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of nonexistence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter what his errors —the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.
Moving on.
I do not think this technically disagrees with objectivist philosophy, I hope that it merely clarifies. I do not see a way around distinguishing independent and dependent existents (entities?) if one is to maintain objectivity. I also do not see any reason that making this distinction interferes with the current core of objectivist philosophy.
Hmm. I think the distinction you are drawing between mind-independent and mind-dependent existents is the same as the distinction in early modern philosophy between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities were held to exist independent of our awareness of them – shape and size are the canonical examples, or perhaps atomic structure in the modern world. Secondary qualities were held to be dependent on our awareness. Examples included color and temperature.
This distinction led to many problems in philosophy. Primary qualities were held to be ‘out there’, in reality, but the metaphysical status of secondary qualities was a tangled knot. Where is the ‘redness’. It can’t be ‘out there’, because if consciousness goes away then the redness goes away. But if it’s in the mind, then color is subjective – it’s an illusion, something we create because of the nature of our minds, not real.
Objectivism rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, for reasons I don’t want to go into now because I have to go to work. I think Peikoff’s discussion of this in chapter 2 of Objectivism would be illuminating, particular the section on “The Metaphysical Status of Sensory Qualities”. You might also look into The Evidence of the Senses by David Kelley.