Reification and Suicide

1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

I’d like to narrow our focus to the time period in which the person is acting on the choice to die.

To be very honest, I feel as though this is becoming a touch fussy and technical. Especially given what seems to be a fair amount of concord between our basic positions. If it turns out that we agree that “pain matters” (or more broadly, “facts matter”) right up to some point of x-length before actual death, then that’s agreement enough for me – on this day, at least.

But since I’ve enjoyed talking with you thus far, I won’t mind another post or two to see if we can better flesh out even this point. Maybe it will provide grist for someone else’s mill. Or who knows, maybe we can blow Objectivism up into new and exciting sects! :slight_smile:

1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

Maynard moved to Oregon and got her pills in preparation for the choice to die. But wasn’t she still choosing to live at that point? Indeed, wasn’t she choosing to live right up until she decided enough was enough and took the pills?

An interesting bit of business here.

I would say that once Maynard has “chosen to die,” that she is no longer “choosing to live”… or at least, not in the same sense we normally mean. In moving to Oregon and getting her pills and so forth, she is taking concrete steps towards death – and her essay is evidence that this is her clear intention. It is equally clear that she still has many values (including valuing control over the circumstances and timing of her death), and I consider this related to my understanding of “life-as-experience” being the true standard of value as opposed to “life-as-survival,” yet I am uncomfortable in describing this as “choosing to live,” again, in the sense that we typically mean.

It is as though we imagine Kurt Cobain, or someone else, buying the shotgun… buying the shells… writing his suicide note… meticulously loading the gun…

…and we say, “Yeah, but until he pulls the trigger, he’s choosing to live!”

There’s something that’s just not right about that.

1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

After she took the pills and was waiting to die, what if she suddenly developed a pain in her leg? Would it have mattered to her?

Hmm. How long do the pills take to cause death? What’s the nature of the pain (e.g. how intense is it? how easily can this pain be remedied)? How do the pills operate – is there an analgesic or soporific effect? Etc…

But let’s try to get past those sorts of details. Imagine a man set to die by firing squad. (To keep apples as close to apples as possible, let us say that this is his preferred method of suicide: he has arranged for everything and stands there willingly.) His hands are not bound, and… he has an itch on his nose.

Supposing death to happen at the instant the triggers are pulled, at what point up to that moment will the man not bother to scratch his itch? Perhaps you, or anyone else, might have another answer… but mine? I would scratch my nose at any instant up to the very last. Because all else being equal, I would prefer to have a scratched nose to an itchy one.

So I would say that “facts matter” so long as a person is able to make choices which can affect his experience of life, even if that experience of life reflects the very last few moments of life en route to death (whether that death is self-selected or not).

Or consider your spy, Sarah Aaronsohn. According to what you’d written in the other thread, she committed suicide by shooting herself in the head so as to not betray any secrets. Well, suppose (as sometimes happens in reality) that she flubbed the shot a bit. She shot herself so that she will die… but not immediately. There will be a bleeding out first, which might take as much as a few minutes, during which she will be conscious and subject to a final, frenzied questioning. In those few minutes – “after she pulled the trigger and was waiting to die” – will she be willing to betray her comrades, because “nothing matters”? I don’t think so.

The experience of life yet matters to her (in this case, in what you’d termed elsewhere as a “final psychological satisfaction”), for howsoever long she has life. And if the experience of life matters to her, then so too do facts.

On 12/20/2016 at 8:43 PM, DonAthos said:

This reflects a common – but mistaken – Objectivist understanding, in my opinion:

That understanding is that the desire to live (or to die) is “pre-moral” and consequently amoral. One cannot argue to choose life or death, that one is better than the other, but only that, when one chooses life (howsoever this is managed, left as a mystery), we can then develop/assess an ethics to help one achieve it.

So if one has chosen death (or otherwise rejected “life as the standard,” which is held to amount to the same thing), there are no more ethics to discuss. A funny thing, that, almost like a loophole. Any apparently “immoral” behavior can be reassessed as “amoral,” if it’s concluded that the actor does not hold life as the standard of his ethical choices; if the actor doesn’t seek life in the first place, then how could his actions be said to be “wrong” by that standard?

In other words, it is as “good” for Maynard to end her life quietly, surrounded by the people she loves, as it is for her to detonate a nuclear device in the middle of town, surrounded by the people she loves. We suppose these to be equivalent – equally amoral (or immoral) – because neither allow for her survival, which is what all moral action is supposed to be oriented towards.

Yet I don’t agree with this understanding. I believe that it removes “whim” from the whole of ethical decision making only to return it to the very heart. Rather, I believe that men intrinsically want life, which relies upon, but is broader than, “survival.” Life is instead the experience of living, in totality. And we are able to conceive of the good, ultimately, accounting to that which I’d discussed earlier: that pleasure is positive (that which we desire; that which draws us) and pain negative (that which we wish to avoid; that which repels us), according to the nature of what we are. We know “good” because we have experienced pleasure; we know “evil” due to pain. We can then conceptualize these pleasures and pains long term, and over the course of a human life, and we can assess our calculations emotionally, resulting in “happiness” and “sadness.”

What we want is positive experience: happiness and pleasure and every other variant on that theme, and as much of it as we can get, for as long as we can. Negative experience also exists, and we seek to avoid it in like fashion.

I consequently believe that men always have a self-interest, which is to maximize this experience of life, making it as “positive” as possible, given our context, and that “the good” is that which serves our self-interest. The trick is to discover the nature/mechanism of this self-interest and how best to achieve it, and our means for doing this is reason. I believe that the rest of the Objectivist Ethics roughly follow. (And further, that this accounts for apparent “contradictions” within, such as an apparent allowance for suicide in certain scenarios, a willingness for “self-sacrifice” to save certain loved ones from destruction, and etc. These cannot be understood when we hold “survival” alone as the standard of value, but they can be understood when we conceive of “life” in terms of maximizing our experience of it.)

I agree with almost everything above. Actually, it’s the best summary of Egoism that I’ve seen, to date. That “good” and “evil” are ultimately rooted in pleasure and pain, and that the good is to maximize the former; that the choice to live is also a moral choice; that this standard is different from (and superior to) mere survival, is all true.

 

The only point I’m not sure about is whether men intrinsically want to live.

