validating volition

Over the years many different Objectivists have said much about free will; most notably the original, herself. But the subject has been recurring rather frequently and I, for one, think a thorough reexamination and (more importantly) concretization is in order.

To start things off, the root of the problem [for average laymen] seems to stem from two seemingly contradictory principles:

1; Volition is axiomatic

The fact that everyone who reads this sentence has the choice to read it or not, as they wish, is self evident to them.

Volition itself is introspectively apparent, indisputable and irreducible (at least as far as I can tell); I’m fairly sure it’s axiomatic but we’ll return to the implications shortly.

2: Every thing is ultimately necessary

By this I mean that nothing is causeless. There is a reason for the existence and actions of every entity and, given enough knowledge, every entity’s future actions could be predicted. In the words of Peikoff:

“No other universe is possible or imaginable [given sufficient information]”; one could imagine flying through the sky like superman but, if one bears the law of gravity in mind, one knows it isn’t possible.

This principle of necessity is, I think, not only an explicit part of Objectivism; it’s implicit in all rational thought whatsoever. The alternative is for things to act randomly and, if that were ever truly accepted, no inquiry of any sort would be possible; even superstition would be too specific of a confinement (and without knowledge, no action or life would be possible).

So we have 1: the axiom of volition and 2: the principle of necessity (corollary of identity)

I use necessity because the meaning of causality has been somewhat obscured, but that’s essentially what I mean.


The problem arises when we apply necessity to volition, because we end up debating either Volition by analyzing whether choice is REALLY possible or Necessity by analyzing whether every effect must REALLY have a cause.

I think that both principles are valid and accurate; I think the thing to reexamine is their derivative implications, specifically regarding each other, which thus far have been taken for granted [by average laymen].


Regarding necessity, we have a habit of assigning ONE cause to ONE effect. I’m not sure where it stems from but it obviously doesn’t conform to reality and, consequently, I’d like everyone to bear in mind that multiple interacting entities usually produce multiple effects, in nature.

For example: were you caused by your mother, your father or an oxygenated atmosphere? That’s what I mean; let’s avoid it.


Regarding volition, the implicit fallacy is in a widespread misintegration of the concept “possible” which is taken to mean causeless; a negation of necessity (which is what makes the two seem contradictory).

But do human beings actually behave arbitrarily?

I think that all of my own choices, including the choice to write this presently, are determined in a singularly necessary way: MY CHOICES ARE DETERMINED BY MY THOUGHTS.


Sorry if that’s a non sequiter at present but I have to go.

That is, in a nutshell, what I’ve surmised about Objectivism’s take on volition and why I think that free will is absolutely compatible with determinism: you make every decision for your own specific reasons and your ultimate fate depends on those decisions.

Anyway; applying one to the other:

P: Everything which happens, including chosen actions, is necessary under the antecedent conditions

p: I am capable of choosing from a range of possible actions

C: My own choice IS part of the antecedent conditions of my actions!

Now I know this might not obviously square with the Necessity principle, at first glance, so let’s reapply it to the predicate term (?):

P: I am capable of choosing from a range of possible actions

p: I choose whichever option seems best, according to certain valuative standards

C: Those standards of value partially cause my choices

And we could repeat this one step further and one step further until we got right down into my sense of life and judgments I formed in infancy.


Ultimately I think you *could* completely dissect someone, every perception to every thought to every action, but you couldn’t reduce it straight into stimuli and response.

Human beings are self aware creatures which think before they act (and think about thinking, too). Computational nightmare aside, you can’t accurately predict anyone’s actions while ignoring their mind- NOR chalk it up to a lack of identity.

Compatibilism is right because neither Volition nor Necessity is dispensable. . .

. . . Right?

Over the years many different Objectivists have said much about free will; most notably the original, herself. But the subject has been recurring rather frequently and I, for one, think a thorough reexamination and (more importantly) concretization is in order.

To start things off, the root of the problem [for average laymen] seems to stem from two seemingly contradictory principles:

1; Volition is axiomatic

The fact that everyone who reads this sentence has the choice to read it or not, as they wish, is self evident to them.

