Thoughts on meta-ethical relativism?

Ethics
1

Heres an excerpty of an article I stumbled across while reading about reletivism for my ethics class (I realize its fairly long)

"It seems that ethical claims are normative: they do not merely state descriptive facts; they prescribe or endorse or encourage certain actions.15

Both ethical relativists and ethical objectivists generally agree so far. The disagreement comes when the anti-objectivist asks how it is possible for any claim to be normative. What is normativity, after all? How does normativity fit into “the fabric of the world”?16 Physics describes for us a universe of atoms, electrons, protons, neutrons, electromagnetic and gravitational fields, etc. Biology describes a world of living organisms with drives to eat, reproduce, etc. How does normativity fit into the natural world? The anti-objectivist answers that the only way to scientifically explain the normativity of ethical claims is in terms of how these claims engage a person’s feelings, or passions, or commitments, or some such human psychological motivation.17 Thus, the source of the normativity which ethical claims seem to have is their necessary connection with human motivations (such as desires, passions, etc.).18

For example, say I agree with the claim that murder is wrong. This is an ethical claim, so it is normative. The anti-objectivist will say that what accounts for the normativity of an ethical claim is that, when I agree with the truth of the claim, I am implicitly acknowledging the existence of a motivation to act in accordance with that claim.

Here is another way of thinking about it. Recall my earlier suggestion that, if you acknowledge the truth of an ethical claim, you must admit its relevance to your actions. The anti-objectivist will explain this fact as follows: if you acknowledge the truth of an ethical claim you must admit its relevance to your actions because that ethical claim is true only if you are psychologically motivated to act in accordance with it. The truth of an ethical claim implies the existence of some motivation to follow that claim. Notice a further implication of this view: if there is no motivation to follow an ethical claim, then that claim is not true.

The third premise is one that I think almost all of us would agree with today: when it comes to ethical topics, people frequently do not share the same motivations (i.e., often one person has a certain motivation and another person does not have it, or has an opposed motivation). For example, some people find homosexuality disgusting, while others find it perfectly acceptable. Some people feel strongly that murderers should receive the death penalty, while others feel just as strongly that executing murderers is barbaric. Some people desire to prevent women from having abortions, while others desire just as much to ensure that women have the choice to have abortions. We could go on all day with additional examples.19

On the basis of the above premises, the ethical relativist concludes that all ethical claims are true or false only in relation to each individual person’s particular viewpoint or perspective – where “viewpoint” or “perspective” includes one’s motivations. Can you see why this conclusion follows from the premises? The argument is that ethical claims are normative, and that what makes them normative is that the truth of an ethical claim implies the existence of a corresponding motivation. But people have different motivations regarding ethical issues, so ethical claims are true only relative to those who have the appropriate motivations. Thus, for example, if I lack the motivation to disapprove of stealing, then the claim that stealing is wrong will not be normative for me. But if it is not normative, then it cannot be true relative to me either, because a true ethical claim is always normative."

How does one argue against this? I have trouble asserting that by holding the value of life, the rational position on various issues follows logically, but on certain things it seems to come down to individual (preferential) values. For example, whether one sees your ailing grandmother or sees a concert depends on how you value time with your grandmother versus personal entertainment. This, they claim, makes it a form of subjectivism/relativism. I, personally, am at a loss to frame this in a way that works. Any help would be appreciated.

2

Context does not equal subjectivity. I believe this is covered pretty well in the first few chapters of OPAR. I’d check there if I were you. Good luck.

3

… but on certain things it seems to come down to individual (preferential) values.

Yes, it does. Objectivists typically refer to these as “optional values”. One example would be choosing between two possible careers, both of which are moral. It does not follow that any career is moral. A “career” as a thief would be immoral.

4

Objectivism is probably a lot closer to (academic) relativism than it is to (academic) objectivism/realism, although not the ‘naive’ relativism outlined in the initial post. Ayn Rand believed that all moral statements took the form of what Kant would call hypothetical imperatives (“If you want X, then do Y”), and denied that any universal imperatives (“Do X!!”) of the sort sought by Kant and Plato could be found. Still, it would be misleading to describe Ayn Rand as a relativist (or an objectivist/universalist). The whole of Objectivist morality turns on her notion of a ‘standard’ - the idea that all judgements must necessarily be made with reference to some given standard, and any attempt to judge ‘standardlessly’ results in intrincisim. This important insight is something that is normally ignored by relativists.

