What is Subjectivity?

The sense organs are an automatic conduit between consciousness and existence. Due to the nature of the sense organs, they are, by their nature, necessarily limited to providing the data received with respect to(subject to) the location and orientation of both the sense organ and perceived existent.

But we are not disembodied sense organs and consciousnesses perceiving existents, we are whole organisms of integrated mind and body, we are perceiving and knowing subjects. This is no minor matter, and it is the topic of the concluding remarks of David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses.

Epistemology with a Knowing Subject

Twentieth century epistemology has been studied abstractly in terms of theories of knowledge, inference structures, logical relations among concepts, and logical justification of knowledge. This has all only worked to the extent it has because propositions and concepts can be studied in abstraction apart from any particular subject possessing those abstractions. This approach does not work at all for perception where the cognitive content possessed by the subject cannot be abstracted apart from the language used to express it.

Acknowledging the subject permits regarding perception as cognitive and makes possible the three principles of justified perceptual judgment. Without a full theory of concepts we cannot specify the way in which concepts must be held in order for predication to be justified by perception but we do know the principle involved would not be another belief but a skill. Justification depends in part upon the exercise of an intellectual virtue, objectivity. Skills and virtues alike with the contents of nonpropositional awareness cannot be abstracted away from the subject and captured in a logic of propositions.

Skills and virtues are not found in sense organs or existents or consciousnesses but in subjects in relation to objects. Subjects are real and the subject-relative (subjective) nature of sensing, perceiving and knowing cannot be finessed away. Subjectivity must be acknowledged before objectivity can be achieved. “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.”

Subjective, which gives rise to subjectivism,..

The primacy of consciousness premise gives rise to subjectivism. Everyone grapples with subjectivity, not everyone is a subjectivist living by the philosophy of subjectivism.

  1. What is subjectivity.

  2. Is there anything that is subjective?

Subjectivity and objectivity deal with consciousness and its relationship to existence, so perhaps an explanation by comparison will help.

Objectivity would be a consciousness focusing on external objects outside of itself in reality. Objectivity is recognition by consciousness that the facts of reality exist independent of consciousness.

Subjectivity would be a consciousness focusing on its own contents. Consequently, reality becomes dependent on consciousness; and is then necessarily dictated by the feelings or whims of the being or group whose consciousness is the center of focus. Truth is then no longer a matter of observation of the facts of reality, but rather a focus on the contents of a particular consciousness, or a poll of the total conscience of a group.

It should be obvious which is better for the survival of human beings. To the subjectivist, truth (the facts of reality upon which survival depends) is relative to consciousness. To the objectivist, the facts of reality are what they are, independent of consciousness, and they must be recognized and adhered to if survival is to be secured.

But we are not disembodied sense organs and consciousnesses perceiving existents, we are whole organisms of integrated mind and body, we are perceiving and knowing subjects. This is no minor matter, and it is the topic of the concluding remarks of David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses.

Skills and virtues are not found in sense organs or existents or consciousnesses but in subjects in relation to objects. Subjects are real and the subject-relative (subjective) nature of sensing, perceiving and knowing cannot be finessed away. Subjectivity must be acknowledged before objectivity can be achieved. “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.”

The primacy of consciousness premise gives rise to subjectivism. Everyone grapples with subjectivity, not everyone is a subjectivist living by the philosophy of subjectivism.

I consider the use of Bacon’s quote in this context to be extremely apt.

“Subjectivity must be acknowledged before objectivity can be achieved”, is excellent.

Actually, I woudn’t stop at ‘acknowledged,’ but would go further, to encompass ‘respected’ - which is exactly what we grant Nature, too. Respecting, to command.

Is - ought.

I think there is a perception, particularly among new O’ists, that Objectivism and subjectivity are mutually exclusive … to the detriment of understanding both.

What about “Individual subjectivity, to be objectively commanded, must be identified.”?

Great input from all participants here. :slight_smile:

At the risk of muddying rather than clarifying the waters on this topic, I ask you to consider a concrete example of objective versus subjective in the realm of audio equipment reviews. If anyone here is familiar with the so-called “high-end audio” world, you’ll understand immediately what I’m talking about.

Essentially, there are two camps. The first, the objective reviewers, measure the performance of audio gear with sophisticated test equipment and review the equipment based on those objective (the measuring equipment is not prejudiced) measurements. Of course, these reviewers typically confirm the results with listening tests.

The second camp, the subjectivist reviewers, review audio gear based on listening tests only. All pepper their “reviews” with vague terms that are in fact floating abstractions. According to the subjectivists, there are objectively unmeasurable differences in the performance of audio gear that their subjective sense of hearing unambiguously finds. Not surprisingly, these “golden eared” reviewers always loose this acute ability whenever (which is not often) they participate in rigorous double-blind listening tests, i.e., when possible sources of prejudice are removed.