Volition itself is introspectively apparent, indisputable and irreducible (at least as far as I can tell); I’m fairly sure it’s axiomatic but we’ll return to the implications shortly.

2: Every thing is ultimately necessary

By this I mean that nothing is causeless. There is a reason for the existence and actions of every entity and, given enough knowledge, every entity’s future actions could be predicted. In the words of Peikoff:

“No other universe is possible or imaginable [given sufficient information]”; one could imagine flying through the sky like superman but, if one bears the law of gravity in mind, one knows it isn’t possible.

This principle of necessity is, I think, not only an explicit part of Objectivism; it’s implicit in all rational thought whatsoever. The alternative is for things to act randomly and, if that were ever truly accepted, no inquiry of any sort would be possible; even superstition would be too specific of a confinement (and without knowledge, no action or life would be possible).

So we have 1: the axiom of volition and 2: the principle of necessity (corollary of identity)

I use necessity because the meaning of causality has been somewhat obscured, but that’s essentially what I mean.


The problem arises when we apply necessity to volition, because we end up debating either Volition by analyzing whether choice is REALLY possible or Necessity by analyzing whether every effect must REALLY have a cause.

I think that both principles are valid and accurate; I think the thing to reexamine is their derivative implications, specifically regarding each other, which thus far have been taken for granted [by average laymen].


Regarding necessity, we have a habit of assigning ONE cause to ONE effect. I’m not sure where it stems from but it obviously doesn’t conform to reality and, consequently, I’d like everyone to bear in mind that multiple interacting entities usually produce multiple effects, in nature.

For example: were you caused by your mother, your father or an oxygenated atmosphere? That’s what I mean; let’s avoid it.


Regarding volition, the implicit fallacy is in a widespread misintegration of the concept “possible” which is taken to mean causeless; a negation of necessity (which is what makes the two seem contradictory).

But do human beings actually behave arbitrarily?

I think that all of my own choices, including the choice to write this presently, are determined in a singularly necessary way: MY CHOICES ARE DETERMINED BY MY THOUGHTS.


Sorry if that’s a non sequiter at present but I have to go.

That is, in a nutshell, what I’ve surmised about Objectivism’s take on volition and why I think that free will is absolutely compatible with determinism: you make every decision for your own specific reasons and your ultimate fate depends on those decisions.

I think you left out two important identifications that Objectivism has made: what volition is and what causality means.  Volition is the choice to think or not, to focus one’s mind or not, to raise one’s level of awareness from from a narrower context to a wider context that requires focusing on specific issues.  Causality refer to entities and their actions, not to actions and other actions.  These two issues avoid the usual confusion that thinking is caused by external or internal factors, such as environment or heredity.  

Yes but the identification of volition as the choice to focus doesn’t really fix the problem, by itself; it only moves it to “what causes someone to focus or not”.

Entity based causality shoul’ve been mentioned, though; that’s one of the major flaws in eliminative materialism.

Yes but the identification of volition as the choice to focus doesn’t really fix the problem, by itself; it only moves it to “what causes someone to focus or not”.

There is no end to which people can ask questions. There is an end to which questions can be asked and answers can logically be given. The question is not “moved” to what is self-evident. The question is declared to be illogical and without foundation.

 

Entity based causality shoul’ve been mentioned, though; that’s one of the major flaws in eliminative materialism.

A=A: I don’t follow; I think there’s a connection somewhere around the choice to focus that I’ve failed to make.

Could you elaborate on why the causes of someone’s choice to focus or not isn’t a valid line of inquiry?

A=A: I don’t follow; I think there’s a connection somewhere around the choice to focus that I’ve failed to make.

Could you elaborate on why the causes of someone’s choice to focus or not isn’t a valid line of inquiry?

Since the choice to focus is an action, the only cause that can be attributed to it is the entity making the choice.  If by ‘cause’ you mean an internal or external deterministic process that makes the choice non-volitional, then the claim is self-invalidating.  The choice to focus presupposes any such knowledge on your part.  If your grasp of the truth of any item of your knowledge is predetermined, then you have no basis for claiming it is true, that is, that it corresponds to reality.  Logical fallacies are studied for a purpose: to delimit valid knowledge from invalid knowledge no matter how much scientific research one wants to devote to the study.

