On 3/8/2016 at 2:33 AM, Eiuol said:
The point is you don’t need to feel emotions of the kind you want to think about at the moment.
I mean, basically, you seem to be making a false dilemma, that somehow thinking about emotions accurately means you are feeling the emotions -now-.
Just “not at the moment”? Or possibly “not even at all”?
Assuming that it is true that you don’t need to feel them now, is it then even necessary to feel them ever?
On 3/8/2016 at 2:33 AM, Eiuol said:
By reasoning. By conceptual thought.
You can extrapolate and reason about people’s emotions based on related emotions.
As your answer is that you can create a perceptual basis by reasoning and conceptual thought, it seems like you want to construct a perceptual concrete in the mind from some memorized concretes, so that the result resembles the would-be real experience? Some “ultra-light” dose of that same intensity that somehow lets you stay in touch with how it would feel like, but not so strong as to overwhelm your ability to loose sight of your other values?
What if you did that and then later accidentally experienced it in reality, totally taken by surprise that a particular physical pain is actually much much worse in practice than you had imagined in theory? Would this demonstrate an inability of reason to extrapolate an emotion from the related emotions? Or what else would or could that demonstrate?
On 3/8/2016 at 2:33 AM, Eiuol said:
Affective empathy matters, but cognitive empathy is how you think about it.
Affective empathy matters, but only to a certain extend then? All levels on the pain scale can be extrapolated from experiences of level 1 pain alone, so we need to experience no more pain than that? Notions of “unimaginable pain” are all bogus?
Assuming that cognitive empathy is sufficient, it still leaves the following unanswered. I’m still wondering what you think about the following, if I replace all occurances of “empathy” with “cognitive empathy”:
On 3/7/2016 at 0:41 AM, DiscoveryJoy said:
I’m a bit confused here. What are you implying about how the proper moral thinking should go? How would you form a positive-minus-negative “calculus” for decision making? Is it:
“All I need to care about is whether I need to feel the cognitive empathic pain. If at best I could just swallow some magic pill every time the pain occurs, it would actually all be fine. So I actually only need to include my own cognitive empathic pain in my calculus, which is quite marginal in the long run, so it doesn’t destroy the higher value kept. This calculus doesn’t include the real extend to which the lesser value actually suffers, but that’s not important to me.”
or is it:
“What I should actually care about is the pain that all the time actually exists out there in the other person as such. Not just how occasionally I will have to empathize with it cognitively. I actually need to extrapolate the cognitive empathy over time to fill in the gaps. So there’s a lot more to include in my calculus, which keeps it terrible in the long run, so it actually destroys the higher value kept. But I’m fairly including the extend to which the lesser value actually suffers in my calculus.”
??
Would the latter case already be an example of altruism, of talking above one’s own head, and of being concerned with things completely outside of one’s own responsibility?