As an aside, the ludicrous claims of the high-end audiophiles and the amounts of money they gleefully spend on snake-oil products are well documented and make for some entertaining reading.

You appear to be claiming that the only objectivity possible is actually intersubjectivity, two people agreeing about their subjective experiences. That is pure Kantianism.

Where Kant said that? Incidentally this is not my claim. You shouldn’t confuse the concept of subjective emotion, say “fear” with the feeling itself. While one can discuss such a concept in objective terms, one cannot make another person to experience his own given personal feeling. Hence all feelings, unlike percepts, are subjective. One cannot jump outside of his mind and to point out on his own pain.

Where Kant said that? Incidentally this is not my claim. You shouldn’t confuse the concept of subjective emotion, say “fear” with the feeling itself. While one can discuss such a concept in objective terms, one cannot make another person to experience his own given personal feeling. Hence all feelings, unlike percepts, are subjective. One cannot jump outside of his mind and to point out on his own pain.

Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” redefines what objectivity is. According to Kant the only world we can know about, the phenomenal world, is constructed by consciousness constrained by the innate categories. Consciousness constructing the world it knows is the primacy of consciousness premise, this is subjectivism. When we can communicate our personal experience with others then that is a proof that there must be an underlying category common between people, and that phenomenal knowledge is validated.

Marxist dialectical history works on an equivalent premise but the categories are no longer innate but socially determined and change over time with social evolution. That is an explicitly social version of subjectivism.

Anyway, the point is one cannot jump out of one’s own mind to share a percept either, which leads to the conclusion that feelings are not unlike percepts and percepts are also subjective. The difference between percepts and emotions lies in what causes them, but the experience of them, the memories of other instances, the noting of similarities and differences, conceptualizing them and naming them is the same process for both. With a proper method a subject-relative experience can identified consistently, conceptualized and made objective.

But we are not disembodied sense organs and consciousnesses perceiving existents, we are whole organisms of integrated mind and body, we are perceiving and knowing subjects. This is no minor matter, and it is the topic of the concluding remarks of David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses.

That was more an attempt to describe how they operate than to suggest disembodiment.

Skills and virtues are not found in sense organs or existents or consciousnesses but in subjects in relation to objects. Subjects are real and the subject-relative (subjective) nature of sensing, perceiving and knowing cannot be finessed away. Subjectivity must be acknowledged before objectivity can be achieved. “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.”

David Kelly’s book looks as if it would be another valuable asset to a library.

In ITOE, Miss. Rand does not utilize the concept subjective very often. In fact, these are four of the seven times it appears in the main body of the work.

This does not mean that conceptualization is a subjective process or that the content of concepts depends on an individual’s subjective (i.e., arbitrary) choice.

(This amounts, in effect, to the declaration: “Since the intrinsic has failed us, the subjective is our only alternative.”)

From primordial mysticism to this, its climax, the attack on man’s consciousness and particularly on his conceptual faculty has rested on the unchallenged premise that any knowledge acquired by a process of consciousness is necessarily subjective and cannot correspond to the facts of reality, since it is “processed knowledge.”

These do not really touch upon metaphysical as much as the epistemological.

Yet, in the Appendix:

Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not arbitrary or subjective.

Is this the perceptions of sensations?

The primacy of consciousness premise gives rise to subjectivism. Everyone grapples with subjectivity, not everyone is a subjectivist living by the philosophy of subjectivism.

The root of the word Subjectivism is Subjective. Yes, the primacy of consciousness, and arguably, emotionalism, are the building blocks of subjectivism.

The point that everyone is not a subjectivist shines a light on the awareness to sometimes be oversensitive to it at times.

This seems also to be the arena to develop a broader grasp of the terminology and its usage.

Is this the perceptions of sensations?

Here (and throughout ITOE) Rand uses ‘processing’ to refer to what consciousness does in order to grasp something, consciousness has identity and so has a specific means for sensing , perceiving, and conceiving. The first appearance of ‘processing’ is in section 8 of the main text right after her famous description of Kant as claiming we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, etc.

All knowledge is processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual level. An “unprocessed” knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition. Consciousness (as I said in the first sentence of this work) is not a passive state, but an active process. And more: the satisfaction of every need of a living organism requires an act of processing by that organism, be it the need of air, of food or of knowledge.

