I am posting a paper I wrote for a graduate-level philosophy class that I audited. The course was about using and acquiring evidence, with a lot of discussion about evidence of the senses. It is intended for an academic audience, but I hope it’s readable for anyone. I’m interested in comments and objections. I’ll be posting it in three parts. For the most part, the paper is about I thought experiment I came up with.
Capacities Meet Evidence and Rationality
If two people hold identical evidence, will they both have only one rationally permissible attitude towards a given situation? Absolutely – it couldn’t be any other way. To hold identical evidence implies that the two people are also identical in all relevant ways. It follows that what’s rational for one is rational for the other with that same evidence. Claiming otherwise is to suggest that sometimes, rationality is an individual decision, a belief as trite as the phrase “one man’s trash is another man’s treasure”, ultimately making rationality a subjective matter. This wouldn’t be rational at all, as whim or desire would then determine rationality, when the whole purpose of rationality is to find out what is the case in reality. So much for any philosophical problem.
But such an argument is apparently ignorant of any and all developments of modern epistemology. Isn’t holding identical evidence a matter of the belief in question, not a matter of what type of entity holds the belief? If evidence - some reason to entitle a belief or attitude - is a basis for a belief, then its validity doesn’t depend on where the evidence came from. In this way, evidence is disinterested, necessarily not a consequence of an agent’s perspective. While an agent is able to enjoy the fruits of evidence by means of his nature, the tree of reality from which the apple of knowledge grows is not sustained by anything the agent does. That is, how an agent acquires evidence may lead them to epistemic goods, but evidence itself is separable from the agent. Such theories of epistemology are primacy of evidence, where evidence is considered to be a first consideration and the agent’s capacities at best second [1]. Anyone with a view that capacities are not primary would find my earlier argument to be missing the point, since I am making evidence agent-relative, therefore undermining my own concern over subjectivity. The fact is, because evidence is not determined by a capacity of an agent, being identical in all ways isn’t necessary to hold identical evidence. Stated differently, I’m still not answering the question since there are many ways to hold identical evidence. Accordingly, I still left room for capacities being the very reason multiple rational attitudes may be permissible. They are fallible, so even if they are reliable, they might not be able to apprehend evidence to a degree that is fine enough for a single rational attitude.
I don’t grant this line of argument. My brief argument should be plenty for my conclusion – but only by first changing the notion of what evidence even is. I distinguish my view as one where evidence is created by an agent, not just discovered. When capacities are a more basic consideration than evidence, then there is nowhere else for evidence to arise except for the agent’s capacities built to fulfill his needs. As a consequence, evidence is interested. Interestedness comes from the actor himself, his capacities establishing evidence so that he can act rationally, making evidence itself only ever a product of capacities. But without those capacities, evidence just wouldn’t exist. Agent-relativity of this sort doesn’t result in subjective standards of rationality or truth, so long as the capacities successfully operate in a normative way to strive for orienting the agent to reality, i.e. provide a relation with reality. In fact, it leads to strict normative standards of rationality that specify exactly one rational attitude towards a situation. The reason for this is that capacities by nature provide exactly one attitude for the agent to hold towards a situation that is determinate and never vague or probabilistic. When rationality is a normative standard used by capacities to establish determinacy, and has algorithmic rules, it follows that an agent would only have one permissible rational attitude – a singular rational attitude is present iff a capacity successfully uses rationality.
Premised on interested evidence, determinacy relies on the agent’s relation to the environment and his needs in the environment. If evidence is primary instead of the capacities, then determinacy can still rely on the agent’s relation to the environment, but the agent’s needs or limitations of his capacities may sometimes be an obstacle to evidence. For instance, if the figure in the woods is in fact a bear walking on two legs, but I mistake it as bigfoot, my evidence of it being bigfoot is absent (it is false that it’s bigfoot, so there will never be real evidence to say otherwise) or indeterminate (I can’t tell one way or another if it’s bigfoot or a bear, so I can’t track the truth well). In both ways, the agent’s capacity limitations prevent attaining evidence at full depth. The evidence is deformed or only a seeming. With a capacity limitation, there is room for multiple rational attitudes, entailing that a capacity can provide multiple valid outputs. The whole picture changes when evidence is interested. When capacities create evidence, it is by using information that a capacity already has, such as a vague figure of bigfoot. The inputs used by capacities are at exactly enough detail to determine which type of attitude needs to be held towards the figure, because evidence is in terms of what I need to accomplish in my environment as I apprehend it through my capacities - whether that goal is to flee, or to find bigfoot and take a picture with him.
