8 hours ago, Reasoner said:
familiarize myself more with Kant rather than rely entirely on third party perspectives (of course, I haven’t the energy or time to actually read A Critique of Reason
Totally agree, and as Rand said - you need to know your enemy (e.g., in “Philosophy: Who Needs It?”). However, I don’t consider Critique of Pure Reason Kant’s best work anymore. Now I think his best work is Critique of Judgment. After familiarizing myself with Kant (and I am still in the process), I can verify Peikoff’s categorization of him as DIS. I freaking love Peikoff’s work - it totally opened my eyes on philosophy.
8 hours ago, Reasoner said:
I would argue that the ethics of rational egoism is the ONLY way to develop healthy relationships with others.
This is actually true. However, if you take it to a logical extreme, then it can create a nutshell around you, which cannot be penetrated by others and has others simply slip away (Chekhov’s “The Man in a Case” somewhat comes to mind). And then you are left alone. And since others aren’t required, you remain self-sufficient. I am writing from personal experience, by the way. And this is not only my view on this ethics. Consider Stefan Molyneux, who was also inspired by Objectivism and who talks about building healthier relationships than those usually developed by hardcore Objectivists. Besides, there isn’t really a need to go farther than Rand herself. Consider how she was with her best friends Isabel Paterson and Nathaniel Branden. I consider Branden INT, by the way. The guy was a genius psychologist.
5 hours ago, epistemologue said:
I’m not sure I agree on the point about general vs. specific. If Kant’s position on metaphysics is that it’s unknowable / pure subjectivism, then that’s a really strong position, whereas Rand leaves metaphysical questions open. Her philosophy is more of a “method” than a metaphysically grounded philosophical system.
Actually both systems are methods. In Boydstun’s essay we have this elaboration of Kant’s system as an epistemological method:
On 23.10.2010 at 3:02 PM, Boydstun said:
What is needed in addition to general logic in our cognitive repertoire for experience are Kant’s pure forms of sensory intuition (space and time) and his categories and principles of the understanding. Content supplied by the senses into this formal organization yields empirical knowledge universal and necessary[.]
Academicians understand Kant’s system in exactly the same way, in that epistemology as a method to verify or test knowledge, so it can be differentiated from belief. Kant is not a skeptic (even Peikoff says this in DIM), Kant is a reducer: he reduces everything to reason alone, ignoring what’s ‘above’ and ‘beyond’ reason that cannot be represented as knowledge in Kant’s system. Kant’s system thus becomes extremely narrow, whereas Rand’s is considered to be extremely open, in this respect, even to the point of some academicians calling Objectivism - ‘playing tennis without a net.’ ‘A net,’ in this case, could be considered a Kantian epistemologism of a priori categories of reason. I think Rand’s philosophy’s breadth of application boggles some philosophers’ minds because they cannot wrap their narrow Kantian heads around it. In fact, I think the general vs. specific conflict is the main one between them that can be overcome through my own philosophy, as I consider it to be broad enough and specific that it doesn’t lose on either front and therefore transcends both Rand and Kant. However, maybe it’s the same reason my philosophy is not understood by many: they simply cannot accept its Randian side. My purpose is to help them understand, but the best way is to first improve Rand’s reputation in academia (hence premise 3 is a close second in importance).
5 hours ago, epistemologue said:
I also think these are odd claims, especially given what you yourself just quoted him saying about dignity and being subject only to the law one writes one’s self: “the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than that which he himself at the same time gives”
One of my issues with Kant is an absence of his politology (scratch that - see a discussion on Kant’s politics below, in a reply to splitmary), so we don’t know what role he gave to those in power. He couldn’t have simply ignored the structures of power in favor of merely reducing everyone to minds, right? So the idea of dignity can be interpreted differently based on Kant’s interpretation of how power structure affects citizens. If we agree with Kant and merely reduce everyone to a mind, then each person would be dignified but in a vacuum and completely oblivious to what’s going on around him in terms of politics. But if we take Kant’s statements when he praises war in Critique of Judgment, §28, and also there, §83, when he speculates that war can be guided by concealed higher wisdom, we can interpret his statement of dignity to the same extent the Nazis interpreted dignity: that is, you are only dignified if you fight for your glorious and sacred Third Reich. In support for this kind of thought, consider Kant’s On Pedagogy (I am using a Russian edition, so I have to paraphrase), when he wrote that the only source of evil is when human nature is not made to follow rules and that, since we can train dogs and horses, so we can also train people. At the end of his Pedagogy, surprisingly, Kant teaches how to inculcate respect for religion and faith in God in young adults. Maybe this goes along with the ‘concealed higher wisdom’ that guides people to kill each other for the glory of one’s Fatherland?
5 hours ago, epistemologue said:
How can he be accused of replacing “social will” with universal law, when he describes how one ought to obey no law other than that which he *himself* gives?
Kant’s (in)famous categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” The infamous SS Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Eichmann declared “with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life … according to a Kantian definition of duty”. … [After the trial] Eichmann acknowledged he did not “live entirely according to it, although [he] would like to do so” (wikipedia).