The value of the technical philosophical work “The Evidence of the Senses” is that it goes further into this idea of processing and why it was thought to be a problem. The sensationalism theory of perception holds that perception is really an inference, a computation, or in other words an ordinary conclusion. This requires possession of concepts before you can have percepts in order to calculate or reason, which entails innate knowledge and the primacy of consciousness and so this is the same consistent sense of subjective that Rand always uses, not a counterexample to what I’ve been doing.

(To complete the thought, what goes on between the eye and the percept is processing but it is not consciousness creating its own contents, determining what it will see before it sees it by means of innate knowledge or a priori categories. Processing in perception is not subjective in the sense of subjectivism.)

The root of the word Subjectivism is Subjective. Yes, the primacy of consciousness, and arguably, emotionalism, are the building blocks of subjectivism.

The point that everyone is not a subjectivist shines a light on the awareness to sometimes be oversensitive to it at times.

This seems also to be the arena to develop a broader grasp of the terminology and its usage.

I know it is confusing to have two senses of the word ‘subjective’, one broad and pointing to a fact and the other a (false) normative theory. I’ve gone around on this before with others and the impulse has been to try to resolve the confusion by using different words since different concepts seem to be involved. Dr. Peikoff’s third lecture in his series on “Unity in Ethics and Epistemology” covers that fact that some concepts require two definitions. For example he covers ‘value’ which is both “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” and also “that which one acts to gain and/or keep and which objectively furthers one’s life”. I hope to sort out some confusion when I publish my notes on that lecture. It has certainly helped clear up my own.

There are a few terms in Objectivism that either have sensitive contextual delimitation, or a use that is not in alignment with the conventional mis-use of the term in the public arena. ‘Subjective’ has usually been easier to find synonyms for rather than embrace the way it has manifested itself here. Once again, concepts, as well as knowledge, are both hierarchial as well as contextual in developing their integrations.

“Anyway, the point is one cannot jump out of one’s own mind to share a percept either, which leads to the conclusion that feelings are not unlike percepts and percepts are also subjective.”

No. That would be an example of treatment of data, obtained by extraspection, percepts, as introspectual data, feelings. While percepts pertain to objective reality, feelings pertain to the subjective realm of human mind. The confusion between these two realms is the source of subjectivism . This is exactly the fallacy of Kant and Marx. Ayn Rand in “Romantic Manifesto” describes how perception of the same object causes different emotions in different people. If feeling were objective, then the same percept would cause the same emotion in every human being. Evidently this is not a case.

If feeling were objective,

You have read but not yet understood.

Feelings are not epistemologically objective, but one can as objectively distinguish between grief and regret as between blue and cyan.

Colors are not epistemologically subjective, but a color-blind man and a normal man will perceive the same colored entities in different forms.

Vision Simulator: How Things Look to People with Colorblindness or Cataracts

1 Like

You have read but not yet understood.

“Feelings are not epistemologically objective, but one can as objectively distinguish between grief and regret as between blue and cyan.”

First, often this is not that easy. Second, your analogy is not valid. Colors pertain to the objects of objective reality. Colors transmitted by means of objective medium-light waves, and received by sensory organs which are objective organs of perception. Feelings pertain to subjective realm of mind and observed by subjective means of introspection. Colors are metaphysically objective and feelings are metaphysically subjective. You are counting apples with nails. If you have a difficulty to see the difference between these two existents, watch the movie “Inception".

This is the point made earlier.

If you look at the vision simulator, the object viewed is subject to the metaphysical make-up of the sense organ. An individual who sees the world in monochrome does not invalidate the objectivity available to his conclusion, but it does make the discrimination of colors unavailable to his consciousness. Just as the emotional responses cannot be shared experiencially to others, the observation of the object cannot be shared experiencially to others either. While the vision simulator allows to to get a sense of how the world appears in monochrome, - if you were color blind, could it give you the sense of ‘normal color’ sight?

This is the point made earlier.

If you look at the vision simulator, the object viewed is subject to the metaphysical make-up of the sense organ. An individual who sees the world in monochrome does not invalidate the objectivity available to his conclusion, but it does make the discrimination of colors unavailable to his consciousness. Just as the emotional responses cannot be shared experiencially to others, the observation of the object cannot be shared experiencially to others either. While the vision simulator allows to to get a sense of how the world appears in monochrome, - if you were color blind, could it give you the sense of ‘normal color’ sight?

If you really want a sci-fi conjecture: The pattern of nerve firing that is produced in the retinal nerve by a normal person’s excitation of cones could be artificially simulated. It would then be propagated centrally, presumably following the same course that natural, cone-produced retinal responses follow.

Mindy

Mindy

At that point, would it remain subjective, or acquire objective underpinnings?