Surely, people intrinsically want to experience pleasure and not pain (that’s a built-in part of what those words mean), but there are so many different ways in which to do that. A desire is not a binary thing; it has an intensity which can vary wildly. Furthermore, even if two men held all of the same values, they could still prioritize them differently (which would still lead them to opposite choices). And to want to experience pleasure and not pain isn’t the same as wanting to flourish, which is a much more specific (and volitional) attitude.

I don’t believe men intrinsically want to live, but I do think they should strive to.

 

On 12/20/2016 at 8:43 PM, DonAthos said:

If they love, if they value, then the immorality is in the knowing that they are destroying that which they love, that which they value (and the concomitant negative emotional experience of this knowing). Immorality, here as everywhere else, is ultimately self harm.

If we posit a person who has no reason to wish to live (let us say due to brain cancer, a la Maynard), and no love for anything else, who finds no value in anything, such that he could watch the world burn and not care… or even take a kind of pleasure in it – and perhaps it is possible to pervert an unfortunate soul so – then there is nothing left to argue against actions which would harm others, is there? (Outside of inventing an eternal hell, and trying to convince them of it, I suppose. :wink: ) Such a person is already so benighted and so lost that further self harm isn’t possible.

At such a point, and with such a being, our recourse is no longer to ethics, but self-defense.

So (if I understand correctly), if Sweeney Todd wants these things then he should want life, but if not then morality sort of ceases to apply and anything goes. We’d defend ourselves against him, of course, and might have to kill him, but we couldn’t really call him a bad guy; his goals were just different from ours.

 

No, there is no Hell to threaten him with, but isn’t he one of the bad guys?

 

You’re right that it depends on the motives which prompted such behavior, and that’s where I think he committed the basic sin which enabled the rest: he gave up.

In the face of pain and adversity, he gave up on ever trying to reach for anything better and devoted the remainder of his existence to - to what? Anger and pain.

Regardless of when or how one eventually dies, one must never give up on life in that way.

 

On 12/20/2016 at 8:43 PM, DonAthos said:

For Maynard, wanting to die (because of pain, or anticipated pain, and etc.) does not mean that there remains nothing else in her self-interest. So long as she lives, and so long as she has the capacity to experience that life (meaning: taking pleasures or pains in it, whether physical or emotional) – regardless of whether she intends her own death – to have a positive experience of life, the most positive experience possible, while possible, remains in her self-interest. There is potentially a world of difference for Maynard between knowing that what she chooses will not harm the ones she loves, versus causing them harm, even in a final few seconds of conscious existence.

And that experience matters. In a sense, it is the only thing that does.

Absolutely.

And right up until her last moment (regardless of when that moment came) she’d have choices to make; there would be alternatives open to her, and it’d be her responsibility to make the most she could of them. Even if this meant nothing more than winning one more game of Chess or formulating a parting statement to someone she cherished, she would still be in charge of the quality of the rest of her own life.

And I don’t think her death would necessarily be a form of surrender or renunciation, depending on how she spent the last of her time.

 


 

Sensory values (such as the physical sensations of pleasure or pain) are built-in and automatic; we all know which of them to pursue and which to avoid. Conceptual values are not; they depend on our conscious convictions, and they aren’t always right. It is possible for people to hate what’s good for them and revel in their own destruction.

We should want to live as men if we want to live at all; the only alternative is oblivion. We should want to live because it’s the only opportunity for joy, beauty or meaning that any of us will ever have; the dead can’t have fun.

The very possibility of goodness, as such, rests on life. We should want the good (whatever extent is possible to us, in whatever form) because it is good.

 

There is no inherent meaning built into life; only what we give it, by the way we spend it. Each of us invents the meaning of his own life (usually not intentionally). To want the best in all things, day after day, is to value your own meaning and your self. To hold onto that desire against hardships and adversity only multiplies your glory when they end but you don’t. 

To give it all up over pain or ugliness is to incorporate that ugliness into your own identity and make it your meaning - and nothing could be uglier than that. When someone says “there is no good” or “it’s just not worth it” it speaks less to the nature of reality than to the nature of their soul.

 

That’s where the bottom of it seems to be. Not in “life, if you want it” nor in “values, if you hold them” but the very possibility of goodness, as such (if there is ever to be such a thing as “the good”).

 

Sorry for all the poetry.

On 12/21/2016 at 9:06 PM, MisterSwig said:

I see three basic positions on this thread:

  1. Pain doesn’t exist. It’s a zero.

  2. Pain exists, but it doesn’t matter.

  3. Pain exists, and it does matter.

Does that about sum it up?

Yes and no.

 

What we’re really discussing is the possibility of happiness. Everyone knows that suicide is moral when that possibility is gone; what we disagree about is where to draw the line that marks it. This is a particularly tricky question because it involves causality, free will, human efficacy, evaluation and a few other things, all tangled up together.

Chronic pain and illness happens to be a convenient example; any situation that diminished the possibility of happiness far enough would work. What’s essentially been argued is:

 

1: anybody can be happy, in any situation

2: anybody can move from any situation to one that allows for happiness

3: some people are just f***ed

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I think you don’t quite realize that some familiar patterns may be due to your own approach.

Believe me, I’m well aware that I contribute to my woes. (And this isn’t about you alone, either.) Probably I contribute in a number of ways, but the nearest at hand that I can recognize is that I allow my own questions to go unanswered and then continue to participate in discussions, answering other peoples’ questions, following their trains of thought, responding to their examples and thought experiments, and etc… So by degrees I grow frustrated at what seems unfair and uneven treatment, but in many respects, I let it happen.

Maybe I just need to become sterner and less accommodating. But I would also appreciate it if you could resolve to answer questions when I pose them to you.

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I know I said that flourishing is good, not survival itself per se. Flourishing and being dead isn’t good or even possible. So as far as three months of living life in comparison to dying willfully, three months matter more.

It is true that “flourishing and being dead” isn’t possible.

I do not agree that this necessarily means that six additional months of life is preferable to three months of life, regardless of the circumstances.

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Then the rest is that if one lives by one’s nature, they will necessarily be flourishing.

I completely disagree with this – and I further believe that this idea of “living by one’s nature” reflects an error that has crept into Objectivist debate in a number of ways (including controversies I know you to be familiar with, such as masculinity/femininity, sexual orientation, and etc.).

Besides which, Brittany Maynard in her last half-year of life with brain cancer, and regardless of whether she opted for suicide or not, can hardly said to have been “flourishing.” That’s just an utter perversion of meaning. (“Yeah, the plants are blighted… but they’re living according to their nature, so really, they’re flourishing!”)