 

What is the nature of reason if the choice to focus is determined?

 

Do you think the question “why contradictions exist” is a valid line of inquiry?  Why not consider Descartes claim that there may be an evil demon deceiving us, therefore we can’t be certain of our perception of the world?  Is that a valid line of inquiry?

 

Where and how would you draw a line?  At what point would you claim “this line of inquiry is illogical and cannot be pursued”?  Where and when does one accept that one has reached a fundamental fact of reality and further questioning is fruitless?

Since the choice to focus is an action, the only cause that can be attributed to it is the entity making the choice.  If by ‘cause’ you mean an internal or external deterministic process that makes the choice non-volitional, then the claim is self-invalidating.  The choice to focus presupposes any such knowledge on your part.  If your grasp of the truth of any item of your knowledge is predetermined, then you have no basis for claiming it is true, that is, that it corresponds to reality.  Logical fallacies are studied for a purpose: to delimit valid knowledge from invalid knowledge no matter how much scientific research one wants to devote to the study.

 

What is the nature of reason if the choice to focus is determined?

 

Do you think the question “why contradictions exist” is a valid line of inquiry?  Why not consider Descartes claim that there may be an evil demon deceiving us, therefore we can’t be certain of our perception of the world?  Is that a valid line of inquiry?

 

Where and how would you draw a line?  At what point would you claim “this line of inquiry is illogical and cannot be pursued”?  Where and when does one accept that one has reached a fundamental fact of reality and further questioning is fruitless?

 

A is A

 

Consider specifically choosing “to focus or not” (although I would argue the analysis applies to “choice” generally and it is irrelevant what particular choice is being discussed but I digress)

 

Consider the choice being made and there being an “outcome” being one of focussing or not focussing.

 

From the following premises of Objectivism:

 

A.  Consciousness/minds/brains/human beings are natural entities of reality.

B.  All entities however chosen in reality whether a system, group, part, subpart, obey the law of identity, as does the universe as a whole.

C.  Objectivism holds that a direct corollary of the law of identity is the law of causation according to objectivism. which is a law of how entities act

D.  The law of causation according to Objectivism is the law of identity applied to action, specifically, that an entity having a specific nature will act in only one way in a specific context.

 

Reason dictates that:

1. a human being, if a natural entity in reality must have an (one) identity as in B

  1. If as objectivism holds the law of causation is logically required/implied by the law of identity, then humans must obey the law of causation ©

  2. If, as objectivism holds, the law of causation implies a single outcome given the nature/identity of the entity and the nature/identity of the context, then a human entity can only act in one given way having a particular nature/identity in a specific context. 

  3. If a human entity can act in only one given way the outcome of any choice is determined at the instant just prior to the choice

 

How is it that humans can have choice, and can choose the “outcome” (focus or not in the hypothetical above) given the premises of Objectivism and reason applied thereto?

 

Which of the premises is/are false or which of the statements of reasoning is/are false?

 

I really need your help here.

Consciousness is not an entity for starters. It( the abstraction of consciousness ) is an attribute, without going through the rest of the post, would this observation change the logic of the argument?

A is A

 

Consider specifically choosing “to focus or not” (although I would argue the analysis applies to “choice” generally and it is irrelevant what particular choice is being discussed but I digress)

 

Consider the choice being made and there being an “outcome” being one of focussing or not focussing.

 

From the following premises of Objectivism:

 

A.  Consciousness/minds/brains/human beings are natural entities of reality.

B.  All entities however chosen in reality whether a system, group, part, subpart, obey the law of identity, as does the universe as a whole.

C.  Objectivism holds that a direct corollary of the law of identity is the law of causation according to objectivism. which is a law of how entities act

D.  The law of causation according to Objectivism is the law of identity applied to action, specifically, that an entity having a specific nature will act in only one way in a specific context.

