Valuing other people

Ethics
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1

I would like to know if I am understanding this concept correctly.

 

When it comes to objectivism it is my understanding that when determining how to deal with or interact with people you must first determine how much or to what extent you value said person.  From my perspective I value my own life as well as my wife and my son’s lives the most, followed by my parents, my wife’s parents, friends, extended family members, people I know on down to strangers as having the least value to me.  If two people ask me to do something that would occur at the same time and one is my mother and one is a friend I will help my mother because I value her more than the friend.  If I can save my wife or a stranger then I will save my wife.  Following this rubric I should feel no compunction about not helping or saving the person I value least.  Don’t get me wrong I feel all people have value as a default and through their actions either increase or decrease their value.  If I am correct, however, when I make a decision concerning who to help or how to treat someone it is based upon my opinion of that person’s value to me.

 

Please let me know if I am correct, moving in the right direction or completely wrong.

 

Thanks.

2

What you wrote is consistent with Objectivist principles. It’s the use of your own life and values as your standard to go off of, followed by objectively appraising your values as best you can in order to benefit your life as well as possible.

Edit: The only nit-picking might be your omission of “objective” when you wrote “from my perspective.” If your perspective is to break the law haphazardly, it’s doubtful that would actually be a value to you. Likewise if your perspective is to keep a person in your life who tries to manipulate you with guilt, that would also probably not actually be to your benefit, even if you tried to excuse it to yourself.

3

I agree with JASKN, but there’s one line in your OP that is too concrete. You say: “If two people ask me to do something that would occur at the same time and one is my mother and one is a friend I will help my mother because I value her more than the friend.”

 

Taken literally, this is an over-generalization. Firstly, it could make sense to say “mom, wait I’ll get to you tomorrow; my friend’s thing has to be done today but yours can wait”. Secondly, even if both events must really clash, you do not have to choose based on who is of greater value to you as a whole. That is just one input into the decision. For instance, if your mom really wants you to visit her every Wednesday because that’s the only one possible, and you want to visit a grand aunt instead just this one week, it doesn’t mean you love your mom less.

4

Related, from Tara Smith’s Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics:

Rand regards purpose as one of the three cardinal values. “A central purpose,” Peikoff explains, “is the long-range goal that constitutes the primary claimant on a man’s time, energy and resources. All his other goals, however worthwhile, are secondary and must be integrated to this purpose. The others are to be pursued only where such a pursuit complements the primary, rather than detracting from it” (OPAR 99). A person’s central purpose is the paramount end by reference to which that person can determine the importance to assign to other things in his life; it is the anchor and standard for a rational hierarchy of values, allowing him to prioritize various ends and, correspondingly, to be rational in his pursuit of them. Without a central purpose, a person will not know how valuable anything is to him. His actions are more susceptible to being determined by emotions, since he has no compelling reason to stay with a particular pursuit when it becomes difficult, tedious, or mildly unpleasant. A person who lacks a clear primary objective will have no grounds for evaluating the benefit he might derive from various activities. The person who has embraced a central purpose, by contrast, has a reason for doing things and a basis for deciding which things are worth doing. Correspondingly, a central purpose can provide motivation throughout many facets of a person’s life *

 

The chief reasons that productive work must be a person’s central purpose are three-fold. . . . (210)

 

* Because the central purpose of a person’s life is not a person’s only purpose, it need not crowd out all other values. Moreover, the fact that a central purpose should receive the bulk of a person’s time, overall, does not mean that it merits any particular unit of time. That productive work should be a person’s central purpose does not mean that he should always choose work over alternative activities, for instance.