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No one who is virtuous would suffer, by definition.

This. This right here, Eiuol. This is the point at which you need to stop yourself and recognize that you’ve made a colossal mistake, somewhere earlier in the chain of reasoning.

No one who is virtuous would suffer? (“By definition”???) Is it possible that you really believe that Objectivists neither feel pain, nor experience sadness? That cannot be. Can it?

Or consider the Holocaust and all of the suffering it caused (to such a degree, and on such a scope, that it is nigh unimaginable in totality, but do your best) – you would account that suffering to a lack of virtue of the part of the victims?

There must be some part of you that rejects these sorts of conclusions; I have to believe it.

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It just doesn’t fit well to also say virtue won’t always lead to happiness…

“Fit well”? I don’t know about “fitting well.” But I can say that virtuous action will not always lead one to happiness. It may not “fit well,” whatever that otherwise means, but it is true.

Look. Imagine if I were to say that “following the rules of the road” will always guarantee safe driving. Would that be true? No, it wouldn’t. There are other factors which are crucial – factors which could be deciding. You can be sitting at a red light and someone behind you fails to stop, and they slam into you.

Is there a better method of safe driving than “following the rules of the road”? (Generally speaking.) No. If I were teaching my daughter to drive – as I anticipate that one day I will – I would teach her to do just that. I would teach her to stop at red lights, because that’s her best means to avoid accidents.

But will it mean that she never gets into an accident (even if she always does her best to drive safely)? No. She might yet get into an accident, through no fault of her own.

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When I said inherent pleasure of life, I should’ve said the inherent pleasure of living virtuously.

There’s something in this worth exploring.

You’d described earlier how virtue is a “method.” Just so. Virtue is a method by which we acquire what we value – and among other values are various types of pleasures. Virtue, in and of itself, is not pleasurable, per se – it is the means by which we acquire or achieve those things that are pleasurable or otherwise valuable… if we succeed! (Success, as indicated earlier, is not guaranteed.)

Consider (from Galt’s speech):

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Virtue is not an end in itself. Virtue is not its own reward… Life is the reward of virtue—and happiness is the goal and the reward of life.

Is there something about virtue which is pleasurable on contemplation? Yes, I think that’s so. But I think it has to do with the connection we ordinarily draw between virtue and success… which yet does not guarantee that success. It is, in a sense, borrowed.

Again, imagine the new driver, proud of herself for stopping successfully at the red light. Yes, it is the right thing to do, and she takes a kind of pleasure in acting rightly… which sources from a notion that stopping at red lights will keep her safe from accident, free from injury, and that a life free from that injury will be filled with actual pleasure. This is what is reflected in the “pleasure of virtue.”

Yet that won’t help her much when the bus right behind her fails to brake in time.

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Nothing about virtue is displeasurable, and does not cause suffering.

I agree.

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For the most part, pain is a stimulus, itself value-neutral - or zero-worth.

LOL

“For the most part, pain is value-neutral – if the part of pain we choose not to consider is the part which is charged with respect to value.”

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Pain is part psychological as well. When people kill themselves, they speak about psychology - feeling bad, expectation of what to come as being bad, that there’s no reason to live. They speak of pains besides the stimulus - about existing.

What you speak of certainly can be the case. I do not believe that this describes Brittany Maynard, however. She was not frantically calling into suicide crisis hotlines, or espousing “nihilist” rhetoric, but composing an essay on the selfish reasoning behind her patient decision to end her own life, on her own terms.

On 12/22/2016 at 6:32 PM, DonAthos said:

It is as though we imagine Kurt Cobain, or someone else, buying the shotgun… buying the shells… writing his suicide note… meticulously loading the gun…

…and we say, “Yeah, but until he pulls the trigger, he’s choosing to live!”

There’s something that’s just not right about that.

I think Cobain chose to die once he made suicide his purpose and began acting toward that goal. He could have changed his mind and purpose by putting down the gun and moving on with his life. He had free will. But doing that would have required finding something to live for, such as his wife and daughter. And I guess he decided that wasn’t enough. Apparently the pain was too much for him. I understand he had some bad health problems.

It should not be a philosophical conundrum that the choice to die usually doesn’t last long. If you are serious about wanting to die, then, in normal circumstances, you should be able to achieve your purpose rather quickly. This is why people tend to operate on the premise of life until mere moments before they commit suicide, as long as they have the freedom to do so.

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On 12/22/2016 at 6:32 PM, DonAthos said:

Imagine a man set to die by firing squad. (To keep apples as close to apples as possible, let us say that this is his preferred method of suicide: he has arranged for everything and stands there willingly.) His hands are not bound, and… he has an itch on his nose.

Supposing death to happen at the instant the triggers are pulled, at what point up to that moment will the man not bother to scratch his itch?

It probably depends on why he wants to die that way, which is perhaps the most important factor. Assuming that he doesn’t scratch his nose reflexively, but puts actual thought into it, it would matter whether he wanted to possibly die while scratching his nose, which might seem silly or undignified. Maybe he doesn’t want to be remembered that way, that his last act was scratching his nose. It depends on why and how he plans to die. Maybe he wants to die in complete physical comfort, and so he will absolutely die scratching an itch.

On 12/22/2016 at 5:35 PM, Harrison Danneskjold said:

What Sweeney Todd experienced was not ‘joy’ in the sense we mean it; it was not a healthy or life-affirming thing, nor is a life devoted to revenge a true and flourishing life. In a sense, although his heart beat until the very end of the movie, I believe he died in that scene - and this is the very sort of ‘suicide’ which I am condemning (the fundamental thing).

Typically, when I refer to suicide, I mean it literally. I believe that there are times and places when opting to kill oneself may be the rational and moral thing to do.

But the kind of “suicide” that you’re referring to? (A kind that one may yet survive.) I condemn it too – and you’re right that it is more fundamental.

A good test for Todd (or others) might be: if we allow that he thinks of himself as “full of joy” (though even that is debatable), in the name of wanting joy – and who does not want to be joyful? – would we take his lot?

On 12/23/2016 at 7:33 PM, Harrison Danneskjold said:

The only point I’m not sure about is whether men intrinsically want to live.

Surely, people intrinsically want to experience pleasure and not pain (that’s a built-in part of what those words mean), but there are so many different ways in which to do that.

I think that no one who has experienced pleasure does not want it. I think that no one who has experienced happiness does not want it.