5 hours ago, splitprimary said:
what you’ve described above sounds a lot more like Plato’s political ideas, not Kant’s
Wow, so people must have been right when they claimed that Kant’s philosophy covered everything there is to cover by philosophy. This might seem that his philosophy is as broad as Rand’s, but I interpret this as that he reduced everything to his narrow and specific view, whereas Rand, as epistemologue wrote, ‘leaves metaphysical questions open’ instead of punching out everyone’s reality in 12 categories (as Harriman mentioned something similar once about Kant, I think).
Now, as to Kant’s politics, from the Wikipedia link you shared, “the exercise of governmental power is constrained by the law.” (Question 1:) Is this law different from Kant’s practical laws, and if so - how and what if it conflicts with the laws he derived from reason? This political section is very interesting in respect to how it relates to his practical reason. Another related question for you (Question 2), Skye, is (as you mentioned in our Facebook discussion) how does Rawls’s egalitarianism contradict Kantian politics?
I should also tell you about Eduard Bernstein, a famous neo-Kantian Marxist - as he, starting the whole revisionist tradition in Marxism (followed by Leszek Kołakowski and Noam Chomsky to an extent), thought that Marx was missing ethics and that Kantian ethics was perfect to fill that void. I am not sure whether Rawls’s views at all reflect Bernstein’s (I haven’t studied either in more detail), but maybe they are somehow related through Bernstein’s evolutionary socialism with the final goal of socialism being nothing and progress toward that goal being everything. Reformism (contra revolutionism) can very much match that view, since they’d like to change laws to help citizens economically without necessarily taking political power. It’s liberalism either way you look at it: Kant’s, Rawls’s, or Bernstein’s.
From Wikipedia on Kant’s political philosophy:
Quote
Kant’s approach is based on the supremacy of a country’s written constitution. This supremacy must create guarantees for implementation of his central idea: a permanent peaceful life as a basic condition for the happiness of its people and their prosperity.
This is similar to what European union did with their Charter of fundamental human rights (to me it’s propaganda of peace for economic security, while those same rights are waived instantly when EU starts wars). In contrast (maybe a hidden malice?), compare to § 28.: Of Nature regarded as Might (in Crit#3):
Quote
War itself, if it is carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the rights of citizens, has something sublime in it, and makes the disposition of the people who carry it on thus, only the more sublime, the more numerous are the dangers to which they are exposed, and in respect of which they behave with courage. On the other hand, a long peace generally brings about a predominant commercial spirit, and along with it, low selfishness, cowardice, and effeminacy, and debases the disposition of the people. (my emphases)
Interestingly, low selfishness is seen here as a bad result of commerce. Here is the original German of the last sentence from Kant, I. (1912). Sämliche Werke in Sechs Bänden. Leipzig: Inselverlag. B. 6. s. 126:
Quote
… da hingegen ein langer Frieden den bloßen Handelsgeist, mit ihm aber den niedrigen Eigennutz, Feigheit und Weichlichkeit herrschend zu machen und die Denkungsart des Volks zu erniedrigen pflegt. (emphases as above)
herrschend zu machen can be differently translated as ‘prevailing, prevalent’ (in terms of happening) or ‘ruling’, den niedrigen Eigennutz as ‘base (low) self-interest’, Weichlichkeit as ‘softness’ rather than ‘effeminacy’, and die Denkungsart des Volks zu erniedrigen pflegt as ‘to humiliate the way of thinking of the people.’
Whichever way you look at this, Kant conflicts with Rand, and their ethics covered in my premise 4 is perhaps their biggest conflict.
Also an interesting piece from Wiki:
Quote
Kant opposed “democracy” – which, in that era, meant direct democracy – believing that majority rule posed a threat to individual liberty. He stated, “…democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which “all” decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, “all”, who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.”
I don’t know what to say to that yet or how to apply Kantian politics to governments other than EU, in whose ‘objective’ charter of human rights I don’t believe. Perhaps I was wrong in thinking about Kant’s politics more along the lines of Plato (or Stalin, for that matter), but that’s only because I didn’t know he had politics in the first place (poor excuse, I know). Thank you for enlightening me with this new information, Skye! Maybe Kantian politics is not so bad after all because we haven’t seen yet what it can do to a greater extent. Or maybe EU is exactly that perfection, but then what about Brexit and possible Frexit? Problems with it after all. If it’s already falling apart - that means it’s not working. EU, following Kant, has ‘democratic deficit’ so it is not democracy per se but a federated parliamentary democratic republican union of governments - or whatever kind of beast it is, please someone explain. A mixture of some good, if not currently best, government structures so far, and it doesn’t seem to be working. Kant “distinguished three forms of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy with mixed government as the most ideal form of government.”
I like this part of Kant: “the goal of perpetual peace in society can be achieved only when the rulers consult with philosophers on a regular basis.” But it can work to the opposite effect too, as we all know.
5 hours ago, Eiuol said:
Objectivist is internalist to the extent that perceptual experience itself is valid to use, and one can make use of internal states.