 

Reason dictates that:

1. a human being, if a natural entity in reality must have an (one) identity as in B

  1. If as objectivism holds the law of causation is logically required/implied by the law of identity, then humans must obey the law of causation ©

  2. If, as objectivism holds, the law of causation implies a single outcome given the nature/identity of the entity and the nature/identity of the context, then a human entity can only act in one given way having a particular nature/identity in a specific context. 

  3. If a human entity can act in only one given way the outcome of any choice is determined at the instant just prior to the choice

 

How is it that humans can have choice, and can choose the “outcome” (focus or not in the hypothetical above) given the premises of Objectivism and reason applied thereto?

 

Which of the premises is/are false or which of the statements of reasoning is/are false?

 

I really need your help here.

D is incorrect.  It applies to all other living organisms except those with volition.  

4 assumes D, which I hold is incorrect.  You have no way to predict which choice a volitional being will take no matter how much information you have about them.  You have no way to know whether I will choose to act on my choice once made.  I challenge you to predict whether I will consider your arguments or ignore or evade them when considering my response.  

 

Outcomes only come into play when one has specific information about the values or thinking methods used by a person.  For example, you can probably predict that I will eat food when I get hungry; that I will watch TV if I want to see Jeopardy; that I will think about problems at work if I want to get paid and keep my job.  You can probably predict an outcome if you know that I will keep all of the relevant information in focus before I make decision.  But nothing will enable you to predict that I will focus on the relevant information when making a decision, and nothing will determine it other than my choice to focus or not.

Consciousness is not an entity for starters. It( the abstraction of consciousness ) is an attribute, without going through the rest of the post, would this observation change the logic of the argument?

Who is this addressed to?  If me, I don’t understand how it relates to my argument.  Please explain.

A is A

No sorry re consciousness I was addressing item A in StrictlyLogical’s post.

A is A: I think I see now. I think there are several components of “deterministic” which need to be differentiated.

I do think the choice to focus must be predictable, given enough information. Whether or not a sufficient amount of information is attainable is a debatable point but, in principle, there must be some “causes” which can be understood.

I think this because the alternative would be that this choice is fundamentally unpredictable; fundamentally arbitrary and incomprehensible, which I do not accept.

However, I see your point about reason and any formal epistemology (thank you); the other component to “determinism” is automation, ie. that X will occur without anyone’s deliberate action (which is obviously false).

For example:

If there were a problem which required several conceptual steps to solve, nobody could ever solve it without explicitly taking those steps for themselves- even if they were “destined” to find the solution.

And might I also point out that this is a predictive claim which can only be valid if volitional action is caused.

“Determinism” contains identity, which I think applies, and automation, which can’t.

And I would draw the line of validity between what has a genuine alternate (such as truth) and what doesn’t (such as existence).

Contradictions may be formed because the human mind requires things to either be affirmed or denied, to form functional knowledge, and is fallible.

Every application of “illusion” to reality is invalid because an illusion is a perception which contradicts reality; it boils down to questioning the truth or falsehood of the very standard for comparison, itself.

So Descartes’ deciever was invalid for the same reason the Matrix is: reality is perfectly identical to reality, A=A. :stuck_out_tongue:

“Reality isn’t real” is a perfect reification of a contradiction- and interestingly, I’ve never seen any variation nor permutation of which wasn’t uttered with some alternative dreamworld on hand to solve it with.

A is A: I think I see now. I think there are several components of “deterministic” which need to be differentiated.

I do think the choice to focus must be predictable, given enough information. Whether or not a sufficient amount of information is attainable is a debatable point but, in principle, there must be some “causes” which can be understood.

I think this because the alternative would be that this choice is fundamentally unpredictable; fundamentally arbitrary and incomprehensible, which I do not accept.

I would challenge your first sentence in the second paragraph. The cause is the entity, not the amount of information.  There is an element of subjectivism here: given sufficient info, you could then predict.  Look at it from the perspective of the volitional being.  How much information does it take to make the fundamental choice?  NO information is needed because the choice is introspectively self-evident.  I do not need any information about, let’s say, the importance of philosophy in life, in order to think about it.  All I have to do is be aware of the subject and decide (choose) to focus on the material at hand to study the issue: to choose to acquire information.  How much information would I need that would cause me to think about the subject matter?  How would I acquire such information without already having made the choice to think?  By the same token, how would YOU acquire such information about me before you’d find it predictable if YOU were not focusing?