These goods are “good” according to their nature (or more specifically, according to our nature); we derive our concept of good from them. I also believe men can reject many – or all – of the things which will allow him to achieve these goods. And that’s the pity.

But is a True Nihilist possible, who would not even want pleasure and happiness for himself? That… rather beggars my belief – and though I can imagine a hipster pretending, “Yeah, man. If God Himself offered me eternal bliss, I’d spit in his eye, 'cause that’s just how hardcore I am” – I believe that the same person on the cusp of actual happiness would not reject that experience, as such, but instead amend his mistaken beliefs, insofar as he is able. And that is what gives me hope.

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And to want to experience pleasure and not pain isn’t the same as wanting to flourish, which is a much more specific (and volitional) attitude.

I agree, but what does this “flourishing” consist of, if we were to examine it in terms of its constituent parts? I suspect it ultimately relates to pleasures and pains (speaking both physically and emotionally).

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So (if I understand correctly), if Sweeney Todd wants these things then he should want life, but if not then morality sort of ceases to apply and anything goes. We’d defend ourselves against him, of course, and might have to kill him, but we couldn’t really call him a bad guy; his goals were just different from ours.

Well, that’s the direction that I think a lot of Objectivists take (wittingly or not, whether they realize that this follows from their premises or not). Because they insist that the choice to live is amoral or pre-moral, then someone who explicitly rejects life – or his own life – can no longer be evaluated by the same moral standards. If the Objectivist were to tell Todd, “But if you keep up like this, you won’t survive,” Todd could easily reply, “I don’t care.” Or even: “I’m counting on it.”

But here’s what I would say fundamentally about Todd: his choices will not make him happy. Because I believe that “the good” is rooted in happiness (which is a kind of pleasure), and cannot conceive of morality outside of human experience, it is enough for me to say that he is “immoral.” But what of that? I’m no Christian. I’m not consigning him to hell. To say that someone is “immoral” does not initially contain anything beyond the tautology that Todd’s choices will not make him happy – which is enough. (Which is everything.)

Is that sufficient to be a “bad guy”? Perhaps, in the sense that a mop may be a bad mop (one which will not draw water). He isn’t “being a guy” very well. But that’s more for Todd’s sake than my own; and in truth, if Todd could somehow find his way to actual Earthly happiness, I think he would want to do so. He may reject survival, because he cannot find his way to happiness, but I do not believe he would reject happiness, as such.

When Todd decides to murder, he crosses another kind of line. Do I think Todd is a “bad guy” because he threatens the innocent (which I can relate to myself, as I do not believe I deserve what Todd’s victims receive, and do not want their fates for myself)? I do. I evaluate things primarily as they relate to me and my experiences, and Todd’s actions put him on track to destroy everything I find of value in the world – everything which I would call “good.” And politically, yes, we must certainly defend ourselves against Todd. (Even if we can sympathize with him to any extent, which I do. It is not for nothing that he is the protagonist of the tale.)

But it’s worth keeping in mind that the root of ethical discussion is an individual’s quest for “the good life,” and that this applies to Sweeney Todd as much as anyone else. We cannot ask him to change his methods because it is better or worse for us if he does; we can only try to help him understand that changing his methods would be better for him – insofar as that is true.

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In the face of pain and adversity, he gave up on ever trying to reach for anything better and devoted the remainder of his existence to - to what? Anger and pain.

Regardless of when or how one eventually dies, one must never give up on life in that way.

I agree wholeheartedly.

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On 12/23/2016 at 7:33 PM, Harrison Danneskjold said:

And right up until her last moment (regardless of when that moment came) she’d have choices to make; there would be alternatives open to her, and it’d be her responsibility to make the most she could of them. Even if this meant nothing more than winning one more game of Chess or formulating a parting statement to someone she cherished, she would still be in charge of the quality of the rest of her own life.

And I don’t think her death would necessarily be a form of surrender or renunciation, depending on how she spent the last of her time.

Agreed on all counts, including when you say that it would be Maynard’s “responsibility to make the most” of the alternatives available to her, so long as we remember that this is only her responsibility to herself.

I would expect that she views her own suicide, in fact, as making good on that responsibility.

On 12/23/2016 at 7:33 PM, Harrison Danneskjold said:

Sensory values (such as the physical sensations of pleasure or pain) are built-in and automatic; we all know which of them to pursue and which to avoid. Conceptual values are not; they depend on our conscious convictions, and they aren’t always right. It is possible for people to hate what’s good for them and revel in their own destruction.

We should want to live as men if we want to live at all; the only alternative is oblivion. We should want to live because it’s the only opportunity for joy, beauty or meaning that any of us will ever have; the dead can’t have fun.

The very possibility of goodness, as such, rests on life. We should want the good (whatever extent is possible to us, in whatever form) because it is good.

Yes to all of this. Given the nature of the thread, I would add that while “the possibility of goodness…rests on life,” that does not mean that all life guarantees “the possibility of goodness” when that goodness is understood to be “joy, beauty, meaning,” or etc.

It is further my contention that the possibility of some amount of goodness, in select situations, may not be worth enduring the certainty of much badness.

On 12/23/2016 at 7:33 PM, Harrison Danneskjold said:

There is no inherent meaning built into life; only what we give it, by the way we spend it. Each of us invents the meaning of his own life (usually not intentionally). To want the best in all things, day after day, is to value your own meaning and your self. To hold onto that desire against hardships and adversity only multiplies your glory when they end but you don’t. 

To give it all up over pain or ugliness is to incorporate that ugliness into your own identity and make it your meaning - and nothing could be uglier than that. When someone says “there is no good” or “it’s just not worth it” it speaks less to the nature of reality than to the nature of their soul.

 

That’s where the bottom of it seems to be. Not in “life, if you want it” nor in “values, if you hold them” but the very possibility of goodness, as such (if there is ever to be such a thing as “the good”).

I’m not entirely certain I have the meaning here, but I would insist that there are things which are “just not worth it.”

Is it worth it to put oneself through the rigors of college for a four year degree? Potentially. How about eight years of schooling for the same reward? Or twenty? Or eighty? (So that, perhaps, just before death, one may graduate.) At some point, a person may well decide that the benefits of his college education are not worth the hardships.

And Brittany Maynard may see one last game of chess in her future, though surrounded by hours, days, weeks, months of suffering. And it may not be worthwhile to her to endure that much suffering for the sake of that game of chess – and whether you or I believe that we would make the same decision in her situation, I respect her choice.

