Fields. Fields and nonlocality join to destroy the possibility of a particle metaphysics and the fantasy of computability.
It doesn’t matter for the purpose of philosophy what the field is, call it the “little stuff” field. It is not a particle, that is the point. (Catch the pun?)
What is the nature of the “little stuff”?
Edit: (From a dictionary): Field - Physics:
• the region in which a particular condition prevails, esp. one in which a force or influence is effective regardless of the presence or absence of a material medium.
• the force exerted or potentially exerted in such an area : the variation in the strength of the field.
Is it your view that “all the phenomena of life can be accounted for, described by, and deduced from the laws of physics and chemistry.”
(That’s from Robert Efron’s “Biology Without Consciousness”, part two, “The Principle of Reduction,” The Objectivist 1968: “The most important premise of the philosophy of materialism which affects the field of biology is the “principle of reduction,” that is, the premise that all the phenomena of life can be accounted for, described by, and deduced from the laws of physics and chemistry.”)
Is it your view that “all the phenomena of life can be accounted for, described by, and deduced from the laws of physics and chemistry.”
(That’s from Robert Efron’s “Biology Without Consciousness”, part two, “The Principle of Reduction,” The Objectivist 1968: “The most important premise of the philosophy of materialism which affects the field of biology is the “principle of reduction,” that is, the premise that all the phenomena of life can be accounted for, described by, and deduced from the laws of physics and chemistry.”)
No. Read the paper, Trebor. It is an extended refutation of reductive materialism. It helpfully identifies “particle metaphysics” as the enabling premise behind “particle determinism”. I have debated many people who have come to OO.net with questions about determinism and free will, and they all have had what seemed to them a powerful and irrefutable explanantion for the way things work or in other words a metaphysics. Getting them to admit that volition is self evident or to be aware of the logical inconsistencies of their argument only gets them halfway to ridding themselves of determinism. The reason is that pointing out logical inconsistencies and appealing to their own power to perceive are epistemological arguments, when what they need is a refutation of their metaphysical premise.
“Little stuff” was a concept invented by Ayn Rand. It is the posited ultimate constituents of matter, smaller than even subatomic particles - its function was to free thought from the content of physics. “The little stuff” has nothing prior to or fundamental to explain it. Peikoff mentions this in lecture 4 of “The Art of Thinking”. “Little stuff” is what it is, and it is not up to philosophy to say what are its properties. Philosophy cannot even specify an entity ontology.
edit: added:
The same pattern of thought has occurred since ancient Greece:
Democritus atomic theory was deterministic, and Epicurus introduced the swerve to preserve free will.
Cartesian/Newtonian billiard ball mechanics are deterministic, and Kant made the world safe for religion and souls again by claiming the world was unknowable.
Quantum mechanics are given a probabilistic interpretation, and various ‘quantum mystics’ claim free will hides in the low probability wave function solutions.
It is all the same pattern. Epicurus accepted Democritus atomic theory, Kant was an enthusiastic Newtonian, and quantum mystics just love love love quantum wierdnesses. All the crazy attempts to defend free will begin by accepting the determinist metaphysics, that only the basic particulars (of whatever theory) have a genuine existence because they are at the bottom of a metaphysical hierarchy.
Thus, particle metaphysics is an endless source of mischief on both sides of the determinism versus free-will debate.
Objectivism rejects metaphysical hierarchies, it endorses epistemological hierarchies.
Okay, thanks Grames, I’ll read the entire paper.
There are only processes? Processes of what? Actions of what? Steps taken by what?
Membranes vibrating in multi-dimensional spacetime.
Getting them to admit that volition is self evident or to be aware of the logical inconsistencies of their argument only gets them halfway to ridding themselves of determinism. The reason is that pointing out logical inconsistencies and appealing to their own power to perceive are epistemological arguments, when what they need is a refutation of their metaphysical premise.
This is an astute observation. I run into it with every determinist - ultimately, their (and truly, my) understanding is that everything can be split into smaller and smaller billiard balls. At the very base, you should be able to predict the actions of all things based on billiard-ball type interactions.
I have trouble refuting that. I’ve tried to used emergent properties to describe it, to match my observations of free will. Are fields an emergent property of matter? Or are fields just ‘fields’? Any further description would be appreciated.
This is an astute observation. I run into it with every determinist - ultimately, their (and truly, my) understanding is that everything can be split into smaller and smaller billiard balls. At the very base, you should be able to predict the actions of all things based on billiard-ball type interactions.
I have trouble refuting that. I’ve tried to used emergent properties to describe it, to match my observations of free will. Are fields an emergent property of matter? Or are fields just ‘fields’? Any further description would be appreciated.