 

 

Also, from me:*

In Rand’s conception, “productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values” (OE 25). David Kelley elaborates this conception. Recall that moving, final scene for Eddie in Atlas: “not just business and earning a living . . . but Dagny, business and earning a living and that in man which makes it possible—that is the best within us.” (Cf. NE 1177a12–18.) Kelley thinks that “productive work expresses ‘the best within us’ because it reflects man’s basic relationship to reality: the use of reason to create the values his survival requires” (IOSJ May 1993). Kelley generalizes from work (in the sense of making a living) to achievement, which would include work, raising children, maintaining a house, sustaining a happy marriage, organizing a civic cause, or overcoming a physical handicap or psychological problem. “An achiever is a doer: someone who projects a goal, who takes responsibility for bringing it about, and who takes pride in doing it well” (ibid.).

 

This generalized value, achievement, Kelley calls a global value. Global values cut across many, more particular values. Other global values would be enjoyment and virtue (virtue as a value). Such values have enough breadth and depth to be serious possible answers to the questions, “what do I want out of life? What is it that gives my life meaning and would leave me feeling empty and aimless were it taken away?” (ibid.). Kelley argues that the values of enjoyment and of virtue are intimately connected with the value of achievement, but that achievement should be the central global value, if our ultimate value is life and our highest purpose is happiness.

 

 

Also:

. . . A theory of ethical egoism certainly has to justify any empathy and concern for others back to one’s own self-interest, and I think this is precisely what the conception of caring about another’s happiness does.  It attains a direct and emotional benefit for the actor to do something good for someone they value.  At the same time, an egoistic theory that claims to provide objective values cannot simply say that “whoever you happen to care about, you should act to value them” any more than it can say that “whatever you happen to value, value it” as hedonism does.  We must have principles to distinguish which relationships are objectively good for us and which are bad.  I think Objectivism accomplishes this in much the same way that it guides our choice of a career, so I’ll use that as an analogy.

 

First and foremost, one’s choice of a career depends on personal, subjective values; on what one is passionate about.  If I’m passionate about furthering the study of economics (as I am) then I should seriously consider this personal preference when choosing a career.  However, if I’m passionate about robbing banks, say, or conning others, Objectivism provides a moral framework that enables us to reject ‘bank robber’ and ‘con man’ as rational career choices.  Thus, Objectivism provides some moral constraints, within which our personal, subjective preferences play a major role in determining what we should do.

 

Objectivism informs our decisions about relationships in much the same way.  Much is left up to personal preference, to romantic attraction and chemistry, and yet there are objective constraints on what kind of relationships are ‘good’ for us.  Someone that physically abuses you (to use an extreme example), or someone that constantly manipulates you, is objectively destructive to your life and goals.  Even if you are in love with such a person, you should act to change that, much the same way you would strive to reform yourself if you felt pulled towards a life as a con man.

 

Thus, I think we can say that valuing others and acting for them fits into our self-interest in the same way that pursuing a career that we love does.  These things bring immediate and important psychological benefits, in addition to more clearly instrumental values, and we can still objectively distinguish the good for our life from the bad.  This is what a theory of ethical egoism must accomplish, and I think Rand’s does so.

 

5

If ones interactions are based solely on a heirarchy of value, one must necessarily exclude oneself in order to help anyone, else the expendature of effort would always be wasted on a lesser value for the same reason as helping a stranger before a friend would.  Rational selfishness, as I understand it, simply prevents one from acting altruistically (without apparent gain); the only necessary heirarchy being to acknowledge oneself before others.  This implies to me that choosing to interact with others is less dependent on a heirarchy of value than a reciprocity of value, i.e., one chooses to expend effort on others (take a loss) with the rational expectation that others will choose to act in kind (restore your loss).

6

If ones interactions are based solely on a heirarchy of value, one must necessarily exclude oneself in order to help anyone, else the expendature of effort would always be wasted on a lesser value for the same reason as helping a stranger before a friend would.  Rational selfishness, as I understand it, simply prevents one from acting altruistically (without apparent gain); the only necessary heirarchy being to acknowledge oneself before others.  This implies to me that choosing to interact with others is less dependent on a heirarchy of value than a reciprocity of value, i.e., one chooses to expend effort on others (take a loss) with the rational expectation that others will choose to act in kind (restore your loss).

