I have heard knowledgable objectivists describe the objectivist understanding of rights like this: we do not have ‘natural’ rights, as neo-kantian types claim. Rather, what we call our rights are those principles we have discovered to be necessary to live the life of a rational being. For example, since we need to produce useful stuff to live (rationally), we need to have property rights to protect our ability to keep those valuable things we create.
If this is an accurate gloss, consider the following example: One night you discover that I have broken into your house and am attempting to leave with some of your stuff. You know I am an intellegent person, so rather than try to stop me you reason with me: “You should not take my stuff. Man needs property rights to live as a rational being.” I reply “I do not recognize your need as a claim on me.” What’s wrong with this picture?
I suppose what’s wrong with that picture is that you’re trying to reason with a person who rejects reason. You should instead call the police, whose job it is to protect the rights that you have. Your right to your property does not depend on the thief recognising that right. If you are so unfortunate as to live in a society which does not recognise your rights, that is sad and you should try to move to a free society if you can, but their failure does not alter the fact that you do have a right to the product of your reason.
I should also point out that man’s rights are natural, in that they are a recognition of man’s nature (and are not arbitrary social constructs). That nature needs to be discovered, however: it is not perceptually self-evident.
I suppose what’s wrong with that picture is that you’re trying to reason with a person who rejects reason.
I agree with you, but I’m trying to understand why what I am doing in the example constitutes rejection of reason.
Here is the example in more straightforward terms: We get rights from needs (namely, what we need to live rationally). But needs aren’t moral claims for people to behave a certain way. So your rights don’t have any moral weight, because they do not impel me to behave in a certain way (namely, to respect them).
Naturally, I do not think that we do not have rights or that those rights are impotent. I just want to know how Objectivism accounts for the normative force of rights, because in the above analysis it seems like they have none.
I should also point out that man’s rights are natural, in that they are a recognition of man’s nature (and are not arbitrary social constructs). That nature needs to be discovered, however: it is not perceptually self-evident.
I am using the term “natural rights” as it is often used by neo-kantians: rights we get in virtue of having the ability to reason (primarily the ability to reason about moral concepts), irrespective of what kind of biological beings we are. Our biology is, as far as I know, important to Objectivist ethics, but relatively unimportant to neo-kantians.
What’s wrong is that, by stealing my property, you’re forcing a claim upon my rights.
But there needs to be an explanation as to why something being your property counts as a claim against my ability to take it. Why does a TV being yours mean I can’t just take it, in the same way I can take an abandoned TV, given the way Objectivists understand both the source of rights and the moral significance of need?
But there needs to be an explanation as to why something being your property counts as a claim against my ability to take it. Why does a TV being yours mean I can’t just take it, in the same way I can take an abandoned TV, given the way Objectivists understand both the source of rights and the moral significance of need?
Simple. You earned it, i.e, you earned the money to pay for the TV and/or aquired it by gift, ect.----by right A thief has not earned anything and has no right to the unearned. If you find an abandoned TV, that’s a different story because the person volitionally chose to abandon his right to the TV to whomever comes along. But it is his choice to do so in contrast to the theft of his property against his will by a thief.
We get rights from needs (namely, what we need to live rationally). But needs aren’t moral claims for people to behave a certain way. So your rights don’t have any moral weight, because they do not impel me to behave in a certain way (namely, to respect them).
I think I know where you’re going. As a prelude, I suggest reading “Man’s Rights” if you haven’t, and Tara Smith’s Viable Values. You’re ultimately going in the direction of the prudent predator issue, which you could search on this forum (it came up maybe a month ago). How much of this are you already familiar with? That would help to understand the shared context.
Here is the example in more straightforward terms: We get rights from needs (namely, what we need to live rationally). But needs aren’t moral claims for people to behave a certain way. So your rights don’t have any moral weight, because they do not impel me to behave in a certain way (namely, to respect them).
The answer is that you need his rights to be respected. Your survival requires rights and rights, by definition, apply to all people. You violate your own interests when you violate the rights of others.