The physical picture that is emerging, and which is described in the paper linked above, is that matter is the emergent phenomena of the elementary fields.
The physical picture that is emerging, and which is described in the paper linked above, is that matter is the emergent phenomena of the elementary fields.
MIND = BLOWN. I started to read the article but really need to chew it over a few days/weeks/months to come to terms with it. That really would be an incredible way to think about matter.
Consciousness is a relationship, but I think people want a specific pattern which they can point to and call conscious, which I think would lead to universal animism.
Mandatory link; http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.comp.html
Wtf!!! I just found out all this discussion has been happening on one of my favorite topics… Im dissecting this thread but wanted to add something now:
Grames said:
“A philosophical primary is an epistemological designation meaning that it is at the bottom of the knowledge hierarchy, a first level concept known directly and defined ostensively.”
Lets not forget a very important aspect left out here and elsewhere : To be a first level concept it must NOT require conceptualizing any concept that it presupposes. Like action and entity.
Lets not forget a very important aspect left out here and elsewhere : To be a first level concept it must NOT require conceptualizing any concept that it presupposes. Like action and entity.
If a concept can be defined ostensively then it does not logically presuppose another concept. So that is an aspect that was not left out.
Grames, in the past you claimed that actions, smells and sounds were instances of first level concepts and so have others, so it is useful to point out that it is more than the fact that something is perceptual, that is, that it does not logically pressupose another concept. As Ms Rand said explicitly.
Mental “state” is a misleading term and a clumsy concept.
The mind does not have discrete and persistent “states”; it engages in processes.
Consciousness is not an attribute like vertibrae or thumbs; it is an activity.
So mental “states” are like respiratory or circulatory “states”; unintelligible without the previous and subsequent “states” (processes).
And whether mental processes cause neural processes, or vice versa, is an invalid question; mental processes ARE neural processes, from a different perspective.
That’s like asking whether the computations of an active video game cause the images on your TV or are caused by your controller: the options aren’t exclusive and no matter which you choose, you’ll be wrong.
And “field” is epistemologically an existent (extended-sense entity) of some distinguishing trait(s), just like true entities, but without clearly discernable boundary.
Perceptual “fieldish” existents would be wind, sunlight/shadow, smoke, et cetera; distinctive attributes and causal effaciacy without solidity.
So far as such existents are objectively causal agents (much like tornadoes in trailer parks) there is no metaphysical basis for excluding them from being the “little stuff”. It poses epistemological challenges but none I can think of which could invalidate it.
The only issue I haven’t seen Grames address on it (haven’t yet read all the links) is that all lower level concepts of fields are primarily known via their effects on true entities (gravity OF an object, the force of wind ON an object, etc) while a field-based “little stuff” would have to radically redefine our intuitive concept of “entity” through nonlocality in order to give these little fields self-sufficient ontology (magnetism with no solid magnet, but diffused).
This issue, however, is purely one of definitions and could be reconciled with minimal effort. I mention it only because I cannot think of any others.
Particles, Fields and The Future of Physics - A Lecture by Sean Carroll (1:37 approx 1 hour lecture plus q&a session)
Puts the spotlight on quantum field theory.
The question is explicitly asked in the Q&A of whether or not a field exists even in the absence of its associated particle and the answer is a blunt “yes”.
I do not dispute that there are lots of scientist who believe that the existence of fields and the ontology of fields is uncontroversial. However I know the facts surrounding the debate. I know that most scientist are CLUELESS to these ontological debates particulars. A “blunt” proclamation is not an inductive validation of the concept field! Proclaiming the smartest so and so of philosophy or physics says so, is no substitute for first hand inductive validation and application of epistemology. (To special science claims or general)
In the screen shot at the beginning of that video it makes a proclamation about wavefunction realism.
If this were a settled matter, the book The Wavefuntion wouldn’t be filled with essays on this debate!
Oh, and on the location of consciousness:
A frontal lobotomy could be shown to destroy at least most of the patient’s conscious functions. That seems to fairly conclusively show that something in the frontal lobe must be intact for self awareness to continue. . .
Incidentally I find the practice of lobotomy monstrous and more evil than any human being could ever deserve.
Its historical effects, however, can be particularly illuminative.
Grames:
Assuming premises:
A. Each of mind, consciousness, human being at any one moment in time is (or is embodied in) a natural system/entity and has a specific identity;
B. At that same moment in time a context (surrounding reality) interacting with A has a specific identity.
I am interested in your thoughts regarding the O’ist law of causation being
universal (at all scales and applying to any and all natural systems/entities)
undeniably single valued and
a corollary of the law of identity.
and how this applies to free will of a natural entity/system being the mind/consciousness/human being.