What you describe is a reciprocal altruism where all interactions are about loss, cost, or expense. Rational selfishness is about taking action or acquiring value without supposing you must forgo a loss. Why take a loss in the first place? That’s altruism for sure, you said yourself that expending effort is a loss. Hierarchy of value basically do explain all types of interactions, the kind of interaction you described about reciprocity assumes losses without reference to yourself as an individual. Say you buy a gift for a friend. How does that fit into reciprocity? You can talk about losses like time and money with an expectation others will do the same. Except… if you are only after evening out your loss, you are back where you started. Seems pointless. That is, unless the other person is higher on a hierarchy of value than yourself.

 

Hierarchy of value with yourself as the primary is a way to think of what benefits you gain to your life. Why would I want to buy a gift for others? Not to gain their approval, manipulate them to do mybidding, avoid social disapproval, or even to neutralize apparent losses. Rand in particular argued how these methods are bad for achieving values, thus immoral! I buy a gift out of my own interest for building a relation, and improving values important to me. On top of that, it’s not a loss to me any more than buying something for myself. In other words, values are important for how they improve your  life. Reciprocity focuses on a consequence (ohhh, now I’ll get a gift in return!) while hierarchy focuses on agents and entities (cultivating friendship is good for both of us as individuals). Reciprocity isn’t bad, but it is if that’s your primary basis for interactions.

7

There can be no such thing as reciprocating altruism in that every expenditure of self would be offset by a replenishment of self, i.e., there would always be some apparent gain for every actor.  Let’s be clear; altruism is self destruction.  So when you ask, “why take a loss in the first place”,  there are only two possible reasons:

  1. one has the expectation of some gain to follow the loss, making it worth the effort, or
  2. one has no expectation of gain, making it self destructive.

 

There is no way to initiate interaction without expending effort, i.e., reducing ones own resources (taking a loss).  Therefore if being rationally selfish means avoiding loss altogether, it then also implies not interacting at all.  Clearly this is not acceptable to a contractural animal.  As traders of value, one may rationally expect gifting to be reciprocated, i.e., offering a gift with the expectation of receiving something of value in return.  It seems to me that achieving values non-altruistically depends on giving with the expectation of getting, or getting and then reciprocating.  The former seems obvious, and the latter equally so in order to avoid treating others as an end to oneself.

8

The discussion has been well aimed, in that it introduces values which are ‘spiritual’ values as well the usually debated concrete ones - and having rejected any mind-body dichotomy - Objectivists know there is no distinction between those. In a thread on friendship, Devil’s Advocate rightly (I think) pointed out that ‘utility’ (between friends) verged on altruism. The same goes for reciprocity, whether it may be termed “reciprocal egoism” or “reciprocal altruism”.

Here, one is assessing one’s effort in terms of a desired return. Which entails sacrificing one’s judgment to the other person’s judgment. Which, broadly, is basic altruism.

But if you value someone, it is your moral evaluation of his recognizable virtues that counts, primarily. A simple word, a gift, or any action that acknowledges his ‘spiritual’ importance to you- without expectation of return- is rationally selfish.

(The Kelley excerpt touches something- I suppose self-evident, but mostly only implicit in AR’s writing- i.e. that virtue is a value in itself. Thanks for that.)

9

The discussion has been well aimed, in that it introduces values which are ‘spiritual’ values as well the usually debated concrete ones - and having rejected any mind-body dichotomy - Objectivists know there is no distinction between those. In a thread on friendship, Devil’s Advocate rightly (I think) pointed out that ‘utility’ (between friends) verged on altruism. The same goes for reciprocity, whether it may be termed “reciprocal egoism” or “reciprocal altruism”.

Here, one is assessing one’s effort in terms of a desired return. Which entails sacrificing one’s judgment to the other person’s judgment. Which, broadly, is basic altruism.

But if you value someone, it is your moral evaluation of his recognizable virtues that counts, primarily. A simple word, a gift, or any action that acknowledges his ‘spiritual’ importance to you- without expectation of return- is rationally selfish.

