19 hours ago, MisterSwig said:
1. Chosen: Purpose is volitionally chosen, not automatic, and therefore it’s most likely a uniquely human thing. (I doubt chimps could have a human-like purpose.) It’s possible to not choose a purpose, in which case we would act pre-volitionally like a baby or post-volitionally like an emotion-driven looney.
I should say (though I don’t know how much this matters to the thread) that I can’t speak to non-human experience; I don’t even have the qualifications necessary to discuss it based on third-party observation, or biology, or etc. I know that certain animals (like chimps) are accounted very intelligent, and I have no reason to rule out the existence of alien creatures with volition or human-like consciousness. Further there is the question as to whether or not man could create machines with similar capacities. So as to whether purpose is “a uniquely human thing,” or the likelihood of such a proposition, I have no idea.
As to whether purpose is volitionally chosen, I say: yes, with caveat.
Earlier, I had said that “we typically have some reason in mind for our actions, do we not? A purpose of which we are conscious.” I think that true. But while the man who drinks vodka nightly may have some purpose in mind when he goes to the store, he might not be cognizant of all of his motivation – some of which might be subconscious, and hidden from him. And further, he might not be able to relate his conscious purpose, his chosen purpose, with long-term outcomes or larger purposes. (His short-term and long-term purposes may even be in conflict.)
I say this, because I have found some Objectivists in the past who like to attribute all of the outcomes of an action with a consciously held purpose. As in, the man who drinks vodka every night works towards his own destruction (which is true), and purpose/choice/action is volitional (which is true), therefore, the man who drinks vodka every night is choosing his own destruction – and is therefore an evil death-worshipper. But I don’t think this kind of conclusion reflects reality.
There is a sense in which that is true that the man who drinks vodka every night is choosing his own destruction, so long as we retain the context; because it might well be the case that such a man does not understand that his path will lead him to destruction. If he understood everything that he could expect to lose, in reason, on the basis of the choices he’s making… he might well make different choices.
(The basis of this “understanding” – whether it can be an “honest mistake,” or is necessarily reflects some kind of evasion, or etc., is another conversation.)
19 hours ago, MisterSwig said:
2. Good or bad, harmony or discord: Because man is fallible, his chosen purpose might be good or bad for his individual survival. Likewise, it might be in harmony or discord with his particular moral code. The two evaluations are separate and unique questions, meaning that a particular purpose could be good for survival while in discord with one’s moral code, and vice versa.
I’m uncertain about the phrase “because man is fallible,” but yes, a man’s chosen purpose might be good or bad for his individual survival. And it might find harmony or discord with his particular moral code.
It is true that these are two different evaluations, but I think it necessary (especially given the context of this conversation) to say that there are many Objectivists who would argue that the basis of a rational moral code is whether some purpose is good or bad for the individual’s survival. For instance, here is David Kelley, writing on his understanding of the Objectivist Ethics (from The Logical Structure of Objectivism):
Quote
Although Ayn Rand made it clear that she meant her morality to ensure a rich, fully human life, it is the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death that stands at the root of all values.
Several admirers of Rand’s approach to ethics have debated the sense in which survival can serve the most basic criterion of ethics. Here we have argued that survival is the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence.
I disagree with him. While I believe that there is a fundamental relationship between survival and morality, I do not believe that “survival” alone, as Kelley has it, “can serve [as] the most basic criterion of ethics.” I believe that “life” in the phrase “life as the standard of value” encompasses more than “the literal alternative of life versus death.”
In “The Objectivist Ethics,” Rand further her describes the standard she advocates (here describing it as “that which is proper to man”), saying that man must choose his values “in order to achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy that ultimate value, that end in itself, which is his own life.” This is the fuller meaning that constitutes my moral code, inclusive of “fulfillment” and “enjoyment,” and I think that it is consequently more expansive than Kelley’s understanding of “existence versus nonexistence,” which seems to be wholly encompassed by “achieve” and “maintain.”
If we conceive of my moral code as “it is good to do that which serves one’s life” (where “life” is held in this fuller sense), then although it would remain true that it could be evaluated separately as to whether some purpose serves one’s life or adheres to his moral code, I would argue that these evaluations ought always produce the exact same results – insofar as a person has a rational moral code.
I do not believe that a rational moral code could ever counsel a person to act against his life, in this full sense. (Yet I believe that suicide in some cases is moral; this again accounts to my specific understanding of “life as the standard of value” – what I have argued for elsewhere as “life-as-experience” – but there are current topics [one and two] already dedicated to exploring the topic of ethical suicide, and I should not like to revisit it here.)
19 hours ago, MisterSwig said:
3. Complex: Man is capable of setting short, mid, and long-term goals. And so there may be multiple chosen purposes for any particular action. When properly integrated, these single purposes become one complex purpose which we use to guide our entire life process. It’s possible for man to set only short-term goals, in which case he drops the context of a future life and lives only for the present purpose. It’s also possible for man to have a longer-term goal but lack the planning skills or ability to achieve it, in which case his shorter-range goals will not be integrated with the longer-term one, and ultimately he will fail or be frustrated, unless he learns and adjusts his goals accordingly.
Agreed.
19 hours ago, MisterSwig said:
4. Post-life: On account of having imagination, it is possible for man to set a post-life goal which is achieved (or not) only after and on account of his death. Despite not being alive to see this final purpose fulfilled, he can still act with purpose before death in order to best ensure that the imagined goal is achieved. And like all purposes, even this one can be good or bad for survival, and in harmony or discord with one’s moral code.
To elaborate a bit on #4, a popular example of a post-life goal is: to get into Heaven and be with God. Religious folk may or may not attempt to integrate this final goal with their short, mid, and long-term goals in life before death. They may routinely choose to drop the context of such a supernatural afterlife and focus on pursuing more this-worldly purposes such as making money and raising a family. But if they do pursue Heaven, then they must do so according to some standard of value, such as whatever moral code they can glean from their favorite religious text. If they should decide that getting to Heaven and being with God requires killing infidels because that’s what their favorite prophet said, then their shorter-range goals in life will probably include waging war upon non-believers. They might even conduct a suicide mission against the enemy to prove their devotion to their ultimate purpose.
Another popular post-life goal is: helping loved ones. This is accomplished by creating a will and bequeathing property to the people we love. But in order to have something to bequeath, this purpose must be properly integrated with pre-death goals, such as making a good living and buying valuable property. If one chooses to live hedonistically and spend everything on booze and gambling, there may be nothing left for loved ones in the end.
It is certainly the case that men may have a morality which values things beyond an individual’s life (even in the full sense I’d described earlier) – a “greater good.” But that does not describe my morality, and neither do I believe it consistent with the Objectivist Ethics, nor see the justification for it.
Such a “greater good” must hold something as the root of value (as Kelley relates the root of value to the individual’s survival, and I do with the individual’s “experience”) – so if you mean to advocate for a “greater good” than man’s life (either here or perhaps preferably in another thread, specifically geared to do so), I would wish to concentrate on ferreting that “root of value” out.
At the least, I do not believe that a “greater good” must be invoked to explain such things as wills and bequeathals. I will observe here, for instance, that I am deeply interested in helping my loved ones, both during my life and to provide for them after my death – but I hold that this serves my life, here and now, which is why I consider it rationally “of value” to take action to make such provisions here and now.