 

The choice to focus is independent of any subject or any amount of information.  It is irrelevant whether the choice is to shoot heroine into your veins or which career to follow.  The principle is, then, will I cause my consciousness to function in such a manner as to obtain the information about the subject I am focusing on.  

 

The alternative to predictability is not unpredictability, the alternative is acceptance of the fact of volition as a action open of human consciousness. In other words, the only thing that is predictable is that a choice will be made, and that I (each individual) will face such a choice. 

 

However, I see your point about reason and any formal epistemology (thank you); the other component to “determinism” is automation, ie. that X will occur without anyone’s deliberate action (which is obviously false).

For example:

If there were a problem which required several conceptual steps to solve, nobody could ever solve it without explicitly taking those steps for themselves- even if they were “destined” to find the solution.

And might I also point out that this is a predictive claim which can only be valid if volitional action is caused.

There is no such thing as destiny, again, it contradicts volition. But how does this last solve your question. You’re basically saying that if certain choices are made, then the consequences of those choices will follow. But the issue here, as I understand your question, is what determines the choice?

 

It is caused, by the entity facing the choice.

 

“Determinism” contains identity, which I think applies, and automation, which can’t.

And I would draw the line of validity between what has a genuine alternate (such as truth) and what doesn’t (such as existence).

Contradictions may be formed because the human mind requires things to either be affirmed or denied, to form functional knowledge, and is fallible.

Every application of “illusion” to reality is invalid because an illusion is a perception which contradicts reality; it boils down to questioning the truth or falsehood of the very standard for comparison, itself.

So Descartes’ deciever was invalid for the same reason the Matrix is: reality is perfectly identical to reality, A=A. :stuck_out_tongue:

And how does this affect your understanding of volition?  If truth has an alternative but existence does not, what does that tell you about volition?  If human consciousness were not volitional, how could one distinguish between truth and existence?  Do non-human animals have a problem with what is true or not?  Why not?

D is incorrect.  It applies to all other living organisms except those with volition.  

4 assumes D, which I hold is incorrect.  You have no way to predict which choice a volitional being will take no matter how much information you have about them.  You have no way to know whether I will choose to act on my choice once made.  I challenge you to predict whether I will consider your arguments or ignore or evade them when considering my response.  

 

Outcomes only come into play when one has specific information about the values or thinking methods used by a person.  For example, you can probably predict that I will eat food when I get hungry; that I will watch TV if I want to see Jeopardy; that I will think about problems at work if I want to get paid and keep my job.  You can probably predict an outcome if you know that I will keep all of the relevant information in focus before I make decision.  But nothing will enable you to predict that I will focus on the relevant information when making a decision, and nothing will determine it other than my choice to focus or not.

 

Please clarify if you mean D is correctly identified according to Objectivism, but is incorrect, or if you mean to say I have incorrectly identified the premises of Objectivism and D according to Objectivism is something actually something different.  Which is it?

 

I would submit D cannot be incorrect unless something in B or C is incorrect. 

B is taken to be universal according to Objectivism, while C is according to Objectivism logically necessitated from/entailed in B.  Recall the law of causality according to Objectivism is SINGLE valued, and is claimed by Objectivism to be a corollary of the law of identity , merely the law of identity as applied to action.  

I think “could have been otherwise” is the essential difference of volitional action. All existents have identity and have to act accordingly. The identity of volitional organisms is such that its actions could have been otherwise. The actions are caused by the organisms choice to act.

A is A: The posts on valid inquiry were rather tangential; I know your questions were rhetorical but I wanted to share some answers, anyway.

There are two ways I can see in which they relate to volition.

1: The choice to focus having two possible alternates would be, in my opinion, a valid study.

2: This choice, along with the finite nature of knowledge, give rise to the possibility of error (which instincts do not possess).