(The Kelley excerpt touches something- I suppose self-evident, but mostly only implicit in AR’s writing- i.e. that virtue is a value in itself. Thanks for that.)

 

For clarity, my argument has to do with a heirarchy of value applied to interactions with others, which I propose simply reduces to oneself and others in that order.  Again, there’s only one result for actions that are altruistic; self destruction.  Presuming one isn’t acting altruistically, one is (by default) expecting to get something of value by interacting with others.  When you say, “one is assessing one’s effort in terms of a desired return”, one is simply recognizing that traders of value, trade values.  The notion that, “it’s better to give than receive”, or that one is giving without expectation of return, means that one values operating at a loss, which practiced consistently devalues oneself; that is basic altruism.

 

My argument against utility as applied to friendship is similar here, in that assigning a heirarchy of value to interactions with others actually transforms the kind of spiritual values you refer to into valuing others as an end to oneself according to what they have to offer.

10

As long as one is operating by one’s rational and selfish values, there can be no loss.

To recognize virtue presupposes that one owns or aspires to the same virtues, selfishly. 

It’s enough reward for my act of acknowledgment (in my reckoning) that such fine people exist, without any need of further “trade” back from them. For those nearer to hand, there is all that and much more besides: They are important to me -  hierarchically, certainly, also not causelessly or arbitrarily- and with them I assume continual exchange of values.

11

My argument against utility as applied to friendship is similar here, in that assigning a heirarchy of value to interactions with others actually transforms the kind of spiritual values you refer to into valuing others as an end to oneself according to what they have to offer.

Yes, this is true, but the idea of not using people as ends for yourself misses the point. Hierarchy of value is basically a hierarchy of importance. Egoism presumes yourself to be a beneficiary ultimately, so of course other people should serve that end. Reciprocity is okay, I’m not saying that’s bad, I’m saying a healthy hierarchy takes into account which values are fundamental. Your life is fundamental, your happiness, so that should be the function of values. Fortunately, value is not a zero sum game, so using people to benefit yourself is not the same as doing whatever you want to others. Mutual benefit is what would drive valuing other people, where you are attaining greater value by interacting. There may be a “gross loss” of resources, sure, but trade enables “net gain” - Would you say buying a book for yourself is a loss of money then making up for the loss with the book you receive? Or would you consider the book to be worth more than the money? Take that for people, too. If you buy the book as a present for a good friend rather than yourself, does it change your answer?

12

As long as one is operating by one’s rational and selfish values, there can be no loss.

…

I don’t want to get stuck on this point.  What I’m referring to as a loss is spent effort, which cannot be avoided when choosing to interact with others.  One works to maintain a relationship, and one is rewarded for ones effort by getting something out of that relationship.  Values are being exchanged, which means each party gives something up and gets something in return.  One recognizes the loss when one ceases to get anything in return, and hopefully one stops trying at that point.  I think it’s incorrect to claim there can be no loss, but it may be you consider the return precedes the loss, i.e., “it pleases me to make the effort, so it’s really no effort on my part.”

 

…

It’s enough reward for my act of acknowledgment (in my reckoning) that such fine people exist, without any need of further “trade” back from them. For those nearer to hand, there is all that and much more besides: They are important to me -  hierarchically, certainly, also not causelessly or arbitrarily- and with them I assume continual exchange of values.

Not trying to pic nits here, but one only discovers fine people by interacting with them, i.e., taking the time and effort to relate to them (your loss).  A continual exchange of values means give and take, i.e., the loss of your time and effort (which could have been spent on other selfish pursuits) is compensated by recieving something of value from those you interact with.

13

Eioul and DA:

All true, but not far enough - I think. Something we implicitly learn from young is hierarchy of values and a measure of reciprocity.

“Mom is more important than Teacher in my life. My best friend is x, my second best is z. If I never ‘do’ anything in exchange for my friends, then I can’t expect to keep them long”.