At that point, would it remain subjective, or acquire objective underpinnings?

My summary of how Kelley handles this case is:

V. Brain in a Vat, Virtual Reality, The Matrix™©, Avatar™©

{ None of these sexed up terms were in existence when the book was written. Kelley merely refers to “the device” and the argument is named “The Causal Argument” It is all the same, for all these arguments trace back to Descartes’ evil demon originally. }

The Causal Argument:

Consider perception as a one way causal sequence of: object > receptors > cortex > percept.

The same perceptual experience will result so long as the last intraneural stages occur.

Postulate a device that can create the same proximate neural stimulus as an object, or a world of objects.

  1. It cannot be argued that the resulting percept is radically nonperceptual—this is not a hallucination.

  2. The things perceived within the device are not real, they are only simulated.

  3. Therefore no percept can be trusted as real, all perception is an inner theater.

Refutations:

*Minor refinement — Perception is not one way, it also depends on moving, orienting, focusing, eye saccades , etc. The device must also be connected to motor neurons to simulate interaction so that the subject can explore the simulated world.

True, the subject’s experiences would not be similar to what is perceived, the device and its stimuli. But representationalism is still false, percepts are never regarded as objects compared to external objects in terms of similarity and dissimilarity. Even in the normal case percepts are not similar to objects.

Perception is awareness of external objects, but realism makes no assumptions about how that works. If the simulation is as complete as postulated, there would be perception of the simulated world but it would be a perceptually relative form of perceiving the deeper reality of the memory states of the device. It does not follow that the subject’s experience would be internal and unreal. What is perceived depends in part on what is there to be perceived and its interaction with our senses.

The above assumes the device stays on for a long enough time to permit exploration. If the device were rapidly switched off and on it would be difficult to predict if the subject would perceive anything at all or only a stream of sensations. The sensory systems have a finite capability to process stimuli, evolved to suit the typical ranges of a past environment.

First, often this is not that easy. Second, your analogy is not valid. Colors pertain to the objects of objective reality. Colors transmitted by means of objective medium-light waves, and received by sensory organs which are objective organs of perception. Feelings pertain to subjective realm of mind and observed by subjective means of introspection. Colors are metaphysically objective and feelings are metaphysically subjective. You are counting apples with nails. If you have a difficulty to see the difference between these two existents, watch the movie “Inception".

Emotions are not metaphysically subjective for the reason that they are not purely mental phenomena but have corresponding bodily states. The case can be stated more strongly: Emotions are distinguished from other mental phenomena and from each other entirely on the basis of the bodily states they evoke. Bodily states are objective. Heart rate, perspiration, breathing, muscular tension, sexual arousal, all of these things are every bit as materialistic and objective as a brick wall and can be identified with objective certainty.

“Emotions are not metaphysically subjective for the reason that they are not purely mental phenomena but have corresponding bodily states”

Emotions are primarily automatic value-judgments which depend on implicit values previously internalized by sub consciousness. They are pure subjective phenomena which may not relate to any existent of reality, like love of god for example. Feelings, like pain do pertain to bodily states. However they are not result of objective process of perception, but introspection. Sometimes they do correspond to the physical processes in the body, but some times not, like in case of phantom and psychosomatic pain. In any case the awareness of feeling itself occurs in mind. Dreams don’t correspond to any events of reality. There are many other purely subjective mental phenomena, like false memories, emotions invoked by music, etc…The fundamental difference between subjective and objective experience is that in case of objective experience the source of it is objective reality; in case of subjective experience the source is the subject himself

At that point, would it remain subjective, or acquire objective underpinnings?

It is akin to watching TV. We have many devices that extend or enhance our senses, microscopes and telescopes, infra-red binoculars, etc. This would fall right in the same category as the experience derived from these devices, I would say.

Mindy

“Emotions are not metaphysically subjective for the reason that they are not purely mental phenomena but have corresponding bodily states”

Emotions are primarily automatic value-judgments which depend on implicit values previously internalized by sub consciousness. They are pure subjective phenomena which may not relate to any existent of reality, like love of god for example. Feelings, like pain do pertain to bodily states. However they are not result of objective process of perception, but introspection. Sometimes they do correspond to the physical processes in the body, but some times not, like in case of phantom and psychosomatic pain. In any case the awareness of feeling itself occurs in mind. Dreams don’t correspond to any events of reality. There are many other purely subjective mental phenomena, like false memories, emotions invoked by music, etc…The fundamental difference between subjective and objective experience is that in case of objective experience the source of it is objective reality; in case of subjective experience the source is the subject himself

You’re not describing metaphysical subjectivity at all. You’re talking about different things.