On a sidenote, I think Ayn Rand would agree with your relativist that ‘normativity’ (in the academic sense) is a myth.

5

Yeah, part of my problem in the ethics class is the varying definitions as compared to those used by Rand. I seem to be the only Objectivist in the class, with four fervent relativists who actually have alot of philosophy backround.

A question: how is realism related to Objectivism? I felt alot of similarity when reading Smith’s article “Realism”, though I may be mistaken.

Also, you said certain things are “optional values”. How does this fit in? What are examples non-optional values(other than choosing life over death) as well as other optional ones. I have difficulty reconciling Rand’s Objectivism with academic relativism without it breaking apart into subjectivism, atleast in terms of my understanding of it. In class I am constantly bombarded with “You see people buring a cat , is it moral” or “You can save five men by taking the life of another, do you do it?” I usually say these are utterly hypothetical, but do the answers to these fall under “optional values” or universal ones?

6

Yeah, part of my problem in the ethics class is the varying definitions as compared to those used by Rand. I seem to be the only Objectivist in the class, with four fervent relativists who actually have alot of philosophy backround.

A question: how is realism related to Objectivism? I felt alot of similarity when reading Smith’s article “Realism”, though I may be mistaken.

The problem with terms like ‘realism’ or ‘relativism’ is that they are so broad that its hard to even call them meaningful. There are hundreds of different brands of ‘moral realism’, so you would really have to be more specific. I think Ayn Rand would have labelled the majority of them as being forms of intrinsicism however.

Also, you said certain things are “optional values”. How does this fit in? What are examples non-optional values(other than choosing life over death) as well as other optional ones.

What career should I pursue, which people should I associate with, what flavour of icecream should I have with pineapple jelly. One thing that is normally common to optional values is that although there is no one ‘right’ answer, there are usually several wrong ones. Being a doctor or a scientist can both be valid career choices, but being a tax-collector couldnt.

I have difficulty reconciling Rand’s Objectivism with academic relativism without it breaking apart into subjectivism, atleast in terms of my understanding of it. In class I am constantly bombarded with “You see people buring a cat , is it moral” or “You can save five men by taking the life of another, do you do it?” I usually say these are utterly hypothetical, but do the answers to these fall under “optional values” or universal ones?

In my opinion, academic relativism (analytic, not continental) often has its heart in the right place despite being dangerously wrong about several important issues such as the proper role of ‘standards’. I find it far preferable to objectivism though, which strikes me as akin to secularised religion.

Questions like ‘you see people burning a cat, is it moral?’ serve to bring out the absurdity in simplistic formulations of moral objectivism. The only way you could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is if you believe that moral rules are somehow context-free, universal, and timeless. You dont get questions like this in Objectivist literature, and for good reasons. Your best bet would be a blanket refusal to answer them, unless more context was given.

7

Okay, how about my original example of going to a concert with friends versus seeing an ailing grandmother. To me, it seems, this comes down to preferential values. If I was really close to my grandmother, I would choose to see her, as I would likely draw more pleasure from it. If I was a concert-goer and I barely knew my grandmother, the show would likely be the better choice. I guess this goes along with the hypothetical emperitive - If one wants X, one should choose Y. So am I right to assume that neither of these choices is inherently/universally(however one wants to phrase it) better than the other? Are only choices related to life/death and breaching others rights applicable to universally right or wrong? IE: It is wrong to murder innocents, it is wrong to enslave others, regardless of your personal goal.

Thanks for help thusfar, it has helped me get a much better grasp of objectivist ethics.

8

Yes, you’re right about the grandmother vs. concert example. As such, Objectivism will not tell you directly that seeing your grandmother is the better or the worse choice than going to a concert – not in that form. There are so many facts you have to consider. You listed some. There are others: how ill is your grandma? when did you last see her? how rare is the concert? how close are you to your friends? Actually, even this list of questions is a poor illustration of the numerous factors that will be present in the real situation.

While Objectivism will not provide you directly with the the answer, it will help you evaluate and make a decision. As in the example of choosing a career, each concrete value (seeing grandma, seeing concert, etc.) is an example of a more abstract moral value.

Are only choices related to life/death and breaching others rights applicable to universally right or wrong?

In the first essay of “The Virtue of Selfishness”, Ayn Rand lists some core values and virtues. If you have not yet read that essay, I strongly suggest you do so.