One doesn’t need to be a rational egoist to know this (though as Objectivists it is undoubtedly pre-eminent to make the implicit, consciously explicit). You guys have done that, effectively. But most everyone takes the above as a given.

When both altruists and egoists can claim as their own, “reciprocal altruism” and “reciprocal egoism” - then, reciprocity is not reason enough.

The question is: What makes rational egoism extraordinary? (And that, it is.)

I think all this hinges critically on what altruism (and most importantly, rational egoism) is considered by us to be.

Rand, I believe I recall right, called altruism " simply, self-sacrifice". Sure, the ‘doing’- the allowance of time and trouble, the expenditure, etc.etc. on others all enter that definition. I think that’s only the tip of the iceberg, however.

“Sacrifice of self” is the broader, deeper meaning which runs through all her writing as I view it.

Sacrifice of self: surrender of one’s own consciousness, judgment, morality and objective principles - one’s mind independence, in a nutshell - to the standards of other people.

A consequence is not just existing *for* others -imo- the cause-effect is existing *through* and *by* them, too.

(Through their consciousness; by their sanction.)

Back to rational egoism, and I hope I’m making sense, that if one focuses too tightly on the ‘doing’ -i.e. trade, exchange, reciprocal benefit and so on - one loses sight of the bigger picture pertaining to sacrifice. Man is a complex creature, and his relationships with, and values for, other people are nuanced and varying - to which he is remarkably adaptable as result of his volitional consciousness.

I repeat - *of course* it is important to be aware of value for value. When and if it becomes one-sided it hardly needs stating that one withdraws.

I can see no altruism entering what was an honest error, perhaps one concerning another individual’s character.

But after all, in reality, values come in a large array of forms, and very little can be measured out equally. And measurement should not be over-concerned about anyway.

(Just one quick example from many, is a total stranger doing something incredibly kind for you, never to be seen again. Similarly, the aid you undertake for somebody else in a spot of trouble.) A rational egoist would act according to his own standards and a deep hierarchy of values.

My solitary point of this is to show that what makes rational selfishness extraordinary, is that its practice should be liberating and self-expansive - not: rigid, narrow or (always) utilitarian.

14

Yes, this is true, but the idea of not using people as ends for yourself misses the point. Hierarchy of value is basically a hierarchy of importance. Egoism presumes yourself to be a beneficiary ultimately, so of course other people should serve that end. Reciprocity is okay, I’m not saying that’s bad, I’m saying a healthy hierarchy takes into account which values are fundamental. Your life is fundamental, your happiness, so that should be the function of values. Fortunately, value is not a zero sum game, so using people to benefit yourself is not the same as doing whatever you want to others. Mutual benefit is what would drive valuing other people, where you are attaining greater value by interacting. There may be a “gross loss” of resources, sure, but trade enables “net gain” - Would you say buying a book for yourself is a loss of money then making up for the loss with the book you receive? Or would you consider the book to be worth more than the money? Take that for people, too. If you buy the book as a present for a good friend rather than yourself, does it change your answer?

 

To be rationally selfish, one is necessarily motivated to get the better part of the deal, so yes, the book is always worth more than the money, and companionship is worth more than the effort to form and maintain a relationship.  However in term of relationships one values more or less, would you say that what you are willing to spend on a book (time and effort) is directly proportional to the value of the person you intend to give it to?  Because that is what a heirarchy of value applied to interactions with others implies…

15

…

My solitary point of this is to show that what makes rational selfishness extraordinary, is that its practice should be liberating and self-expansive - not: rigid, narrow or (always) utilitarian.