Yes, and I understood that you understood that the external includes the internal, hence also supporting the breadth/generality of premise 1. Kantians, on the other hand, cannot understand this because the external is included under the internal - the opposite of Rand.
To us (Objectivists and me), perception connects our consciousness to external, physical, contextual reality, right? To Kantians, perception as internal appearances connects them (as minds with a priori categories) to a metaphysical reality (noumenon) within themselves (within mind but beyond the boundaries of reason). That’s why Kantians are confusing to us.
5 hours ago, Eiuol said:
You might be better off avoiding that terminology and saying that internal and external can be linked without a filter in between.
Or maybe just explain that ‘filter’ better. Or maybe the ‘filter’ itself can be used to transcend the conflict of 2? That’s what I am trying to figure out. Can someone connect the connections between external and internal for Rand and Kant maybe by following a better description of them? I know external and internal are connected, but I don’t seem to understand how in context with Kant. We totally need a Kantian expert on this thread. I am only trying to understand him still.
Correct me if I am wrong. The directionality seems to be different: in Objectivism perception is outward - toward (external) objects; in Kantianism perception is inward - toward (internal) appearances of objects. While Objectivists take objects as objects (3D?), Kantians take objects as only surfaces (2D?). Perhaps the dimensionality is a useless analogy here, but I am trying to make a point that Objectivists take things-in-themselves as parts of objects of perception, like Marxist materialists do (who, in my opinion, also try to transcend idealism and Kantian materialism, but in their own way, obviously), but Democritus and Kant only looked at the surface of things, at their appearances within reason and could only explain the external world by means of mind/reason, that is, internally. Democritus also used math to explain different characteristics of atoms and called them ‘amers’ (this is from a soviet 1979 text, so I am not sure how it would back-translate or whether it’s even considered accurate by the West academia), but here is something from SEP as a temporary buffer before further transition:
Quote
[Democritus] famously denies {my emphasis} that perceptible qualities other than shape and size (and, perhaps, weight) really exist in the atoms themselves: one direct quotation surviving from Democritus claims that ‘by convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in reality atoms and void’
That is, atoms (or matter) couldn’t be known in themselves for Democritus but only through appearances (phenomena in Kant), which Democritus gave as much and similar value as did Kant, while both weren’t strictly empiricists.
In the Russian book Democritus (B. B. Bits, Democrit, Moskva: “Misl’”, 1979), there is written:
Quote
“… in the smallest atom there were 7 amer [амер(ы)]: top, bottom, left, right, front, back, middle. It was mathematics …” (p. 53)
Hereby, I see this as a kind of similar view taking various categories through which we describe reality. The difference is that Democritus used mathematics, which is analytical, and Kant used synthetic a priori, but with Rudolf Carnap, a logical positivist, we found that there are also analytic a priori (perhaps the Russellian bridge from logic to math helped). Quine showed (as did Peikoff later) that there are NO synthetic and analytic distinctions, and Chomsky used some of Quine’s ideas to support his ever-in-progress-to-completion universal grammar theory (remember how Rand called Kantians the grammarians in “Fairness Doctrine for Education” [FDE], 1972?). Hence historically we got to grammar, or mere sentence structures without any meaning in themselves, from a priori categories, first philosophical and then mathematical. This is also going beyond Peikoff’s DIM but following in his footsteps and using the main Objectivist premise of philosophy affecting culture and science.
6 hours ago, Eiuol said:
Regarding all that except the Copenhagen interpretation, Descartes and Locke probably impacted a lot more than Kant. Kant had some impact but that’s just nativism. If anything, Chomsky matters more to all those fields than Kant and is on equal ground as Kant in those fields.
If it wasn’t for Descartes and Leibniz, Kant might have never found his philosophy. Descartes was overly concerned with reason and mechanistic determinism (also found in Kant’s Crit3 when he speaks of mechanical teleology), while Leibniz tried ‘integrating’ Plato with Democritus, and his philosophizing about phenomenological ‘appearances’ were praised by Kant (see Boydstun’s essay, from which I quoted in an earlier comment). So surely, Descartes upped philosophy through Enlightenment, but Chomsky is no Descartean (even though he calls himself so). Instead, he is, as Rand noticed quite accurately, a Kantian. See this quote to remind you of this from FDE:
Quote
Most of today’s philosophy departments are dominated by Linguistic Analysis (the product of crossbreeding between philosophy and grammar), with some remnants of its immediate progenitors, Pragmatism and Logical Positivism, still clinging to its bandwagon. The more “broadminded” departments include an opposition - the other side of the same Kantian coin, Existentialism. (One side claims that philosophy is grammar, the other that philosophy is feelings.)
I spoke to a Kantian (Bill Harris, also known on this blog), and he said there is no philosophy in her quote, but I disagree. Here you may find the same kind of metaphilosophical delineation developed in Peikoff’s DIM. In this quote, Rand differentiates the determinists vs. indeterminists: the famous conflict between Democritean and Epicurean philosophy (notice that they are both materialists, thus DIS in my book). Today the conflict is between Chomskyans (the grammarians) and the decentralizers like Michel Foucault (the feeling type, like Nietzsche). Do you see the parallels?