However, only one attitude can be chosen at a time by a capacity, so disentangling what may be determined as rational by a capacity from what is chosen as rational is difficult. Historically, Aristotle figured out his theory of virtue by observing people seen as virtuous then analyzing which actions and attitudes make them identifiably virtuous [2]. I want to do a similar analysis, by observing what rational agents do, then analyzing how evidence makes them identifiably rational. But I can’t use observation in as a direct way as Aristotle, since it’s not possible to directly observe a rational agent in repeated identical situations. I want to know if more than one rational attitude is permissible, not just coarse principles of rationality.
Looking at how capacities function makes it possible to indirectly figure out how attitudes arise. By knowing principles that a capacity uses, I can determine if the capacity really leaves room for multiple rational attitudes. Decision theory and computer science operate on similar methods of taking a procedure and extrapolating how it would operate in contexts that don’t exist yet. The methodology works for proposed situations, not just situations that exist right now. For my analysis, then, I propose a thought experiment where a rational agent faces identical situations.
Vladmir the Soldier
From a distance, Vladmir sees a distant object slowly flying in his direction. His heart begins to beat faster – it might be a missile, and he is the only one able to act fast enough to shoot it down with his anti-missile launcher before it impacts. This is the very reason the warzone brings so much internal conflict in his life, but it is a necessary conflict. Political change wouldn’t be able to happen unless all people supported it.
Being in an area of constant conflict in the Ukraine, he spent a lot of time looking for anything suspicious in the sky, especially missiles. This looks different than a missile, though. Vladmir notices that it isn’t as long as a missile, but the shape is similar. He knows he doesn’t have more than a few seconds to think about it – probably 20 seconds at most. Shooting down a passenger jet would cause an international outcry, when all he wants to do is protect his town. An arbitrary choice wouldn’t help, certainly not when he wants his side to win the war. After all, Vladmir is a rational man; he doesn’t desire to act on mere impulse as a skunk would towards a threatening bear. He reasons that the object would not be a civilian target, nor would it be a missile. It was not operating like either, as it looked like it was starting to fly clockwise, not straight.
There is no maybe for Vladmir. He feels unsure about finer details like precise length and shape, and he can’t identify in words what he’s looking at definitively. But he is absolutely sure that the rational attitude to take is that the object is a real threat. In a warzone, Vladmir knows that only the right attitude can get him out in one piece – physically and psychically. He fires the anti-missile launcher and watches his target explode.
Suppose the events in Vladmir’s life repeated for eternity, identically up to the second paragraph. No changes whatsoever. Being a rational man, would he want to do otherwise – would he still be rational if he reached a different attitude towards his evidence?
Eternal Recurrence
Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence is first explained at the end of The Gay Science, mentioned earlier in the book only briefly as characterizing the man of renunciation’s values [3] and plays a major role as the main idea addressed in his next book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The aphorism “the greatest weight” [4] explains eternal recurrence as a poetic proposition towards the reader to imagine the tremendous weight he or she would feel if they were told that their life would repeat in every way, great and small; that the hourglass of life would be flipped over and over again and occur just as before, for eternity. Perhaps one would feel dread, or perhaps one would feel a love for their fate, embracing their choices in totality. Nietzsche used the introspective power of this hypothetical to reach towards radically new ways to look at life and morality.
However, it also reflects an epistemological question as well: if a person were to repeat their life, would that also mean every personal attitude would be the same? Whether it is the man of renunciation, the Chinaman of Konigsberg [5] or the ubermensch, Nietzsche seems to think so, and comes up with the will to power as an explanation. But what about the rational man? And more, what options were available to the rational man? These types of epistemological questions are not lost on Nietzsche. In an aphorism not long before the eternal recurrence, he questions that rationality is able to apply equally to all people because no situation can ever truly be exactly the same; every action is done in a unique way [6]. But it is a response to the Kantian categorical imperative’s sense of rationality rather than rationality per se, and Nietzsche still probably wonders what the best type [7] of man would do, which is especially applicable if recurrence happened to him. Nietzsche uses eternal recurrence as a way to look at individuals and their attitudes towards life. If the rational man is seen as a type of man, in terms of the types of capacities he employs, then coarse principles of reason can still result in specific, singular attitudes for his unique situation. No one would hold an identical attitude as another unless they really were exactly the same person, but being a type of individual, the rational man would continually end up with the same attitudes in recurrence.