 

Agreed

16

Yes, this is true, but the idea of not using people as ends for yourself misses the point. Hierarchy of value is basically a hierarchy of importance. Egoism presumes yourself to be a beneficiary ultimately, so of course other people should serve that end. Reciprocity is okay, I’m not saying that’s bad, I’m saying a healthy hierarchy takes into account which values are fundamental. Your life is fundamental, your happiness, so that should be the function of values. Fortunately, value is not a zero sum game, so using people to benefit yourself is not the same as doing whatever you want to others. Mutual benefit is what would drive valuing other people, where you are attaining greater value by interacting. There may be a “gross loss” of resources, sure, but trade enables “net gain” - Would you say buying a book for yourself is a loss of money then making up for the loss with the book you receive? Or would you consider the book to be worth more than the money? Take that for people, too. If you buy the book as a present for a good friend rather than yourself, does it change your answer?

 

“Hierarchy of value is basically a hierarchy of importance.”

Meh…  I think reciprocity of value hits closer to the mark, but I may trying too hard to distinguish the appreciation of value, from the utilization of value…

 

“Mutual benefit is what would drive valuing other people, where you are attaining greater value by interacting.”

Agreed, but this implies the value of interacting, not ranking.

 

I agree with JASKN, but there’s one line in your OP that is too concrete. You say: “If two people ask me to do something that would occur at the same time and one is my mother and one is a friend I will help my mother because I value her more than the friend.”

 

Taken literally, this is an over-generalization. Firstly, it could make sense to say “mom, wait I’ll get to you tomorrow; my friend’s thing has to be done today but yours can wait”. Secondly, even if both events must really clash, you do not have to choose based on who is of greater value to you as a whole. That is just one input into the decision. For instance, if your mom really wants you to visit her every Wednesday because that’s the only one possible, and you want to visit a grand aunt instead just this one week, it doesn’t mean you love your mom less.

 

I’m including your comment, softwareNerd, because it appears to make exceptions for having a hierarchy of value, which led me to question the importance of a hierarchy to begin with.  If a hierarchies of value don’t lead to priorities of interaction, what’s the point of asserting the value of one over another?  In your examples, priorities of interaction appear depend on convenience.

17

I’m including your comment, softwareNerd, because it appears to make exceptions for having a hierarchy of value, which led me to question the importance of a hierarchy to begin with.

I don’t see them as exceptions.

For instance, just because someone’s favorite meal is steak does not mean they will eat steak at every meal, nor does it mean that every time they eat steak they repudiate it as being their favorite dish. It’s a classical problem that economists tried to explain by introducing the concept of diminishing marginal utility.

Does that mean that hierarchy is unimportant? I suppose it depends how one is using this “hierarchy”. If one is thinking of it as “X is the most important person in my life”, or “doing well in this exam is my top priority for the next two months”, etc. – i.e. using it as a broad context-setting theme –  think that’s just fine. However, if one is using it the way the OP was asking about: i.e., should every moment I spend be spent with the highest person on the hierarchy if I have a choice; or, I cannot take one minute out of studying to play  video games,… then that would be debilitating.

18

I suppose what I’m left with is a sense of value as preference rather than priority.  My aversion to all things altruistic prevents me from being comfortable about ranking others according to what I can get from them.  I value (or prefer) their companionship more than their utility.  Apologists for altruisim usually contradict the concept by saying it makes them feel good, as though pleasure were equivalent to value.  Any poison, properly prepared, can taste wonderful.  I am reminded of Ayn Rands statement, “The form in which man experiences the reality of his values is pleasure.” ~ Values, ARL.  Clearly pleasure is a measure of value, but not value per se.  I suspect there’s some similar fudging in the application of value as a hierarchy, where the only real measure is pleasure, indifference or dislike.

19

“…but this implies the value of interacting, not ranking.”

It implies one or both of these two. Valuing people is always about interacting, but ranking or hierarchy is going to help that even more. That’s where my questions came in. We’ve established why other people are valuable, but not the way people should be valued. The value is produced by interacting, yes, but then we have to say how to interact to gain the most value. I’m saying reciprocity as a principle isn’t enough, even if it’s not “total” altruism. It’s not selfish enough.