Apart from that, I invite you to read Maynard’s essay again and ask yourself whether it seems to you to be a rejection of the good of life… or an affirmation of the good (albeit in a tragic way). Is Maynard saying “there is no good” through her words and actions, do you think? Or something else?

On 12/23/2016 at 7:33 PM, Harrison Danneskjold said:

Sorry for all the poetry.

There are many things in life a man might rightly apologize for. Poetry is not among them.

On 12/25/2016 at 1:22 PM, MisterSwig said:

I think Cobain chose to die once he made suicide his purpose and began acting toward that goal.

I agree.

Brittany Maynard similarly made suicide her purpose, when given her diagnosis, and began acting toward that goal. She made large changes to her life, in fact, to facilitate the specific end of life that she desired. She moved from California to Oregon – why? Not to join the logging industry. Not because the Ducks were having a good year. But because “Oregon is one of only five states where death with dignity is authorized.”

On 12/25/2016 at 1:22 PM, MisterSwig said:

It should not be a philosophical conundrum that the choice to die usually doesn’t last long. If you are serious about wanting to die, then, in normal circumstances, you should be able to achieve your purpose rather quickly. This is why people tend to operate on the premise of life until mere moments before they commit suicide, as long as they have the freedom to do so.

I don’t find any “philosophical conundrum” here, but neither would I agree that Maynard was operating on “the premise of life” (in the sense of survival; my account of “life-as-experience” is something else) in moving to Oregon and taking a series of steps consciously and specifically designed to end her life. It is only a “conundrum” if we observe people taking clear steps in order to commit suicide and wish to say (for whatever reason) that they are yet “choosing to live.”

Maynard was not choosing to live – she was choosing to die.

On 12/25/2016 at 1:43 PM, MisterSwig said:

It probably depends on why he wants to die that way, which is perhaps the most important factor. Assuming that he doesn’t scratch his nose reflexively, but puts actual thought into it, it would matter whether he wanted to possibly die while scratching his nose, which might seem silly or undignified. Maybe he doesn’t want to be remembered that way, that his last act was scratching his nose. It depends on why and how he plans to die. Maybe he wants to die in complete physical comfort, and so he will absolutely die scratching an itch.

Certainly, all of those things are possible. But the point is: the facts matter right up until the end, because the facts bear on our experience. (If this man does not want to die while scratching his nose, finding it undignified, but faces the possibility of a “reflex action,” then it might take an act of focus/will to stop himself from scratching his nose in the face of an itch.)

Remember: we are discussing this scenario currently because you’d asked whether, once someone has decided to die, things like “pain” (or “much else”… which presumably includes an itchy nose) matter. My answer was – and remains – that yes, these things matter. They matter so long as we have an experience of them, and insofar as our choices may affect our experiences.

On 12/28/2016 at 7:53 AM, DonAthos said:

Brittany Maynard similarly made suicide her purpose, when given her diagnosis, and began acting toward that goal.

I guess I’m still a little unclear in my own mind about when the choice to die is made. Perhaps there is a transitional period in which the choice to live is more like the choice to live while making suicide possible. I don’t think moving to Oregon and all that qualifies as choosing to die, because Maynard is not acting toward suicide yet. She’s acting toward making it possible. There is a difference. Cobain had already made suicide possible by purchasing a gun. Then he started acting toward suicide when he decided it was time to do the actual deed and killed himself.

It must be a very hard thing to switch from wanting to live to wanting to die. And psychologically that switch might take several days or weeks to finalize. But in terms of physical actions taken which reflect the switch, I’m not sure that suicide has been chosen until the person performs the actual act of killing themself.

I’m thinking of the spy who acquires and carries around a cyanide pill in case of capture. Would we say that they chose to die and are acting toward suicide from the moment they thought of getting the pill? Or simply that they were making suicide a possibility while still choosing to live?

3 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

I guess I’m still a little unclear in my own mind about when the choice to die is made. Perhaps there is a transitional period in which the choice to live is more like the choice to live while making suicide possible. I don’t think moving to Oregon and all that qualifies as choosing to die, because Maynard is not acting toward suicide yet. She’s acting toward making it possible. There is a difference.

If possible (and sometimes it is not), I don’t want to get too caught up in terminology. Here is what I’m saying:

At some point, Brittany Maynard decided that she wanted to end her life in a particular fashion. Thereafter, she took many steps specifically oriented to producing that outcome. And in fact, if it matters for this discussion, she did produce that outcome.

I think all of that is incontrovertible.

Now, in the other ongoing thread dedicated to this topic (or at least, a very similar one), I’d quoted Rand as saying:

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An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means—and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil.

and also

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Man must choose his actions, values and goals by the standard of that which is proper to man—in order to achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy that ultimate value, that end in itself, which is his own life.

I believe that many Objectivists would take these to mean that many of Maynard’s actions (including moving to Oregon) would be immoral because as they conceive of “life as the standard of value,” they would not consider those actions to “further” or “achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy” that life, being as they are designed to either end Maynard’s life, or – as you would have it – “make it possible” for her to commit suicide. (I describe this conception of “life as the standard of value” as “life-as-survival.”)

As I conceive of “life as the standard of value”? Yes. I believe that Maynard’s actions do further, achieve, etc., her life; her actions win her peace of mind, among the other advantages that she cites in her essay.

But what made me uncomfortable with your treatment of it, was that you seemed to be positing that Maynard was acting in a way consonant with “life-as-survival” right up until the moment when she ingests her pills, at which point she has abandoned all of that, and with it, her concern for anything else (which you will recall was the context of our initial departure).

However, I believe that Maynard is acting on one continuous standard throughout, with “life as the standard of value,” so long as that is understood to incorporate the value of experience, as I have described before. She is acting on that very same standard when she gets married, and when she moves to Oregon, and when she takes the pills. I believe that it is accounting to that standard that we can understand if Maynard does not suddenly abandon her principles when swallowing those pills (just as the spy would not abandon her principles if she had misfired her gun, and was questioned while bleeding out), or takes the time to scratch her nose, even in her final moments.

Because her experience continues to matter to her so long as she has experience, and accordingly, facts continue to have value.

I’ve said this before, but it didn’t really get addressed. When someone is subjected to the kind of prolonged, severe pain we are discussing in this thread, their mind gradually turns into a kind of funhouse mirror. This isn’t speculation, you can study any number of examples of people who have been brutally tortured, raped, assaulted, etc. Severe stress is inconsistent with rationality, because it directly undermines a person’s capacity to think rationally on the physical level.

1 hour ago, William O said:

I’ve said this before, but it didn’t really get addressed. When someone is subjected to the kind of prolonged, severe pain we are discussing in this thread, their mind gradually turns into a kind of funhouse mirror. This isn’t speculation, you can study any number of examples of people who have been brutally tortured, raped, assaulted, etc. Severe stress is inconsistent with rationality, because it directly undermines a person’s capacity to think rationally on the physical level.

I don’t doubt any of what you say. I can at least confirm that my own thinking suffers under stress or pain or lack of sleep, or etc.; it makes sense to me that if these apparent causes were intensified (e.g. torture or sleep deprivation), their deleterious effects on rationality would increase accordingly. And this is perhaps not very surprising, generally speaking, given the relationship between “mind” and “body.”

I suppose that this point wasn’t addressed substantively for a couple of reasons. In the first place, it appears to rob those who wish to insist that “man can flourish despite all” of some of the grandeur of their claim. epistemologue seemed to present a mind almost floating within a body, which could reason and be happy all on its own, utterly irrespective of whatever was happening “out there.” Eiuol seems to me to argue for the same sort of potential via a combination of Objectivist belief and Buddhist meditation. (And while I do not hold Eiuol consequently responsible for all Buddhist claims, I think it no coincidence that these meditative practices typically are associated with a philosophy that regards much of the physical world as “unreal.”)

Insisting that there are these inescapable relationships between “mind” and “body” takes away from the project of asserting that the mind is all-powerful, that anything can be borne, that a True Moral Man can simply laugh off the very worst of life.

The other reason I expect your point wasn’t addressed is because there are any number of interesting arguments which have been raised, both to attack and defend the idea that “suicide is immoral.” It appears that most people participating in the thread would concede that if rationality is impossible or destroyed, suicide is acceptable at least – so if we’re discussing cases where pain simply destroys reason, that will not help us to investigate or illuminate or test those arguments. (Though it should at least put the lie to the “unreality” of pain that underlies many of them, or the argument that pain exists, but somehow “doesn’t matter.” Yet it will not help us to resolve whether the experience of pain in itself, apart from its effects on reason, ought to factor into ethical reasoning. I continue to argue that it should. I believe that our experience of life matters.)

On 12/27/2016 at 8:41 PM, DonAthos said:

There are many things in life a man might rightly apologize for. Poetry is not among them.

While I appreciate the sentiment, I’ve been using “poetry” as a gentler euphemism for the sloppiness you observed, here:

On 12/27/2016 at 0:36 PM, DonAthos said:

Typically, when I refer to suicide, I mean it literally.

And I’m sorry about that.

 

On 12/27/2016 at 0:36 PM, DonAthos said:

I agree, but what does this “flourishing” consist of, if we were to examine it in terms of its constituent parts? I suspect it ultimately relates to pleasures and pains (speaking both physically and emotionally).

On 12/27/2016 at 8:41 PM, DonAthos said:

It is further my contention that the possibility of some amount of goodness, in select situations, may not be worth enduring the certainty of much badness.

…

I’m not entirely certain I have the meaning here, but I would insist that there are things which are “just not worth it.”

Agreed.

 

I’ve been reflecting on this, recently, and ultimately realized that the only “reification” in this thread was of my own sense of life.

A sense of life seems like part of existence (“out there” to be proven) but it isn’t. It can’t really be proven, in the same sense and for the same reasons that colors can’t be explained to the blind. One man’s core can’t be taken out and shared with another, no matter how much he may wish to.

 

So I’m sorry that all my sexy, sexy poetry interfered with that whole “truth” business.  B)

 

On 12/27/2016 at 0:36 PM, DonAthos said:

I think that no one who has experienced pleasure does not want it. I think that no one who has experienced happiness does not want it.

These goods are “good” according to their nature (or more specifically, according to our nature); we derive our concept of good from them.

With regard to raw sensory values, such as the physical stimuli of pleasure or pain, yes. We’re all born with the evaluations of such sensations hardwired into our nervous systems (at least at first).

With regard to conceptual values, I don’t think so. Values like truth, integrity, justice, productive work, pride, beauty and romance (which are so much more meaningful than any isolated sensation could ever be) aren’t universal or automatic, at all; they depend on volitional mental processes.

 

Even those of us who have experienced that Aristotelean sort of “happiness” which we (Objectivists) all seek so fervently, won’t necessarily continue to want it in the way we should; it depends on our thoughts and choices. We can kill it without even knowing that we are (which is actually far easier than preserving it), which is precisely what I believe Rand was arming us against when she wrote:

“In the name of the best within you, do not sacrifice this world to those who are its worst. In the name of the values that keep you alive, do not let your vision of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that man’s proper estate is an upright posture, an intransigent mind and a step that travels unlimited roads. Do not let your fire go out, spark by irreplaceable spark, in the hopeless swamps of the approximate, the not-quite, the not-yet, the not-at-all. Do not let the hero in your soul perish, in lonely frustration for the life you deserved, but have never been able to reach."

 

On 12/27/2016 at 0:36 PM, DonAthos said:

But is a True Nihilist possible, who would not even want pleasure and happiness for himself? That… rather beggars my belief – and though I can imagine a hipster pretending, “Yeah, man. If God Himself offered me eternal bliss, I’d spit in his eye, 'cause that’s just how hardcore I am” – I believe that the same person on the cusp of actual happiness would not reject that experience, as such, but instead amend his mistaken beliefs, insofar as he is able. And that is what gives me hope.

 

You underestimate the flexibility of the human mind.

 

I believe I’ve already mentioned it elsewhere but at one point, when I was a little Mormon, I realized that God was demanding (via the scriptures I read) my own self-induced blindness and the unconditional surrender of my critical faculty. I didn’t have those words for it, of course; all I knew was that the universe would give me infinite joy for doing what was obviously wrong, and infinite pain if I tried to do what was right.

So if you can’t imagine anyone who, when offered eternal bliss by God Himself, would spit in his eye… c’est moi! And I think the range of goals and attitudes which men can hold is much broader than you might currently suspect.

 

Interestingly, though:

On 12/10/2016 at 5:04 PM, itsjames said:

I’m not sure I agree that the belief in God – and the practice of this belief – can ever be honest, especially when the believer claims they are “certain”. Sure, many believers can be honest in other areas of their lives, making them “basically” honest. But if honesty is the devotion to reality, I don’t see how believing in God can be an honest thing. Please enlighten me, if you think I’m wrong.

The preceding dilemma is older and more common than any bromide; that’s the choice every single Christian faces whenever they’re asked to probe the issue too deeply. You can see it in their faces, if you’re paying attention. And that’s a source of unlimited amusement - for me.  :twisted:

 

On 12/27/2016 at 0:36 PM, DonAthos said:

To say that someone is “immoral” does not initially contain anything beyond the tautology that Todd’s choices will not make him happy – which is enough. (Which is everything.)

Yes, and “there, but for the grace of God, go I”.

Except it isn’t God who shapes our souls; it’s every single one of us. And it’s important to keep track of who is an architect and who is an arsonist for the same reason that ruthless self-evaluation is important:

 

They tell you the trajectory of things.

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A sense of life seems like part of existence (“out there” to be proven) but it isn’t. It can’t really be proven, in the same sense and for the same reasons that colors can’t be explained to the blind. One man’s core can’t be taken out and shared with another, no matter how much he may wish to.

Agreed.

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So I’m sorry that all my sexy, sexy poetry interfered with that whole “truth” business.  B)

LOL

I’m still not certain how much you ought apologize for (honest confusion has a rightful place in discourse), but if there is anything for me to forgive, you’re forgiven.

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On 12/27/2016 at 10:36 AM, DonAthos said:

I think that no one who has experienced pleasure does not want it. I think that no one who has experienced happiness does not want it.

These goods are “good” according to their nature (or more specifically, according to our nature); we derive our concept of good from them.

With regard to raw sensory values, such as the physical stimuli of pleasure or pain, yes. We’re all born with the evaluations of such sensations hardwired into our nervous systems (at least at first).

Exactly. We do not “choose” our fundamental orientation to pleasure or pain. This is what allows us to eventually conceive of things in terms of “good” and “evil.”

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With regard to conceptual values, I don’t think so. Values like truth, integrity, justice, productive work, pride, beauty and romance (which are so much more meaningful than any isolated sensation could ever be) aren’t universal or automatic, at all; they depend on volitional mental processes.

I agree with you that such conceptual values depend upon volitional mental processes, yet note that I did not refer to “truth, integrity, justice, productive work, pride, beauty and romance,” but happiness. And my point about happiness was not that it is automatic, or achieved in a non-volitional manner, but that “no one who has experienced happiness does not want it.”

What happiness is , is good. I’ve not yet worked out the position in full, either in my own mind or in argument, but I suspect that happiness is the emotional concomitant of the mental projection of pleasure over time. Consider the “roots” of happiness, as a child. When are you “happy”? When you know that, tonight, you’re getting ice cream after dinner; when you know that you’re going to Disney World for your birthday; when it’s the cusp of summer vacation, which means that you’re going to spend your days swimming and fishing instead of listening to boring lectures. (And what is “sadness”? When you expect a punishment tonight, when Dad gets home.) I’ve a long ways to go from here, potentially, but this is the avenue of thought I’m exploring.

In any case, such is fully volitional and not automatic. Is it “universal”? I suspect it is, or nearly so, at least. Insofar as all human beings are equipped to experience pleasure, and insofar all human beings develop the wherewithal (and make subconscious “choices”) such that they can predict the experience of some pleasure or pain over time, then I would expect them to experience the same fundamental emotional state.

This is why Rand can depend upon “happiness” as the purpose of ethics, philosophy, and life itself, without having to make an argument for happiness, as such. She knows that her audience will have some experience of/understanding of what happiness is like, and she knows that happiness argues for itself, just as pleasure does, in that our experience of it is the good.

(I think it likely that some – or even most – people never experience a full adult happiness, where the evaluation is based upon a projection over one’s entire lifetime; but then, the childhood experience is likely enough to compensate for this, at least in providing the “purpose” for adult ethical reasoning.)

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Even those of us who have experienced that Aristotelean sort of “happiness” which we (Objectivists) all seek so fervently, won’t necessarily continue to want it in the way we should; it depends on our thoughts and choices.

I agree that consciously we may not “continue to want it in the way we should.” We can convince ourselves that all manner of things are more important than our happiness. (Including, funnily enough, our own technical survival.)

And certainly our thoughts and choices are instrumental in one’s pursuit of happiness (even if, as I argue, right thought and choice does not guarantee it). We can prevent ourselves from achieving happiness in innumerable ways, and especially if we consciously reject the idea that happiness is of value (let alone our ultimate value), or place something above it.

But the “wanting of happiness” I mean is not true wanting, in the full sense of the term. Maybe it’s my turn for poetry now? But I mean to point at the root of what allows for wanting in the first place. It is as “the choice to focus” is to actual, conscious, volitional choice. It is in the same sense as “liking” pleasure. (Pleasure is what enables us to “like”; we cannot opt not to “like” pleasure. “Liking” pleasure and “liking” happiness are both redundant, and insipid.)

In a metaphorical way of thinking, I would hold that the (actual) experience of happiness is utterly seductive to the human mind. Whatever thoughts a person holds about why he doesn’t care for happiness would melt utterly away in the face of the real McCoy, because just like pleasure, happiness cannot be denied.*

____________________

* More poetry, perhaps. The experience of happiness could yet be denied on a conscious level, just like a person may tell himself “this is not pleasurable” when experiencing pleasure, or “this is not painful” when experiencing pain – but such fundamentally dishonest denials can only get a man so far.

How deep can evasion run? That’s an interesting question…

Edited to add: Just as the above with respect to pleasure, try to imagine someone experiencing happiness (or something like it – perhaps some variant of “joy”), like, say, a young child on Christmas morning, unwrapping his presents. Imagine that child saying to himself something like, “I do not like this experience of ‘joy’; I do not like this feeling, and I do not want it again.”

Does such a scenario seem realistic – at all? If you could picture such a thing, such a child saying that to himself (maybe because he’s been taught to do so), could he say so honestly?

If we could imagine some early-twenties philosophy student saying the same thing on a Christmas morn, smiling despite himself in a feeling of earnest joy that he otherwise, and as a matter of principle, would resent, maybe that’s a touch truer to reality. I’m sure that people talk themselves out of pleasures all the time.

Yet I believe that the evasion of one’s own actual experience can only run so deep. And where and when someone experiences happiness, I believe it beyond our ability to (honestly) say that we do not like it – because happiness is good of our nature.

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You underestimate the flexibility of the human mind.

Maybe I do.

But I believe that even the mind has a nature; that it is not infinitely malleable (just as happiness is not).

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I believe I’ve already mentioned it elsewhere but at one point, when I was a little Mormon, I realized that God was demanding (via the scriptures I read) my own self-induced blindness and the unconditional surrender of my critical faculty. I didn’t have those words for it, of course; all I knew was that the universe would give me infinite joy for doing what was obviously wrong, and infinite pain if I tried to do what was right.

So if you can’t imagine anyone who, when offered eternal bliss by God Himself, would spit in his eye… c’est moi!

Yes, but look.

Look at where you are now. Look at what you believe now. Even if you believe that at one point you committed yourself to “unconditional surrender,” apparently the surrender was not, in fact, unconditional.

I don’t doubt that a person can believe himself to reject all good, but I do doubt whether a person can actually reject all good.

It could be as you say that I underestimate the flexibility of the human mind, but insofar as I believe that we cannot “choose against pleasure” (in that we experience it as good, of our nature), and insofar as I believe that happiness finds its own roots in pleasure, then I believe that there must remain within a human mind, howsoever twisted, some capacity to yet recognize and respond to that which is in fact good. (This is what allows those who have “surrendered unconditionally” to yet overcome it; it is what allows people who have made themselves “blind” able to see.)

What the good is (including pleasure, including happiness), is not up for debate. It is not a matter of subjective choice. It is not arbitrary. It is a fact of our nature. And any individual may believe himself to be outside of that nature or not subject to it, or to be the one radical for whom “the bad is the good” and “the good the bad,” and he may act accordingly (to his own woe), but he cannot actually excuse himself from his own nature.

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Locked-in patients trapped inside their paralysed bodies have told doctors they are ‘happy’ using an astonishing new brain computer interface which deciphers their thoughts.

In a groundbreaking experiment, four people who were incapable of even moving their eyes, were able to respond with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to spoken questions.

On seven out of 10 occasions the patients said they were happy despite their utterly debilitating condition which means they require round the clock care for all their basic needs.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/01/31/locked-in-patients-tell-doctors-happy-computer-reads-thoughts/

I wanted to bump this thread with some quotes on suicide:

epistemologue:

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You cannot affirm your life by destroying it.

 

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Choosing to die is not a “pro-life choice”. That is clearly absurd.

 

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“Rational suicide” is a contradiction in terms… suicide is inherently irrational, because the whole principle of action of any kind, is to act toward your values, and suicide is always exactly the opposite. You can’t do it and gain value; you can’t not do it and lose value. it’s inherently wrong, built into the very basis of all ethics and rationality.

 

splitprimary:

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It’s a contradiction to value the destruction of your source of values.

 

Kant:

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Suicide is incompatible with a system of willed ends… so a maxim to commit suicide cannot be coherently willed

 

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For Kant, our rational wills are the source of our moral duty, and it is therefore a kind of practical contradiction to suppose that the same will can permissibly destroy the very body that carries out its volitions and choices. Given the distinctive worth of an autonomous rational will, suicide is an attack on the very source of moral authority.

 

Tom K:

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How can it be in ones self interest to destroy ones self?

 
Matt Walsh:

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We certainly cannot take ownership of ourselves by obliterating ourselves.

 

Gotthelf:

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No one can exit the realm of morality guiltlessly.

Spinoza:

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E3p6: 'Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to preserve in its being.’ …always desires to retain its identity. For this reason Spinoza thinks that suicide can only result from external influences on our minds and bodies since the essence of our mind and body always affirms and does not deny our existence (E3p4d).

E4p20s: ‘But that a man should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something should come from nothing. Anyone who gives this a little thought will see it.’
 
Striving to preserve in existence is built into the essence of every finite being… we strive and desire to continue the form of life that is what we are.

 

secondhander:

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For someone to choose to kill himself is the height of contradiction. You couldn’t choose to die, unless you were alive. Ultimately, it is a sign of a mental disorder, and therefore irrational and is the wrong choice to make. Once one kills himself, then of course there are no values or morals to consider. But the choice was wrong, objectively. 

 

 

3 hours ago, intrinsicist said:

“Rational suicide” is a contradiction in terms… suicide is inherently irrational, because the whole principle of action of any kind, is to act toward your values, and suicide is always exactly the opposite. You can’t do it and gain value; you can’t not do it and lose value. it’s inherently wrong, built into the very basis of all ethics and rationality.

“the whole principle of action of any kind, is to act toward your values”

First, I assume you mean “rational values”.

The value of one’s life, is determined by the one living it (the valuer). It is not a given. If life was intrinsically good, suicide would be impossible to someone would can perceive this consistent beauty. One would have to be blind to the “value” emanating from “being”.

Based on your determination, laws could be written to punish you for attempting suicide.

If life is intrinsically “good”, then you would be correct. That would imply that there is something “out there” (intrinsical) that guarantees life to be worthwhile. There isn’t. Life just is. It is neither good nor bad. For the most part, you end up making it good or bad based on your choices, one way or the other.

Suicide, if desired, is valued. That is an objective observation. If the person uses all means to evaluate their situation and determines that death is the best option of all the “bad” options, then suicide can be rational in that case. When Rommel accepted the deal he got from Hitler, to die as a hero and guarantee his wife and child’s treatment, it was of value to him. It was in fact rational unless there was some intrinsic angel or fairy that could have fixed things.

7 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

determines that death is the best option

The whole point here is that choosing death as a best option is the irrational part. You could argue that a person can be in a situation where they aren’t alive in a meaningful way, but that only means nothing whatsoever matters and there would be no such thing as a best option. If life is the standard by which we measure all actions we take, and that’s how we decide if something is rational or not, then any action that takes you in the opposite direction is either rational, or you exist completely outside the domain of life. Intrinsicism would be that you are always in the domain of life by virtue of being alive, that’s where I disagree with him. I agree completely though that suicide can never be rational.

7 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

guarantee his wife and child’s treatment

Altruism of the highest kind.

11 hours ago, intrinsicist said:

quotes on suicide:

Could you give some context on whichever ones you can? The where. I mean, the second quote about Kant is an interpretation, so I’m curious who wrote that and where.

3 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

7 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

guarantee his wife and child’s treatment

Altruism of the highest kind.

They are “his”. It is his self interest that it acts on. He wants them to live, as in “I could not live knowing that he did to them”.

Altruism would be if he sacrificing himself for a duty to the neighbors kid that he never met, based on some sense of duty.