The dilemma of choosing empathy

1 hour ago, DiscoveryJoy said:

I don’t have a problem with not literally seeing birds, I’m confident of grasping their reality when thinking about them. The reason is that I have experienced birds in reality.

Just have a hard time comparing such emotionless object-grasping like birds to the grasping of pain on the highest level. It is my understanding that according to http://www.healthcentral.com/chronic-pain/coping-403768-5_2.html  there are up to ten levels of pain. How is it possible to claim to be able to conceive of levels 9 and 10, if experiencing such levels would actually require causing serious damage to yourself? How would there even be a perceptual basis on which to conceptualize?

By reasoning. By conceptual thought. The point is you don’t need to feel emotions of the kind you want to think about at the moment. You can extrapolate and reason about people’s emotions based on related emotions. I mean, basically, you seem to be making a false dilemma, that somehow thinking about emotions accurately means you are feeling the emotions -now-. Affective empathy matters, but cognitive empathy is how you think about it. Similarly, it matters to see birds in reality, but the concept ‘bird’ is how you think about them. It then becomes a matter of evaluating values like anything else, with a lot of thinking how values change over time, if your value is healthy enough to be a value, etc. If an important person to you is in jail in Siberia for insulting Stalin and tortured there, then that affects your life a lot in concrete ways. If an even higher value is in jail, your life is affected even more.
 

On 3/8/2016 at 2:33 AM, Eiuol said:

The point is you don’t need to feel emotions of the kind you want to think about at the moment.

I mean, basically, you seem to be making a false dilemma, that somehow thinking about emotions accurately means you are feeling the emotions -now-.

Just “not at the moment”? Or possibly “not even at all”?

Assuming that it is true that you don’t need to feel them now, is it then even necessary to feel them ever?

On 3/8/2016 at 2:33 AM, Eiuol said:

By reasoning. By conceptual thought.

You can extrapolate and reason about people’s emotions based on related emotions.

As your answer is that you can create a perceptual basis by reasoning and conceptual thought, it seems like you want to construct a perceptual concrete in the mind from some memorized concretes, so that the result resembles the would-be real experience? Some “ultra-light” dose of that same intensity that somehow lets you stay in touch with how it would feel like, but not so strong as to overwhelm your ability to loose sight of your other values?

What if you did that and then later accidentally experienced it in reality, totally taken by surprise that a particular physical pain is actually much much worse in practice than you had imagined in theory? Would this demonstrate an inability of reason to extrapolate an emotion from the related emotions? Or what else would or could that demonstrate?

On 3/8/2016 at 2:33 AM, Eiuol said:

Affective empathy matters, but cognitive empathy is how you think about it.

Affective empathy matters, but only to a certain extend then? All levels on the pain scale can be extrapolated from experiences of level 1 pain alone, so we need to experience no more pain than that? Notions of “unimaginable pain” are all bogus?

 

Assuming that cognitive empathy is sufficient, it still leaves the following unanswered. I’m still wondering what you think about the following, if I replace all occurances of “empathy” with “cognitive empathy”:

On 3/7/2016 at 0:41 AM, DiscoveryJoy said:

I’m a bit confused here. What are you implying about how the proper moral thinking should go? How would you form a positive-minus-negative “calculus” for decision making? Is it:

“All I need to care about is whether I need to feel the cognitive empathic pain. If at best I could just swallow some magic pill every time the pain occurs, it would actually all be fine. So I actually only need to include my own cognitive empathic pain in my calculus, which is quite marginal in the long run, so it doesn’t destroy the higher value kept. This calculus doesn’t include the real extend to which the lesser value actually suffers, but that’s not important to me.”

or is it:

“What I should actually care about is the pain that all the time actually exists out there in the other person as such. Not just how occasionally I will have to empathize with it cognitively. I actually need to extrapolate the cognitive empathy over time to fill in the gaps. So there’s a lot more to include in my calculus, which keeps it terrible in the long run, so it actually destroys the higher value kept. But I’m fairly including the extend to which the lesser value actually suffers in my calculus.”

??

Would the latter case already be an example of altruism, of talking above one’s own head, and of being concerned with things completely outside of one’s own responsibility?

 

Not sure about what your thoughts are on my recent replies, since many of my questions remained unanswered.

But I am meanwhile reflecting about the following proposal:

The fact that a lower values suffers by itself does not make it right to give up a higher value for it. The degree of the suffering is irrelevant. It is therefore wrong to engage in empathy on the sensual level by inflicting slight doses of physical pain to yourself only in order to be in touch with the degree of the suffering, in order to be able to include it in a calculus of the kind: “How much value for me minus how much pain for him?”. It is even wrong to engage in empathy on the cognitive level with that goal. Because the whole calculus is wrong. It is wrong because it places someone else’s suffering on the same level as if it were your own. It is wrong because it says that “Your suffering is my suffering, so I have to consider it equally alongside with my higher values, in order to make a decision”. It is wrong because that kind of calculus must always lead to giving up the higher value, since it is always overridden by the pain grasped: If you pretend like the one whose feed are burning all the time is you , then you cannot allow yourself to enjoy any value at the same time, ever.

A value-based approach only asks the question: “Which of the two values is actually higher, independent of whether it is suffering or not?” The higher value must be given precedence in any case. If necessary, one just needs to be brave enough to ignore someone else’s pain now in order to implement the proper decision, and learn how to deal with the pain later. Deal with it later, not in the sense of constantly seeking empathic experiences, but only in the sense of learning how to move on and not wanting any more when and if the topic comes up.

You can let me know what you think about that if you like.

 

The only question remaining to me is what to say if someone considers a certain “regular awareness of certain people’s emotional wellbeing”, such an awareness by itself, kind of a value. Not necessary because one values those people more than or as much as one’s higher values, but because of some idea that one generally needs to be “conscious of what’s going on out there in close people” on principle, perhaps as an expression of one’s own character etc., and the idea that one needs to bear that awareness on the back of one’s mind all the time as permanently as mentally possible. As a psychological precondition to allowing yourself to enjoy your higher values. So if the situation is so bad that sticking to this principle makes the enjoyment of your higher values impossible, but you still stick to that principle “for the sake of the principle”, having to forgo your higher values, what would that mean?

Would that be a valid principle to have in the first place? Or would such a principle invalidate the idea that what you call “your higher values” really are your higher values, because you are placing that principle above those “alleged higher values”? Or would you say “No, the principle is just a principle, it can backfire in certain highly improbable cases, but the value is still a value and sticking to the principle does not invalidate what you think is your value hierarchy, even if it might seem so. You cannot compare principles against values!”?