No one is a total altruist, unless they’re be dead or an ascetic. By and large, a lot of moral psychology research shows that many people use reciprocity to judge what to do. I’m fine with saying reciprocity is important to understand and use. But a hierarchy of values I think is the more fundamental consideration to drive any and all valuing. Perhaps not as explicit for all people, but it’s there. If you want to be selfish, understanding your own value hierarchy with people in it is more important than reciprocity.

" However in term of relationships one values more or less, would you say that what you are willing to spend on a book (time and effort) is directly proportional to the value of the person you intend to give it to?  Because that is what a heirarchy of value applied to interactions with others implies…"

It’s related, but the point of a hierarchy is about all the value you get in total. What you spend is irrelevant, what you get and offer in value is what counts. if time and effort were all I measured with, you’d be right. Think in terms of gains, not losses. I’m not sure why you are talking about a hierarchy where the only real measures are pleasure, indifference, or dislike. I’m talking about happiness as the best measure…

You seem to be talking about a “now” hierarchy, where the immediate beneficiary has to be the highest value. I’m using a long-term hierarchy where I know what’s “most important” but also know that all values are connected in some way. You need a hierarchy to see the flow of value to yourself! By valuing other people through how they reciprocate to make up for losses, it isn’t self-focused. That’s how utilitarianism works, weighing pros/cons, wins/losses. You may see hierarchy as a means of measuring utility in that way, but I don’t understand that as a negative. How can you value companionship without its utility unless you derive no greater value than not interacting at all? I’m talking to you according to what plan/hope I get - in this case, it’s knowledge about ethics.

20

“No one is a total altruist, unless they’re be dead or an ascetic.” ~ Eiuol

 

This much we can agree on.  Altruism is self destruction, so those who claim to be altruistic are either in denial or lack conviction.  I get the reference to altruistic reciprocity, but I consider it to be an oxymoron.  The term altruistic implies no apparent gain for the actor ever, so action motivated by the actor’s expectation of quid pro quo isn’t altruistic by definition.  I can only presume the real meaning is intended as cooperative (not altruistic) or tit for tat (again not altruistic), which combined with reciprocity essentially means cooperating with the expectation of cooperation, which is redundant at best.

 

When I say reciprocity of value, I mean exchanges of value that are mutually beneficial, therefore inherently non-altruistic.  This differs from hierarchy of value in that the term hierarchy means ranking, which implies exchanges of value that are something other than mutually beneficial; it leaves the door open to the kind of disparate exchanges of value motivated by altruism, e.g., giving because it feels good.  When the only “value” being sought is pleasure, emotions become the final arbiter of trade.

–

“What you spend is irrelevant, what you get and offer in value is what counts.” ~ Eiuol

 

What you spend is what you offer in value.  It is the cost to you, that you sanction parting with in order to attain something of value from another.  Remove the other side of the equation, such that you spend the same time, effort, cost, asset, to offer a value to no one, and you will find the relevance of wasted effort in terms of something you value.

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“I’m not sure why you are talking about a hierarchy where the only real measures are pleasure, indifference, or dislike.” ~ Eiuol

 

Because these are the only real measures of interaction in terms of attaining something of value.  Sure you can go on ranking levels of pleasure, dislike and perhaps indifference, but isn’t this just ranking for the sake of ranking??  If one ranks for the purpose of consistently offering (and expecting) more to/from those one adores, than to/from those one abhors, with gradations of effort/expectation to/from those in between, that’s one thing.  But establishing a hierarchy of value to interact inconsistently undermines the supposed purpose.  Emotions are the barometer of interaction past tense, and only useful in terms of do overs; “I’ll try anything once, and twice if I like it”.

–

“You seem to be talking about a ‘now’ hierarchy, where the immediate beneficiary has to be the highest value.” ~ Eiuol

 

I suppose, so long as it’s understood that the immediate beneficiary is always oneself…

 

… and I always benefit from the thoughtful feedback I receive here from you, and others like softwareNerd and whYNOT, et al.  :thumbsup: